Abhijit Ramalingam

• PhD, Economics
• Professor at Appalachian State University

While inequality in resource endowments has been shown to affect cooperation levels in groups, much of this evidence comes from studies of within-group inequality. In an online public goods experiment, we instead examine the effects of payoff-irrelevant inequality in resources between groups on cooperation within equal groups, i.e. the effect of me...

Norm-based accounts of social behavior in economics typically reflect tradeoffs between maximization of own consumption utility and conformity to social norms. Theories of norm-following tend to assume that there exists a single, stable, commonly known injunctive social norm for a given choice setting and that each person has a stable propensity to...

We experimentally examine if reductions in inequality that do not lower the endowments of the rich raise contributions to public goods in formerly unequal groups. Even injections of additional resources directed to the poor fail to raise cooperation to levels observed in groups that were always equal and have fewer resources. Our results suggest th...

Using public goods games in a laboratory setting, we study team-level production, where two teams compete for the resources of a common-member who can benefit from and provide effort in both teams. Intrinsically, the common-member faces divided loyalties. We examine such competition in a setting in which the common-member has productive abilities e...

Inequality reduces the ability of communities to work together. Recent policy proposals seem to presume that reducing inequality may allow groups to improve outcomes. We experimentally test if, after experiencing inequality, pure redistribution to eliminate inequality increases contributions to public goods. It does not; it fails to raise cooperati...

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the extent to which leaders—faced with opportunistic incentives—employ monitoring to improve team production. Participants are assigned to teams, with one person appointed as the leader. The leader has the power to commit to a monitoring option, which replaces the default equal sharing rule with one tha...

We experimentally examine if reductions in inequality that do not lower the endowments of the rich can raise contributions in formerly unequal groups. Even injections of additional resources directed to the poor fail to raise cooperation to levels observed in groups that were always equal and have fewer resources. Our results suggest that the poor...

While inequality in resource endowments has been shown to affect cooperation levels in groups, much of this evidence comes from studies of within-group inequality. In an online public goods experiment, we instead examine the effects of payoff-irrelevant inequality in resources between groups on cooperation within equal groups. When all groups are p...

The MECHANISMS study investigates how social norms for adolescent smoking and vaping are transmitted through school friendship networks, and is the first study to use behavioral economics methodology to assess smoking-related social norms. Here, we investigate the effects of selection homophily (the tendency to form friendships with similar peers)...

Inequality reduces the ability of communities to work together. Recent policy proposals seem to presume that reducing inequality may allow groups to improve outcomes. We experimentally test if, after experiencing inequality, unconditional income transfers to the poor increase contributions to public goods. Pure redistribution to eliminate inequalit...

Experiments in economics usually provide subjects with starting capital to be used in the experiment. This practice could affect decisions as there is no risk of loss. This phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. In a repeated public goods game, we test for house-money effects by paying subjects in advance an amount they could lose in the ex...

While inequality in resource endowments has been shown to affect cooperation levels in groups, much of this evidence comes from studies of within-group inequality. In an online public goods experiment, we instead examine the effects of payoff-irrelevant inequality in resources between groups on cooperation within equal groups. When all groups are p...

Experiments in economics usually provide subjects with starting capital to be used in the experiment. This practice could affect decisions as there is no risk of loss. This phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. In a repeated public goods game, we test for house-money effects by paying subjects in advance an amount they could lose in the ex...

Little is known about the personality and cognitive traits that shape adolescents’ sensitivity to social norms. Further, few studies have harnessed novel empirical tools to elicit sensitivity to social norms among adolescent populations. This paper examines the association between sensitivity to norms and various personality and cognitive traits us...

Using a dictator game experiment, we examine whether the introduction of group identities affects aggregate giving. The introduction of group identities is known to create an in-group bias in giving. What is not known is whether in-group love or out-group hate predominates in the creation of the in-group bias, and which predominates will determine...

We investigate the effects of partner and random stranger matching protocols in experimental Tullock contests between two and between three players. Consistent with previous findings, we find no difference in absolute bid levels due to group size across matching protocols. However, overbidding is lower in two-player groups under both matching proto...

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the extent to which leaders-faced with opportunistic incentives-employ monitoring to improve team production. Participants are assigned to teams, with one person appointed as the leader. The leader has the power to commit to a monitoring option, which replaces the default equal sharing rule with one tha...

In a laboratory setting, we study team production of group-level public goods, where two teams compete for the resources of a common-member who can benefit from and provide effort in both teams. Intrinsically, the common-member faces divided loyalties. We examine such competition in settings in which the common-member has productive abilities equal...

Experiments in economics usually provide subjects with starting capital to be used in the experiment. This practice could affect decisions as there is no risk of loss. This phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. In a repeated public goods game, we test for house-money effects by paying subjects in advance an amount they could lose in the ex...

Using an online incentivised dictator game experiment, we examine whether the introduction of minimal group identities affects aggregate giving. Aggregate giving increases with the introduction of group identities alone; and the magnitude of this boost depends positively on the relative size of the subset of the population who exhibit an in-group b...

Background: Many adolescent smoking prevention programs target social norms, typically evaluated with self-report, susceptible to social desirability bias. An alternative approach with limited application in public health is to use experimental norms elicitation methods. Methods: Using the Mechanisms of Networks and Norms Influence on Smoking in Sc...

Background/purpose: The MECHANISMS study targets smoking prevention for 12-13 year olds in Northern Ireland and Bogotá, and investigates the mechanisms through which social norms for smoking and vaping are transmitted through school social networks. We aimed to provide a broad overview of homophily and peer influence effects for norms and other smo...

We investigate how individuals react to different types of asymmetries in experimental two-player Tullock contests where contestants expend resources to win a prize. We compare the effects of three different sources of asymmetry: resources, abilities and possible outcomes. We find that overall competitive effort is greatest in the presence of asymm...

Using a dictator game experiment, we examine whether the introduction of group identities affects giving. Group identities can activate feelings of in-group love and out-group hate to create an in-group bias. In addition, group identities may spawn social sanctions that are designed to reinforce this in-group bias. We find that the aggregate effect...

Many adolescent smoking prevention programmes target social norms, typically evaluated with self-report, susceptible to social desirability bias. An alternative approach with little application in public health are experimental norms elicitation methods. Using the Mechanisms of Networks and Norms Influence on Smoking in Schools (MECHANISMS) study b...

In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team competes with another team for a prize. In our experiment, this insight generalises to internally unequal teams. Indeed, in some cases the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal teams than equal ones.We also find that the boost to contributions is most si...

In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team is placed in a competition with another team for a prize. This paper is concerned with whether this insight generalises to teams that are internally unequal. In our experiment, it does. Indeed, in some cases the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal team...

This proof of concept study harnesses novel transdisciplinary insights to contrast two school-based smoking prevention interventions among adolescents in the UK and Colombia. We compare schools in these locations because smoking rates and norms are different, in order to better understand social norms based mechanisms of action related to smoking....

We experimentally investigate the effects of conflict budget on conflict intensity. We run a between-subjects Tullock contest in which we vary the contest budget from Low to Medium to High, while keeping the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid the same. We find a non-monotonic relationship: bids increase when the budget increases from Low to Medium,...

This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, “Give and Take” versions of strategically and payoff isomorphic linear public goods games and the effectiveness of peer punishment in promoting cooperation in finitely repeated fixed-group game settings. We find in the absence of the punishment institution, cooperation declines more...

We disentangle the effects of choice (give vs. take) and externality (positive vs. negative) framing of decisions in isomorphic and payoff-equivalent experimental public good games. We find that, at the aggregate level, neither frame affects group contributions. At the individual level, the Take choice frame leads to greater free-riding, and also t...

In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access t...

In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with 'divided loyalties', and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates 'winners' and 'losers'. However, if groups have access to...

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players c...

In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team is placed in a competition with another team for prize. This paper is concerned with whether this insight generalises to teams that are internally unequal. In the experiment we report, it does. Indeed, the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal teams than...

We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on contest outcomes. We study three situations: in 'gain' two players start with no prize and make sunk bids to win a prize; in 'loss' both the players start with prizes and whoever loses the contest loses their prize; and in 'mixed' only one player starts with a prize that s...

We provide evidence that more explicit instructions can affect behaviour in a public goods game with punishment. Instructions that highlight the positive externality associated with public goods contributions and provide more examples improve subjects’ comprehension levels, as measured by shorter decision times in the experiment. They also lead to...

Social information ‘nudges’ concerning how others perform typically boost individual performances in experiments with one group reference point. However, in many natural settings, sometimes due to policy, there are several such group reference points. We address the complications that such multiple group social information might introduce through a...

We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on group conflict. In turn we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Amartya Sen that the salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that of a mere classification would not do so. In a baseline treatment, two groups – East Asians and Caucasians – e...

In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose independently whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right” to sanction can do so. We find that the eff...

We present a clean test of whether inequality in endowments affects contributions to a public good. It is a clean test because, to our knowledge, it is the first to control for possible endowment effects. We find that the key adverse effect of inequality arises because the rich reduce their contributions when there is inequality.

This paper investigates how the transparency of decision-making affects preferences over distributional outcomes. We also examine what motivates individuals to voluntarily invest economic resources to monitor decision-making processes. We find that third-party monitoring does not affect distributional outcomes in a three-person ultimatum game. Our...

Teams often suffer from a free rider problem with respect to individual contributions. That putting teams into competition with each other can mitigate this problem is an important recent insight. However, we know little about how inequality in endowment between teams might influence this beneficial effect from competition. We address this question...

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly a...

We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centr...

In a principal–agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.

In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose unilaterally whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right” to punish can do so. We find that the effect...

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks....

Why do firms exist? What is their function? What do managers do? What is the role, if any, of social motivation in the market? In this paper, we address these questions with a new theory of the firm, which unites some major themes in management, principal-agent theory, and economic sociology. We show that although the market is a superior incentive...

In this paper, we develop a new theory of the firm where the market is primarily an incentive system whereas the firm is an intrinsic motivation device. The firm is more efficient than the market when asset specificity and subjective risk are sufficiently high because it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on...