Agustín G. Bonifacio

Agustín G. Bonifacio
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Agustín verified their affiliation via an institutional email.
National University of San Luis · Department of Mathematics

PhD in Mathematics

About

34
Publications
1,865
Reads
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49
Citations
Introduction
Agustín G. Bonifacio currently works at the Department of Mathematics, Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina. His work focuses on matching theory, social choice theory, and mechanism design.
Additional affiliations
May 2015 - present
National University of San Luis
Position
  • Professor (Assistant)
Education
April 2008 - December 2014
National University of San Luis
Field of study
  • Mathematics
March 2003 - March 2008
National University of Río Cuarto
Field of study
  • Mathematics
March 2000 - April 2007
National University of Río Cuarto
Field of study
  • Economics

Publications

Publications (34)
Article
Full-text available
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM is sufficient to describe their strategic behavior. We characterize a large family of own-peak-only rules tha...
Preprint
Full-text available
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability. JEL classification: D51, D63, D70.
Preprint
Full-text available
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where public schools have priorities over teachers and teachers hold substitutable preferences over subsets of schools....
Preprint
Full-text available
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in two-sided matching markets where only substitutability on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we use Tarski operators defined on the lattices of worker-quasi-stable and firm-quasi-stable matchings. These operators resemble lay-off and vacancy chain dynamics, respectivel...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it? We present an algorithm that models this situation as a re-stabilization process involving a vacancy chain. Each step of the algorithm is a link of such a chain. We show...
Article
Full-text available
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of iterative reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowmen...
Preprint
Full-text available
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM is sufficient to describe their strategic behavior. We characterize a large family of own-peak-only rules tha...
Article
Full-text available
In a many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong core coincides with the strongly stable set, and (iii) the super core coincides with the super stable...
Preprint
Full-text available
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
Article
Full-text available
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with responsive preferences. Envy-freeness is a weakening of stability that allows blocking contracts in...
Preprint
Full-text available
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of monotonic reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowmen...
Preprint
Full-text available
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not hav...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth -telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among tops-only rules. Then, we focus on three important families of (non-tops-only) voting methods: maxmin, scoring , a...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with responsive preferences. Envy-freeness is a weakening of stability that allows blocking contracts in...
Article
Full-text available
In a many-to-one matching model, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings when firms' choice functions satisfy substitutability. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice...
Preprint
Full-text available
In a many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong core coincides with the strongly stable set, and (iii) the super core coincides with the super stable...
Article
Full-text available
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of “cycles in preferences” and generalizes the algorithm presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the one-to-one model.
Preprint
Full-text available
We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non loca...
Preprint
Full-text available
It is known that a coalition formation game may not have a stable coalition structure. In this study we propose a new solution concept for these games, which we call “stable decomposition”, and show that each game has at least one. This solution consists of a collection of coalitions organized in sets that “protect” each other in a stable way. When...
Preprint
Full-text available
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in preferences" and generalizes the algorithm presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the one-to-one model. JEL...
Article
Full-text available
As was pointed out to us by Huaxia Zeng, Theorem 1 in Bonifacio and Massó (2020), is not correct. In this note we recall former Theorem 1, exhibit a counterexample of its statement, identify the mistake in its faulty proof, and state and prove the new version of Theorem 1. At the end we give an alternative proof of Lemma 9, whose former proof used...
Preprint
Full-text available
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study the problem of convergence to stability in coalition formation games in which the strategies of each agent are coalitions in which she can participate and outcomes are coalition structures. Given a natural blocking dynamic, an absorbing set is a minimum set of coalition structures that once reached is never abandoned. The coexistence of si...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study the problem of convergence to stability in coalition formation games in which the strategies of each agent are coalitions in which she can participate and outcomes are coalition structures. Given a natural blocking dynamic, an absorbing set is a minimum set of coalition structures that once reached is never abandoned. The coexistence of si...
Article
Full-text available
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that dom...
Preprint
Full-text available
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules o...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. Using the property of replacement monotonicity, we: (i) establish sufficient conditions for a rule to be Pareto dominant strategy-proof; (ii) present a multidimensional version of the seque...
Article
Full-text available
We study reallocation rules in the context of a one-good economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (preferences or endowments) in order that each agent is better off after an appropriate...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
En este trabajo estudiamos la existencia de equilibrio en economías de intercambio con preferencias single-peaked, a través del "equilibrio walrasiano con slack" (Mas-Colell, 1992). Resolvemos explícitamente el equilibrio en término de los datos del modelo (dotaciones iniciales y “peaks”) y caracterizamos el mismo como la única solución que satisfa...
Article
Full-text available
In this paper we prove existence theorems of best proximity pairs in uniformly convex spaces, using a fixed point theorem for Kakutani factorizable multi-functions.

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