Adriana ReneroPrinceton University | PU · Philosophy Department
Adriana Renero
PhD in Philosophy
About
8
Publications
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13
Citations
Introduction
I am currently a Lecturer in the Philosophy of Mind at Princeton University as well as a Visiting Research Scholar in the Philosophy of Mind at the Saul Kripke Center, City University of New York (CUNY). I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness (from 2017 to 2021). I earned my PhD in Philosophy from the Philosophy Department, The Graduate Center, CUNY. https://www.adrianarenero.com/
Publications
Publications (8)
The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory me...
In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi's controversial thesis that there is a 'simultaneity and indissolubility' if not an 'identity' of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle's philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to e...
Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically exa...
We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plato’s theory about it as expounded in the Theaetetus. Considering Socrates’ remarks in the Theaetetus brings us to some concerns raised by Turing and to Wittgenstein’s famous comment explanations come to an end somewhere. We present two simple technical r...
Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson’s claim that being conscious of broadspan musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show
that these two...
Existe una tendencia a estudiar los puntos de encuentro o desencuentro entre Kant y Hegel pero se olvida la reflexión de Schelling, crucial para comprender el diálogo entre estos sistemas de pensamiento. Un caso en que se patentiza este olvido se advierte en Sublime Understanding, Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel (2005) de Kirk Pillow, quien...
Projects
Project (1)
In his unpublished 1979 lectures on the philosophy of mind, Kripke offers another argument against the physicalist thesis that “one who knows all the physical truths—or all the physical facts—knows everything.” This argument appeals to the auditory domain. In this work, I discuss several cases of deaf people, which Kripke provides, and adapt these into one single case: the deaf person case. Then I claim that this is a precursor of Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument against physicalism” i.e. the often-quoted “Mary case” (1982). In doing so, I compare and contrast Kripke and Jackson’s cases, and argue that the deaf person case constitutes a more persuasive argument against physicalism. I also show that Kripke offers an account of descriptions of the phenomenal character of auditory experiences and pinpoints important aspects of phenomenal character that Jackson does not address.
