Adriana Renero

Adriana Renero
  • PhD in Philosophy
  • Research Fellow at Saul Kripke Center at The Graduate Center, CUNY

About

12
Publications
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32
Citations
Introduction
I am currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Philosophy Department, as well as an Affiliated Research Scholar in the Philosophy of Mind at the Saul Kripke Center in the City University of New York (CUNY), Graduate Center. I am a former Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness. I earned my Ph.D. in Philosophy from the CUNY, Graduate Center, Philosophy Program. www.adrianarenero.com
Current institution
The Graduate Center, CUNY
Current position
  • Research Fellow at Saul Kripke Center

Publications

Publications (12)
Article
Full-text available
The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory me...
Article
Full-text available
In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneity and indissolubility' if not an 'identity' of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle's philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to e...
Article
Full-text available
Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically exa...
Article
In his unpublished 1979 Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, Saul Kripke offers a knowledge argument against materialism focusing on deaf people who lack knowledge of auditory experience. Kripke's argument is a precursor of Frank Jackson's better‐known knowledge argument against materialism (1982). The paper sets out Kripke's argument, brings out it...
Article
In 'What Forms Could Introspective Systems Take? A Research Programme', Kammerer and Frankish aim to map the space of 'possible forms of introspection' while lending themselves to questions about how different kinds of minds represent themselves. This paper aligns with their research programme in embracing other possible forms of introspection; it...
Article
Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a R...
Chapter
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We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plato’s theory about it as expounded in the Theaetetus. Considering Socrates’ remarks in the Theaetetus brings us to some concerns raised by Turing and to Wittgenstein’s famous comment explanations come to an end somewhere. We present two simple technical r...
Article
The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory me...
Article
Full-text available
Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson’s claim that being conscious of broadspan musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show that these two...
Article
Full-text available
Existe una tendencia a estudiar los puntos de encuentro o desencuentro entre Kant y Hegel pero se olvida la reflexión de Schelling, crucial para comprender el diálogo entre estos sistemas de pensamiento. Un caso en que se patentiza este olvido se advierte en Sublime Understanding, Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel (2005) de Kirk Pillow, quien...

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