

Social Activism in and Around Organizations

FORREST BRISCOE*

Penn State University

ABHINAV GUPTA

University of Washington

Abstract

Organizations are frequent targets for social activists aiming to influence society by first altering organizational policies and practices. Reflecting a steady rise in research on this topic, we review recent literature and advance an insider-outsider framework to help explicate the diverse mechanisms and pathways involved. Our framework distinguishes between different types of activists based on their relationship with targeted organizations. For example, “insider” activists who are employees of the target organization have certain advantages and disadvantages when compared with “outsider” activists who are members of independent social movement organizations. We also distinguish between the direct and indirect (or spillover) effects of social activism. Much research has focused on the direct effects of activism on targeted organizations, but often the effects on non-targeted organizations

*Corresponding author. Email: fbriscoe@psu.edu

2 • The Academy of Management Annals

matter more for activists goals of achieving widespread change. Drawing on this framework, we identify and discuss eight specific areas that are in need of further scholarly attention.

Management scholars are increasingly interested in how social activists influence organizations to make changes related to social issues. In this process, activists typically target companies or other marketplace organizations whose practices encroach upon the interests of stakeholders and the larger society, deploying various tactics to gain attention and influence organizational decision-makers and the wider public. Naturally, activists often seek to have an influence beyond those organizations that they directly target, such that the changes they seek become taken-for-granted across a wider field or society. Although such sweeping change is rare, the widespread adoption of environmental conservation practices, supplier conduct codes, LGBT employee policies, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives by businesses have all come about in part because activists pressured companies to change (Bartley, 2003; Hoffman, 2001; Raeburn, 2004; Soule, 2009). Organization-directed activism has also driven the adoption of changes in higher education, including collegiate recycling programs, ethnic studies departments, and supply chain monitoring (Briscoe, Gupta, & Anner, 2015; Lounsbury, 2001; Rojas, 2006). Interestingly, the impacts of activism also extend beyond activists' intended goals; for example, organizations observing activism from a distance may learn to avoid markets where it is occurring (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010), or they may decide to act in a more opaque manner to avoid activist attention (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012).

In the decade or so since initial calls for integrating organizational theory and social movement studies in order to investigate this phenomenon (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005), there has been a steady growth in high quality scholarship on the topic, published in management journals as well as disciplinary social science journals. Given the multi-faceted nature of activism in and around organizations, scholars have approached the phenomenon from diverse theoretical, empirical, and epistemological lenses. Much research has built on the sociological tradition, which has expanded from a focus on the state to studying protest in organizational fields involving corporations, universities, hospitals, and other types of market actors (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000; Soule, 1997; Van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004). At roughly the same time, a branch of non-market strategy research has expanded to study activist effects on companies as a form of "private politics" (in contrast to "public politics" aimed at the state) (Baron, 2001, 2003; Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Lenox & Eesley, 2009), and management stakeholder theorists have expanded work on activists as a type of "secondary" stakeholder to the firm (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Frooman, 1999; Rowley &

Moldoveanu, 2003). There is now a growing interest in the potential to bring these streams of research together, in order to see how theory and findings can be integrated around the common phenomenon of social activism in and around organizations (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 2013; King & Pearce, 2010; Leitzinger & King, 2015; Parmar et al., 2010; Soule, 2012).

To review and synthesize this literature, in this chapter we focus on two organizing themes which we think have the potential to reconcile and integrate past work, and to generate new insights in future work. The first theme is different types of activists, defined in terms of their relationship to their targets. This focus can help to understand the diverse mechanisms and pathways through which activists influence their organizational targets. In the literature to date, scholars have explained the influence capacity of activist efforts through a number of different mechanisms and structural factors. These include activists' own agentic framing and tactical efforts (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Rojas, 2006), the structural and cultural vulnerabilities of targeted organizations and their leaders (e.g. Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; King, 2008a), and the presence or absence of free spaces (i.e. meeting places that are insulated from the control of powerful elites, enabling participants to interact more freely) for mobilizing activists in relation to targeted organizations (e.g. Kellogg, 2009; Rao & Dutta, 2012). Surprisingly, existing research has accorded only limited attention to the idea that activists vary in their capacity to harness these influence mechanisms. It seems likely that access to these mechanisms and their efficacy will differ by activist type. For example, Greenpeace's militant sabotage tactics are unlikely to be available to activists who are employees of the organization they seek to change. Conversely, Greenpeace may find it hard to create and deliver a presentation to a company's senior leadership that is tailored to appeal to them—but activists who are a company's employees are well positioned to do that.

In light of those differences, we see an opportunity to integrate and reorient this literature according to the relationships between social activists and the organizations they are targeting. In particular, we envision a spectrum of social activist types ranging from non-members or "outsiders" at one end (such as independent social movement organizations (SMOs)) to full members or "insiders" at the other end (such as employee groups), with partial members (such as shareholders and students) falling somewhere in-between. The insider–outsider qualities of activists will affect their resource interdependence with, and knowledge of, their target organizations. As we will describe, these differences are likely to influence many relevant behaviors and outcomes of activism.

Our second theme involves focusing attention on the full range of direct and indirect effects of activism. Important insights have emerged in this literature about the ways that activists influence change beyond the organizations they

directly target. We see fertile ground for scholars to continue unpacking the “indirect” or “spillover” effects of social activism in organizational fields and markets. These effects can be important for shaping change in existing organizational fields, as well as for enabling the emergence of new organizational fields. Given that research on indirect effects of activism is relatively sparse and underdeveloped, we think this presents many opportunities for future research.

Below, we begin our chapter by defining social activism and related constructs, and sketching the scope for our review. In reviewing the literature, we highlight the challenges and advantages for different types of activists. Next we review work on the different types of indirect effects that result from activist actions, again attending to how these indirect effects vary for different types of activists. Taking stock of the literature as a whole, we then identify avenues of future research, based on gaps that need filling, promising links to other research domains, important trends in society, and methodological opportunities and challenges.

Definitions and Scope

For this review, we have largely adopted the concepts and terms used by social movement researchers. Hence, we define *social activism* as instances in which individuals or groups of individuals who lack full access to institutionalized channels of influence engage in collective action to remedy a perceived social problem, or to promote or counter changes to the existing social order (King & Soule, 2007; Tilly, 1978). Table 1 provides a list of other core concepts, along with illustrative examples.

This definition of social activism leads us to delineate the scope of our review in a few ways. First, we focus on activism directed toward a *social* issue or goal. While this encompasses a wide range of empirical cases in which activists direct their efforts at resolving issues or problems in society, it excludes studies of activist-like behaviors intended only to capture financial benefits. One example of the latter is shareholder activism seeking to enact corporate governance reforms purely for the purpose of unlocking a firm’s financial value to investors (see Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011). However, in many cases the boundary between financial and social value is blurry, even made so deliberately by activists seeking to establish marketplace legitimacy for their social goals (Hiatt & Carlos, 2015). Economic actors such as corporations also participate in this blurring, when they highlight positive social dimensions to their market activities. Consistent with these blurred lines, corporations may partner with social activists, or even sponsor them, to advocate for positions on social issues that will support their financial interests (de Bakker et al., 2013). Likewise, institutional and social entrepreneurs often seek to create new market opportunities for

Table 1 Social Activism Concepts and Examples

Concept	Definition	Representative examples
<i>Social activists</i>	Individuals and groups engaging in collective action to remedy perceived social problems. Social activists operate through groups or social movement organizations (SMOs) characterized by varying degrees of formal and informal organization	Corporate LGBT employee groups, environmental organizations (e.g. Greenpeace, Sierra Club), Anti-Walmart community organizers
<i>Organizational targets</i>	Organizations at which activist pressure is directed	Corporations, universities, hospitals, churches
<i>Tactics</i>	<p>Collective action routines pursued by social activists for the purpose of gaining concessions, grabbing attention, and/or mobilizing participants. Social activists choose tactics from among a wide repertoire of possibilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Persuasive/influence tactics</i> – geared toward convincing decision-makers about the merits of activist claims • <i>Disruptive/protest tactics</i> – focused on creating material or reputational costs for organizations 	<p>Lobbying, victim testimonial, educational seminar, issue selling behavior, dramaturgical performance</p> <p>Product boycott, equipment sabotage, blockade, sit-in, protest demonstration</p>
<i>Concession</i>	Commitment by organizational decision-makers to altering organizational practices in line with activist demands	Adoption of domestic partner benefits, reducing emission levels, altering product features
<i>Opportunity structure for activism</i>	Structural or cultural factors that affect the likelihood of activism, in part because of perceptions about the likelihood of activist success	Corporate opportunity structures include external factors (e.g. industry conditions) and internal factors (e.g. executive values)
<i>Indirect effects</i>	Effects on the decision-making behavior of entities (organizations or third parties) that were not the original targets of activism. These could be intended (creating domino effect) and unintended (rise of new market opportunities)	Activist tactics deployed against target universities affecting decisions of peer universities in the same network; efforts of Women’s Christian Temperance Movement leading to the rise of soft-drink producer companies

Table 1 (Continued)

Concept	Definition	Representative examples
<i>Unintended effects</i>	Effects that were not part of activists' goals and objectives. These could occur within targeted organizations (targets engaging in impression management) or elsewhere (e.g. practice adoptions by peer organizations)	Activist boycotts causing companies to engage in impression-management; disruptive activist tactics slowing the spread of practice among peer organizations
<i>Organizational field</i>	A set of organizations who are likely to view each other as "social peers" and influence each others' decision-making	Fortune 500 companies, top US research universities
<i>Third parties</i>	Actors that have a vested stake in the organizational field that activists are targeting—but which are not an integral part of activism or the targets	
	<i>Industry self-regulation groups</i>	Fair Labor Association
	<i>Consultants/professions</i>	Diversity Best Practices, Society for Human Resource Management
	<i>Regulators/policy-makers</i>	Federal Department of Agriculture
<i>Mobilization</i>	Recruitment of bystanders into participation, or energizing of existing participants, to engage in collective action toward activist goals	Native army regiments engaging in mutinies, hospital residents coming together to fight unjust employment practices
<i>Media amplification</i>	Media coverage of activism, making it visible to more people, and potentially heightening its influence in the organizational field	Consumer boycotts having greater influence depending on how much media coverage they receive

Sources: Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) and McAdam and Snow (1997).

themselves while also solving social problems (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011).

Hence, for our review, we only excluded studies where the activists in question did not describe their goals in a way that involve social issues. Note this definition also accommodates a reality in which a given actor, such as a small business owner, can in one setting be participating in activism (e.g. protesting big-box store chains), and in another setting be the target of activism (e.g. when employees demand changes in employment practices). We return to this issue in our final discussion.

Our definition of social activism also implies an expansive view of organizational change as an outcome of activism, including both intentional and unintentional effects on organizations. The bulk of research on social activism in organizational contexts examines outcomes that are part of activists' goals and objectives. These include direct effects such as gaining concessions (King, 2008a), instigating practice change (Kellogg, 2011; Lounsbury, 2001), and creating financial costs (King & Soule, 2007), as well as indirect effects such as altering the practices of supplier firms by targeting buyer organizations (Bartley & Child, 2014). Beyond these effects that reflect activist goals, activism can also have unanticipated effects—including direct effects on targeted organizations, or indirect effects on other entities in the field. For example, community anti-Walmart activism not only affected the opening of Walmart stores in those communities (Ingram et al., 2010)—an outcome desired by the activists—but also inadvertently affected the location decisions of Target, a rival company (Yue, Rao, & Ingram, 2013). Sensing a growing enthusiasm among scholars to identify the unintended effects of activism, a key feature of our review is to conceptualize organizational change broadly to include all the outcomes that can be traced to activist presence and actions.

The Spectrum from Insider Activists to Outsider Activists

Sociological research has suggested that activists' ability to utilize a variety of tactical efforts depends on activists' social position and their perceptions of the likelihood of different target responses such as granting concessions or engaging in retaliation (Gamson, 1968; Katzenstein, 1998; Santoro & McGuire, 1997; Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, & Su, 1999; Walker, Martin, & McCarthy, 2008). Organizational researchers have distinguished between activists that are primary stakeholders (shareholders) and secondary stakeholders (all other claimants, including employees, students, SMOs) of the firms, with the general awareness that the latter experience greater difficulties in gaining attention and influence (Vasi & King, 2012; Weber, Rao, & Thomas, 2009). As there is growing recognition that secondary stakeholders may exhibit heterogeneity in how they can mount successful challenges toward organizational

Table 2 An Insider–Outsider Framework: Different Activist Types and Their Influences on Organizational Targets

Insider activists	Intermediate cases	Outsider activists
<i>Full members of target organization</i>	<i>Partial or temporary members of target organization</i>	<i>Non-members of target organization</i>
Example: employees	Examples: company shareholders, university students	Example: social movement organization (SMO) participants
A. Resource dependence on the target organization		
Insider activists	Intermediate cases	Outsider activists
High dependence	Varied dependence	Low dependence
<i>Implications</i>		<i>Implications</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced incentive to voice grievances • Difficulty recruiting into participation • High barrier to deployment of disruptive tactics 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased incentive to voice grievances • Easier recruiting into participation • Low barrier to deployment of disruptive tactics
B. Knowledge about the target organization		
Insider activists	Intermediate cases	Outsider activists
High knowledge level	Varied knowledge level	Low knowledge level
<i>Implications</i>		<i>Implications</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective framing of claims and goals toward target, using knowledge of values and culture • Ability to focus lobbying, using knowledge of informal structure (factions, friendships) • Insight on how to threaten, using knowledge of critical resources and routines 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More difficulty framing claims and goals toward target • Limited ability to focus lobbying • Lower certainty on how best to threaten

targets (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Yaziji & Doh, 2013), we review and analyze the existing literature based on different activist types and the mechanisms underlying their targeting and success.

Following research on activism directed against the state (Banaszak, 2010; Santoro & McGuire, 1997; Soule et al., 1999), we categorize activist types in the organizational context on a spectrum ranging from insiders to outsiders. While prior research on activism against the state has distinguished insider

activists from outsiders based on whether they hold institutional positions of power (e.g. legislators, and government elites), we believe that activism taking place in and around organizations can be usefully categorized on the insider–outsider continuum, based on the relationship of the activists with the target organization (Katzenstein, 1998)—a broad classification that, although recognized in some studies, up to now has not been the subject of a systematic review. In particular, we use two key dimensions to characterize insider versus outsider activists: resource dependence with respect to the target organization, and knowledge about the target organization. Table 2 summarizes these two dimensions, which align in many (but not all) circumstances, such that insiders are characterized by high levels of dependence and knowledge, while outsiders are characterized by low levels of both. Table 2 also maps these dimensions onto four specific, readily identifiable activist types that are described in the literature: employees, shareholders, students, and participants in social movement organization (SMO) participants. Below, we introduce the two dimensions, before turning to the core of our literature review organized along this continuum.

Resource Dependence

A salient feature of activism in and around organizations is the nature of interdependence between the activists and the target organization. Just as the behaviors and performance of organizations are affected by their resource dependence on the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013), activists' tactics, strategies, and capacity to influence will be affected by their resource dependencies on target organizations. In particular, insider activists, such as employees, and to a lesser extent students or shareholders, may find themselves more constrained in how they are willing to voice their grievance or press their goals, due to their reliance on the target organization for material and social resources, and the relative lack of bargaining power associated with the threat to withdraw their resources from productive use by the target (Commons, 1934; Hirschman, 1970).

We focus on the relative dependence of activists on the target organization—that is, how much greater the activist's dependence on the target organization is compared with the organization's dependence on the activist (see Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Frooman (1999) developed the idea that the ability of any stakeholder to externally influence an organization should be a function of the stakeholder's interdependence with the organization. Applied to activism toward organizations, higher relative dependence should dissuade people from participating in disruptive activism—i.e. activism that generates material or reputational costs for the target organization—due to their

concerns about reprisal from members of the targeted organization. Relative dependence implies that reprisals in the form of resource withdrawal or sanctioning by organizational leaders would be costly for the activist in this case. For example, employees who are activists may risk being branded as trouble-makers in ways that damage their careers (Taylor & Raeburn, 1995). Conversely, relative independence frees activists from concerns with reprisal, opening up a wider tactical repertoire to include options that are disruptive or threatening to the target.

Knowledge about the Target Organization

While resource dependencies pose a challenge for insider activists, knowledge about the target organization can partly offset that challenge by equipping activists with an enhanced ability to persuade organizational decision-makers in favor of their claims. This idea follows from the application of opportunity structure and political process theories in social movement sociology, which have aimed to identify the structural and cultural factors that make some targets more attractive and susceptible to activist influence than others (Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992). These theories have recently been adapted to the context of organizational targets (Briscoe et al., 2014; Kellogg, 2011; King, 2008a; Vasi & King, 2012), but a logical precondition for activists to act on these factors is obviously possessing knowledge about them.

Indeed, recent research in social movements and non-market strategy has offered insights on how knowledge about the organization can afford strategic advantages to activists (Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Briscoe et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2009). Broadly, there seem to be three sub-dimensions of knowledge about organizations that may help insiders looking for a change. First, knowledge of informal social structures may help activists to deploy their efforts selectively at places and with people that promise greater payoff. Second, knowledge about prevailing culture (language, symbols, artifacts, and values) within target organizations can help them decide where and when to deploy their efforts, by revealing the proclivities of influential leaders and groups. Lastly, knowledge about organizational routines may equip those (assumedly rare) insider activists seeking to cause disruption in order to gain momentum and increase their influence.

Types of Activists and Their Direct Effects

In the following sections, and in the first panel of [Table 3](#), we review the literature using this framework, highlighting how different types of activists depend on different influence mechanisms and tactics. We treat employees as archetypal insiders, and participants in independent SMOs as archetypal outsiders, with shareholders and student activists falling in-between. In making this

Table 3 Literature on Social Activism in and Around Organizations with Examples of Movements, Social Issues and Invoked Mechanisms

	Insider activists Full members of target organization	Intermediate cases Partial or temporary members of target organization		Outsider activists Non-members of target organization
	Employees	Shareholders	Students	Social Movement Organization (SMO) participants
(1) Direct effects on the organization being targeted	Meyerson and Scully (1995), Scully and Creed (1998), Creed et al. (2002), Raeburn (2004), Briscoe et al. (2014) (LGBT) Kellogg (2011, 2012) (Employment practices in hospitals) Rothenberg and Levy (2011), Soderstrom and Weber (2015) (Environmental) Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey (2014) (Varied issues in the gold mining industry)	Proffitt and Spicer (2006), David, Bloom, and Hillman (2007), Vasi and King (2012) (Environmental) McDonnell, King, and Soule (2015) (Varied issues)	Soule (1997) (South Africa divestment) Lounsbury (2001) (Recycling program) Briscoe et al. (2015) (Anti-sweatshop) Walker et al., (2008) (Varied Activism)	Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi (2014) (Divestment from Burma) Zhang and Luo (2013) (Corporate philanthropy in China) Luders (2006) (Civil rights) Hendry (2006), Eesley and Lenox (2006), Zietsma and Winn (2007), Lenox and Eesley (2009), Kim and Lyon (2014), Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee (2015), Eesley, DeCelles, and Lenox (2015), Vasi, Walker, Johnson, and Tan (2015) (Environmental) Bartley and Child (2011, 2014) (Anti-sweatshop) Ingram et al. (2010) (Anti-Walmart) Lewis, Gray, and Meierhenrich (2014) (Save Darfur campaign) King (2008a), McDonnell and King (2013), Henisz et al. (2014), McDonnell (2015), McDonnell and Werner (in press) (varied activism and issues)
<i>Commonly invoked mechanisms</i>	<i>Persuasion and education</i>	<i>Enhancing perceptions of financial risk</i>	<i>Disruption and persuasion</i>	<i>Disruption of reputations and resources</i>

Table 3 (Continued)

	Insider activists Full members of target organization	Intermediate cases Partial or temporary members of target organization	Outsider activists Non-members of target organization
	Employees	Shareholders	Social Movement Organization (SMO) participants
(2) Indirect effects on other organizations in the targeted field	Raeburn (2004), Briscoe and Safford (2008) (Spread of same-sex partner benefits) Briscoe and Murphy (2012) (Spread of retiree benefits curtailment)		Students
			Lounsbury (2001), Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch (2003) (Spread of recycling programs among universities) Briscoe et al. (2015) (Spread of supplier sanctions among universities during anti-sweatshop campaign)
<i>Commonly invoked mechanisms</i>	<i>Altering perceptions of practice legitimacy</i>		Schurman (2004), Weber et al. (2009) (Anti-biotech activism affecting strategy of multiple firms in the industry) Bartley (2003) (Anti-sweatshop activism affecting rise of social and environmental certification associations) Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri (2007) (Conversion of cooperative thrifts into bureaucratic organizations) Soule et al. (2014) (Inter-organizational diffusion of Divestment decisions from Burma) Yue et al. (2013) (Anti-Walmart protest influencing Target’s market selection)
		<i>Altering perceptions of practice rationality</i>	<i>Enhancing investment uncertainty, altering perceptions of market opportunities</i>

3. Indirect effects on the creation and destruction of market opportunities

Rojas (2006, 2012) (Establishment of Black studies programs)

Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey (2008) (Emergence of grass-fed meat and dairy market)
 Haveman et al. (2007) (Evolution of bureaucratic thrift industry)
 Schneiberg, King, and Smith (2008), Schneiberg (2013) (Emergence of cooperative in insurance, dairy, and grain industries)
 Sine and Lee (2009), Carlos, Sine, Lee, and Haveman (2014), Pacheco and Dean (2014) (Emergence and success of US wind energy sector)
 Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert (2009) (Demise of breweries followed by emergence of soft-drink manufacturers)
Enhancing perceptions of market potential

Commonly invoked mechanisms

Delegitimizing the status quo

4. Indirect effects on further mobilization of activists

Rao and Dutta (2012) (Spread of regimental mutinies among units of Bengal Native Army)

Soule (1997) (Spread of shantytown tactic in the South Africa Divestment movement)
 Polletta (1998) (Spread of sit-ins tactic during civil rights movement)
Novelty of tactics, narratives, media amplification

Commonly invoked mechanisms

Perceived opportunity for change

linkage, we do not mean that each type of activist exhibits a uniform level of resource dependence and knowledge, but instead that each type may have its own central tendency.¹ In our review of the literature, and in Table 2, we treat dependence and knowledge as positively correlated, such that employees are high in both dimensions, and participants in SMOs are low in both dimensions. Shareholders and student activists are more varied in their positioning on these dimensions. Later, when we discuss ways to move the field forward, we consider important circumstances where the two dimensions are not aligned, providing interesting opportunities for research.

Outsider Activists (Non-members)

In the domain of management theory, the most often discussed form of social activism involves challenges that come from external SMOs. Such outsider activists typically coalesce around social or environmental issues that are deemed important by the activists and their societal constituents. For example, green groups aiming to curb pollution target manufacturers with poor environmental records, and anti-sweatshop SMOs organize boycotts of apparel brands based on the treatment of workers in their supply chains. Community activists often mobilize to oppose the siting of industrial facilities, and to pressure companies into increasing support for victims in the wake of local disasters.

The efforts of outsider activists have received substantial scholarly attention among social movement, non-market strategy, and stakeholder management scholars. In particular, studies have examined the enabling role of contextual and resource conditions that allow these SMOs to gain influence over the organizations they target (e.g. Bartley & Child, 2011; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Ingram et al., 2010; King, 2008b). As we outlined above, the outsider attributes of activists will tend to limit their relative dependence on targeted organizations, and at the same time will tend to constrain their access to information about social structures, culture, and routines within the targeted organization.

Resource dependence. The absence of relative dependence on a targeted organization implies that outsider activists will enjoy a greater capacity to threaten the organization, expanding their tactical repertoire. Threats could be aimed at disrupting organizational resources, routines, or reputations, increasing the likelihood that decision-makers in target organizations are forced to pay attention (Alinsky, 1971; Baron & Diermeier, 2007; King, 2008a). Because outside activists are less likely to be dissuaded by fears of retaliation or resource withdrawal by organizational targets, they should be more willing to take risks and openly “voice” their concerns in protest. Consistent with this line of thinking, Walker et al. (2008) argued that activists targeting the state can expect forceful retaliation, and will therefore be less likely to employ militant tactics—in comparison to those targeting corporations or

educational institutions, who can expect a softer response, and who will therefore be more militant. Extending this logic, among activists targeting a given organizational sector such as corporations, those positioned as outsiders should also be relatively more willing to employ disruptive tactics.

Accordingly, much of the research on outsider activism against corporations has suggested that they often rely on disruptive tactics as the primary means of gaining influence (Bartley, 2003; Hendry, 2006; King, 2008a). On balance, these tactics cause organizational decision-makers to consider the costs (or at least the risk of costs) of refusing to grant concessions to the activists. For example, common disruption tactics include blockading access or entry, sabotaging equipment, sit-ins that disrupt meetings or work routines, lawsuits, product boycotts, and picket line protests (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Hendry, 2006; Schurman, 2004; Zietsma & Winn, 2007). Disruptive tactics also have the added advantage of tending to garner more media attention, bringing more public attention to the social issue that is the focus of the activist group (Schurman, 2004). For instance, Bartley (2003, p. 443) reported that environmental activists protested by “filling the parking lots of home improvement stores with inflatable chainsaws”—a tactic which both threatened to disrupt retail sales and provided favorable optics for the nightly television news. Eesley et al. (2015) also showed that outsider SMOs relied heavily on disruptive protests and boycotts, which enabled them to drag companies “through the mud” by subjecting them to negative media attention. Hence, in the absence of relative dependence, outsider activists are apt to more often employ disruptive tactics.

By and large, as outsider activists seek to leverage the disruption mechanism, their success appears to depend on how organizational decision-makers and other stakeholders experience and interpret the activism’s disruptive potential. While sometimes disruption imposes costly material damage to organizational resources and performance, on other occasions its effects stem from inflicting reputational harm on organizations. For example, sit-ins organized by activists against segregated business establishments during the civil rights movements had a direct negative impact on sales (Luders, 2006). As illustrated in Table 3, our review suggests that studies on the direct effects of outsider activism have more often invoked disruption of reputation and resources as the mechanism underlying the efficacy of disruption. Even if activists lack resources and strength to directly impact organizational resources, they can still be successful as their activities are covered by print and social media (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993), drawing decision-makers’ attention and stoking their fears of negative social evaluations.

Consumer boycott represents a distinct class of disruptive tactics that is commonly instigated by outsider activists. In responding to a consumer boycott, decision-makers in a targeted company might assess the risk that

enough consumers would participate to make a material impact on a company's sales. Yet building on prior studies (Fombrun, 1996; Whetten & Mackey, 2002), King and colleagues (King, 2008a; King & McDonnell, 2012; McDonnell & King, 2013) argued that boycotts exploit the concerns that corporate decision-makers have with maintaining their reputations among other stakeholders—such that even the perception of negative publicity associated with a boycott can lead companies to respond to activist demands, essentially regardless of actual consumer participation in the boycott. Hence, the extent of media coverage and extent of a company's reputational vulnerability are key determinants of boycott responsiveness.

A body of related empirical research in stakeholder theory and non-market strategy has also focused on the disruptive potential of activists as stakeholders influencing organizational outcomes. In stakeholder theory, organizations can be affected positively by the support of stakeholders, or negatively by the withdrawal of support or opposition of stakeholders (Frooman, 1999). Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky (2010) found that firms with scarcer resources were more likely to adopt environmental practices in response to stakeholder pressures. Consistent with this, in the non-market strategy domain, Eesley and Lenox (2006) and Lenox and Eesley (2009) found that firms were more vulnerable to activism when the activist groups possessed more resources, and less vulnerable when firms had considerable capital reserves. Henisz et al. (2014) recently showed that if stakeholder interactions between mining companies and activist stakeholders were characterized more by conflict than cooperation, this negatively affected investor valuations, assumedly because investors anticipated the future costs and benefits stemming from the character of those interactions. Crilly and Sloan (2012) have also added the insight that companies respond differently to stakeholders in part because leaders in those organizations hold fundamentally different views, or logics, concerning the purpose of the firm itself and its role vis-à-vis stakeholders.

Note that some outsiders do use persuasion tactics, or a blend of disruption and persuasion tactics. For example, the Sierra Club and other groups periodically issue scientific reports aiming to influence the public as well as corporate decision-makers to make changes related to climate change and other environmental issues. If publicized widely, such informational tactics can cause disruption to the resources and reputations of the firms that are believed to be non-compliant, as the evidence provided helps validate activist claims. For example, Hiatt et al. (2015) argue that activists' congressional testimonies, a form of non-disruptive tactic, enhance corporate decision-makers' perceptions of regulatory risks, leading them to respond favorably to activists. Although little is known about when disruption works better or worse than persuasion for outsider activists, studies have recently found that local environmental SMOs that primarily use persuasion tactics influenced the development of alternative energy

industries (Carlos et al., 2014; Pacheco & Dean, 2014; Sine & Lee, 2009); we discuss these studies below under the indirect effects of activism.

In reviewing this literature on outside activists, we found that many studies have implied the intervening mechanisms through which activism influences organizational outcomes. In Table 3, we summarize the mechanisms most commonly invoked or theorized to be associated with (outsider) SMO efforts, as well as mechanisms associated with other types of activists. Few studies that we reviewed spelled out mechanisms in any detail—or showed direct evidence on them (e.g. by testing whether the mechanism statistically mediated the main effect of activism on organizational responses, or otherwise providing systematic data on the causal factors connecting activism and responses).

The omission of mechanism evidence in these studies may in part be explained by the challenge of learning why exactly organizational decision-makers grant concessions to activists, or why exactly a targeted organization's other stakeholders make changes in response to seeing activism. To appreciate the difficulty, consider the most common mechanism asserted in the studies we reviewed above: perceived organizational reputation threat. To gather data on this, one would need to conduct surveys of company executives during or soon after they observe activism against their companies, to ascertain whether and why they feared their organizational reputations being threatened, and how they acted on those fears. Such data collection is not impossible, but it is certainly challenging. Instead, some studies have attempted to provide indirect evidence by delineating moderating conditions to approximate the presence of mechanisms. For example, an enhanced effect of activist boycott on corporate concessions when the boycotts receive newspaper coverage provides some evidentiary basis to the idea that reputational concerns arising from public naming and shaming may be inducing companies to cave in to activist demands. We discuss the issue of mechanisms further in future research directions below.

Low dependence on target organizations may offer another distinct advantage to outside activists, in the form of projecting an image of “authenticity” for movement claims (Carroll & Wheaton, 2009). In a world increasingly crowded with corporate-sponsored movements, or “astroturf” movements (McDonnell, 2015; Walker, 2009), it is important for activists to be perceived as independent of organizational targets in order to be taken seriously by participants and bystanders that the activists seek to enlist for their cause. Although less explored in studies to date, lack of dependence should allow activists to engage more effectively in the social construction of organizational “culpability,” arousing anger and motivating movement participants and bystanders to increase their participation in activism (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2009).

Knowledge about the target. While outsider activists enjoy low dependency on organizational targets, they tend to lack knowledge of the internal social structures, cultures and routines of target organizations. This seems important for understanding the process of influence via persuasion (and to a lesser extent disruption as well)—but it has not often been considered. While research on how activists leverage access to internal knowledge about the firm is still in a nascent stage, existing research in organizational studies has provided ample support for this idea. For example, social network scholars have shown that actors who more accurately perceive the social networks in an organization can act more efficiently, by lobbying the right people in the right places, and thereby improving their odds of successfully influencing the organization (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). In contrast to insider activists—who know about an organization’s structures, cultures, and routines because of their roles in it—outsider activists may only gain that level of knowledge for organizations that operate as relatively “open” systems (Scott & Davis, 2007; Walker et al., 2008). As a result, outsider activists might be expected to exhibit greater inefficiencies in their strategic target selection and effort deployment, and be especially limited in their ability to deploy persuasion tactics, relative to insiders.

To shore up deficiencies in their knowledge about targets, outsider activists can obviously increase the sophistication of their operations. Indeed, an important early perspective on the effectiveness of activists was pioneered in McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) resource mobilization theory. This perspective outlined the structural features of SMOs that would increase their effectiveness in both mobilizing and influencing targets. For example, one tenet of this theory is that activist groups with professionalized staffs should be more effective in myriad ways. This line of thinking appears useful in understanding activism in and around organizations as well, especially because cause-based organizations have experienced rising staff professionalization and attendant rationalizing practices such as strategic planning and quantitative evaluation (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Yet the predictions of resource mobilization theory have not featured prominently in recent studies on activism in the management field. One might expect, for example, that more-professionalized activist groups would be more systematic in their analysis of target options within a given field of organizations, and therefore more efficient in targeting.

In sum, outsider activism appears to have received the lion’s share of research attention, with cumulative findings suggesting that outsider activism is associated with use of disruptive tactics aimed at inflicting reputational and material damage on target organizations. These disruptive tactics are more likely to be successful when organizations experience financial and reputational declines, and when the media amplify news of the activism so that it reaches more stakeholders.

Insider Activists (Full Members)

While the typical lay image of an activist may be that of an outsider SMO participant that challenges the institutional order, as shown in the left-hand columns of Table 3, scholars have begun to pay more attention to social activism taking place within the confines of organizations, including corporations, universities, and hospitals. Although Zald and Berger (1978) famously pointed out the possibilities on this front in a prescient early article, the topic only started gaining recognition in the management field after Meyerson, Scully, and colleagues began studying workplace activists during the 1990s (Meyerson, 2001; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Scully & Creed, 1998; Scully & Segal, 2002). Employment relations scholars have also studied employee activist groups, noting their similarities and differences from the unions that represent their members in collective bargaining with employers (Heckscher & Carré, 2006). In addition, although outside the scope of our study, organizational behavior scholars have also explored how individuals engage in acts of employee advocacy, through studies of issue selling and internal lobbying (Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001).

Although we anticipate that many types of activists will display some insider attributes, for this review we adopt the view that employees are the quintessential insiders, tending to be characterized by high relative dependence on their employing organizations, and by possession of considerable knowledge about the organization. As such, some employees may gain partial access to channels of institutionalized influence, such as senior executives. Many other employees in organizations do not enjoy such access, but nonetheless are able to gain influence through collective action inside the organization. Examples of employee activist groups include the Black Caucus of the Xerox Corporation, the Ford Motor Company's Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Employees, the Delta Pilots Pension Preservation Organization, Cisco Women in Science and Engineering, and employee groups formed to advocate for causes ranging from environmental reforms and increased worker safety to religious accommodation in the workplace.

Social activism within organizations is a prime example of a "voice" behavior (Hirschman, 1970), as employees seek to instigate social change (or preserve the status quo) in their workplace. Yet insiders are often restrained in their activities (indeed, some would likely object to be called activists as opposed to advocates or change agents). Meyerson and Scully (1995) described employee activists as "tempered radicals." These individuals must wear two hats: as employees they "earn the rewards and resources that come with commitment and complicity" vis-à-vis organization, but as activists they also critique some of the organization's practices and policies (Meyerson, 2001; Meyerson & Scully, 1995, p. 589). Despite challenges in collecting data, organizational scholars have examined several important instances of insider

activism. One prominent example is the LGBT workplace movement, in which employees formed groups to urge companies to provide partner health insurance, anti-discrimination assurances, and otherwise recognize the equal rights of their LGBT employees (Creed & Scully, 2000; Raeburn, 2004). Other examples include the movement among medical residents to gain work–life balance and ensure patient safety (Kellogg, 2011), and efforts to reform corporate environmental practices (Soderstrom & Weber, 2015).

Resource dependence. A notable feature of insider activism is activists' high relative dependence on the organizations that they target. The risk of reprisal usually constrains insiders from engaging in activism that involves breaking organizational rules and norms. Since the success and survival of organizations depend on effective maintenance of organizational routines and reputations, decision-makers in powerful positions are likely to discourage and punish behaviors that challenge institutionalized authority and chain of command (Kellogg, 2012; Rojas, 2006; Soule, 2012). This implies that the disruption-based influence mechanisms that are part of outsider activism are unlikely to be utilized by insider activists. Consistent with this, Friedman and Craig (2004), in a study of minority employees joining corporate networking groups, found little willingness among participants to become oppositional or engage in open protest.

Employee social activism differs from whistle-blowing, which describes an individual employee bringing claims of illegal, illegitimate and/or immoral organizational practices to the attention of authorities (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Keenan, 2002; Zhuang, Thomas, & Miller, 2005). Prominent examples of whistle-blowing include Mark Whitacre revealing price fixing practices inside Archer Daniels Midland, Jeffrey Wigand showing that tobacco firms had known that cigarettes contained cancer-causing additives, and Sharon Watkins unveiling financial fraud at Enron. In some ways, whistle-blowing is like a disruptive form of employee activism. For one, the goals of many whistleblowers and activists appear similar, seeking to end or alter objectionable organizational practices based on their knowledge of those practices. Without stringent legal protections against retaliation, both whistleblowers and disruptive internal activists are also both likely to lose their jobs with the target organization as a result of their actions (Dworkin & Callahan, 1991). Perhaps for that reason, both forms of activity are relatively rare. At the same time, whistle-blowing and insider activism differ crucially in that whistleblowers tend to act alone, and act outside the organizational system, while employee social activists tend to enlist peers, engage in collective efforts, and work within the organizational system. We return to whistle-blowing research below as an opportunity for cross-fertilization.

Knowledge about the target. Employee activists can possess valuable knowledge of the informal social structures, prevailing values and culture, and organizational routines of their organizations, as summarized on the lower left side of [Table 2](#). Such insider knowledge is particularly useful for implementing persuasion tactics. Reflecting this advantage, [Table 3](#) indicates that studies of insider activists mostly focus on their persuasion and educational efforts, which hinge on their ability to change the orientation of decision-makers and/or other members of their workplace (Gamson, 1968). Persuasion tactics often involve the framing of social issues to support sought-after organizational changes. Those issue frames are then communicated to organizational members and leaders through internal lobbying efforts, focused “issue selling,” the circulation of informational reports such as benchmarking reports or scientific studies, and through political efforts to form coalitions in support of change (Dutton et al., 2001; Raeburn, 2004). Additional persuasion tactics include the use of victim testimonials, documentary films, and social media to convey grievances or the need for change (McCarthy, Wolfson, & Harvey, 1987; Taylor, Rupp, & Gamson, 2004; Vasi et al., 2015).

Studies of insider activists have explored a number of micromobilization and influence tactics used by employees to further their goals related to changing their organizations. A common theme across these tactics is that they appear to all be made feasible, or at least made more effective, through the superior knowledge that insiders possess regarding informal organizational structures, cultures, and routines. It is also worth noting that more of this research has been conducted through in-depth qualitative studies, rather than through quantitative research. As a result, it has a different feel in terms of forming a base of evidence, generally richer in processual detail but less readily generalizable, relative to work on outsider activism involving SMOs. Key micro-level influence tactics include:

- *Tailored framing.* Building off seminal early work on framing in social movements targeting government policies (Benford & Snow, 2000), scholars have explored how activists within companies use framing and informational strategies to influence the hearts and minds of organizational members and decision-makers (Creed et al., 2002; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). In particular, studies of LGBT employee activists showed how the addition of anti-discrimination clauses in employee handbooks and the extension of health insurance to same-sex partners of LGBT employees were influenced by activist framing efforts. In some cases, activists framed their grievances in term of “ethics” to connect it with their organization’s purported commitment to “treating each other fairly, with dignity and respect” (Meyerson & Scully, 1995, p. 597). In other cases, employee activists argued and demonstrated that equality based on sexual orientation

was “good for business” (Creed et al., 2002, p. 492). Employee activists creatively tailored their messages and delivery methods according to their inside knowledge of the different organizations in which they were operating.

- *Repurposing organizational routines and processes.* Insiders often creatively repurpose existing processes and routines to which they are privy. In her study of how the women’s movement gained influence in the federal bureaucracy, Banaszak (2010) showed how activist employees in a federal agency used routine reviews of the federal register to identify subtle but potentially far-reaching regulatory changes that might otherwise have been missed—and relaying that information to other activists within and outside the government. Kellogg (2011) showed that reformist hospital interns, who generally lacked power, were able to harness middle-manager accountability rules and anonymous upward feedback systems in order to apply pressure onto powerful surgeons who were otherwise resistant to change. Kellogg (2009, p. 688) also showed how reformers had identified critical “relational spaces” within the organization’s demanding work routines, allowing them to coalesce around a common grievance and pursue collective action. In the geographically distributed organization of the Bengal native army, Rao and Dutta (2012, p. 626) showed that oppressed soldiers used long-standing religious festivals for mutinous collective action because those settings were “insulated from the control of elites.”
- *Utilizing knowledge of decision-makers’ personal values and political coalitions.* Insider activists can gain access to better knowledge about the values of the organization’s current leaders, and the political coalitions that indicate support and resistance to activists’ goals, through personal experience as well as the ubiquitous “grapevine” of gossip and informal conversation. Weber et al. (2009) documented that the political divisions among the upper echelon of biotechnology firms in Germany were crucial in shaping activists’ influence on decision-making. An insider understanding of competing interests among elites provides activists with the opportunity to weaken the “political will and coalition-building ability” of opponents (Weber et al., 2009, p. 116). Briscoe et al. (2014) found that employees in Fortune 500 companies used their knowledge about CEOs’ values, and of CEOs’ power within the firm, to assess the ripeness of conditions to establish an activist group to pursue the cause of LGBT rights. Knowledge about organizational elites may also help activists to identify and cultivate potential allies to support their cause (Van Dyke, 2003).
- *Leveraging networks to pursue change.* Scholars studying the LGBT workplace movement have documented the ways that employee activists constructed and utilized networks linking across organizations in order to share information on strategies and tactics (Briscoe & Safford, 2008;

Raeburn, 2004). These inter-organizational channels among activists also allowed them to compile benchmarking data to be used to demonstrate to organizational decision-makers the “business case” for change. LGBT workplace activists also used *intra*-organizational networks within their companies in a variety of ways, borrowing and sharing tactics across units within the organization, using electronic networking resources, and tapping into other pre-existing diversity networks (Raeburn, 2004b; Scully, Creed, DeJordy, & Ventresca, 2015; Scully & Segal, 2002).

As we highlight later in the paper, understanding the role of local knowledge in activists’ ability to mobilize and influence decision-making presents many more opportunities for future research. This research on employee activism tends to more often employ qualitative methods, relative to work on SMOs targeting organizations. Qualitative methods are very helpful in identifying details about activist influence tactics. Yet at the same time, work on employee activism can also be critiqued for lacking full detail on the precise mechanisms of influence. As noted in Table 3, insider activism is often envisioned to operate through persuasion and education of decision-makers, but studies usually lack detail on the cognitive, affective, or group dynamic processes that must underlie the implied shift in decision-maker stances right before they capitulate or show resistance to activist demands.

Insider activists face an interesting tension between utilizing resources made available through the target organization—which they may be able to access precisely because of their intimate knowledge and connections in the organization—and the risk of becoming co-opted by the organization. Co-optation may not necessarily be negative from the point of view of achieving immediate activist goals, but it implies a further increase in relative dependence on the organization, and a corresponding loss of perceived independent authenticity (Johnson, 2003; Selznick, 1949). Exploring this issue in the context of LGBT employee activist groups, Briscoe and Safford (2010) found that as activists gained a modicum of success and legitimacy in the overall field of corporations, the time between activist group founding within a company and official recognition of the group by corporate leadership declined from nearly 4 years to 0 years, and then in a sense inverted as some remaining companies began pre-emptively setting up official LGBT employee groups that were resourced by the firm (even without employees requesting this action, and often on the advice of consultants who provided a template for chartering the group and effectively ensuring its functioning within the bounds of corporate acceptability). In their study of the automotive industry’s response to the issue of climate change, Rothenberg and Levy (2011) observed that the climate scientists employed by corporations experienced a similar tension as their values of scientific objectivity and independence stood at odds with pressures to interpret research in light of firms’ market interests.

To sum up, employees who engage in activism face personal risk and uncertainty, given their dependence on the target organization. This often curbs the use of tactics that would be more common among outsider SMOs. Instead, the effectiveness of insider activists tends to hinge on their use of persuasion tactics that leverage internal organizational knowledge. Key micro-level influence tactics that benefit from such knowledge include use of tailored framings, repurposing of organizational routines, and harnessing of informal social structures to lobby for change. More research is needed on when and how such efforts effectively overcome the burden of resource dependence.

Intermediate Cases (Partial or Temporary Members)

While employees and social movement groups represent ideal types of insider and outsider activists, respectively, other types of activists appear to fall somewhere in the middle of the insider–outsider continuum. In this review, we focus on shareholders and students, shown in the middle columns of [Tables 2 and 3](#). Student activists, who have long been the subject of study in social movement sociology (Bayer & Astin, 1969; Lipset, 1976; Rojas, 2012; Soule, 1997), appear to be positioned in between insiders and outsiders, as “partial members.” Student groups enjoy strong knowledge of organizational values and routines, relative to outsiders, but they may lack insight into the informal social structure compared with full insiders. In terms of relative dependence, student groups are subject to being disciplined and expelled, making them dependent—but they are also only temporary members of the organization, and they enjoy many codified rights and protections. Similarly, shareholders are insiders to the extent that the organization has high relative dependence on them as a group (Vasi & King, 2012)—but they are outsiders in that they are not privy to internal knowledge of the organization.

Crucially, we also envision high variance within these two partial-member groups in terms of their knowledge and dependence. Graduate students and student leaders of campus organizations, for example, may have gained more knowledge of the inner workings of their institutions; shareholders who have accrued a significant percentage of the target firm’s equity will have greater access to, and leverage over, decision-makers in the target organization. This also suggests the correlation between knowledge and dependence may be weaker for partial-member activists, encompassing more individuals and groups that are high on one but not both dimensions. We return to this point in our discussion below.

In theory, the varied relationships between partial members and their target organizations might give this group more flexibility in selecting effective methods of activism—or conversely it might produce uncertainty about the best course of action. As shown in [Table 3](#), research on activism by students includes common instances of both persuasion and disruption mechanisms.

Studies have alluded to the complexities that activists encounter. In contrast to external social movement groups who tend to derive their effectiveness from the production of costly disruption for targets (Luders, 2006), partial members are not always successful in using disruption. In some circumstances, disruption by partial insiders can even hurt the activists' cause. In his study of Black Studies movement on college campuses, Rojas (2006) found that compared with non-disruptive tactics, disruptive tactics were less successful in making universities adopt Black studies programs, as decision-makers perceived the disruptive tactics to be illegitimate and disrespectful to their authority. In the context of the campus anti-sweatshop movement, Briscoe et al. (2015) found that while disruptive tactics were effective in inducing concessions by targeted schools, they inhibited the larger success of the movement because administrators in other schools inferred that those concessions were coerced—and therefore were not worthy of emulation in the absence of force.

In the same vein, activist investors also build pressure on companies to be more socially and environmentally responsible using mixed tactics such as proxy resolutions, and media pressure. In their recent study of environmental activism, Eesley et al. (2015) found that activist investors were more likely to rely on proxy votes and lawsuits, which, even though they received little media coverage, nonetheless created perceptions of market risks in the investor community. However, the evidence on the efficacy of shareholder activist tactics is decidedly equivocal. On one hand, studies have shown that proxy resolutions by shareholder activists did lead to corporate policy changes (O'Rourke, 2003; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). On the other hand, David et al. (2007) observed that shareholder proposals reduced firms' social performance as firms diverted resources away to demonstrate progress on more symbolic fronts.

Unintended Direct Effects

So far we have discussed the direct effects of different types of activists, but activism often produces effects that are unintended and unanticipated by those involved. We summarize the limited research to date on unintended direct effects here (there is not enough of it for a separate panel in Table 3). As activists build pressure on companies to change practices in order to resolve a specific grievance, they not only influence how companies respond to those specific instances of activism, but they sometimes also influence the broader non-market strategy of organizations. For example, firms that are subjected to activist boycotts can experience failures of their political strategy, as political parties and candidates distance themselves from targeted firms. McDonnell and Werner (*in press*) found that legislators were more likely to return campaign donations from companies that were boycotted by activists, and those boycotted firms were also more likely to experience a drop in

invitations to appear before Congress and a decline in the awarded government contracts.

Since decision-makers seek to safeguard themselves from such costly effects of activism, they often resort to actions that they believe will dissuade activist targeting and/or render activist claims ineffective (Baron, 2001; Baron & Diermeier, 2007). For example, corporations may take actions directed toward softening the blow of activists' "naming and shaming," issuing pro-social claims (McDonnell & King, 2013) and engaging in CSR practices unrelated to activist demands (Gupta, 2015). Companies may also reduce efforts at so-called brownwashing—underreporting environmental commitments to placate profit-orientated investors (Kim & Lyon, 2014). Additionally, organizations may engage in more radical actions to avoid becoming targets of social movement pressure, such as sponsoring boycotts of the practices of peer organizations and regulatory bodies (McDonnell, 2015).

Building on this recent work, there are many areas in need of more scholarly attention. Researchers may examine situations when firms go beyond deflecting activist claims to fighting back. In documenting corporate "grassroots" lobbying efforts, Walker (2009, 2014) shows how companies increasingly respond to social activism against them through sophisticated counter-mobilization efforts that in many ways mirror "authentic" activist practices. Our emphasis on differentiating among activist types may be useful for understanding how firms retaliate against activism. For example, are employees who engage in workplace activism more likely to be dismissed by companies? How are critical SMOs resources (e.g. donors, memberships) subject to influence by corporations? Additionally, researchers may examine how activism causes organizational changes that are unrelated to activist demands but reflect a company's efforts to avoid future conflict—such as changes in organizational structures, human resource practices, products, or specific personnel.

As summarized in the lower panels of Table 3, we next review the existing literature on a range of indirect effects of activism levied against organizational targets.

The Indirect Effects of Activism in and Around Organizations

Activism levied against specific organizational targets often produces indirect or spillover effects, extending the impact of that activism beyond the original site of contention. Of course, activists often deliberately try to generate indirect effects that support their cause. Yet some effects are beyond activists' control, and hence difficult to anticipate. Following the second, third, and fourth panels in Table 3, we consider, respectively, the indirect effects on other organizations in the targeted field, on the creation and destruction of market opportunities, and on the further mobilization of activists. In each area, we consider the

importance of activist types in bringing out indirect effects, and identify areas of research on the indirect effects that have escaped scholarly inquiry.

Indirect Effects on Other Organizations in the Targeted Field

Even though activists typically select a subset of organizations to become targets for their tactical efforts, they often seek to influence other organizations in the field that remain untargeted due to the obvious limitations on activist resources and capabilities (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Waldron, Navis, & Fisher, 2013). For example, activists may seek to target larger and more prestigious organizations, which are often emulated by other organizations in the field (Still & Strang, 2009). Theoretically, this phenomenon represents the yoking of social activism to inter-organizational learning and diffusion, whereby organizational decision-makers are driven to adopt changes made by peer organizations as they seek to maintain rationality and legitimacy in the face of an uncertain and shifting environment (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Campbell, 2005; Soule et al., 2014; Zald, Morrill, & Rao, 2005).

Research at the intersection of social activism and organizational theory has picked up this theme as a way of understanding the broader influences of activism. Raeburn (2004) noted that LGBT activists often wished to bring about a “domino effect” for achieving the cause of workplace equality. Haveman et al. (2007), in their study of the progressive movement of nineteenth century, found that the effects of social activism were transmitted to other organizations in the field through the rise of institutional intermediaries. Briscoe and Safford (2008) considered how identities of the target organizations affect activists’ likelihood of indirectly affecting other organizations in the field, and found that it was the success against activist-resistant firms that conferred the socio-political legitimacy to activist claims and led to broader diffusion of practices.

As research on indirect effects of activism on other organizations has increased, scholars have only begun to consider how indirect-effect *mechanisms* might vary across activist types. Here again, the basic distinction between insider and outsider activists should matter since, although both have been shown to influence peer organizations, they are likely to do so differently (summarized in the second panel of Table 3). Building on our framework, we anticipate that outsider activists will be well positioned to create indirect effects by invoking threat to create investment uncertainty, or by altering perceptions of market opportunity. As outsider activists gain concessions by negatively impacting the material and reputational resources of target organizations, this creates a perception of threat among other organizations in the field who may follow suit out of fear that they could be targeted too. Recent work provides some preliminary evidence consistent with this. In their study of activism against big-box stores, Yue et al. (2013) found that when community activists succeeded in discouraging Walmart to open a store, they

simultaneously managed to dissuade Target, a rival company. Insider activists, on the other hand, may not be in a position to create such a threat-based effect as their tactics are likely to be more informational and much less visible. Instead, they may achieve indirect effects primarily through altering the legitimacy of their demands and ensuing changes in organizational practices. Briscoe and Safford (2008) found that LGBT activists achieved field-level adoption of domestic partner benefits by legitimizing those adoptions as culturally and socially appropriate things to do. In the context of anti-sweatshop movement, Briscoe et al. (2015) found that sanctions against a socially irresponsible supplier spread among universities when activists used evidence-based tactics, leading decision-makers to infer that the practice has rational merits.

Activists also vary in the extent to which they plan or hope to achieve indirect effects on other non-targeted organizations. In some cases, activists purposefully levy tactics against one organization or institution in order to effect change in a secondary organization or institution. Walker et al. (2008) termed this “proxy targeting.” For example, the group Justice for Janitors targeted building owners to build pressure on cleaning contractors to improve employment conditions for their workers. Student movements on college campuses, such as the divestment and anti-sweatshop movements, also follow a long tradition of proxy targeting as activists hope to achieve broader change in business and government by using universities as proxy platforms. Briscoe et al. (2015) examined efforts of anti-sweatshop activists targeting universities to change employment practices of major suppliers of university licensed apparel. Of course, students and their faculty advisors are relative insiders on college campuses, giving them advantages in terms of knowledge of their target organizations. Yet even outside activists may seek to strategically target more “vulnerable” points in product supply chain, where the opportunity structure for influence is most attractive. For instance, grocery stores are often targeted by activists hoping to change practices of food production companies for whom those grocery stores are the key buyers.

In other cases, the indirect effects on other organizations appear largely unintended. Briscoe and Murphy (2012) showed that activism in response to visible corporate changes led other companies to learn, such that they favored less-visible formats for their changes in order to avoid the activism. Such indirect learning effects may lie behind some of the corporate green-washing and decoupling behavior that has been observed in the absence of direct activism.

Indirect Effects on the Creation and Destruction of Market Opportunities

As shown in Table 3, an increasingly prominent theme in research on social activism involves effects on the rise and fall of whole markets and industries. As activists attempt to delegitimize the status quo, offering new templates for organizational acceptable decision-making, they often create sociocultural

spaces that can be translated into entrepreneurial opportunities. For example, Weber et al. (2008) showed how a loose coalition of activists and entrepreneurial pioneers spurred the market for grass-fed meat and dairy products, by constructing a meaningful contrast between the existing system of large-scale industrial agriculture—as inauthentic, unsustainable, and unnatural—and the new marketplace they envisioned. These concepts helped recruit new market participants who were ideologically motivated but who also were able to perceive and articulate market value as a result of the meaning work done by social activists. In their study of the Grange, an anti-corporate movement promoting the spread of cooperative forms of organizations, Schneiberg et al. (2008; Schneiberg, 2013) found that the strength of the activist groups, as well as the strength of corporate counter-mobilization against them, helped give rise to these organizational forms.

In general terms, the development of market opportunities can be traced to changes in the availability of factors of production, as well as changes in logics and cognitive structure in institutional fields—each of which can be profoundly shaped by social activism (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Schneiberg et al., 2008). In their historical analysis, Hiatt et al. (2009) showed that as Women’s Christian Temperance Movement activists targeted alcohol producers, this created opportunities for soft-drink manufacturers by both altering the norms and beliefs of consumers, and increasing the availability of resources. Research by Sine and colleagues on the effects of the contemporary environmental movement has also lent support to this idea, showing how the wind power industry emerged out of environmentalists’ efforts, shifting the legitimacy of industrial products, and assisting in the development of infrastructure that supported the new industry (Carlos et al., 2014; Sine & Lee, 2009). Further elaborating on the dynamics of activism spillovers, Pacheco and Dean (2014) showed that firms considering a new market respond to activism as an indicator of market support when there are fewer competitor signals to follow—but they respond to activism less when they have plenty of competitor action to guide them instead.

While management scholars have shown great interest in understanding the production of market opportunities as an outcome of social activism, they have tended to focus almost exclusively on outsider activists affecting practices in organizations and beyond (see the third panel in Table 3). Indeed, unpacking the mechanisms through which insider and outsider activists can differently assist the formation of new markets remains an unexplored but ripe area of research. To begin with, future researchers may examine the relative effectiveness of insider versus outsider activists in engendering new market opportunities. Do insider and outsider activists differ in their contribution to the creation of market opportunities that complement versus substitute existing organizations and industries? Since insider activists rely on persuasion and information provision for gaining influence, do they assist the survival of

existing organizations, as opposed to bringing about their replacement by new players? Are insider activists more likely to instigate incremental change in industries by legitimizing new practices, versus outsider activists who may be better positioned to disrupt the existing institutional order?

Indirect Effects on Further Mobilization of Activists

In their influential review article on diffusion processes, Strang and Soule (1998) summarized a significant body of research showing how social activists influence each others' behaviors in a range of social movement contexts. Activism levied against one target has the potential to spark further activist efforts, representing spillovers across geographic locations, organizational fields, and institutional domains. Activists groups borrow framing and rhetorical strategies, and tactical repertoire, from other activist groups, allowing mobilization on a greater scale than isolated acts of protest would allow (Andrews & Biggs, 2006; Tilly & Tarrow, 2006); such effects even ripple out from one social movement to other movements focused on different social issues (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). From the point of view of management scholars, these indirect effects of activism on movement mobilization may be less central to organizational change outcomes, yet they still represent an important upstream dynamic that shapes the pattern of activism toward organizations. In the fourth panel of Table 3, we show that only a small body of research has examined these indirect effects of activism on further mobilization in organizational settings.

This diffusion-of-mobilization process can occur through two pathways. First, activism levied against target organizations can energize participants to push for change in other settings. For example, in her study of sit-ins during civil rights movement, Polletta (1998) posited that the narratives of sit-ins repeatedly recounted by activists energized other activists who then adopted that tactic themselves in other locations. In the campus divestment movement, Soule (1997) observed that student activists' use of "shantytown" tactics spread across campuses even despite the lack of evidence for their efficacy. In the historical context of the Bengal native army, Rao and Dutta (2012) found mutiny—a highly disruptive form of activist tactic—to be quite contagious, as the likelihood of mutiny in a given locale increased with the number, proximity, and recency of prior mutinous events.

In a second diffusion-of-mobilization process, the indirect effect of activism on future mobilization hinges on visible activist successes, such that it is these successes that inspire other activists more than the activism on its own. Successes are more newsworthy, and lead others to perceive a greater likelihood of achieving their own success if they risk taking action. This latter process is consistent with the rationality-based learning theory of diffusion that will be familiar to management scholars, in which actors who observe successful

outcomes of practice adoption among their peers infer that they may have similar success (Greve, 2005; Kim & Miner, 2007).²

These indirect effects of activism on further mobilization may also vary across activist types. Most obviously, it seems likely that outsider activists, who do not fear backlash, will more often choose to publicly denounce

Table 4 Areas for Future Research

-
1. *Off-diagonal conditions in the insider–outsider framework*
 - Under what conditions do social activists experience “off-diagonal” conditions (i.e. high knowledge about the target organization, but low dependence on it)?
 - What are the implications of off-diagonal conditions for activism and responses to it?
 2. *Identification as a new dimension in the insider–outsider framework*
 - How does individual identification with the target organization affect potential activists (apart from knowledge or resource dependence)?
 - How does identification with the target affect oppositional emotion, activist identity formation, or motivation to participate in activism?
 3. *Studying the indirect effects of activism*
 - How do indirect effects extend to non-targeted organizations? To market creation and destruction? To public policy? To third-parties such as investors, professionals, or consultants?
 - When do these indirect effects lead to extensive field-level change?
 4. *Connections across types of activists, and blurring of activist distinctions*
 - How does collaboration work between insiders, outsiders, and partial members?
 - What is the nature of corporate-sponsored activism?
 - When do flank effects, and other interactive effects of uncoordinated activist efforts, emerge?
 5. *Opportunity structures for activism at the organizational level*
 - What are the important elements of the opportunity structure, such as organizational culture and ideology? Organizational leadership? Formal organizational structure?
 - How does the opportunity structures for whistle-blowing relate to the opportunity structure for social activism?
 6. *The role of information and communication technology (ICT)*
 - How do new ICT-enabled tactics for influence and mobilization work?
 - What are the implications of new ICT-enabled opportunities for surveillance efforts by targets, activists, and others?
 7. *The role of national and regional institutional context*
 - Urgently needed: research on emerging market contexts
 - What are the effects of national and regional variation in legal and cultural institutions on activism targeting organizations, and the responses of those organizations?
 8. *Methodological opportunities and challenges*
 - More single-issue studies to pinpoint influence mechanisms in organizational fields
 - Integration of insights from single- and multi-issue activism research traditions
 - Real-time field studies of organizational decision-makers responding to activism
-

organizational targets, drawing media attention by highlighting corporate wrongdoing. Insider activists, in contrast, are apt to be wary of publicly criticizing their employer, instead choosing to mobilize and share information quietly through social networks and less-visible channels.

Moving the Field Forward

Building on our literature review, we foresee several areas for making future contributions. Some research opportunities reflect themes in our framework, including categories of activists and mechanisms of influence that need more attention. Taking stock of the distribution of studies across types of activists in recent research (see Table 3), it seems fair to say that outsider activists have received the lion's share of attention. In terms of both direct and indirect effects, opportunities exist to study insiders, such as employee activists, as well as other partial-member activists, such as shareholders. In terms of tactics and mechanisms of influence, disruption has received much more attention than persuasion—although adequate detail is lacking on the operation of virtually every disruption and persuasion mechanism, as scholars have seldom put the theorized mechanisms to a full empirical test. Finally, research is relatively sparse on the indirect effects on new markets, and in connection with third parties such as industry associations, professions, and regulators. Below we offer eight further promising themes for future research, which we also list in Table 4.

Off-diagonal Conditions in the Insider–Outsider Framework

The two insider–outsider dimensions we highlighted in this review, summarized in Table 2, tend to correlate. However, there are some structural situations where the two dimensions diverge, creating “off-diagonal” conditions. In particular, the combination of low dependence and high knowledge appears interesting to study, because—from the vantage of the activists—it combines insight into the target organization with freedom from the influence of that target organization.³

For example, such an off-diagonal condition arises as individuals leave their organizations, becoming ex-members. For a period of time, ex-members are likely to enjoy a strong stock of knowledge about their former organization, while at the same time having just reduced their economic dependence on the organization greatly. This ex-member status could thus provide an advantage for those who initiate or increase their activist efforts. Indeed, anecdotal information suggests that former employees, university alumni, and military veterans can make for potent critics of those institutions, in part because of the knowledge they possess (Figueroa, 2014; Mott, 2004). As a result, ex-members may perceive a greater ability to engage in activism, including more disruptive forms of activism, relative to their former colleagues who remain organizational members.

The conditions under which such ex-members are motivated to engage in activism toward their former organizations remains to be explored.

In a similar manner, some contract employees, consultants, and professional service workers operating at a client site may have access to knowledge without much dependence. Contractors may gain insights into an organization's operations while remaining relatively less dependent on it for material and social resources. Temporary organizational members may similarly occupy a high knowledge/low dependence position. Kellogg (2011) found that certain temporary insiders had a special role in driving change in the surgical wards she studied: residents who knew they were "moving through" and would be gone after one year were more willing to risk disrupting operations in order to effect change. Some professional experts may also enjoy status vis-a-vis target organizations that allows them to pursue insider tactics more safely and effectively (Heinze & Weber, 2016). This suggests a potentially unique activist role for temporary insiders and others with insider privileges who are buffered from the full repercussions of risky protest. That said, the dependence—and activism potential—of individuals in these positions will depend on the extent to which other members of the targeted organizations are able to retaliate against them, for example, by influencing other potential exchange partners to avoid them.

Identification as a Dimension of the Insider–Outsider Framework

In synthesizing recent research, we have focused on resource dependence and local knowledge as two dimensions underlying activists' relationship with target organizations. However, recent literature in both sociology and management has suggested another facet that may be fruitfully explored in future research: activists' identification with the target organization. Some stakeholders, such as current and former employees, and members of the community where an organization is located, may identify with the organization in ways that matter beyond their relative dependence on the organization. Similarly, some stakeholders with high dependence (e.g. some employees and suppliers) may lack identification and view their relationship as purely transactional. Like relative dependence and knowledge of the target, activist identification with the target organization may be important to the extent that it shapes tactics and outcomes for activists. Indeed, Meyerson and Scully (1995) suggested that LGBT employee activists' identification with their employer organization affects their framing and choice of tactics. Future work may extend these insights by exploring how identification shapes activism across the spectrum of different activist types.

Several threads in existing sociology and management research suggest avenues for studying the identification of activists with target organizations. Sociological research on social movements has traditionally viewed activists' identification with the grievance *issue*, or those claiming the grievance, as a

precondition for individuals to engage in social activism, and choosing their tactical repertoire (Clemens, 1997; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Stets & Burke, 2000). The key insight here is that activists decide to undertake costly and risky actions not just to advance their instrumental interests, but because of their identification with the issue, and with fellow claims-makers and with the SMO (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982; Hunt & Benford, 2004; Snow & McAdam, 2000). The crystallization of an “oppositional” identity, or a shared identity amongst individuals who stand opposed to the status quo, fundamentally shapes how activists experience and seek to resolve the grievance. In management research, stakeholder theorists have also proposed that activist group members’ identification with the activist group, and identities of the activists’ groups vis-a-vis each other may predict activist actions (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Further, an extensive body of research on organizational identification shows that the organizational members’ behaviors are shaped by identification processes (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013). Entrepreneurship scholars have also recently explored how founders’ social identifications with different social groups shapes their choices in developing the structure and culture of their ventures (Wry & York, 2015).

In what might be considered an extreme case, Kellogg’s (2011) ethnography on surgical residents showed how tensions over identification with the target institution profoundly affect insider activists. In the hospitals she studied, low-status reformers faced an overwhelming socialization process designed to transform them into hide-bound conformist “iron men.” Reformers thus sought to forge new identities that were both oppositional—in the sense that they opposed the status quo in the target institution—and at the same time accepted within the framework of the target institution, as they hewed to unassailable organizational goals such as patient safety in hospitals. This study provides initial evidence suggesting that insider activists’ identification with their employer organization may matter above and beyond their resource dependence.

It seems opportune to extend thinking on how activist identification with the target affects the behavior of activists, and perhaps also that of organizational decision-makers. Does a shared identification with a common target play a role in forging collective identity among activists? Are activists who identify with the target less likely to experience oppositional emotions (Whitaker, 2001)? Those who strongly identify with the target organization may feel more anxiety or emotional dissonance on recognizing a conflict between their organization and their values. How do activists resolve that dissonance? Under what conditions does greater identification with the target increase activism? Studying the effects of university scandals on giving patterns of alumni and non-alumni donors, Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, and Hubbard (2016) found that high-identification stakeholders (i.e. alumni) were more likely to increase their support for the organization, whereas low-identification stakeholders

tended to withdraw their support. Extending this logic, would the activists who identify with the target organization be more likely to rely on persuasion-based tactics, instead of disruption-based tactics? How does access to local knowledge affect the behavior of activists with high versus low organizational identification? Are decision-makers more likely to respond favorably to high-identification activists to maintain their long-term relationship? Or, are decision-makers more likely to assume that high-identification employees will not engage in disruptive activism that can cause reputational damage, reducing their openness to activist concerns?

Studying the Indirect Effects of Activism

Scholars have made strides in unpacking how activists instigate wider changes in organizational fields. This is an important area of research, as it allows us to move beyond conceptualizing activist–organization interaction as a simple dyadic phenomenon, toward an understanding of the full scope of activist influences. This line of inquiry is also relevant for advancing research on institutional, or field-level change, by offering one pathway for understanding how societal pressures get translated into institutional changes (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012; Van Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma, & den Hond, 2013).

Among the different types of indirect effects identified in our review, spillover effects on other organizations seem to have received the most cumulative attention. Yet even here, many interesting questions remain. For example, work in diffusion theory suggests that practices can be implemented and adapted in substantially different ways as they diffuse (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010). If that is true, what role do activists play in shaping those implementation patterns (Scully et al., 2015)? In their case study of the Dutch outbound tourism industry, Van Wijk et al. (2013) found that over time, activists were able to recruit the cooperation of incumbents by diluting their radical aims and supporting the adoption of pragmatic solutions. Such compromise processes clearly play an important role in shaping the practice changes that eventually take hold in many instances. What role do insider activists play in this process in comparison with outsider activists, given insiders' superior access to internal knowledge of organizational goals?

Compared with indirect effects on other organizations, it seems that less work has been done to understand other types of indirect effects. As mentioned earlier, researchers may clarify how different types of activist types vary in their ability and approach to creating new market opportunities. What are the conditions that enable insider versus outsider activists to create new markets that further their goals? What are the tactical efforts that are more likely to give rise to new market opportunities? How

exactly are social ventures and commercial entrepreneurs monetizing the sentiments mobilized by social activists?

Another important extension of this research could be to consider changes in public policy as an indirect effect of activists' targeting of organizations. Social movement theorists have tended to think of governments as the targets of activists seeking to influence industrial activity via legislative and regulatory changes, for example, as activists lobby governments to enforce stricter pollution standards. Sometimes the opposite process can be at play, namely activists target organizations, and after a critical mass of organizations make changes, then legislators agree to update their policies. For example, Soule et al. (2014) showed how groups such as the Free Burma Coalition protested corporate investors to divest from Burma, with the ultimate goal of building pressure on the Burmese government to curb human rights abuses.

Activism in and around organizations can also have effects on various kinds of third parties operating in the organizational field that activists are targeting. For example, several recent papers have shown how, in the aggregate, investors and equity analysts respond to activism against publicly traded companies (Henisz et al., 2014; Kayser, 2015; King & Soule, 2007; Vasi & King, 2012). Yet those studies tend to black-box the process of sensemaking in the investor community. Future studies may shed light on how investors and analysts interpret social activism, and how they prognosticate about the consequences of activism for organizations. In a sense, these actors are also acting as armchair social scientists, seeking to anticipate and hedge against the effects of activism. Studies might also consider the structure of communication channels between activists and investors, and how they matter.

Another type of third parties, professional consultants, are involved in helping organizational decision-makers respond to activism, as well as formulate strategies and implement practices related to the social issues that activists focus on. For example, employee benefits consultants and actuaries helped corporations adopt innovative practices that avoided backlash from employees and retirees as they scaled back on their retiree benefit obligations (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). On a wider scale across varied social issues, decades of social activism indirectly fueled the growth of an industry of public relations consultants (Walker, 2014), who promise to safeguard firms from activist influence (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Given the critical roles that third-party actors play in the organizational fields where they operate, it would seem prudent to deepen our understanding of how they react and interact with social activists.

Connections Across Types of Activists and Blurring of Activist Distinctions

Interestingly, activists of different types sometimes join hands to mount challenges against organizational targets. In her book on the US women's movement, Banaszak (2010) highlighted the importance of coordination between

activists inside and outside the federal government, in furthering the movement's goals. Rojas (2012) distinguished some types of student activism on college campuses that are sponsored by outside groups whose goals are largely unconnected with the academic activities performed by universities. While scholars have noted a degree of collaboration between insider and outsider activists in the recycling (Lounsbury, 2001), LGBT (Raeburn, 2004), and anti-sweatshop movements (Briscoe et al., 2015), this phenomenon has not been subjected to much scholarly inquiry. Future research may examine the challenges and opportunities that come about in the process of these collaborations. Are insider activists able to offset their resource dependence disadvantages by collaborating with outsider activists? Does the disruptive potential of outsider activism become heightened through access to insider knowledge of the organization? Do the effects of (threat-based) outsider activists and (sociocultural) insider activists act as substitutes or complements to one other? When are collaborative channels between types of activist hidden from public view?

A related issue is the blurring of lines between social activists and their targets. While our review, and most prior work on social activism, tends to focus on activism around well-known social issues, we think our framework will be useful for future scholarship at the increasingly blurry intersection of social activism and financial value creation in markets, where some individuals and organizational actors purport to be pursuing both simultaneously (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Canales, 2013). McDonnell (2015) found that sometimes companies will participate in product boycotts and other actions that represent "corporate-sponsored" activism, & Walker (2009) shows how companies engage public affairs consultants to produce "corporate grassroots" mobilization.

Such blurring of boundaries raises many important questions, and suggests we think about mobilization in a more expansive way to include commercial actors and other types of actors in the wider field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, & MacIndoe, 2005). In what ways can civil society institutions that are sponsored by industrial concerns, such as voluntary private regulatory bodies like the Fair Labor Association, be considered SMOs? What about entities that are co-sponsored by companies and activists, such as the online "boundary organizations" that O'Mahony and Bechky (2008) studied? How can companies that are both sponsors of social activism and targets of it, such as Patagonia or Starbucks, be understood as elements of the activist ecosystem? Concerning insider activism in particular, how can senior executives be understood to be engaging in social activism (Yue, 2015)? When does "corporate-sponsored" activism reflect the work of insider activists who are not visible to the public? And what are the implications of formal alliances, corporate board interlocks, or informal networks

that link organizations in targeted fields with activist groups seeking to change those fields?

Connections among activist types may also emerge when we look across various stages of a macro change process in an organizational field. For example, disruption may serve to propel change early on, garnering public attention and forcing some limited concessions, while persuasion comes to the fore later on. McDonnell et al. (2015) found that initial activism led corporations to adopt social management devices, including public commitment aligned with activist goals, which over time increased their susceptibility to activist claims. In the same vein, Briscoe et al. (2015) found that if an organization's rivals experienced disruptive tactics, then later on it was more likely to respond positively to persuasive pressure and the spread of concessions in its environment. These findings are broadly consistent with the "flank effect" in which the presence of radical activists leads decision-makers to be more willing to work with moderate activists (Haines, 1984).

Individuals may also serve as conduits linking insider and outsider activists through their careers. Sociologists studying social movements have documented activist careers and their impacts in the civil rights, women's, and far-right movements (Clemens, 1999; Linden & Klandermans, 2007; McAdam, 1989). Few major studies have focused on careers that intersect social activism with business or other organizational fields, yet individuals who work or volunteer in activist organizations can obviously also be professional employees of targeted organizations, either at the same time or at different times in their careers. These people are likely to serve as conduits for knowledge, values, and influence between the activist sector and the business sector. Work in management research points to the role of inter-organizational mobility in driving organizational learning and innovation (e.g. Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003)—how do these mobility patterns also operate to shape social activism and its effects in and around organizations? In a related study, Moore (2009) showed how scientists working in government and university research labs became activists, forming organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, to protest against the use of science in military applications. Conversely, Epstein (1995) found that AIDS treatment activists were able to achieve something close to insider status, as they became a source of valued expertise for the medical research community that they were targeting. What role is played by institutions that aim to stimulate and configure such cross-sector careers, like Patagonia's Tools for Grassroots Activists conference, or Environmental Defense Fund's Climate Corps program?

Opportunity Structures for Activism at the Organizational Level

The idea of a corporate or organizational "opportunity structure" for activism focuses on how different features of organizations and their environments will

make them more attractive as activist targets. Elements of an organization's environment that contribute to the opportunity structure include industry conditions, national contexts, and regulatory pressures (Baron, 2001; Schurman, 2004; Zhang & Luo, 2013). More recently scholars have pointed to factors within the target organizations that serve as opportunity structures for activists (Briscoe et al., 2014; Kellogg, 2011; King, 2008a). There are significant opportunities for management scholars to theorize and test both external and internal elements of the opportunity structure. Here we highlight opportunities related to organizational culture and ideology, organizational leadership, and formal organizational structure.

For the last several decades, organizational culture has occupied a central position in both micro- and macro-organization studies (Giorgi, Lockwood, & Glynn, 2015). Over time organizations tend to develop shared values, beliefs, and norms that guide decision-making inside the firm (Chatman, 1991). Differing organizational cultures can silence workers, or conversely encourage them to voice concerns (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Hence, social movement scholars may find value in examining how different cultural values in the workplace promote different forms of insider activism and enable activists to influence practices in different ways (Waldron et al., 2013). For example, in Katzenstein's (1998) comparative analysis of feminist activism inside the US military and the Catholic Church, she found differences in activist influence tactics between the two settings that reflected contrasting normative conditions. In the military, a merit-based, legalistic, hierarchical culture led activists to focus on letter-of-the-law discrimination and to target top decision-makers for persuasion; the church shared some cultural similarities, but the church's social-justice heritage led activists there to pursue tactics involving a far-reaching "meaning-making" project, reinterpreting the church's stance on socially excluded groups in light of its traditional mission, and gathering support closer to the grassroots level.

Across all types of organizations, the centrality of culture to organizational decision-making suggests a range of interesting questions related to social activism. Do organizational cultures with strong norms of integrity encourage employees to engage in social activism or whistle-blowing? Does a "customer orientation" culture increase the odds of capitulating to consumer boycotts? Can we predict where activism will emerge within an organization based on the normative climates or occupational cultures of different organizational departments or subunits? Beyond organizational culture that is "locally produced" inside the firm, organizations also can embody distinct positions along the ideological spectrum of society at large, for example, representing greater liberalism versus conservatism (Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2015). How do activists perceive these ideological differences? Gupta (2015) found liberal firms more likely to concede to activism demands, while conservative companies were more likely to engage in impression-management tactics.

Do liberal firms respond more often to persuasion tactics from insiders? Do conservative companies respond differently to disruptive threats?

Scholars in both micro and macro areas of management recognize the importance of leadership. A large body of research indicates that the demographic and psychological attributes of top executives affect behaviors and outcomes in organizations (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). Indeed, scholars have just begun to attend to how attributes and dynamics among top executives may shape the behaviors and influence other constituents in and around organizations. In their qualitative study, Weber et al. (2009) showed that conflict among top executives of German biotech firms allowed activists to have a greater influence on the industry. Briscoe et al. (2014) showed that CEO political liberalism predicted LGBT activist group formation. Scholars may extend this research to consider how the attributes and behaviors of directors and senior executives shape activist efforts, including their framing strategies and tactical choices. Internal activism may well be predicted by leader attributes across multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy, as work by Detert and Trevino (2010) shows that an employee's voice can be enabled or stifled by managers throughout the chain of command. Other unanswered questions include whether alignment between the values of activists and firm leadership encourages (or inhibits) activism. Finally, some types of leaders may be likely to concede to disruptive actions by outsider activists, while others may be likely to retaliate against it.

Of course, a consideration of culture, ideology, and values in the context of social activism would not be complete without acknowledging the role that these factors play among activists themselves. Although most activism appears to be liberal in ideological orientation, there are certainly also instances of ideologically conservative social activism in and around organizations. Few studies have operationalized the ideological valence of activists themselves. What predicts activist-target alignment? Given their greater dependence and knowledge, are insider activists more sensitive to alignment, compared with outsiders?

Formal organizational structure is also likely to influence social activism. Just as society-level structural conditions shape the occurrence and success of activism within a country or region (Doh & Guay, 2006; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1995), the structural conditions inside organizations should shape activism and its effects. Building on early research in organizational theory, scholars may examine whether insider activism is more likely to arise in organizations with flatter structures or more hierarchical structures (Morrill, Zald, & Rao, 2003). Building on insights from employment relations research, what are the effects on employee activism from bureaucratic structures and personnel systems intended to accommodate worker needs and grievances (Dunlop, 1958; Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1986)? Do structures that curb supervisor abuses ameliorate feelings of collective worker resistance

(Roscigno & Hodson, 2004)? Zald et al. (2005) suggest that organizations with an “open polity”—characterized by more decentralized decision-making—will tend to interact more with, and be more influenced by, external social movements. Do flatter structures promote instances of insider activism by increasing employees’ perception of achieving change or preempt activism by providing institutionalize channels of influence to employees? Given that activists’ tactical disruptiveness depends on their perceptions about targets’ capacity to retaliate (Walker et al., 2008), does employees’ structural position in the organization vis-à-vis senior management reduce their likelihood of engaging in disruptive activism? An organization’s human resource policies may also affect the extent to which it attracts or deflects activist targeting. Although, on the face of it, it appears that employees have more reasons to target companies with less-employee-friendly policies (Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004), the opposite reasoning has also received some empirical support. King and McDonnell (2012) found that companies with higher CSR commitments (which includes employee rights and diversity) more often become the targets of consumer boycotts.

Lastly, as we mentioned earlier, both whistle-blowing and social movement researchers have studied where and when disruptive disclosure tactics occur (Near, Dworkin, & Miceli, 1993). Thus, we would encourage joint consideration of the factors that represent opportunity structures for these two types of voice behaviors in organizations. To date, these literatures have remained mostly separate, with whistle-blowing work focusing on social-psychological antecedents of (usually individual) behavior, and movements researchers focusing on structural factors influencing (usually collective) mobilization and tactics. Future research may help to theoretically and empirically integrate these research streams. How do they co-occur? Do the opportunity structures that have been identified to predict activism apply to whistle-blowing? How does disruption caused by whistle-blowing affect an organization’s likelihood of experiencing insider activism?

The Role of Information and Communication Technology

The way activists operate and influence organizations may be evolving along with developments in information and communication technology (ICT). Earl and Kimport (2011) argued that advances in ICT have dramatically increased instances of online activism, by lowering the costs of participation for activists, and reducing the need for mobilizing infrastructure by SMOs. A recent study by Vasi et al. (2015) provided an example of how activist tactics affect can leverage the power of ICT to enable changes in society. They showed how the release of the documentary “Gasland,” which shed light on the negative impact of fracking on communities, affected the passage of fracking moratoria in several states by eliciting greater online participation, and media attention. Indeed, on the face

of it, it appears that technology is a helpful tool in the hands of activists seeking to bring about changes in the practices of organizations. Zhang and Luo's (2013) study of activism to increase corporate philanthropy in China also showed that online activist campaigns using popular social media platforms can generate significant concessions.

Widespread internet use, social media, and free file- and video-sharing sites have facilitated the transmission of persuasive information about social issues, as well as information implicating organizations or their leaders in relation to social issues. How do activists benefit from ICT use to amplify their public claims about organizations and their role in social issues? Have these technologies diminished the role of the traditional print media? One implication may be that insider activists and whistleblowers, in particular, find it easier to transmit insider knowledge to outsider groups that have less relative dependence on the organization, and greater disruptive capacity. Recent examples, from the WikiLeaks scandal to the reporting of SeaWorld's controversial practices through the "Blackfish" documentary, suggest insider activists are acting on this newfound capability.

If ICT developments enable persuasion tactics by facilitating the duplication and transmission of information, they might be particularly important in shaping the indirect effects of activism. For example, in their recent campaigns, campus anti-sweatshop activists released videos and information documenting victim testimonials, which were then circulated by students—and which were discussed by university administrators on their own listservs—fueling concessions at schools that were not initially targeted by activists (Briscoe et al., 2015). This suggests a potent role for organizational members who have (or control) access to ICT resources, in shaping the indirect effects of activism.

Of course, organizations themselves are also routinizing the use of ICT for close monitoring of activists and counter-mobilization. Companies now routinely hire social media professionals to help manage perceptions of their images and their products (Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010). There are even consulting firms that will help companies to identify employees who are well suited to serve as social media advocates for the company's positions on social issues that are important to their business (Higginbottom, 2014). So what is the net result of these ICT developments? If organizational decision-makers fear that activist controversies will "blow up" even more easily in the internet era, might they be more responsive (or even proactive) to activist tactics?

Just like any other form of activist efforts, the efficacy of ICT for different types of activists should also be subjected to empirical examination. Lewis et al. (2014) showed that even though the "Save Darfur" campaign on Facebook managed to get a significant number of "clicks", very few of them translated into actual donations for the cause. These findings about the limitation of ICT for eliciting committed activism may also provide insights for organizationally focused activism. How do activists combine online campaigns,

which can generate rapid awareness, with offline efforts that engender greater commitment among members? When do social media campaigns on their own build credible reputational threats against organizations?

The Role of National and Regional Institutional Context

Building on political opportunity/political process theories (McAdam, 1996), it seems quite likely that the behavior of activists in and around organizations will depend on national and regional institutional context. Research on this topic is lacking, especially in emerging markets, where government intervention in business is high and political freedoms are limited (Marquis & Raynard, 2015). Those conditions are likely to shape the behaviors of different types of activists targeting companies and other organizations. For example, in contexts where disruptive protest tactics meet harsh reprisal, influence mechanisms, and tactical repertoires are likely to be altered. Within one emerging market context, Zhang and Luo (2013) found that persuasion-based shaming tactics led by consumers significantly influenced corporate philanthropy decisions after the Szechuan earthquake disaster. Conversely, although little research has been done to date, disruptive employee protests, including strikes and work stoppages, appear common in emerging market contexts where labor is in short supply, and workers therefore have some degree of bargaining power (Elfstrom & Kuruvilla, 2014, 2015).

Many fundamental comparative institutional questions need addressing. How do organizations based in various country contexts differ in their responses to disruptive versus persuasion-based tactics? How does a country's worker rights regime, or underlying national ideological tendencies, affect the presence of, and response to, insider activism? Within a given country such as the United States, regional variation in the legal protections enjoyed by employees may affect the frequency and character of insider activism. Do changes in ideological slant or legal status over time, within countries, states or regions, affect the relative presence and success of insider versus outsider activism? Under what institutional conditions are organizational leaders more permissive of insider activism? Do activists' chances of harnessing threat-based versus legitimacy-based indirect effects depend on national context? Foreignness itself may be a factor that shapes the way activists approach targeted organizations. Crilly, Ni, and Jiang (2015) recently found that companies engaging in social responsibility practices receive different responses from activists depend on whether the company is local or foreign. This suggests another interesting avenue to explore based on companies' home institutional context relative to the countries in which they are operating. And, once successfully pressured to adopt a change in one country, (when) do multinationals tend to then adopt those changes globally?

Methodological Opportunities and Challenges

As the literature on social activism in and around organizations has grown, there are some discernible methodological choices and challenges that researchers have encountered. While providing a full inventory of those issues is beyond the scope of this article, we discuss some key areas that connect with the framework we described above.

Single- versus multi-movement studies. Most quantitative studies of activism in and around organizations can be divided into multi-movement studies, which combine a heterogeneous collection of activists and protest tactics into one large sample—and single-movement studies focusing on one particular social movement (common issue, similar activist types and tactics). The advantage of combining diverse instances of activism is that it allows researchers to create large samples and observe central tendencies. The downside is that such a mixture of activist types and tactics is likely to conflate the different mechanisms underlying activist influence—which may be why multi-movement studies often paint a rudimentary description of the mechanism, alluding to activists “building pressure” or “threatening reputational damage.” Moreover, the diversity of activist types, issues, and responses makes it harder to assess indirect effects, as the processes underlying spillover effects can also vary substantially across different types of activist and their tactics. These factors lead us to recommend more single-movement or single-issue studies, to understand influence mechanisms and indirect effects.

Revealing social activism and decision-making inside organizations. To adequately understand the mechanisms through which activists influence targets, we need more studies of insider activism, as well as studies that reveal the linkages between all types of activists and the internal workings of targeted organizations. There are significant challenges in collecting and analyzing data for these purposes. One approach is to identify an organizational research site where activism is brewing, either insider or outside the organization, to conduct an in-depth field study in real time (e.g. Kellogg, 2011). Researchers need to commit a significant amount of time and energy toward first gaining trust and access to the study site, and then toward engaging in real-time participant observation and/or longitudinal interviews in order to observe or reconstruct “thick descriptions” of the social, political, and cultural processes occurring in relation to activist efforts. Where fruitful, scholars may gain insights into how insiders mobilize and influence decision-making. For example, in a recent study of this type, Soderstrom and Weber (2015) used this research design to study critical moments of interaction among nascent activists inside a firm, observing how these interactions were repeated, leading to feelings of collective solidarity and momentum, fueling the development of a noteworthy change effort.

Particularly challenging to execute—but potentially very insightful—would be studies on the decision-making processes of top management teams deliberating about how to respond to activist demands; as Kaplan (2008) has shown, researchers can observe the “framing contests” playing out during executive deliberations using ethnographic methods and/or meeting minutes. We also would add that in addition to insider activism occurring within established companies, universities, hospitals, and so forth, it would likely be instructive to examine insider activism taking place in entrepreneurial organizations, where structural and cultural elements may be more fluid and dynamic, as well as in social ventures, where sentiments related to social issues are likely to be prominent—but not necessarily settled.

A second approach to studying social activism inside organizations—which we think is complementary and potentially could be combined with a qualitative field study—involves utilizing data from an organization’s computer systems to analyze social and organizational interactions with, and responses to, activism. Because so much of life now occurs online, there are likely to be detailed electronic residues left by activist micromobilization efforts inside organizations. There are also likely to be electronic traces that reveal various intended and unintended impacts of activism throughout the organization. Such residues might be used, for example, to map the dynamic emergence of a network of internal (and external) activists over time, or for an event history analysis of who is recruited into the movement from within the organization’s ranks. As with any field study, gaining the trust of individual participants as well as organizational gatekeepers for this purpose will be challenging, but not necessarily impossible.

Studying online activism. Developments in ICT have increasingly equipped researchers with an ability to create large datasets on instances of social activism, yet few studies have leveraged these opportunities. In their recent study, Vasi et al. (2015) used internet data to capture online mobilization in response to the anti-fracking documentary. Social movements’ studies, which have traditionally relied on print media to capture instances of activism, may assemble richer datasets for all types of activism using ICT resources. These data collection approaches may potentially enable researchers to put our entire framework to test, that is scholars may contrast and compare the relative influence, tactics, and mechanisms for insider versus outsider activists. This could also be a significant step toward testing theories of where, when, and what type of activism emerges (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Mena & Waeger, 2014; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). As noted above, ICT-enabled tools may be particularly advantageous for observing insider activism; this contrasts with a tendency in existing studies to rely on print media, which is better suited for studying disruptive forms of activism (Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005).

Conclusion

Taking stock of relevant streams in management and social science research, we have described the current state-of-the-art in research on activism in and around organizations. We structured our review around different types of activists, and their varying effects on organizational targets and other actors. Bringing together work from relatively disconnected traditions, we identified common themes and cumulative findings, and delineated areas that are ripe for scholarly attention.

Findings from our review highlight several research opportunities, including the need to better understand insider activists and partial-member activists, and to fathom the details of how persuasion tactics and other “soft” influence processes work. We would further suggest that scholars endeavor to explore the full range of indirect effects that result from activist efforts in and around organizations. Finally, we see valuable opportunities to unpack the effects of evolving societal trends on social activism, including the use of internet and communication technologies, and to identify and assess the precise micro-mechanisms underlying activist influences of all types.

Endnotes

1. Indeed, variation around that central tendency also exists and can be studied. For example, under some conditions, employees can shore up their bargaining power, reducing dependence on a target organization. When employees can credibly threaten to withhold their collective labor, and if substitutes for their labor inputs to the organization are limited, their relative dependence is greatly reduced (Commons, 1934). This should expand tactical repertoire options and increase the odds of success for employee activists.
2. Movement spillover effects can be viewed through an ecological lens, as the rise and fall of SMO populations affects their legitimacy, and the intensity of competition for resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Minkoff, 1997).
3. The other off-diagonal condition, involving low knowledge and high dependence, might be found to hold for members of coercive organizations or “total institutions” such as prisons, asylums, cults, militias, nursing homes, work camps, and so on (Goffman, 1961).

References

- Alinsky, S. D. (1971). *Rules for radicals: A pragmatic primer for realistic radicals*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Amenta, E., Carruthers, B. G., & Zylan, Y. (1992). A hero for the aged? The Townsend movement, the political mediation model, and US old-age policy, 1934–1950. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(2), 308–339.
- Andrews, K. T., & Biggs, M. (2006). The dynamics of protest diffusion: Movement organizations, social networks, and news media in the 1960 sit-ins. *American Sociological Review*, 71(5), 752–777.

- Ansari, S. M., Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2010). Made to fit: How practices vary as they diffuse. *Academy of Management Review*, 35(1), 67–92.
- de Bakker, F. G., den Hond, F., King, B., & Weber, K. (2013). Social movements, civil society and corporations: Taking stock and looking ahead. *Organization Studies*, 34(5–6), 573–593.
- Banaszak, L. (2010). *The women's movement inside and outside the state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baron, D. P. (2001). Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and integrated strategy. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 10(1), 7–45.
- Baron, D. P. (2003). Private politics. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 12(1), 31–66.
- Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D. (2007). Strategic activism and nonmarket strategy. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 16(3), 599–634.
- Bartley, T. (2003). Certifying forests and factories: States, social movements, and the rise of private regulation in the apparel and forest products fields. *Politics & Society*, 31(3), 433–464.
- Bartley, T., & Child, C. (2011). Movements, markets and fields: The effects of anti-sweatshop campaigns on US firms, 1993–2000. *Social Forces*, 90(2), 425–451.
- Bartley, T., & Child, C. (2014). Shaming the corporation: The social production of targets and the anti-sweatshop movement. *American Sociological Review*, 79(4), 653–679.
- Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 53(6), 1419–1440.
- Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 3(1), 65–107.
- Bayer, A. E., & Astin, A. W. (1969). *Campus disruption during 1968–1969* (ACE Research Reports). Washington, DC: American Council on Education.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611–639.
- Briscoe, F., Chin, M. K., & Hambrick, D. C. (2014). CEO ideology as an element of the corporate opportunity structure for social activists. *Academy of Management Journal*, 57(6), 1786–1809.
- Briscoe, F., Gupta, A., & Anner, M. (2015). Social activism and practice diffusion: How activist tactics affect non-targeted organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 60(2), 300–332.
- Briscoe, F., & Murphy, C. (2012). Sleight of hand? Practice opacity, third-party responses, and the interorganizational diffusion of controversial practices. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(4), 553–584.
- Briscoe, F., & Safford, S. (2008). The Nixon-in-China effect: Activism, imitation, and the institutionalization of contentious practices. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53(3), 460–491.
- Briscoe, F., & Safford, S. (2010). Employee affinity groups: Their evolution from social movement vehicle to employer strategies. *Perspectives on Work*, 14(1), 42–45.
- Bundy, J., Shropshire, C., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2013). Strategic cognition and issue salience: Toward an explanation of firm responsiveness to stakeholder concerns. *Academy of Management Review*, 38(3), 352–376.

- Campbell, J. L. (2005). Where do we stand? Common mechanisms in organizations and social movements research. In G. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, & M. Zald (Eds.), *Social movements and organization theory* (pp. 41–68). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Canales, R. (2013). Weaving straw into gold: Managing organizational tensions between standardization and flexibility in microfinance. *Organization Science*, 25(1), 1–28.
- Carlos, W. C., Sine, W. D., Lee, B. H., & Haveman, H. (2014). Gone with the wind: Industry development and the evolution of social movement influence (August 1, 2014). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746274>.
- Carroll, G. R., & Wheaton, D. R. (2009). The organizational construction of authenticity: An examination of contemporary food and dining in the US. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 29, 255–282.
- Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50(2), 167–199.
- Chatman, J. A. (1991). Matching people and organizations: Selection and socialization in public accounting firms. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, 459–484.
- Clemens, E. S. (1997). *The people's lobby: Organizational innovation and the rise of interest group politics in the United States, 1890–1925*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Clemens, E. S. (1999). Securing political returns to social capital: Women's associations in the United States, 1880s–1920s. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 29(4), 613–638.
- Commons, J. (1934). *Institutional economics: Its place in political economy*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Creed, W. D., & Scully, M. A. (2000). Songs of ourselves: Employees' deployment of social identity in workplace encounters. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 9(4), 391–412.
- Creed, W. D., Scully, M. A., & Austin, J. R. (2002). Clothes make the person? The tailoring of legitimating accounts and the social construction of identity. *Organization Science*, 13(5), 475–496.
- Crilly, D., Ni, N., & Jiang, Y. (2015). Do-no-harm versus do-good social responsibility: Attributional thinking and the liability of foreignness. *Strategic Management Journal*. doi:10.1002/smj.2388.
- Crilly, D., & Sloan, P. (2012). Enterprise logic: Explaining corporate attention to stakeholders from the 'inside-out'. *Strategic Management Journal*, 33(10), 1174–1193.
- Dacin, M. T., Dacin, P. A., & Tracey, P. (2011). Social entrepreneurship: A critique and future directions. *Organization Science*, 22(5), 1203–1213.
- Darnall, N., Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (2010). Adopting proactive environmental strategy: The influence of stakeholders and firm size. *Journal of Management Studies*, 47(6), 1072–1094.
- David, P., Bloom, M., & Hillman, A. J. (2007). Investor activism, managerial responsiveness, and corporate social performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 28(1), 91–100.
- Davis, G. E., McAdam, D., Scott, W. R., & Zald, M. N. (Eds.). (2005). *Social movements and organization theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. (1994). A social movement perspective on corporate control. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39(1), 141–173.

- Detert, J. R., & Trevino, L. K. (2010). Speaking up to higher-ups: How supervisors and skip-level leaders influence employee voice. *Organization Science*, 21(1), 249–270.
- Doh, J. P., & Guay, T. R. (2006). Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and NGO activism in Europe and the United States: An institutional-stakeholder perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 43(1), 47–73.
- Dozier, J. B., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Potential predictors of whistle-blowing: A prosocial behavior perspective. *Academy of Management Review*, 10(4), 823–836.
- Dunlop, J. T. (1958). *Industrial relations systems*. New York, NY: Henry Holt.
- Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O’Neill, R. M., & Lawrence, K. A. (2001). Moves that matter: Issue selling and organizational change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(4), 716–736.
- Dworkin, T. M., & Callahan, E. S. (1991). Internal whistleblowing: Protecting the interests of the employee, the organization, and society. *American Business Law Journal*, 29(2), 267–308.
- Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). *Digitally enabled social change: Activism in the internet age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Eesley, C., DeCelles, K. A., & Lenox, M. (2015). Through the mud or in the boardroom: Examining activist types and their strategies in targeting firms for social change. *Strategic Management Journal*. doi:10.1002/smj.2458.
- Eesley, C., & Lenox, M. J. (2006). Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action. *Strategic Management Journal*, 27(8), 765–781.
- Elfstrom, M., & Kuruvilla, S. (2014). The changing nature of labor unrest in China. *Industrial & Labor Relations Review*, 67(2), 453–480.
- Elfstrom, M., & Kuruvilla, S. (2015). *Experimentation and decentralization in China’s labor relations* (Working Paper).
- Epstein, S. (1995). The construction of lay expertise: AIDS activism and the forging of credibility in the reform of clinical trials. *Science, Technology & Human Values*, 20(4), 408–437.
- Figuroa, A. (2014). Former Army Board Staff Lawyer speaks out about unjust practices and calls for reforms. *Fusion News*.
- Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. (2009). *Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2012). *A theory of fields*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Friedman, R. A., & Craig, K. M. (2004). Predicting joining and participating in minority employee network groups. *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, 43(4), 793–816.
- Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. *Academy of Management Review*, 24(2), 191–205.
- Gamson, W. A. (1968). *Power and discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, W. A., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). *Encounters with unjust authority*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, W. A., & Wolfsfeld, G. (1993). Movements and media as interacting systems. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528, 114–125.

- Gioia, D. A., Patvardhan, S. D., Hamilton, A. L., & Corley, K. G. (2013). Organizational identity formation and change. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 7(1), 123–193.
- Giorgi, S., Lockwood, C., & Glynn, M. A. (2015). The many faces of culture: Making sense of 30 years of research on culture in organization studies. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 9(1), 1–54.
- Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds.). (2009). *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Greve, H. R. (2005). Interorganizational learning and heterogeneous social structure. *Organization Studies*, 26(7), 1025–1047.
- Gupta, A. (2015). *Organizational political ideology and firms' market and non-market behavior* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Pennsylvania State University, University Park.
- Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. (2015). *Red, blue, purple firms: Organizational political ideology and corporate social responsibility*. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BC.
- Haines, H. (1984). Black radicalization and the funding of civil rights. *Social Problems*, 32(1), 31–43.
- Haveman, H. A., & Rao, H. (1997). Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: Institutional and organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(6), 1606–1651.
- Haveman, H. A., Rao, H., & Paruchuri, S. (2007). The winds of change: The progressive movement and the bureaucratization of thrift. *American Sociological Review*, 72(1), 117–142.
- Heckscher, C., & Carré, F. (2006). Strength in networks: Employment rights organizations and the problem of Co-ordination. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 44(4), 605–628.
- Heinze, K. L., & Weber, K. (2016). Toward organizational pluralism: Institutional intra-preneurship in integrative medicine. *Organization Science*, 27(1), 157–172.
- Hendry, J. R. (2006). Taking Aim at business what factors lead environmental non-governmental organizations to target particular firms? *Business & Society*, 45(1), 47–86.
- Henisz, W. J., Dorobantu, S., & Nartey, L. J. (2014). Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement. *Strategic Management Journal*, 35(12), 1727–1748.
- Hiatt, S., & Carlos, C. (2015). *Differential effects of collective action on firm entry in the emergent U.S. biodiesel sector*. Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, Vancouver, BC.
- Hiatt, S., Grandy, J., & Lee, B. (2015). Organizational responses to public and private politics: An analysis of climate change activists and U.S. oil & gas firms. *Organization Science*, 26(6), 1769–1786.
- Hiatt, S. R., Sine, W. D., & Tolbert, P. S. (2009). From Pabst to Pepsi: The deinstitutionalization of social practices and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54(4), 635–667.

- Higginbottom, K. (2014, April 14). Social media ignites employee activism. *Forbes*. Retrieved December 22, 2015, from, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2014/04/14/social-media-ignites-employee-activism/>
- Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., Certo, S. T., Dalton, D. R., & Dalton, C. M. (2011). What I like about you: A multilevel study of shareholder discontent with director monitoring. *Organization Science*, 22(3), 675–687.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hoffman, A. J. (2001). *From heresy to dogma: An institutional history of corporate environmentalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- den Hond, F., & de Bakker, F. G. (2007). Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups influence corporate social change activities. *Academy of Management Review*, 32(3), 901–924.
- Hunt, S. A., & Benford, R. D. (2004). Collective identity, solidarity, and commitment. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 433–457). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Hwang, H., & Powell, W. W. (2009). The rationalization of charity: The influences of professionalism in the nonprofit sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54(2), 268–298.
- Ingram, P., Yue, L. Q., & Rao, H. (2010). Trouble in store: Probes, protests, and store openings by Wal-Mart, 1998–2007. *American Journal of Sociology*, 116(1), 53–92.
- Johnson, E. P. (2003). *Appropriating blackness: Performance and the politics of authenticity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kaplan, S. (2008). Framing contests: strategy making under uncertainty. *Organization Science*, 19(5), 729–752.
- Katzenstein, M. (1998). *Faithful and fearless: Moving feminist protest insider the church and military*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kaysers, S. A. (2015). The Cost of Corporate Social Responsibility after a Catastrophe (May 5, 2015). Ross School of Business, Working Paper No. 1261. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543011>.
- Keenan, J. P. (2002). Whistleblowing: A study of managerial differences. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, 14(1), 17–32.
- Kellogg, K. C. (2009). Operating room: Relational spaces and microinstitutional change in surgery. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(3), 657–711.
- Kellogg, K. C. (2011). *Challenging operations: Medical reform and resistance in surgery*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kellogg, K. C. (2012). Making the cut: Using status-based countertactics to block social movement implementation and microinstitutional change in surgery. *Organization Science*, 23(6), 1546–1570.
- Kilduff, M., & Tsai, W. (2003). *Social networks and organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kim, E. H., & Lyon, T. P. (2014). Greenwash vs. brownwash: Exaggeration and undue modesty in corporate sustainability disclosure. *Organization Science*, 26(3), 705–723.
- Kim, J. Y. J., & Miner, A. S. (2007). Vicarious learning from the failures and near-failures of others: Evidence from the US commercial banking industry. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50(3), 687–714.

- King, B. (2008a). A political mediation model of corporate response to social movement activism. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53(3), 395–421.
- King, B. (2008b). A social movement perspective of stakeholder collective action and influence. *Business and Society*, 47(1), 21–49.
- King, B., & McDonnell, M. H. (2012). Good firms, good targets: The relationship between corporate social responsibility, reputation, and activist targeting. In K. Tsutsui & A. Lim (Eds.), *Corporate social responsibility in a globalizing world* (pp. 430–450). Cambridge: Cambridge.
- King, B. G., & Pearce, N. A. (2010). The contentiousness of markets: Politics, social movements, and institutional change in markets. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, 249–267.
- King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. (2007). Social movements as extra-institutional entrepreneurs: The effect of protests on stock price returns. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 52(3), 413–442.
- Kochan, T. A., Katz, H. C., & McKersie, R. B. (1986). *The transformation of American industrial relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kriesi, H. (2004). Political context and opportunity. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 67–90). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Leitzinger, J., & King, B. (2015). *Social movements, stakeholders, and nonmarket strategy*. Paper development workshop at 2015 Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
- Lenox, M. J., & Eesley, C. E. (2009). Private environmental activism and the selection and response of firm targets. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 18(1), 45–73.
- Lewis, K., Gray, K., & Meierhenrich, J. (2014). The structure of online activism. *Sociological Science*, 1, 1–9.
- Linden, A., & Klandermans, B. (2007). Revolutionaries, wanderers, converts, and compliants life histories of extreme right activists. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 36(2), 184–201.
- Lipset, S. M. (1976). *Rebellion in the university*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lounsbury, M. (2001). Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college and university recycling programs. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46(1), 29–56.
- Lounsbury, M., Ventresca, M., & Hirsch, P. M. (2003). Social movements, field frames and industry emergence: A cultural–political perspective on US recycling. *Socio-economic Review*, 1(1), 71–104.
- Luders, J. (2006). The economics of movement success: Business responses to civil rights mobilization. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111(4), 963–998.
- Marquis, C., & Raynard, M. (2015). Institutional strategies in emerging markets. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 9(1), 291–335.
- McAdam, D. (1989). The biographical consequences of activism. *American Sociological Review*, 54(5), 744–760.
- McAdam, D. (1996). Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions. In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings* (pp. 23–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- McAdam, D., Sampson, R., Weffer, S., & MacIndoe, H. (2005). "There will be fighting in the streets": The distorting lens of social movement theory. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 10(1), 1–18.
- McAdam, D., & Snow, D. A. (1997). *Social movements: Readings on their emergence, mobilization, and dynamics*. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury.
- McCarthy, J. D., Wolfson, M., & Harvey, D. S. (1987). *Chapter survey report: Project on the citizens movement against drunk driving*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Youth Development, Catholic University of America.
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), 1212–1241.
- McDonnell, M. H. (2015). Radical repertoires: The incidence and impact of corporate-sponsored social activism. *Organization Science*. doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.1017
- McDonnell, M. H., & King, B. (2013). Keeping up appearances reputational threat and impression management after social movement boycotts. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(3), 387–419.
- McDonnell, M. H., King, B. G., & Soule, S. A. (2015). A dynamic process model of private politics activist targeting and corporate receptivity to social challenges. *American Sociological Review*, 80(3), 654–678.
- McDonnell, M. H., & Werner, T. (in press). Blacklisted businesses: Social activist challenges and the disruption of corporate political activity. *Administrative Science Quarterly*.
- Mena, S., & Waeger, D. (2014). Activism for corporate responsibility: Conceptualizing private regulation opportunity structures. *Journal of Management Studies*, 51(7), 1091–1117.
- Meyerson, D. (2001). *Tempered radicals: How everyday leaders inspire change at work*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Meyerson, D. E., & Scully, M. A. (1995). Tempered radicalism and the politics of ambivalence and change. *Organization Science*, 6(5), 585–600.
- Minkoff, D. C. (1997). The sequencing of social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 62(5), 779–799.
- Moore, K. (2009). *Disrupting science: Social movements, American scientists, and the politics of the military, 1945–1975: Social movements, American scientists, and the politics of the military, 1945–1975*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Morrill, C., Zald, M. N., & Rao, H. (2003). Covert political conflict in organizations: Challenges from below. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 391–415.
- Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world. *Academy of Management Review*, 25(4), 706–725.
- Mott, M. (2004). Elephant abuse charges add fuel to circus debate. *National Geographic News*.
- Near, J. P., Dworkin, T. M., & Miceli, M. P. (1993). Explaining the whistle-blowing process: Suggestions from power theory and justice theory. *Organization Science*, 4(3), 393–411.
- O'Mahony, S., & Bechky, B. A. (2008). Boundary organizations: Enabling collaboration among unexpected allies. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53(3), 422–459.
- Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Defeating the merchants of doubt. *Nature*, 465(7299), 686–687.

- O'Rourke, A. (2003). A new politics of engagement: Shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 12(4), 227–239.
- Ortiz, D. G., Myers, D. J., Walls, E., & Diaz, M. E. (2005). Where do we stand with newspaper data? *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 10(3), 397–419.
- Pacheco, D. F., & Dean, T. J. (2014). Firm responses to social movement pressures: A competitive dynamics perspective. *Strategic Management Journal*, 36(7), 1093–1104.
- Parmar, B. L., Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., Wicks, A. C., Purnell, L., & De Colle, S. (2010). Stakeholder theory: The state of the art. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 4(1), 403–445.
- Pfeffer, J. S., & Salancik, G. (1978). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Polletta, F. (1998). “It was like a fever . . .” narrative and identity in social protest. *Social Problems*, 45(2), 137–159.
- Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. M. (2001). Collective identity and social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 283–305.
- Proffitt, W. T., & Spicer, A. (2006). Shaping the shareholder activism agenda: Institutional investors and global social issues. *Strategic Organization*, 4(2), 165–190.
- Raeburn, N. C. (2004). *Changing corporate America from inside out: Lesbian and gay workplace rights*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rao, H., & Dutta, S. (2012). Free spaces as organizational weapons of the weak religious festivals and regimental mutinies in the 1857 Bengal Native Army. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(4), 625–668.
- Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M. N. (2000). Power plays: How social movements and collective action create new organizational forms. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 22, 237–281.
- Rehbein, K., Waddock, S., & Graves, S. B. (2004). Understanding shareholder activism: Which corporations are targeted? *Business & Society*, 43(3), 239–267.
- Rojas, F. (2006). Social movement tactics, organizational change and the spread of African-American studies. *Social Forces*, 84(4), 2147–2166.
- Rojas, F. (2012). Social movements and universities. In M. Bastedo (Ed.), *Organizing higher education* (pp. 256–277). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Roscigno, V. J., & Hodson, R. (2004). The organizational and social foundations of worker resistance. *American Sociological Review*, 69(1), 14–39.
- Rosenkopf, L., & Almeida, P. (2003). Overcoming local search through alliances and mobility. *Management Science*, 49(6), 751–766.
- Rothenberg, S., & Levy, D. L. (2011). Corporate perceptions of climate science: The role of corporate environmental scientists. *Business & Society*, 51(1), 31–61.
- Rowley, T. I., & Moldoveanu, M. (2003). When will stakeholder groups act? An interest- and identity-based model of stakeholder group mobilization. *Academy of Management Review*, 28(2), 204–219.
- Rybalko, S., & Seltzer, T. (2010). Dialogic communication in 140 characters or less: How Fortune 500 companies engage stakeholders using Twitter. *Public Relations Review*, 36(4), 336–341.
- Santoro, W. A., & McGuire, G. M. (1997). Social movement insiders: The impact of institutional activists on affirmative action and comparable worth policies. *Social Problems*, 44(4), 503–519.

- Schneiberg, M. (2013). Movements as political conditions for diffusion: Anti-corporate movements and the spread of cooperative forms in American capitalism. *Organization Studies*, 34(5–6), 653–682.
- Schneiberg, M., King, M., & Smith, T. (2008). Social movements and organizational form: Cooperative alternatives to corporations in the American insurance, dairy, and grain industries. *American Sociological Review*, 73(4), 635–667.
- Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. (2008). Social movements and institutional analysis. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 648–670). London: Sage.
- Schurman, R. (2004). Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry opportunity structures and the efficacy of the anti-biotech movement in Western Europe. *Social Problems*, 51(2), 243–268.
- Scott, W. R., & Davis, G. F. (2007). *Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural, and open system perspectives*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Scully, M., & Creed, W. E. D. (1998). *Switch persons on the tracks of history: Situated agency and contested legitimacy in the diffusion of domestic partner benefits*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, San Diego, CA.
- Scully, M., Creed, W. E. D., DeJordy, R., & Ventresca, M. (2015). *More than zeroes: Non-adopters and the microprocesses of diffusion* (Working Paper).
- Scully, M., & Segal, A. (2002). Passion with an umbrella: Grassroots activists in the workplace. In M. Lounsbury & M. Ventresca (Eds.), *Research in the sociology of organizations* (pp. 125–168). New York, NY: JAI/Elsevier.
- Selznick, P. (1949). *TVA and the grass roots: A study of politics and organization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sine, W. D., & Lee, B. H. (2009). Tilting at windmills? The environmental movement and the emergence of the US wind energy sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54(1), 123–155.
- Smets, M., Morris, T. I. M., & Greenwood, R. (2012). From practice to field: A multilevel model of practice-driven institutional change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 55(4), 877–904.
- Snow, D., & McAdam, D. (2000). Identity work processes in the context of social movements: Clarifying the identity/movement nexus. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, identity, and social movements* (pp. 41–67). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Soderstrom, S., & Weber, K. (2015). *Organizational sustainability agendas: An interaction ritual perspective on issue mobilization* (Working Paper). Northwestern University.
- Soule, S. A. (1997). The student divestment movement in the United States and tactical diffusion: The Shantytown protest. *Social Forces*, 75(3), 855–882.
- Soule, S. A. (2009). *Contention and corporate social responsibility*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Soule, S. A. (2012). Social movements and markets, industries, and firms. *Organization Studies*, 33(12), 1715–1733.
- Soule, S. A., McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Su, Y. (1999). Protest events: Cause or consequence of state action? The US women’s movement and federal Congressional activities, 1956–1979. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 4(2), 239–256.

- Soule, S. A., Swaminathan, A., & Tihanyi, L. (2014). The diffusion of foreign divestment from Burma. *Strategic Management Journal*, 35(7), 1032–1052.
- Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63(3), 224–237.
- Still, M. C., & Strang, D. (2009). Who does an elite organization emulate? *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 54(1), 58–89.
- Strang, D., & Soule, S. A. (1998). Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From hybrid corn to poison pills. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 265–290.
- Taylor, V., & Raeburn, N. C. (1995). Identity politics as high-risk activism: Career consequences for lesbian, gay, and bisexual sociologists. *Social Problems*, 42(2), 252–273.
- Taylor, V., Rupp, L. J., & Gamson, J. (2004). Performing protest: Drag shows as tactical repertoire of the gay and lesbian movement. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 25, 105–137.
- Taylor, V., & Van Dyke, N. (2004). ‘Get up, stand up’: Tactical repertoires of social movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 262–293). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution* (p. 143). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Tilly, C. (1995). *Popular contention in Great Britain. 1758–1834*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2006). *Contentious politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Van Dyke, N. (2003). Protest cycles and party politics: The effect of elite allies and antagonists on student protest in the United States, 1930–1990. In J. Goldstone (Ed.), *Parties, politics and movements* (pp. 262–293). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dyke, N., Soule, S. A., & Taylor, V. A. (2004). The targets of social movements: Beyond a focus on the state. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, 25(1), 27–51.
- Van Wijk, J., Stam, W., Elfring, T., Zietsma, C., & den Hond, F. (2013). Activists and incumbents structuring change: The interplay of agency, culture, and networks in field evolution. *Academy of Management Journal*, 56(2), 358–386.
- Vasi, I. B., & King, B. G. (2012). Social movements, risk perceptions, and economic outcomes: The effect of primary and secondary stakeholder activism on firms’ perceived environmental risk and financial performance. *American Sociological Review*, 77(4), 573–596.
- Vasi, I. B., Walker, E. T., Johnson, J. S., & Tan, H. F. (2015). “No fracking way!” Documentary film, discursive opportunity, and local opposition against hydraulic fracturing in the United States, 2010 to 2013. *American Sociological Review*, 80(5), 934–959.
- Waldron, T. L., Navis, C., & Fisher, G. (2013). Explaining differences in firms’ responses to activism. *Academy of Management Review*, 38(3), 397–417.
- Walker, E. T. (2009). Privatizing participation: Civic change and the organizational dynamics of grassroots lobbying firms. *American Sociological Review*, 74(1), 83–105.
- Walker, E. T. (2014). *Grassroots for hire: Public affairs consultants in American democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Walker, E. T., Martin, A. W., & McCarthy, J. D. (2008). Confronting the state, the corporation, and the academy: The influence of institutional targets on social movement repertoires. *American Journal of Sociology*, 114(1), 35–76.
- Weber, K., Heinze, K. L., & DeSoucey, M. (2008). Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the movement for grass-fed meat and dairy products. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53(3), 529–567.
- Weber, K., Rao, H., & Thomas, L. G. (2009). From streets to suites: How the anti-biotech movement affected German pharmaceutical firms. *American Sociological Review*, 74, 106–127.
- Whetten, D. A., & Mackey, A. (2002). A social actor conception of organizational identity and its implications for the study of organizational reputation. *Business & Society*, 41(4), 393–414.
- Whittier, N. (2001). Emotional strategies: The collective reconstruction and display of oppositional emotions in the movement against child sexual abuse. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 233–250). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Wry, T., Cobb, J. A., & Aldrich, H. E. (2013). More than a metaphor: Assessing the historical legacy of resource dependence and its contemporary promise as a theory of environmental complexity. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 7(1), 441–488.
- Wry, T., & York, J. (2015). An identity based approach to social enterprise. *Academy of Management Review*. doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0506.
- Yaziji, M., & Doh, J. P. (2013). The role of ideological radicalism and resource homogeneity in social movement organization campaigns against corporations. *Organization Studies*, 34(5–6), 755–780.
- Yue, L. Q. (2015). Community constraints on the efficacy of elite mobilization: The issues of currency substitutes during the panic of 1907. *American Journal of Sociology*, 120(6), 1690–1735.
- Yue, L. Q., Rao, H., & Ingram, P. (2013). Information spillovers from protests against corporations a tale of Walmart and target. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(4), 669–701.
- Zald, M. N., & Berger, M. A. (1978). Social movements in organizations: Coup d'état, insurgency, and mass movements. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(4), 823–861.
- Zald, M. N., Morrill, C., & Rao, H. (2005). The impact of social movements on organizations. In G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Social movements and organization theory* (pp. 253–279). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M., Reger, R. K., & Hubbard, T. (2016). Reputation as a benefit and a burden? How stakeholders' organizational identification affects the role of reputation following a negative event. *Academy of Management Journal*, 59(1), 253–276.
- Zhang, J., & Luo, X. R. (2013). Dared to care: Organizational vulnerability, institutional logics, and MNCs' social responsiveness in emerging markets. *Organization Science*, 24(6), 1742–1764.
- Zhuang, J., Thomas, S., & Miller, D. L. (2005). Examining culture's effect on whistleblowing and peer reporting. *Business & Society*, 44(4), 462–486.
- Zietsma, C., & Winn, M. I. (2007). Building chains and directing flows: Strategies and tactics of mutual influence in stakeholder conflicts. *Business & Society*, 47(1), 68–101.