Russia, the US, 'the others' and the '101 things to do to win a (colour) revolution': reflections on Georgia and Ukraine[1]

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Abstract
This article analyses the importance of external influences to the success of what has been called a 'colour revolution'. Drawing from the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, it discusses the social and political significance of a colour revolution and spells out the possible ways external influences can impact socio-political events in a country where a colour revolution is attempted.

Introduction
This paper explores the importance, and effects, of external influences to the success of non-violent protest movements. In particular it suggests that, although external influences are not the decisive factor, they have a main role in the success or failure of a colour revolution. Thus, by drawing from the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, it explores the importance, and effects, of external influences to the success of what have been labelled 'colour revolutions' and singles out the main points ('101 things to do') that were conducive to the success of a mass protest movement.

A colour revolution can be defined as a modular phenomenon, proper to post-socialist spaces, in which the political regime is challenged through massive involvement of people in politics. This normally happens as a result of a strategy with positive (bringing people to the polls) and negative (discrediting the regime) components. It is normally marked by the use of humour and other non-formal ways to deliver a message and the massive involvement of people taking to the streets to contest the political elites.

A number of factors make Georgia and Ukraine very useful examples in understanding the relevance of external influences to such events like a 'colour revolution'. First, in both mass protests were organized when bottom-up movements were not considered dangerous by local elites and Russia. In addition, attention to local and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) was not as focussed as it would later become, leading some authoritarian regimes such as Belarus and Uzbekistan to further tighten their control of international funding, even of grassroots movements. Another point is that both countries were open to Western influences and never hid their Western aspirations, whilst keeping decent relations with Moscow. For this reason, both presidents were concerned with their reputation in the West and, given the post-totalitarian nature of the regimes, they tended to be more sensitive to Western criticisms.

Literature on colour revolutions considers external forces only at the political level; that is diplomatic and financial support to democratic movements of a country, coming from both governmental and non-governmental actors. I would also include knowledge transfer, experience sharing, and networking, that has not necessarily been carried out, or engineered, by the US but has also happened at European Union (EU) and grassroots level. In addition such support came also from former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and is less secret than it seems. The experiences of the Baltic Countries and Poland were used to

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conceptualize a strategy that was then used in the OK'98 campaign in Slovakia and subsequently in Serbia in 2000, just to mention the most famous cases (see Demes and Forbig 2007). External influences can include the inflow of information affecting the elites' oppositions and peoples' attitude in a given country. Trainings on civil disobedience carried out, though not widely publicized, and a whole work of international networking had been done in the past years (United States Institute of Peace 2001, Kaskiv, Chupryna and Zolotariov 2005) where Western and Eastern European experiences met and integrated to produce real 'manual for the perfect *revolutionaire*' (see Sharp 1993). This is all the more visible from the Western side for the simple reason that Russian influences are so embedded in the history of former Soviet countries that became part of the panorama. The Central European University is selecting what is alleged to become the elite of those countries, programmes of assistance to Ukrainian and Georgian students are well established in the US and in loco (see the Civic Education Project or the HESP network).

According to this paper, external influences were present and strong, and 'the truth' is in between the two official positions: with Moscow stating that 'It was a pure project of politechnology' and Washington responding 'We were not there, and if we were, we were asleep'. (And if we were there, we were sleeping, I tried (unsuccessfully) to translate an Italian say. You can simply replace it with "we were not involved")One could actually see each of what have been called 'colour revolutions' as an arm wrestling between Moscow and Washington, with the EU timidly trying to have a voice (see Ó Beacháin and Polese 2008 for this position). However, this has pushed scholars to overemphasize the role of external forces in such movements or, at least, to devote much more attention to the role of the US (Aslund and MacFaul 2006, Bunce and Wolchik 2006, MacFaul 2006) neglecting the role of common people and grassroots actors. Surprisingly enough, scholars have not explored as much American promotion of democracy, Russian promotion of its foreign policy and its effects on those revolutions. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, in an interview with Novaya Gazeta (9 December 2004) clearly stated that the US had 'won' Ukraine as much as Russia 'had' lost it; this is partially due to the US strategy of 'democracy promotion' (Bunce and Wolchik 2007) being more effective than Moscow foreign policy.

What has happened in post-soviet spaces has shown a radical change not only in US foreign policy but in the very way to do foreign policy. And the 'civil society paradigm' (Tordjman 2008) has transformed any foreign funded entity, not necessarily NGO and regardless of its size and focus of activity, in a non-democratic country, into a potential engine for regime change.

However, to see external influences as the one and only factor, or at least the determining one, means to ignore a number of other things that have been essential. For one thing, if external influences are so important, why has a colour revolution failed in Belarus at least twice? I would consider external influences as the essence of a protest movement in the CIS. They are to be there from the very first moment and are necessary to the final output. But they are not sufficient, with a lot of salt but no meat you have no final dish and you have no colour revolution. To show this the next section presents a short theoretical discussion on colour revolutions and the points that are more important to their success. The five following sections explore the way external influences can impact: civil society, the current regime, the opposition, international diplomacy and people's attitude to spell out all the possible ways international actors can have a voice in domestic politics.

'Colour revolutions': more colour or more revolutions?

Since the very first use of the expression 'colour revolution' scholars have been debating on whether any of the events taking place in post-socialist countries can be considered as a 'revolution' in its historical meaning. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* defines a revolution as 'a major, sudden, and hence typically violent alteration in government and related association structures'. Revolution and civil violence have often been used synonymously (Rule 1988); it comes as no surprise, hence, that many scholars refuse the dignity of a revolution to colour revolutions or else maintain that revolutions cannot be democratic (see Thompson 2003: ch. 1). Revolution is often conceived to be a total transformation bound to affect mankind as a whole (Griewank 1955 [1973], Kosseleck 1969) and thus those that happened in post-socialist countries are deemed not to be revolutions. Thompson (2003) calls such popular movements achieving political change 'democratic revolutions', proposing that social movements can become politicized and prompt political change in a country, though the final effect is uncontrollable and can lead to democratic consolidation as well as to a new authoritarian regime (see Sharp 1993). Another group of scholars, (see Foran 2005, Skocpol 1979) call such movements, of social significance but with little violence involved, 'social revolutions'. Given the very nature of protest movements organized around incoming elections Bunce and Wolchik (2007) call such changes 'electoral revolutions'.

Political regimes depend upon a number of factors but it is ultimately people who decide its fate. Democratic consolidation has not happened in Serbia, Georgia or Ukraine because 'the democratic ones' have been replaced the 'bad guys' but because the events have prompted a socio-political transformation and people have become more aware and politically active. Authoritarian attitudes shown by Ukrainian and Georgian presidents Leonid Kuchma or Eduard Shevarnadze are visible in their successors Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili. However latter cannot abuse their position too much not only because the West is watching them but also because people would most likely react, something that they would not have done before a 'colour revolution' happened. Given that those colour revolutions seem to affect more people's attitude than politics, I would suggest they can be considered in the category of social revolutions. If we take Skocpol's definition of a social revolution, we will find many things in common with a colour revolution:

> 'Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures, and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class based revolts from below' (Skocpol 1979: 4).

A colour revolution is not the end of the story. Both in Georgia and Ukraine political change has meant destabilization of politics, change of the attitude of the electorate (see Rakhmanin 2007) and the use (or should I say abuse) of street protests in the past years can be seen as evidence. Using the expression 'colour revolution', thus, I shall not claim that those events occurred in Georgia or Ukraine were 'real revolutions'. Rather I am referring to a phenomenon as it is widely known. The word revolution has been widely used in so many contexts (see Zimmerman 1983) that there is no reason why it cannot be used here. After all, few scholars have come up to question whether the 'industrial revolutions' or even the 'sexual revolution' were real revolutions. I would be happy to endorse any other wording. Still, there is something revolutionary about those events, if we go deeper than the surface.

Foran distinguishes 'revolutions' from mere 'violence' through the presence of three factors: political change, structural transformation and mass participation (2005: 7) so that scholars normally consider significant only events in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, despite attempted colour revolutions elsewhere. After some reflections, events in Croatia and Slovakia have also been granted the dignity of colour revolution. They all have in common

that transition to democratic rule has been started up by people's protests against rigged elections, protests were non-violent and took advantage of modern means of communication (mobile phones, the internet) and a widespread use of humour and arts to deliver a political message (Sorensen 2008). However, similar protests and actions that occurred in a wider number of countries in post-soviet spaces, though, have not being acknowledged as 'colour revolutions'. Does it mean that a colour revolution must be matched by a political transformation? Does it mean that elite recharging is the main indicator of a colour revolution? If so, I cannot but agree with those scholars rejecting the word revolution in this case, for this would fit the democratic top-bottom transition as conceptualized by Linz and Stepan (1998).

Availing of this version, however, would mean to ignore that similar events took place in a number of other countries in the region. They were ignored by the public because they were not politically successful. Protests against rigged elections, following a strategy of civic disobedience and mobilization of people in concert with the opposition, have been attempted in every single CIS country except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (where it was prompted by facts other than fraudulent elections). In Belarus it went as far as to mobilize tens of thousands of protesters who where brutally repressed. Conversely, in Kyrgyzstan, the (unexpected) emergency situation prompted by riots, together with the high expectations that after Georgia and Ukraine a revolution was inevitable (see Bessinger 2007) that suggested the president to flee the country (Ó Beacháin and Polese 2008).

Therefore, I would suggest, it is impossible to draw a dividing line between a proper 'colour revolution' and a 'non-colour revolution' (that is what has not been considered a real one because there was no political change). The reason is that I deem the political outcome of a mass protest less important than the very fact that mass protests have taken place, which in turn means a social and cultural transformation of the post-socialist spaces, where protests of such scale was rather unusual.

Exploring "External Influences" and the decisive factors in a colour revolution
The meaning of 'external influences' is conceived quite broadly in this paper. Influences are not only considered at governmental level but include NGO cooperation at grassroots level and the influence of foreign NGOs on politics. These last two aspects have been largely underestimated by both researchers and politicians. In an interview, Teto Japaridze, the national security advisor in the Shevarnadze government, said that the role of NGOs is much smaller than it has been depicted (Karumidze and Wertsch 2005). However, this is based on the assumption that politicians communicate directly with the people, which is not always the case. When a message has to be circulated, including in the Ukrainian and Georgian cases, there must be somebody who takes care of it.

The role of NGOs in all colour revolutions has been largely under- or overestimated throughout Eastern Europe. The tendency by opposition politicians and the West in general has been to underestimate them, crediting them for their civic actions but refusing to acknowledge their strategic importance in the frame of mass protests that were deemed 'genuine' (and it is still unclear why the existence of NGO leaders able to work with masses should diminish the social importance of such protests). On the other hand, they have been demonized by displaced political figures and their supporters in Russia and the CIS. Ultimately, this has led protest movements to be perceived as 'artificial' or 'manufactured'. NGOs and the people factor have not been given enough credit by the West. In Ukraine and Georgia leaders of the toppled government have portrayed them as a Western instrument

provoking collective hysteria; in Uzbekistan, Russia and Belarus their action was already limited, but they faced further repression following the November 2003 events in Georgia.

Civil society was active well before a colour revolution occurred (see Polese 2005, 2006), though in a different form; indeed, some actions of covered activism, unorganized or semi-organized protests, 'make no headlines' and thus tend to be ignored by historians, as long as they do not become very loud (Hobsbawn and Rude 1964). They become relevant for the public only when they take the form of a collective action, that is when the cost of participating in protests is lowered enough to allow a mass participation of people (see Tarrow 2005, Tucker 2007 for an approach covering the colour revolutions) that result in a 'moment of madness' (see Thompson 2003). As a result, what Scott (1985) has called the 'silent struggle' of unorganized protesters has been largely ignored by both scholars and politicians or, in the best case, considered not enough relevant.

In this respect it has been suggested that all the colour revolutions happened between 2003 and 2006 in the post-soviet spaces depends on the combination of five factors: attitude of current elites, compactness of the opposition, level of external influences, relevance and activism of civil society and population's attitude (more on Ó Beacháin Polese 2008). Where all those five variables have produced favourable conditions, a colour revolution has occurred. Otherwise it has been aborted. It is worth underlining that those variables are interrelated and, for instance, the compactness of the opposition or the degree of activism of civil society is also dependent on the government attitude, which could brutally repress the society to the extent that even the most vibrant civil society would capitulate. The relationship between the five factors can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Five Variables of a 'colour revolution'

	Elite's attitude	Opposition (compactness)	External forces	Civil society	People's attitude
Elite's attitude	Modular (an elite can learn from another in another country)	X	X	X	X
Opposition (compactness)	X	Modular	X	X	X
External forces	X	X	Modular	X	X
Civil society	X	X	X	Modular	X
People's attitude	X	X	X	X	Modular

For 'elite attitude' I mean the character of the state on the eve of the protests. Relatively democratic oriented elites are more likely to allow the preconditions for a colour revolution by allowing the development of civil society, the opposition more freedom to organize (and allowing it to be legal, which is not the case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for instance), foreign influences in domestic affairs and generally not hindering popular political participation. A democratic and permissive attitude might not necessarily derive from a genuine desire of democracy but might be dictated by necessity such as lack of economic

resources that prompts the elite to be more Western friendly in exchange for greater financial aid. Alternatively, the elite in power might present some signs of fragmentation, given that conflicts for power inject factionalism so that 'the regime' is far from being monolithic.

A compact opposition is a *conditio sine qua non* for a number of reasons. If opposition leaders are engaged in a struggle for power against one another they will be unable to challenge pro-presidential elites and will tend to steal voters from one another rather than the ruling regime. Only when the opposition can unite the anti-regime elements in the electorate can they try to convince those who are undecided or on whom the regime depends. Furthermore, if the opposition itself is fragmented external actors (and the electorate itself) will be confused and disheartened by the presence of so many leaders. The ability to unite is also affected by the presence of charismatic leaders able to rouse the population and give concrete shape to popular discontent by formulating a concrete programme of action. Finally the strength of the opposition is also measurable through the economic means they have at disposal. If the economic elite are fully backing the government, it will be difficult for the opposition to find the means to find the necessary resources.

It is important to assess the relationship between the country elite and foreign forces, as diplomatic pressures may apply; by the same token, foreign support to the opposition, when possible, could be a strong factor. Foreign aid may come as a result of a *do ut das* compromise, a return from the country is expected, in terms of support for democracy or enhanced diplomatic relations. However it is important to explore how the instructions of foreign powers are perceived and interpreted at the local level. Do recipients follow a suggested path because they believe in it or because they think it is the best way to gain access to financial resources?

Given its particular position in between politics and the polity, the role of civil society is of utmost importance and on its organization rest the success of a successful civic campaign, with its positive elements (bringing people to the polls), negative ones (increasing people's awareness that the government is mostly responsible for their economic problems) and the mass protests once the government refuses to step down. It is also useful to understand what influence civil society has in a country's politics and popular attitudes and behaviour. People could be considered the main point of the revolution, given that power depends on people, directly or indirectly. As important as organized movement is, there is the silent struggle of people who can refuse, on a personal basis, to support the government, as already occurred in Serbia in 2000. However, since a major resource for the opposition is street protests, it is important to understand how and why people react to stimuli from politics and civil society and to what extent they are able to organize by themselves or to follow a leader.

To this one could add Bessinger's argument of the revolutions as modular phenomena (2007) but there is another point and this is mainly connected with external forces. In the table below I have added the possibility that one variable influences itself also as a modular phenomenon. The main idea is that, if some allies change side, the price of changing side lowers and more political parties can join the opposition once a 'pioneer' has joined it. By the same token, more people in the streets will encourage those who are undecided to take to the streets as well. This can also explain the rumour that 'protesters were paid'. Once the opposition understood the snowball effect of people's engagement, they had more interest in bringing people to the streets and increasing the number of protesters. They might have had to pay some people to show that the number was constantly increasing and, by lowering the cost of such action, prompt those still undecided to protest.

Whilst contemporaneity was a main strength of the anti-soviet and anti-communist protests (Bessinger 2002), it seems to be a weakness of the colour revolutions. Bunce and Wolchik (2007) use the indicative expression 'electoral revolutions' as protests are attempted as a result of rigged elections and Tucker (2007) suggests that, among other points, rigged elections provide for a concrete argument and an emotional component ('they have stolen our will') that is decisive to push people into the streets.

Ultimately, all the mass protests organized, with the exception of Uzbek one, have happened in the aftermath of elections, be they rigged or not. But if we compare the dates of all the successful revolutions we will see that a successful revolution has to stand alone. What I mean is that, if more than a revolution is attempted at once, only one is going to be successful. This has certainly something to do with the country itself, protests are more likely to have a resonance in Georgia than in Turkmenistan, but can also suggest that international (diplomatic or not) efforts cannot be effectively concentrated on two countries (two revolutions) at once.

Table 2: dates of colour revolutions (source: Ó Beacháin and Polese 2008b)

	Elections	(Attempted) Revolution	Result
Armenia	19 February and 5 March 2003, (presidential); 25 May 2003 (parliamentary); 27 November 2005 (only referendum);	April 2004	Opposition defeat
Georgia	2 November 2003 (parliamentary)	November 2003	Rose Revolution: President Shevardnadze deposed and replaced by Mikheil Saakashvili in January 2004 elections (96% for Saakashvili)
Russia	December 2003 (parliamentary) 14 March 2004 (presidential)	None	No change
Ukraine	2004(31 October)	November 2004	Orange Revolution: Defeat for Victor Yanukovich, Victor Yushchenko elected President (5-% for Yushchenko)
Uzbekistan	2004 (26 December) Parliamentary	Andijan, 13 May 2005	Massacre
Tajikistan	Tajikistan 27 February and 13 March 2005 (Parliamentary)	None	No change
Moldova	6 March 2005 (Parliamentary)	2003-5: Ruling communist party changes orientation	"Silent revolution"

		from Russia to the West	
Kyrgyzstan	27 February and 13 March 2005 (parliamentary)	March 2005	Tulip Revolution: President Askar Akaev ousted and replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiev who presidency is confirmed in July 2005 election (89% for Bakiev)
Azerbaijan	15 October 2003 (presidential) 6 November 2005 (parliamentary)	October 2003, November 2005	Opposition defeat
Kazakhstan	19 September and 3 October 2004 (parliamentary), December 2005 (presidential)	None	No change
Belarus	13 and 17 October 2004 (parliamentary and referendum); 19 March 2006 (presidential)	12 April 2002 ("We can't live like this"); October 2004, March 2006	Opposition defeat
Turkmenistan	December 2004 (parliamentary) February 2007 (presidential)	None	No change

In the rest of the paper I set out to assess the relevance of external forces to the five points mentioned above.

In a country there are some forces that operate at the top political level and others that operate at the bottom level. The first three points above mentioned (attitude of local elites, compactness of the opposition and external influences) are referred to as 'top', while still acknowledging that they can be affected by some bottom forces. The last two points (civil society and population) are considered bottom forces. Top and bottom are not separated and present a high degree of interdependence. However, I have distinguished in this paper what I call top-top, top-bottom, bottom-top and bottom-bottom influences.

Examples of top-top influences include the attempt of Russia to send its Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to mediate the Georgian crisis, EU pressures on Ukraine to hold fair elections and promises of financial assistance to encourage democratization of a country. Top-bottom influences can include relations between external forces and those forces at the bottom of the society, namely civil society and people, and can range from financial support to secret trainings in revolutionary techniques. Bottom-top influences are those actions performed by the people or civil society of a foreign country that will ultimately affect top politics, like the training of Ukrainian politicians on mass management and the setting of a civic campaign. Finally bottom-bottom influences are those relations that are not directly linked to politics and range from international NGO networking to people's financial support in favour of the

revolutionaires. It is all the more complicated to separate each factor from the others: they are rather interrelated, but for the sake of the analysis I shall try to define an (arbitrary) border between them and treat them separately.

Table 3: a tentative scheme of external influences (more elaborated in the conclusions)

	Top influences	Bottom
Elites	USA, EU, Russia, Neighbours, information on neighbour revolutions	Know how on how to smash down non-violent protests. Handbook of the counterrevolutionaries
Opposition	Opposition in neighbour countries (like Yabluko or the Communist Party in Russia), US or EU support, know how by more politically developed countries galvanization thanks to other revolutions	NGO training on how to manage a revolution for politicians
External	Diplomacy	Protest movements in front of consulates and embassies
Civil society	Financial assistance that can come from governments	International networking, physical support, petitions
People	Information, galvanization, material support (food and commodities during a revolution)	Mouth to mouth information, international solidarity, travelling to the country to show support,

On the attitude of local elites
A first main cluster of forces are external influences on local elites. Since most pre-revolution regimes were quite dependent on Russia, the role of agencies in this respect can be summarized as the West working on the compactness of governmental forces, trying to weaken them and to prompt some main figures to ally with the opposition, and Russia supporting those forces that can keep the country 'politically stable'.

There is little doubt that throwing a couple of bombs and accepting Russian soldiers into the country would solve the political crisis, and probably much quicker than it happened, but one should account that political elites are not always ready for this and external influences can prevent or encourage the use of force to solve the political crisis once this has happened. In addition, regardless of Russia, had Ukraine and Georgia a deeper ideological commitment and were their elites convinced they had the legitimacy to be there and that the state monopoly on force could be used against some citizens for the good of all the citizens (see Gellner 1983, Sharp 1993), both revolutions would have turned out much more red than orange or rose.

The starting point to analyse the way elites can be affected by external forces is their level of compactness. This can be measured by how committed they are to a common ideology that, in turn, is correlated with the kind of regime. I would suggest that post-totalitarian regimes are more 'at risk' because their ideological commitment is weaker than in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes (I rely on the classification by Linz and Stepan 1998). Since the pro-regime factions were together more for convenience than for ideological commitment, it was easier to pull some forces out of the pro-presidential ones and undermine the regime. In addition, current elites decide the fate of the opposition. Where the opposition is illegal, foreign powers cannot get in touch with them without risking of being accused of subversive activities, and thus loosing trust of the local regime and thus negotiation power.

External influences can help diffusion of an alternative ideology that might sound appealing to pro-governmental forces and tempt them to join the opposition. In Ukraine an example was the 'conversion' of Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch that joined the opposition party Nasha Ukraina in 2002 or the restructuring of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and its commitment to 'European Socialism' in contrast with the strongly pro-Soviet Progressive Socialist Party (see Mostovskaya and Rakhmanin 2002a and 2002b). These are not isolated cases, BIUT leader Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko themselves were reared politically in a communist environment. In Georgia a similar tendency is visible, with opposition members Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze politically born under President Shevarnadze and gradually forming an opposition. Given the lack of elite circulation, this would suggest that if we are to look for a transformation in Georgia or Ukraine we should consider the broad effect of a colour revolution, not its mere political outcome.

Even more relevant is the presence of a potentially separatist party, like the Democratic Union for the Revival of Georgia, headed by Batumi based Aslan Abashidze, as a time bomb in the Georgian parliament. Shevernadze could count on Abashidze in moments of crisis but their relations were not ideal. Elite competition transformed the political classes and made them more volatile, more ready to support the current tendencies than commit ideologically to a position. This, in turn, played in favour of Western diplomats, for they were able to contact some part of the majority and undermine the president's support. The role of Russia was similar; supporting those political forces that were the best to preserve their interest in the country but as long as they did not pose an internal threat to the Kremlin. For example Russia granted support to the communists in Ukraine only after they represented a lesser evil than Nasha Ukraina, having refrained from doing so before 2002 to limit the popularity of a communist ideology in Russia itself. In addition, maintaining close ties with oligarchs in both countries, Moscow secured some sort of affection and the tacit promise that they would not try to alter the status quo. This could also be done through the use of separatist regions, agitated in case of necessity (see mainly Abkhazia and Crimea) and used together with gas, and oil, as stick and carrot to keep elites under control.

Another important point is the negotiating power of elites. Limited availability of natural resources generates dependence from other countries that gain in influence. Both Georgia and Ukraine depend on external assistance for provisioning. Russia was able to play with gas strongly enough to keep a hand in the countries. By the same token, the US and the EU were able to negotiate some democracy for some dollars and euro. In this respect both Ukraine and Georgia had kept a rather neutral position between 'East (Russia) and West'. Thanks to an ideology subordinated to pragmatism, they were accepting help from both sides and were concerned by what both sides could think of them (which is not the case of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or even Russia), allowing independent media, but controlling them, allowing foreign NGOs (in times when NGOs were not so suspicious) and exerting little control; enjoying the advantages of being part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but giving clear signals to the West that they were interested in them (or at least in Western money). This eventually allowed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations (ENEMO) to send teams of external electoral observers, those who have not been allowed to Russia recently. By providing the electorate with an alternative vote count, the opposition was able to boost its popularity and increase public anger that ultimately brought hundreds of thousands into the streets. This also proved a way to pressurise the regime to refrain from the use of force to suppress demonstrations, as this would have been publicly stigmatized (Kuzio 2005a).

Even if the elite attitude depends mainly on top-politics factors, there are some things that can go bottom-top. The main one is probably information. Information does not belong to any of the mentioned categories or better to all of them, but the more accurate the information, the more the elites are aware of what is happening.

A clear picture of what has happened in Serbia can give the elites a grasp of what might happen in their country. Should detailed information of what was behind the Serbian revolution arrive to the ears of the authorities, they would know much better how to deal with future protests. This was not yet the case in 2003 and 2004 but those 'revolutionary' strategies have started to be used also by authorities so that know-how on civil actions has prompted political elites to elaborate a counter-revolutionary strategy to deal with the protests. A timid attempt was seen in Georgia, with Ajara sending people to Tbilisi, in Ukraine with people from Donetsk dragged on trains to Kiev but the strategy has been perfected only later, when Kyrgyz authorities have created a clone of Kel Kel or even better, when Putin's supporters secured a 'pro-governmental NGO movement, to be used also in case of street protests (see Ó Beacháin and Polese 2008).

Another main point is expectations. Before the 'rose revolution' few people would expect to see such massive protests, and that they would lead to the resignation of a president after parliamentary elections. As a result Moscow did little to influence the elections, for it seemed it still retained control over strategic places in Georgia, which was risking to be ripped apart from all sides. Moscow had much more margin of manoeuvre in Ukraine than Georgia. Relations with Shevarnadze were not ideal but he was far better than his alter ego coming from an opposition strongly west-oriented, risking to worsen even more the Moscow-Tbilisi ties. By contrast, in Ukraine, a tacit agreement made Russia support the governmental candidate quite openly. This is certainly due to closer ties between the countries but also to the fact that once Moscow 'lost Georgia', it did not want to risk to loose a more strategic country like Ukraine.

The 'invisible hand': civil society and colour revolutions
Civil society can be defined as 'the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purpose and values' (London School of Economics 2004), its role varies from country to country, in some places it is organized formally (Burdieu 1983, Coleman 1988, Putnam 1994), in some others it is still present, despite the lack of formal registration of associations (Pichler and Wallace 2007) and depends on historical traditions, current human resources, practical knowledge and financial resources. In this respect, it would be worthwhile to understand what influence civil society has in a country's politics and popular attitudes and behaviour. Its importance is deduceable also from the fact that it has remained active regardless of the success of a revolution and has succeeded to involve an increasing number of people in political life. In Georgia this has become evident when the people's president Mikhail Saakashvili has been challenged by the people themselves and compelled to hold early presidential elections in 2008. In Ukraine, among other events, a tendency not to vote for the 'suggested candidate' in small towns has been witnessed, leading several 'local leaders' not to be elected. Journalist Sergey Rakhmanin in *Zerkalo Nedeli* (1 April 2006) suggested that this is a sign of political maturity of the Ukrainian public since it has happened throughout the country.

A main theoretical difficulty is to define what an NGO is and what it is not, especially in Eastern Europe. Pichler and Wallace (2007) already highlighted the limits of a classical approach to the study of civil society, for some informal groups could be active but not registered and thus working as an NGO despite not being an NGO. To this, one could add the

fact that in some cases NGOs become an instrument of foreign policy disguised as non-partisan movements. Finally a main question is the donor-recipient relationship and the expectations of the donor once it grants the money. To what extent is it accurate to classify as a neutral NGO a movement that is funded by a Western agency that will most likely have some demands once it funds the NGO?

The role of civil society in post-soviet societies had been largely underestimated until the rose revolution, at least by Moscow, while this became a main target of Western support (Tordjman 2008). However, once the lesson was learnt civil society became also a point of confrontation, with specular pro-governmental NGOs gathering people to counterbalance Western-oriented NGOs. The importance of NGOs and civil society in general is enormous and external influences could go through several channels.

External influences on civil society in former soviet countries are traceable back to the 1960s and 1970s, when a green movement was proposed in a non-political form to avoid repression and some Western grassroots NGOs (like the Service Civil International) succeeded in working together with local *konsomol* organizations for joint pioneer camps. A further boost of civil movements was provided by the USSR ratification of the Helsinki convention in 1975, which created a legal ground for the protection of dissidents or of people politically active but not necessarily supporting the government (Polese 2006).

External influences do not necessarily need to come from the 'West'. The wave of protests in 1989/1990 in the Soviet Union had a strong domestic component (though I would not exclude a Western component, see Robertson 1993) and protest actions supported one another, morally or physically. As in the Baltics, the 1990 protests in Ukraine were peaceful and led to some results (not in Georgia, where the 1989 protests ended in bloodshed), Prime Minister Vitaly Masol resigned, upon the request of hunger strikers. With the opening up of the country, foreign NGOs started mushrooming in Georgia and Ukraine, along with government programmes supporting civil society. The most famous is certainly the Soros supported Renaissance Foundation but a growing number of NGOs of different sizes started working in the nineties in Ukraine, where the tendency to be hassled by government officials was less strong than elsewhere. Ukraine and Georgia were far more easy a work environment than its neighbours. NGOs and Think Tanks were increasingly winning credibility and where the Civic Education Project (Open Society Institute) could work undisturbed while in Minsk was subject to inspections every other week. NGO activity was constantly expanding, both in the east and west of the country, and touching more and more aspects of people's daily life, from education to HIV prevention, from orphanages to ecology.

Both Georgian and Ukrainian activists were in close contact with the Albert Einstein Institute in Boston and a Russian and Ukrainian version of Sharp's book *From Dictatorship to Democracy* was made available on its website. In addition a 'revolution maker' like Markovic was called to Kiev (Krivokapic 2005), Otpor activists helped setting up the Georgian scenario (Karumidze and Wertsch 2005) and then Kmara activists have passed this experience off to Ukrainain politicians (Dmithicheva, Silina and Rakhmanin 2004).

Even if top-bottom (and bottom-bottom) influences on civil society have been largely exaggerated by Russia, and their political dimension minimized by the West (Chupryna, Kaskiv and Zolotenko 2007, Mostovskaya 2004), I would suggest they had a main role. A first point to start with would be the overall amount of financial assistance granted by foreign actors, and in particular the US, to programs of support to democracy. In this category we can have direct support for independent information; this also includes training in capacity

building, democratic initiatives and support in local and foreign NGOs working in the country. To some hardcore activists the fact that some non-governmental initiatives were funded by the US government would sound at least ambiguous. Indeed, the fact that some NGOs like the Open Society are partially funded by the US government raises the problem of whether to consider them top or bottom forces. The number of civic initiatives funded since the nineties is high, consistently higher than any other country in Georgia and Ukraine, to the extent that 'Soros' (the name with which the Open Society is identified) is also called '*vedro*' (bucket) by some NGO workers.

An important point is the pressure of governmental forces on civil society to unite or stay united. This was more visible during the PORA (the civic organisation, It's Time) campaign in Ukraine as merging of yellow and black PORA was a *conditio sine qua non* to have access to funding, but also in Georgia Kmara was encouraged to act jointly with other civic movements to maximize the impact on the population. Even when money is not provided, a large number of programmes could boost human capital working in the third sector. Trainings must not be on revolution necessarily but at least provide an alternative conception of democracy and the awareness that people can change things, which I have experienced in a number of projects not necessarily related with western funding. For one thing, despite not receiving money, PORA and Kmara activists could benefit from trainings on election monitoring organized by (Kuzio 2005), be invited by their Serbian counterparts or benefit from Serbian activists sent to the two countries.

The structuralization of activists' ideas has also revealed very important. Activists have often declared that they had understood many things about civic disobedience by themselves, but meeting with more experienced people helped them to better structure the way protests could be organized (Strijbosch 2004). As stakes get higher, civil society may be demonized by the regime. Accusation of terrorism and false evidence is a way to discredit NGOs in the eyes of public opinion. This can be also balanced by foreign diplomacy repeatedly supporting people and people's decision and reminding that civil society is an integrating part of a healthy society. In particular, foreign diplomacy can also help when the government takes a harsher attitude towards those movements. In the Georgian and Ukrainian cases worked better than elsewhere because both presidents were concerned of their image in the West, which had made clear that there was a limit to antidemocratic attitudes.

Bottom forces in foreign countries may have a major role. First of all they can provide information or counter-information. Once people are more aware, public opinion might push top politicians to intervene. The louder the voice, the more the resonance the more effects it will have on international public opinion and politicians; that is a further step towards ensuring the safety of protesters and civil society activists.

With the increasing importance of the internet in daily life it has become all the more simple to communicate and build up international networks. As a result, independently from what was decided at a political level, some NGOs could better communicate and provided for a wider vision of events. In Georgia some hardcore activists entered in touch with Otpor (Serbia) and then OK'98 (Slovakia) activists, passing off their experience to the Ukrainians. Technical know how on revolutions was spread also though these channels. In this respect not only the US but also the European Union allowed a high number of Georgian and Ukrainian NGOs to take part in training, work camps and other grassroots initiatives that would eventually affect the mentality and attitude of youth workers and local leaders (Wallander 2005). Foreign civil society could also have a role in the boosting domestic civil society by pressuring the government through petitions, sit ins and other bottom-up initiatives like

simultaneous picketing of Russian embassies in several countries. There is a limit to what some hundred people can do outside a Russian embassy in a country, but once this happens on a regular basis in a high number of countries and is advertised, it becomes an instrument of international politics as well.

Resistance and silence: people and their attitude
External actors can 'provoke collective hysteria and bring oranges filled with narcotics to keep people protesting for days with no desire to go back home'. This is at least one version of the authorities during the orange revolution (Lozowy 2004). More realistically, there are a number of things that can be done. One is to make people believe that they will succeed. Once a revolution has already happened in a neighbouring country or at least a country with a similar past, people can see the option as more real and believe they might succeed - what Bessinger sees as a modular phenomenon (2007). Once information on what has happened elsewhere permeates the country, people start thinking differently.

As in the case of the opposition, the ultimate choice is domestic. It is up to people to choose whether to go, or not, down to the streets, but thanks to external influences the very alternative can be made possible. People might not be aware of this possibility, may not see it but information coming from outside can make it into a real option (Krivokapic 2005). As I said above, to find the border line between the main actors is not easy, people worked very close to civil society and it is not possible to say that an initiative helped solely civil society or people, most likely it helped both. I shall mention here financial assistance because, once people were in the streets, they needed support.

Both protests happened in a very cold time of the year and people needed to stay warm. Figures on financial assistance during the protests are not available (and probably will be never) but it is sufficient to remark that feeding and keeping warm a crowd reaching 100.000 (Georgia) and one million (Ukraine) costs money (Almond 2004). I have witnessed how this money came also from domestic donations but it would be hard to believe that this was enough. For one thing, more than one informant told me that some embassies were contributing with commodities (gloves, sweaters and the 'notorious American boots') which made them sure that the money was spent for the people and, on the other hand, minimized the risk of being accused of 'financing' a revolution.

As in the case of civil society, diplomatic pressure can help avoiding bloodshed. Whereas it is known that most of the work to split forces within the Ministry of Interior has to be done (Sharp 1993) and was at domestic level (Chivers 2004, Kuzio 2005), awareness of being under observation gave the regime less margin of manoeuvre and eventually resulted in the defection of a number of key figures, fact that prejudged military intervention. Further in this direction, statements can come in favour of the people to counterbalance public accusations of inciting a civil war or destabilizing the country. They could come in different forms but the message behind is 'well dear president, if such a crowd is now out in the street, there might be a reason'.

Support can come also from other bottom movements and in recent times the number of internet petitions is dramatically increased. If there may be doubt on their influence on politicians, this at least raises the awareness of people who will start dedicating more attention to the issue once they hear of it from other channels. Some may opt for internet support of the protests, continuing the chain of petition, spreading information. New technologies have given people much more power in civil actions and the orange revolution has also been labelled an 'internet revolution' (Kyj 2006), whereas in Georgia the use of mobile phones was

equally relevant. Information is a powerful tool and people can do much for it and from it. Once the information spread, foreign supporters of protest movements arrived in Georgia and, even more, in Ukraine. The presence of foreigners, in particular Westerners, may have a double advantage. On the one hand they are a sign of foreign attention for the country and the relevance of the protests but on the other Westerners enjoyed a 'guest' status in the Soviet Union and this still remains, so the presence of foreigners may further keep the authorities from using force. This is not, however, a universal rule as it is subjected to the negotiation power Western forces have. If the country is not concerned with its reputation, there is little Westerners can do in any case.

Setting up the scenario: the opposition and its compactness
As a general tendency, the West rather than Russia was more interested in the opposition; though there are some exceptions like Moldova in 2005, when Moscow made clear that anybody but president Voronin would have been a good for them, or Georgia 2008, given the level of disagreement between presidents Saakashvili and Putin. On the compactness of the opposition there is little to work on. It is up to politicians to form a coalition or not, external forces can only motivate them playing the stick and the carrot. They can suggest the opposition to ally, can make promises for the case in which the opposition outplays the regime but their role is limited. Since majority and opposition are normally in competition, what is healthy for the majority is unhealthy for the opposition and vice versa. In the Georgian and Ukrainian cases it was the West which had more interest in supporting the opposition. Once Shevernadze's position was threatened, Russia showed a strong interest in backing the government and both Armenia and Azerbaijan expressed solidarity for the Georgian president. This was all the more visible in Ukraine, where Russia was acting in order to have the maximum gain from the elections. The ultimate desire of each party is not to form an opposition but to have a major role in domestic politics. Thus it is possible to tempt it and prompt it to change its position, weakening the opposition, something that happened in 2002 in Ukraine (Kuzio 2005b).

Apart from building relationships based on personal and ideological affinities, there is a discourse of convenience. In 2003 in Georgia the members of the opposition who would actively seek parliamentary alliances and to mobilize people were Western-educated and committed to the West, the problem was that it had not succeeded to unite so far and risked not to do so even in 2003, before the elections and during the protests with Mikheil Saakashvili demanding the president's resignation and opposition politicians Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze only a more honest recount (see Karumidze Z. and J. V. Wertsch 2005). A similar discourse was noticeable for Ukraine, where the opposition had failed to compact in 2002, when they de facto defeated all other parties, allowing a coalition between the communists and a pro-presidential party to form a majority (Jamestown Foundation 2002). In 2004, the European aspirations of three main parties were strong enough for uniting most of the opposition, while the communists refused to support the government. The opposition was also motivated by the awareness that their action would be supported by the West, at least implicitly, as it happened both in the Georgian and Ukrainian cases.

From its side, Russia had to play the opposite game; that is to undermine the formation of a coalition. Whilst it was too late to be done in Georgia, in Ukraine it started from the very beginning, with biased information on the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko and the opposition delivered through Russian channels. In addition the fact that in Ukraine some broadcasting hours are rented to Russian channels helped circulation of an anti-Yushchenko discourse. Yuliya Tymoshenko was also publicly accused of corruption and it was made known that, if travelling to Russia, she would face serious charges. There are suspicions that

external influences went as far as to help Yushchenko's poisoning, though the truth on the case will probably never be discovered (Kuzio 2005c).

Financial support is another issue. Whereas officially Russia did not support any fraction and the West did not send any money to an opposition party, several channels were susceptible to use. The promotion of democracy was attempted in a non-partisan way, by funding initiatives rather than supporting a political movement (see Kurth and Kempe 2005). By promoting democracy and democratic initiatives the EU and US left the door open to people of any political ideology, though ultimately the opposition ended up benefiting the most from training on election monitoring and financial support to local initiatives. The strategy mirrors the OK 98 campaign in Slovakia. Once a regime is losing popularity, just let things follow their course and, as long as people to go the polls and the results are not too rigged, the regime will be delegitimized. If elections are falsified, then producing evidence will have a similar effect, but then people will have to 'fight' to get the expected outcome.

Colour revolutions have a particularity that is the interaction of politics, common people and civil society. They have a strong component of democratization not because the 'democratic' candidate is elected but because people are urged to have an active voice in the politics of a country, which is ultimately the very meaning of democracy. The opposition is supposed to coordinate with civil society and organize actions of civil disobedience. Colour revolutions are more difficult to understand, at least at the beginning, for the high level of coordination between politics and civil society. The Otpor experience in Serbia served politicians in Georgia and so did Kmara with some politicians of the opposition who started thinking of mobilizing masses as a way to change the political direction of a country. Not only NGO activists were in touch but, for the first time, NGO activists entered into strict contact with politicians and were working with them as peers.

However, to involve people in politics is not the easiest task on earth. Besides, people can be encouraged to take to the streets but cannot be dragged out to the street. But once people are involved, technology on management of crowds helps at least to find the right way to address to people. True that such technology is to be used by civil society leaders who work closer to the people but there is evidence that politicians themselves (and this is definitely the Georgian and Ukrainian case) got interested in 'how to organize a revolution' and invited foreign experts to learn to do that. I could not find any direct involvement in Georgia as I did in Ukraine (Mostovskaya 2004) but the insistence with which several politicians wanted to go to the street suggests that they were aware of such methods (see Karumidze and Wertsch 2005).
Thus I see at least two ways bottom-actors can influence top politics. One is the very fact that these kind of actions exist and get to the ears of the opposition, that learns of strategies of civil disobedience and that it works (information is again vital here), the other is to provide some leaders with knowledge in crowd management, both theoretical and practical, whereas the countermeasure is the creation and support of opposite movements. On the other hand those actions can be stigmatized by other forces like pro-governmental NGOs in neighbouring countries (read Russia) producing counter-propaganda. (Krivokapic 2005, see also Kolesnikova 2005)

Information is also present in this case. Previous events in Slovakia, but especially in Serbia (for Georgia) and in Georgia (for Ukraine), galvanized the opposition and made clear that regimes were not indestructible, which also undermined the confidence of pro-presidential elites that could consider passing to the opposition, as it happened in many cases.

Diplomacy and negotiations: the role of external forces

This is the main focus of this paper and is dealt with throughout the whole analysis. I can only include what I have not analysed so far that is the moment when crisis erupts and more political actors are fully authorized to be involved, though diplomacy.

A main way to have a voice is to send key persons to take care of domestic policies and this is when the OSCE, EU, US can have a main voice in domestic affairs. In Georgia there was a less visible presence of Western forces with the US ambassador unable to connect with the negotiation table in the few days before Shevarnadze resignation. Pressure had been strong the previous days, when several statements condemning the elections and the way they had been organized made clear to Shevarnadze that he would not get away so easily; failure to propose an acceptable solution would have meant the end of his popularity in the West. Russia was less radical and sent its Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who was well known in Georgia and knew all the political figures in the country, to help out negotiations.

The Ukrainian case is somehow more complicated, with the EU taking a leading role, under the guidance of Poland, the EU country with the closest ties to Ukraine and Lithuania, a former USSR country with a similar experience of civil disobedience. One should not forget that in May 2004 10 new countries entered the EU, 3 of which were former soviet republics, interested in the fate of their former fellow countries and eager to engage in such political dialogue. The other 7 countries were former Soviet satellites and also aware of the political dynamics of soviet politics. This is why, once the crisis was declared, the EU was able to negotiate as a peer of Russia as a Ukrainian neighbour. The EU representative Javier Solana was endorsed with mediation tasks, accompanied by the Polish president Aleksander Kwasnieski and Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus. In addition, Washington's radical position made it difficult to include the US in the negotiation team. Having refused to acknowledge the election results and preparing a list of politicians whose entry into the US would be restricted should Viktor Yanukovich (the government candidate) become president, Washington lost the right to act as a neutral mediator at the negotiation table.

A point worth exploring is violence, or better the absence of violence. Why were people arrested in Belarus or killed in Uzbekistan but not in Georgia or Ukraine? The option of violence was very realistically considered in both cases. Rumours that Russian tanks had passed the border circulated in Ukraine whereas in Georgia there was little need for that, given that Russian troops were already in the country (see Abkhazia). In both cases it was considered to send provocateurs into the crowd so that the police would be 'obliged' to intervene to stop riots; buses full of Ajarian supporters arrived in Tbilisi and trains from Donetsk arrived in Kiev. The secret police considered intervening and this would have been the end of the protests, Russia would say that is its internal affair, and the status quo maintained (Chivers 2005).

However, there were several strong pressures on both presidents. There is little doubt they were aware they did not to have the control of the whole defence forces and that such an order would have prompted widespread violence, risking a Ceucescu scenario (Kuzio 2005). However both presidents had already shown that they cared about their reputation in the West, they had been searching for recognition and credit, albeit to a limited extent, in the US and EU, and were not ready to risk their reputation. Ukraine had signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1998, a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) partnership in 1997 and had been the object of a Common Strategy in 1999. Georgia had signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1999 and had joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992. In contrast with the Uzbek president Islam Karimov or Belarus

president Aleksander Lukashenko both presidents Shevardnadze and Kuchma were concerned with their reputation in the West. This is also due to the limited availability of raw materials in Georgia and Ukraine that cannot propose themselves as 'oil democracies' and have thus to show a commitment to democracy to target western financial assistance.

Two television channels are to credit for their desire to provide impartial information and they both risked being shut down several times, though in the end survived. Attempts to close Rustavi 2 ended up with a major political scandal; the whole staff of Channel 5 went on hunger strike when the government threatened to close it; eventually the government revoked the order of shutting down the channel.

It is difficult to separate external influences from domestic forces. The more I write the more I understand that they are so linked that writing about external influences result in explaining domestic dynamics and vice versa. However it is important not to limit those revolutions to mere political events as the real revolution has happened to people who have radically changed their attitude.

Conclusions

As a result of the analysis one could propose the following scheme. As a general tendency Russia has shown a tendency to undermine the opposition and support the regime whereas the West concentrated on civil society and the opposition. Both strategies (those 101 things to do to win a colour revolution) are conceived in order to gain the maximum profit, or at least not to lose, from a colour revolution.

Table 4: '101 things' to influence the output of a colour revolution

West	Russia
ELITES Top-top Undermine the regime, hijack pro-governmental forces Spreading the idea of an ideological alternative Promise advantage to some forces or threaten them Pressure the regime not to use force Pressure to hold free elections Promise financial and material assistance Bottom-top Information Know-how on protest movements and revolutions	Pressure governmental forces to unite Open ideological support for the regime Financial assistance and/or support for economic stability Offer army or diplomatic support for the domestic use of the army Alternative electoral monitors who endorse the elections as fair and free Promise assistance (or withdrawal of assistance) Counter information Elaboration of a counterstrategy
OPPOSITION Top-top Party support and transnational opposition alliances Financial assistance	Hijack some opposition forces, public accusations against some opposition figures Repression of domestic forces allied with the country's opposition

Bottom-up Training in protest management Interaction NGOs-politics	Support to create specular movements to confuse people Threats that civil disobedience will be repressed
EXTERNAL FORCES Top-top Diplomatic pressures on the regime in moments of crisis, including sending key political persons for negotiations Bottom-up Picketing of embassies and consulates, boycott at people's level	Diplomatic support to the regime Encourage local strikes "after work"
CIVIL SOCIETY Top-bottom Financial assistance Training, capacity building Open political support for local civic society Diplomatic pressures on the local regime not to use the force to repress civil society Bottom-bottom Information International networking of NGO movements Trainings Petitions	Accusations to civil society Evidence to crush civil society, creation of alternative pro governmental movements counter information
PEOPLE Top-bottom Financial or material assistance during the protests Diplomatic pressures not to use force Open statements to support people's power Bottom-bottom Participation in pro-protests actions in home countries Internet support Travelling to the protesting country Information Donations	Financial or material assistance to repress protests or spread rumours of a military intervention Ideological support for the use of force Public condemnation of civil disobedience actions Counter information

A striking detail is the imbalance of top and bottom possibilities. As a general tendency the ideological dimension is stronger at the bottom level. This is why the government can count on lots of pro-regime diplomatic actions but cannot count on the support of bottom forces.

Said more explicitly, if Russia wants to support Shevarnadze or Yanukovich it could do this from the top-level but civil society and population are almost a monopoly of the West for Russians will not bother themselves engaging the opposition. By the same token 'civil society' movements in favour of the regime will be initiated by the government rather than being an initiative of 'real' civil society. However Russia can spread fake information (as it did during the revolutions) hoping that its population would organize itself and contrast the colour revolutions. An analysis of forces active in a colour revolution would need much more space than an academic paper but this was a first attempt to single out the main ways external actors could have a voice in a protest movement, drawn from the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, where foreign influences are much more visible than in Uzbekistan or Belarus.

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