What are the effects of parents involvement on the implementation of guidance and counseling services in school?

The need for registered guidance counselors falls far behind the required number of professionals to cater the institutions obliged to hire them. Unfortunately, due to lack of registered guidance counselors, schools were forced to hire unlicensed counselors. In an article published by Valdez (2018) in news.abs-cn.com, under the provisions of the staffing in the Department of Education, the ratio must be 1:500 which means for every 500 students is 1 guidance counselor. If this will be applied in the present time, 46, 959 Registered Guidance Counselors (RGCs) are needed to cater to the counseling needs of students both in the public and private sector. Unfortunately, there are only 3,220 RGC's as of July 2017 which means there are 43,739 needed to suffice the needs of the students in basic education alone. Due to this issue, teachers fill in to perform the duties of a counselor. However, this is contradictory to Article 4, Section 27 of the Guidance and Counseling Act of 2004 which states that:

“No person shall (a) engage in the practice of guidance and counseling without a valid Certificate of Registration and the valid Professional Identification Card or a special permit; (b) make representations to the public or to third person as a licensed Guidance Counselor during the time that the licensed has been revoked or suspended, and, (c) allow anybody to use his/her license as guidance counselor to enable such unqualified individual to engage in the practice of guidance and counseling."

To go around the law, school heads give their assigned guidance counselors titles as "guidance teacher" or "school guidance leader". This has become a trend to all schools that lacks RGCs and this is the reason behind why there are teachers performing the roles of a counselor.

I have come to know one actor told publicly and media that was unable to attend marriage ceremony due to i was admitted in hospital of Mumbai.now negative so I am appeared again in front of you.

Please discuss if any scientist or Doctor know it about COVID.

3. THE "NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON" SCENARIO 3.1 Iran's nuclear facilities source: https://www.atomicarchive.com/almanac/facilities/iranian-facilities.html.

1. Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center (near the city of Tabriz in East Azerbaijan province). It contacts research on irradiation and other agricultural issues. 2. Sharif University of Technology (in Tehran). The central repository of nuclear research and allegedly a site of uranium centrifuge research. 3. Natanz Enrichment Plant (near the city of Isfahan). In 2003 IAEA inspectors found particles of highly enriched uranium. 4. Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center. It is Iran's largest nuclear research center with about 3.000 scientists working there. 5. Ardakan Nuclear Fuel Unit (in Yazd province). Possible uranium conversion facility to convert uranium ore to nuclear fuel for use in the Bushehr reactor. 6. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (near the city of Bushehr, in Bushehr province). It accommodates two partially completed reactors (1000 MW) being constructed with Russian assistance.7. Rudan Nuclear Research Center (near the city of Shiraz, in Fars province). Thought to accommodate an uranium hexafluoride gas conversion plant. 3.2 Does Iran have nuclear weapons? Dr. Vincent Pry, Executive Director of EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, in a 2022 study titled "The Islamic Republic of Iran's Military Doctrine, Plans and Capabilities for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack" [5] examined the hot issue of nuclear Iran. In the key judgements of this study the author underlines the following: "Washington’s bipartisan consensus is that Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons or missiles capable of threatening the United States with nuclear attack. But some Israeli analysts and some highly credible U.S. experts disagree with the 'consensus view.' For example, a 2015 article co-authored by several senior Reagan and Clinton Administration national security officials warned: 'Regardless of intelligence uncertainties and unknowns about Iran’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, we know enough now to make a prudent judgment that Iran should be regarded by national security decision makers as a nuclear missile state capable of posing an existential threat to the United States and its allies…The fact of Iran’s ICBM capability and their proximity to nuclear weapons necessitates that Iran be regarded as a nuclear missile state - right now.'" 9 In view of the analysis regarding the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran, we expect that such a possibility has been incorporated, already from the beginning of 21st century, as a vital element in 'game theory scenarios' regarding a military action against Iran by research think tanks of U.S., Israel and other key players in the Region. We argue that the "Armageddon Scenario" (a nuclear attack by Iran) will take place only as a response to an Israeli nuclear attack against Iran. Iran attacking first Israel with nuclear weapons will be a suicidal action that will 'wipe it off the map'. It is almost certain that Iran has already received a plethora of warnings on this issue from friends and enemies.3.3 High Altitude Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse threat assessments The impact of a HEMP attack against U.S. The issue of High Altitude Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) threat is analyzed in a congressional report of the EMP Commission, July 2008 [6]. In the summary of the report HEMP is defined as "An instantaneous, intense energy field that can overload or disrupt at a distance numerous electrical systems and high technology microcircuits, which are especially sensitive to power surges. A large scale EMP effect can be produced by a single nuclear explosion detonated high in the atmosphere". The report argues that the threat of an EMP attack against the U.S. is growing along with worldwide access to newer technologies and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also that this threat is hard to assess. The EMP commission's 2004 report proposed a five-year plan for protecting critical U.S. critical infrastructure from HEMP attacks. Contrary to the public sector the commission argues that private sector has done little to protect it against HEMP attacks. Based on the above report one can assume that at the present time U.S. have already protected their critical infrastructure to a considerable degree. The same conclusions can be drawn for Israel, a country that is exposed to a higher degree compared to U.S. to possible HEMP attacks from Iran, noting at this point that Israel is one of the leaders worldwide in technologies offering protection against such attacks.According to the above report "The effects of HEMP became fully known to the United States in 1962 during a high-altitude nuclear test (code named 'Starfish Prime') over the Pacific Ocean, when radio stations and electronic equipment were disrupted 800 miles away throughout parts of Hawaii. The HEMP effect can span thousands of miles, depending on the altitude and the design and power of the nuclear burst (a single device detonated at an appropriate altitude over Kansas reportedly could affect 10 all of the continental U.S.A." (figure 1). On the other hand, studies related to the effects of electromagnetic energy used as weapons have been published infrequently, or remain classified [7]. On the basis of figure 1, if an HEMP is detonated at a height of 500km over the geometric center of U.S. it can produce effects covering roughly the whole country. In the case of Iran, if a HEMP is detonated at an altitude of 60 km over the city of Yazd it can produce also effects covering most of it. At such a height the effects are not harmful for humans.According to the report the simultaneous loss of communications and power as a result of an HEMP attack would greatly complicate the restoration of systems and in the worst case scenario the duration of disrepair may last for years. Table 1 presents the estimates of damage and recovery times for an HEMP attack on Washington D.C. regional area. Since Iran's level of protection against HEMP is much less advanced than that of U.S. or Israel the impact of an HEMP attack against Iran will be much more devastating and paralyzing than the one presented here.The impact of a HEMP attack against Israel In an article in the Times of Israel on 14/10/2012 [8] David Shamah presented the issue of an Iranian nuclear EMP attack on Israel. The author argues that "Iran using a nuclear weapon to carry out an attack against U.S. or Israel could cause severe damage to the electrical grid in the targeted nations, to the extent that the routines of daily life could be halted for a short or even long period of time". According to EMP specialists a powerful EMP strike could severely damage power plants, electrical substations, data centers and communication systems that may take weeks or months to overcome. Also, Dr. Emily Landaw (head of the Arms Control Program at the Institute of National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University) argues that "while a nuclear bomb targeting an Israeli city would cause mass destruction on a local or regional basis, a (nuclear) EMP attack could cause even more lasting damage, destroying Israel's electrical systems". Dr. Joe Tuzara (2012) [9] in a article in the Israel National News on the issue of nuclear Iran makes the following key judgement: "There is no question that Iran is now a de facto nuclear state - a 'casus belli' for Israeli military action". He argues that among the threats arising from a nuclear Iran, a nuclear EMP attack against Israel is the focal dilemma for Israeli security analysts, adding that Israel is not informing U.S. on this issue and that 'trust deficit and loss of U.S. credibility' compels Israel not to depend on others to protect the Jewish people.Yonah Jeremy Bob, in an article in Jerusalem Post (20 Dec. 2016) [10] presents the key points of a conference held in Herzliya, Israel (Nov. 2016) addressing the hot issue of the impact of a nuclear EMP attack on Israel. The conference was co-sponsored by the Electric Infrastructure Security Council and IDC's Lauder School for Diplomacy and Strategy. Shlomo Vlad (former chief scientist of the Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water) said that "an EMP is a real threat that Israel must be concerned about" and since it does not result in the killing of people EMP is not considered a weapon of mass destruction under international law". Kobi Vimisberg (top National Emergency Authority official) warned that "even if the likelihood of an EMP attack is low a country that does not prepare will pay a heavy price". Dr Ehud Ganani (vice president of the Electric Infrastructure Securiry Council of Israel) presented a mock video of what life in Israel might look weeks after an EMP attack. The author of the article vividly presents as follows the contents of this video: "Israelis trying to stream out of the country on ships with Ben-Gurion Airport nonfunctional, doctors describing an inability to save patients because it is difficult for their staff and medicines to get to the hospital, and health problems arising from an acute water shortage". We argue at this point that the impact of such an attack in reality would be less dramatic since Israel, a world high tech leader, has been preparing methodically for a long period of time and with innovative ideas for such an eventuality, employing state-of-the-art technologies to adequately protect vulnerable infrastructure even in the worst-case scenario.Indicative of the above is what Naomi Etzion (top official of Israel Electric Corporation) said in this conference: "The company is investigating several layers of preparation for an EMP attack". Today, six years later, one can expect that Israel has already achieved probably the best level of protection worldwide against a nuclear EMP attack (the worst case among all possible EMP attacks). At this point we argue that the political cost for Iran, in the case it undertakes such an attack, especially in view of the enhanced capabilities of Arrow 3 System of Interceptors of Israel, will be enormous because the devastating impact of such an attack will spread to neighboring non-involved countries being characterized by very low (not to say almost non-existent), as compared to Israel, protection against such an attack. Given that the new version of Arrow System Interceptors (Arrow 3), produced in 2017 jointly with the U.S., has an operational range of 2400 km and flight ceiling of more than 100 km the nuclear warheads of the Iranian ballistic missiles, for an effective EMP attack against Israel, should be detonated at a very high altitude (of more than 100 km) spreading the devastating effects over a huge geographical area extending from Turkey to Saudi Arabia and from Cyprus to Iraq. Note, also, that Arrow 3 System [11] is capable (after adaptations) of shooting down (Iranian) satellites.The impact of a HEMP attack against Iran Dr. Joe Tuzara (2012) [9] argues in a rather journalistic style that "a nuclear EMP attack against Iran will be a 'game-changer' that would take Iranians back to the Stone Age" adding that such a hit can be delivered by Jericho III missiles at a high altitude over north or central Iran with no blast or radiation effects on the ground. The impact of such an attack would be devastating for Iran. He then describes the devastating effects of such an attack as follows: "Coupled with cyber-attacks, Iranians would not know it happened except for a massive shutdown of the electric power grid, oil refineries and a transportation gridlock. Food supply would be exhausted and communication would be largely impossible, leading to economic collapse. Similarly, the uranium enrichment centrifuges in Fordo, Natanz and widely scattered elsewhere, would freeze for decades". Finally the author expresses a rather optimistic certainty on a very hot issue reporting that "Frankly, one thing is certain - Israel won’t nuke Iran unless it unleashes chemical, biological or nuclear weapons against it".According to the report the simultaneous loss of communications and power as a result of an HEMP attack would greatly complicate the restoration of systems and in the worst case scenario the duration of disrepair may last for years. Table 1 presents the estimates of damage and recovery times for an HEMP attack on Washington D.C. regional area. Since Iran's level of protection against HEMP is much less advanced than that of U.S.A. or Israel the impact of an HEMP attack against Iran will be much more devastating and paralyzing than the one presented here. 4. IRAN'S CAPABILITIES TO WITHSTAND AND REACT TO A MILITARY ATTACK BY ISRAEL Iran's capabilities to withstand and react to a military attack by Israel have been significantly enhanced during the last twenty years. These enhanced capabilities regard the following three vital areas:1. The construction of deep underground tunnels to store nuclear component and facilities and also ballistic missile systems to minimize 'vital detection times' by Israeli or American sattelites. It is rather questionable if even the largest 'bunker buster' bombs can neutralize the tunnels. Thus the use by Israelis of nuclear bombs to do this job may arise as a possibility if U.S. insist in refusing to give the powerful 'bunker buster' bombs to Israel. 2. The signifiant enhancement of Iran's defense capabilities against aircraft attacks. On 7/3/18 Anthony Capaccio reported in Bloomberg [12] that Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency disclosed that Russia, in 2016, delivered the powerful anti-aircraft SA-20c SAM system to Iran which is now operational. According to Israeli and U.S. military officials this system offers Iran a 'generational' improvement of its capabilities. 3. The significant enhancement of Iran's capabilities to fully block the Strait of Hormuz for shipping for a long period of time and attack the Persian Gulf oil facilities and depots. On 27/5/2020 the Washington Institute for Near East Policy held a virtual Policy Forum, under the title "Iran's Assymetric Naval Response to 'Maximum Pressure'", with the participation of three veteran observers of Iranian naval forces and doctrines, Michael Connell, Farzin Nadimi and John Miller, to assess Iran's ability to punch above its weight in Persian Gulf [13]. MAP 2. Iran’s defense facilities (military installations, air bases and radar stations) Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Military_installations_of_Iran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Iranian_Air_Force_bases#Tactical_air_bases https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/radar-air-defense-maps.htm https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/images/mapradars-01.jpg|||%20radar%20system The provinces of Iran with the highest numbers of defense facilities are: Kermanshah (Kurdish population majority): 7 facilities. East and West Azerbaijan (Azeri population majority): 6 facilities. Hormozgan (Strait of Hormuz): 6 facilities.Khuzestan (Arabs constitute one third of its population): 5 facilities. 4.2 Iran’s naval capabilities and strategies to inflict a strike in the Persian Gulf Ryan White published in the Naval Post (April 2021) a study titled “Understanding Iran’s Naval Forces. IRIN/IRGCN” [14]. The author notes that “Iran operates two independent naval forces - the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), the Artesh’s naval branch, and the IRGC Navy (IRGCN). Iran established the IRGCN in 1985; the IRIN existed as part of the Artesh before the 1979 revolution". He also notes that “In 2007, the two naval forces reorganized, and Iran assigned specific areas of operation for each.Tehran assigned the IRGCN sole responsibility for the Persian Gulf and assigned the IRIN the Gulf of Oman and Caspian Sea. Both services continued to share responsibility for the Strait of Hormuz”Source: https://navalpost.com/understanding-irans-naval-forces-irin-irgcn/ ND: Naval District IRIN: Islamic Republic of Iran Navy IRGCN: Islamic Republic Guard Corps Navy AOR: Areas of responsibility Table 2 gives information (navy ships and personnel) on IRIN and IRGCN.IRIN 19 submarines, 7 corvettes, 13 fast attack (open seas) missile crafts, 9 patrol missile crafts, 9 landing ships, 6 howercrafts, 18.000 personnel. IRGCN 10 fast attack missile crafts, 45 patrol (coastal) missile crafts, 5 landing ships, 20.000 personnel. Three veteran observers of Iranian naval forces, Michael Cornnell, Farzin Nadimi and John Miller, assessed in 2020 (June) Iran’s ability to punch above its weight in the Persian Gulf in a publication titled “Iran’s assymetric naval response to ‘maximum pressure’" undertaken in the context of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy [13]. Cornnell notes that “Iran’s maritime strategy is 'make do with less'. Iranian naval forces have invested in capabilities that play to their strengths and target their adversaries’ weaknesses. Such technologies include limpet mines, coastal defense cruise missiles, and small to medium-size submarines. Geography also provides Iran with a tactical advantage in the Gulf. The confined environment favors offense over defense, allowing for little reaction time, and heavy maritime traffic provides an opportunity to mask operations”. He also underlines a factor that can take events in the Gulf out of control and considers the ‘vagueness’ and miscalculations regarding the areas of responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) in synergy with the aggressive policies and initiations of the semi-autonomous IRGCN. The autor notes that “In 2008, it shifted to a mosaic defense strategy by delegating more authority to lower-echelon naval commanders. This increases the chance of escalation and miscalculation in the Gulf because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) rewards aggressive, forward-leaning commanders who take risks.” Nadimi notes that “Since the Iran-Iraq War, the IRIN has reached a number of important milestones in terms of expanding its capabilities. These have included delivery of the first Kilo-class submarine in 1991, which provided a new subsurface warfare capability; the commissioning of its first domestically produced warship, the Sina-class fast-attack craft, in 2003; and the commissioning of the first Mowjclass frigate, the Jamaran, in 2010. More recently, the IRIN has developed 4,000- and 7,000-ton warships and 600- and 1,200-ton submarines. Yet it does not have the budget necessary to achieve Tehran’s aspirations for a truly capable blue water navy”. He also underlines the following: "In recent years, the IRGCN has expanded its unmanned explosive boat capabilities and the number of unmanned aerial vehicles it can use for surveillance and strike missions. It has explosive boats positioned all around the Gulf, but the majority are near the Strait of Hormuz in tunnels that offer cover, concealment, and the ability to launch directly into the waterway. As the maximum pressure campaign continues, Tehran could take an increasingly aggressive stance toward the U.S. presence in the Gulf, thereby increasing the risk of escalation and miscalculation". Finally, Miller notes that “Iran has developed unique capabilities to advance its strategic objective of applying pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, including ballistic missiles, land/sea-based antiship missiles, mines, submarines, tactical aircraft, air defense systems (e.g., the S-300), fast-attack and in-shore craft, and drones. The country’s indigenous drone program is notably impressive because it has improved capabilities for command and control, over-horizon targeting, and battle damage assessments. The newly acquired S-300 surface-to-air missile was particularly concerning to the United States because it could facilitate the employment of advanced antiship missiles to strike high-value targets in the Gulf and beyond.”