Started 16th Jul, 2023
  • University of Alicante Spain

The Fate of “Source-Independence” in Electromagnetism, Gravitation, and Monopoles

Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
With the introductory claim that I make here suggestions that seem rationally acceptable in physics and the philosophy of physics, I attempt here to connect reasons beyond the concepts of magnetic monopoles, electromagnetic propagation, and gravitation.
A magnetic or other monopole is conceptually built to be such only insofar as the basic consideration with respect to it is that of the high speed and the direction of movement of propagation of the so-called monopole. Let me attempt to substantiate this claim accommodating also the theories in which the so-called magnetic monopole’s velocity could be sub-luminal.
If its velocity is sub-luminal, its source-dependence may be demonstrated, without difficulty, directly from the fact that the velocity of the gross source affects the velocity of the sub-luminal material propagations from it. This is clear from the fact that some causal change in the gross source is what has initiated the emission of the sub-luminal matter propagation, and hence the emission is affected by the velocity of the source’s part which has initiated the emission.
But the same is the case also with energy emissions and the subsequent propagation of luminal-velocity wavicles, because (1) some change in exactly one physical sub-state of the gross source (i.e., exactly the sub-state part of the gross source in which the emission takes place) has initiated the emission of the energy wavicle, (2) the change within the sub-state part in the gross source must surely have been affected also by the velocity of the gross source and the specific velocity of the sub-state part, and (3) there will surely be involved in the sub-state part at least some external agitations, however minute, which are not taken into consideration, not possible to consider, and are pragmatically not necessary to be taken into consideration.
Some might claim (1) that even electromagnetic and gravitational propagations are just mathematical waves without corporeality (because they are mathematically considered as absolute, infinitesimally thin waves and/or infinitesimal particles) or (2) that they are mere existent monopole objects conducted in luminal velocity but without an opposite pole and with nothing specifically existent between the two poles. How can an object have only a single part, which they term mathematically as the only pole?
The mathematical necessity to name it a monopole shows that the level of velocity of the wavicle is such that (1) its conventionally accepted criterial nature to measure all other motions makes it only conceptually insuperable and hence comparable in theoretical effects to the infinity-/zero-limit of the amount of matter, energy, etc. in the universe, and that (2) this should help terming the wavicle (a) as infinitesimally elongated or concentrated and hence as a physically non-existent wave-shaped or particle-shaped carrier of energy or (b) as an existent monopole with nothing except the one mathematically described pole in existence.
If a wavicle or a monopole is existent, it should have parts in all the three spatial directions, however great and seemingly insuperable its velocity may be when mathematically tested in terms of its own velocity as initiated by STR and GTR and later accepted by all physical sciences. If anyone prefers to call the above arguments as a nonsensical commonsense, I should accept it with a smile. In any case, I would continue to insist that physicists want to describe only existent objects / processes, and not non-existent stuff.
The part A at the initial moment of issue of the wavicle represents the phase of emission of the energy wavicle, and it surely has an effect on the source, because at least a quantum of energy is lost from the source and hence, as a result of the emission of the quantum, (1) certain changes have taken place in the source and (2) certain changes have taken place also in the emitted quantum. This fact is also the foundation of the Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg. How then can the energy propagation be source-independent?
Source-independence with respect to the sub-luminal level of velocity of the source is defined with respect to the speed of energy propagation merely in a conventional manner. And then how can we demand that, since our definition of sub-luminal motions is with respect to our observation with respect to the luminal speed, all material objects should move sub-luminally?
This is the conventionally chosen effect that allegedly frees the wavicle from the effect of the velocity of the source. If physics must not respect this convention as a necessary postulate in STR and GTR and hence also in QM, energy emission must necessarily be source-dependent, because at least a quantum of energy is lost from the source and hence (1) certain changes have taken place in the source, and (2) certain changes have taken place also in the emitted quantum.
(I invite critical evaluations from earnest scientists and thinkers.)

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All replies (40)

Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
I have revised the lead-text for more clarity, and uploaded the PDF under the section on Research.
Juan Weisz
formerly conicet and universidad nacional del litoral
The electric monopole exists as charges and are found, not so magnetic charge or monopole.
Too bad because some theorists like the idea, to make Maxwells equations more symmetric
in electric and magnetic parts, and a few other reasons. This is discussed in Jackson.
The speed of light in vacuum is independent of the motion of the source? You question that?
Or you mean the motion of the source is afected by mometum carried off by photon?
(The motion-radiative problems are yet unexactly treatable in theory)
Exact meaning of sub-liminal here?
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Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Thanks, Alex Wolf
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Juan Weisz,
If, at the moment of ejection of a photon out of an electric state change in an atom in moon, it means that the very emission of the photon is due to the specific change in the electon system in the atom. The specific change is the cause of the change called the emission. Due to the emission something has further changed in the electron system.
But the speed of the moon as such does not affect the emission of the photon in the sense that the changes within one atom's electron system in the moon is negligible compared to all the matter and its changes in the moon taken together. But the speed of certain effects within the electron system in one atom has affected the photon emitted -- not merely in its velocity but also in its momentum and other properties. Sure. What to call this?
I mean by sub-luminal (not sub-liminal) the velocities that are less than that of electromagnetic radiation.
Alex Wolf III
Theory of Everything
No problem. I apologize for the mass of unintelligible typos. I was multitasking using text-to-speech. I look forward to enjoying your research. I hope you find the following answer more No useful: Synchronicity prevails. I am currently writing a paper on proving or disproving magnetic monopoles in a mathematically and physically undeniable way. My functioning form of Universal Theory does good things with monopoles. It is attached. You are free to mess around with it, that it may help you conclusively mathematically and physically prove monopope related work. You are of course free to utilize any of the work personally or otherwise. I actually found that the theory inherently has traits which indicate it may be able to mathematically and physically prove monopoles beyond a reasonable doubt in a fashion which is accurate and consistent both mathematically and physically. I have also found during stages of feasibility and speciousness checking of the indicated Grand Unified Theory framework, that seperate advanced math-based AI as well as a physics-based AIs when questioned after feeding it data on the theory about what inherent properties I may be overlooking to prove certain things came to the same conclusion independently. I immediately found that reiterating the key as well as all of the variables in the full framework equation resulted in the aforementioned mathematics AI as well as the physics AI separately arriving at the conclusion that the theory could be very, very useful in conclusively proving or disproving magnetic monopoles. I was actually told by the physics based AI system that the theory actually full on conclusively proved magnetic monoples, but I am in no way ready, and in no way have the mathematical and physical proof to make that statement in any conclusive way at this time. I also have an indication that they should be correctly termed always as Electromagnetic-monopoles. This is reiterated by the mathematical consistency of the Grand Unified Theory Framework (attached) indicating of course that Electromagnetism is an inherent and fundamental construct affecting time and space. I do believe overlooking the small "electro" portion or neglecting to account for it in a way which is mathematically equivalent to calculated and expected purely magnetic values may cause erroneous calculation as well as improper assumptions of the effect on spacetime and it's relation to other physical processes that may contain vital pieces of the puzzle to deduce the possible mechanism or inexistent of magnetic monopoles Raphael Neelamkavil
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Juan Weisz
formerly conicet and universidad nacional del litoral
Charges like the proton radiate
If accelerated so the trajectory
May be influenced
Sergey Shevchenko
Institute of Physics of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine
“…The part A at the initial moment of issue of the wavicle represents the phase of emission of the energy wavicle, and it surely has an effect on the source, because at least a quantum of energy is lost from the source and hence, as a result of the emission of the quantum, (1) certain changes have taken place in the source and (2) certain changes have taken place also in the emitted quantum….”
- here is no some principal problems. Any/practically every change in a state of any/every material object [a particle, atom, etc.] that happens at interaction with other particle(s), etc., or, say, when an unstable particle or an atom’s unstable state decays, etc., all that always happens in full consistence with energy, momentum, and angular momentum, conservation laws, including if in such cases something – a photon at acceleration of an electrically charged particle, some particles, say, at neutron decay, etc., – are emitted/created.
However that
“… This fact is also the foundation of the Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg. How then can the energy propagation be source-independent?…..”
- really is too vague claim. What happens at “emissions” isn’t foundation of Uncertainty Principle, though happens in accordance with the principle, including, say, at relaxation of short-life Δt excitations of electronic shells in atoms indeed ΔEΔt~ћ/2.
If we say about photons, then just energy of photons, ΔE, is “source dependent” at least in two points: that is determined by the source’s structure, etc. independently on – the source moves in 3D space or not; and by the source vector velocity, if it moves;
- however the concrete photon’s propagation speed in the space doesn’t depend on the source, it is determined only by medium where photon propagates [though the speed depends on photon’s energy, and so, in certain sense, on the source],
- in vacuum photon propagates only with the speed of light, that fundamentally is independent on source, since is determined by properties of the ultimate medium of Matter – the (at least) [4+4+1]4D dense lattice of the primary elementary logical structures – (at least) [4+4+1]4D binary reversible fundamental logical elements [FLE], which [the lattice] is placed in the corresponding Matter’s fundamentally absolute, fundamentally flat, and fundamentally “Cartesian”, (at least) [4+4+1]4D spacetime with metrics (at least) (cτ,X,Y,Z, g,w,e,s,ct).
Propagations of Gravity and Electric Forces mediators in mediums are fundamentally different, E/EM mediators can be even practically completely screened by some mediums, while Gravity can be screened only rather partially, however in vacuum both Forces mediators propagate similarly: only with the speed of light; and if a Gravity or Electric Force charge move in 3D space, then Electric Force mediators obtain “magnetic” properties, rather possibly that happens with Gravity Forces mediators in this case also, more see the Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s 2007 initial model of Gravity and Electric Forces in
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365437307_The_informational_model_-_Gravity_and_Electric_Forces ; including that so called “magnetic monopoles” fundamentally don’t exist.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
In the second paragraph you wrote something general in physics. But what is its connection with the first paragraph you cited from me?
About Uncertainty: I shall change the statement a bit: This is the general reason for (not merely the result of) the Uncertainty Principle.
If "however the concrete photon’s propagation speed in the space doesn’t depend on the source, it is determined only by medium where photon propagates", then it is DEPENDENCE ON THE MEDIUM. But this cannot automatically mean SOURCE-INDEPENDENCE. The latter should be with respect to the speeds of the source and the emitted wavicle.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Watch this video (streamed today, 23 July 2023) from after the 9thminute: A suggestion that the constant velocity of light, Planck’s constant, and Gravitational constant may be found to have covariance when the whole cosmos is considered.
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Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!
Juan Weisz
formerly conicet and universidad nacional del litoral
We use any usefull tool
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Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
What do you refer to here?
Peter Enders
Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University
For the field theory of gravity, see Newton's 'Principia', Section 'Definitions'. For magnetic monopoles, see Dirac's articles. What exactly is your problem?
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Suggestions taken. Thanks. The problems are discussed in the text. If you want to ask clarifications, kindly pinpoint.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
I have seen a lot of physics and mathematics students mistaking the logical ways in which they experiment and theorize as the conceptual foundations of physics and mathematics. They even think of these ways as the possession of scientists. Imaginably, in this pride, they are encouraged by their scientific temper. More evidently, there were and there are physicists holding that their use of logic, epistemology, ontology, etc. is final and that all other details being done by other sciences, especially by philosophers, are a mere waste of time. (If you want me to cite, I suggest to get into some of the YouTube interviews with Stephen Hawking.) The same sort of claim is to be seen being made by many mathematicians: that logic is a by-product of mathematics.
Sergey Shevchenko
Institute of Physics of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine
“…For the field theory of gravity, see Newton's 'Principia', Section 'Definitions'. For magnetic monopoles, see Dirac's articles. What exactly is your problem?….”
- really is principally in XXI century incorrect. Newton Gravity law is some analog of Coulomb law in electrodynamics, but to describe what exist and happens in electrically coupled systems of particles, bodies, etc., it is necessary to know/use a number of other laws that act in this case. So, say Mercury orbital motion cannot be described only in Newton Gravity, and the couple of adequate to the reality description are Paul Gerber’s 1898 one, where he introduced in fact some retarded potentials and speed of gravitational impacts be equal to c,[analogously to ED] and the GR’s one, where that also by some ways is used;
- magnetic monopoles fundamentally don’t exist, since magnetic field is really only a specific transformation of electric field, which is created by moving electric charges; how that happens see the Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s 2007 initial model of Gravity and Electric Forces in
SS post on page 225 in
https://www.researchgate.net/post/An_old_question_that_is_still_fresh_Is_gravity_a_Newtonian_force_or_Einstein_space-time_curvature/225 is relevant in this case also; though last time this thread is too heavily flooded by a series of rather strange posts.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
How Does Physics Know? The Epistemology Presupposed by Physics and Other Sciences
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
3.1. Traditional Physical Categories
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Can source-independence of EM and probably also of Gravitation be held? If yes, why? If no, why?
This question is mind-boggling. I would invite theoretically engaging reflections on this question.
The reason why I ask this is that I remain astounded and helpless at the thought of finding an answer to this.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
This is a serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:
NON-FOUNDATIONS OF ‘WAVICLES’ IN EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX: Bases for Quantum Physics to Evolve (Maybe a physical-ontological Breakthrough)
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
AGAINST COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION, etc.: A Critique of Identity, Simultaneity, Cosmic Repetition / Recycling, etc.
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
Raphael Neelamkavil
University of Alicante Spain
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Similar questions and discussions

Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!
49 replies
  • Raphael NeelamkavilRaphael Neelamkavil
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
1. The Logic of PhysicsPhysics students begin with meso-world experiments and theories. Naturally, at the young age, they get convinced that the logic they follow at that level is identical with the ideal of scientific method. Convictions on scientific temper may further confirm them in this. This has far-reaching consequences in the concept of science and of the logic of science.
But, unquestionably, the logic behind such an application of the scientific method is only one manner of realizing (1) the ideal of scientific method, namely, observe, hypothesize, verify, theorize, attempt to falsify for experimental and theoretical advancements, etc., and (2) the more general ideal of reason.
But does any teacher or professor of physics (or of other sciences) instruct their students on the advantages of thinking and experimenting in accordance with the above-mentioned fundamental fact of all scientific practice in mind, or make them capable of realizing the significance of this in the course of time? I think, no.
This is why physicists (and for that matter all scientists) fail at empowering their students and themselves in favour of the growth of science, thought, and life. The logic being followed in the above-said mode of practice of scientific method, naturally, becomes for the students the genuine form of logic, instead of being an instantiation of the ideal of logic as reason. This seems to be the case in most of the practices and instruction of all sciences till today. A change of the origin, justification, and significance of the use of logic in physics from the very start of instruction in the sciences is the solution for this problem. The change must be in the foundations.
All humans equate (1) this sort of logic of each science, and even logic as such, with (2) reason as such. Reason as such, in fact, is more generic of all kinds of logic. Practically none of the professors (of physics as well as of other sciences) terms the version of logic of their science as an instantiation of reason, which may be accessed ever better as the science eventually grows into something more elaborate and complex. Physicist gets more and more skilled at reasoning only as and when she/he wants to grow continuously into a genuine physicist.
As the same students enter the study of recent developments in physics like quantum physics, relativity, nano-physics (Greek nanos, “dwarf”; but in physics, @ 10-9), atto-physics (@ 10-18), etc., they forget to make place for the strong mathematical effects that are due by reason of the conceptual and processual paradoxes due to epistemological and physical-ontological difference between the object-sizes and the sizes of ourselves / our instruments. The best examples are the Uncertainty Principle, the Statistical Interpretation of QM, Quantum Cosmology, etc.
They tend to believe that some of these and similar physics may defy our (meso-physical) logic – but by this mistakenly intending that all forms of reasoning would have to fail if such instances of advanced physics are accepted in all of physics. As a result, again, their logic tends to continue to be of the same level as has been taken while they did elementary levels of physics.
Does this not mean that the ad hoc make-believe interpretations of the logic of the foundations of QM, Quantum Cosmology, etc. are the culprits that naturally make the logic of traditional physics inadequate as the best representative of the logic of nature? In short, in order to find a common platform, the logic of traditional and recent branches of physics must improve so to adequate itself to nature’s logic.
Why do I not suggest that the hitherto logic of physics be substituted by quantum logic, relativity logic, thermodynamic logic, nano-logic, atto-logic, or whatever other logic of any recent branch of physics that may be imagined? One would substitute logic in this manner only if one is overwhelmed by what purportedly is the logic of the new branches of physics. But, in the first place, I wonder why logic should be equated directly with reason. The attempt should always be to bring the logic of physics in as much correspondence with the logic of nature, so that reason in general can get closer to the latter. This must be the case not merely with physicists, but also with scientists from other disciplines and even from philosophy, mathematics, and logic itself.
Therefore, my questions are: What is the foundational reason that physicists should follow and should not lose at any occasion? Does this, how does this, and should this get transformed into forms of logic founded on a more general sort of physical reason? Wherein does such reason consist and where does it exist? Can there be a form of logic in which the logical laws depend not merely on the size of objects or the epistemological level available at the given object sizes, but instead, on the universal characteristics of all that exist? Or, should various logics be used at various occasions, like in the case of the suggested quantum logic, counterfactual logic, etc.?
Just like logic is not to be taken as a bad guide by citing the examples of the many logicians, scientists, and “logical” human beings doing logic non-ideally, I believe that there is a kernel of reason behind physics, justified solely on the most basic and universal characteristics of physical existents. These universals cannot belong solely to physics, but instead, to all the sciences, because they belong to all existents.
This kernel of reason in physics is to be insisted upon at every act of physics, even if many physicists (and other scientists and philosophers) may not ensure that kernel in their work. I shall discuss these possibly highest universals and connect them to logic meant as reason, when I elaborate on: 3. The Ontology of Physics (in a forthcoming discussion in RG)
The matter on which physicists do logical work is existent matter-energy in its fundamental implications and the derivative implications from the fundamental ones. This is to be kept in mind while doing any logically acceptable work physics, because existent matter-energy corpora in processuality delineate all possible forms of use of logic in physics, which logic is properly to be termed nature’s reason.
Moreover, conclusions are not drawn up by one subject (person) in physics for use by the same subject alone. Hence, we have the following two points to note in the use of logic in physics and the sciences: (1) the intersubjectively awaited necessity of human reason in its delineation in logical methods should be upheld at least by a well-informed community, and (2) the need for such reason behind approved physics should then be spread universally with an open mind that permits and requires further scientific advancements.
These will make future generations further question the genuineness of such logic / specific realization of reason, and constantly encourage attempts to falsify theories or their parts so that physics can bring up more genuine instantiations of human reason. But is such human reason based on the reason active in nature?
Although the above arguments and the following definition of logic in physics might look queer or at least new and unclear for many physicists, for many other scientists, for many mathematicians, and even for many logicians, I define here logic for use in physics as the fundamental aspect of reason that physics should uphold constantly in every argument and conclusion due from it:
Logic in physics is (1) the methodological science (2) of approaching the best intersubjectively rational and structural consequences (3) in what may be termed thought (not in emotions) (4) in clear terms of ever higher truth-probability achievable in statements and conclusions (5) in languages of all kinds (ordinary language, mathematics, computer algorithms, etc.) (6) based on the probabilistically methodological use, (7) namely, of the rules of all sensible logics that exemplify the Laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle, (8) which in turn must pertain to the direct and exhaustive physical implications of “to exist”.
Here I have not defined logic in physics very simply as “the discipline of the rules of thought”, “the discipline of the methodological approach to truths”, etc., for obvious reasons clarified by the history of the various definitions of logic.
But here comes up another question: Is the reason pertaining to physical nature the same as the most ideal form of human reason? From within the business of physics, how to connect the reason of physical nature with that of humans? I may suggest some answers from the epistemological and ontological aspects. But I would appreciate your responses in this regard too.
2. The Epistemology of Physics (in a forthcoming discussion in RG)
3. The Ontology of Physics (in a forthcoming discussion in RG)
Spacetime Curvature, Gravitational Waves, Gravitons, and Anti-Gravitons: Do They All Exist? (short text)
68 replies
  • Raphael NeelamkavilRaphael Neelamkavil
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
There may be physicists and philosophers of physics who do not admit that, just like electromagnetism, gravitation too should have its basic wavicle units and that they too should exist physically. Merely because gravitation is termed energy, it cannot merely be a quantity with nothing existent in order to hold and transport the said quantity of energy.
Moreover, there seems to be forgetfulness to take into account the fact that “gravitational waves” must be conceived in two ways: (1) whole conglomerations of gravitational effect by an object on another, and (2) the basic unit of gravitational propagation that moves in a 4-dimensional sinusoidal manner, whereby it is clear that only infinite speed can trace absolutely straight line due to the lack of any internal or external influence upon an infinite-speed propagation. I would opine that there exists much confusion between these two notions of gravitational waves when physicists describe gravitational waves and their various discoveries in astrophysical experiments.
There may be physicists who think that, since, as of now, gravitational waves can be detected and treated only as the waves of whole measures of the gravitational effect of one gross body upon another, a basic existent wavicle unit of gravitation is unnecessary for physical purposes. These physicists may be seen as not permitting the existence of gravitons by arguing that the smallest unit of graviton is not a spacetime curvature as is so far seen in astrophysical experiments! This tendency in physics and other sciences is what I would term perspectival absolutism.
The mere fact that gravitons are so minute as not to be treated in GTR and cosmology as spacetime warps need not mean that these warps represented by mathematical expressions should not exist as physical existents. If they are existent within and between two astronomical bodies, they consist of something too, that is, of wavicle gravitons. The case is similar to that of electromagnetic unit wavicles cumulatively causing electromagnetic spacetime curvatures.
If gravitons are existent, then gravitons as particles / wavicles are supposed to be emitted by bodies and the same are received by other bodies to produce gravitational curvatures and thus gravitational attraction between the two bodies. Logically, the emitter may experience a twitch in the direction of propagation of each graviton, if gravitons may not be source-independent due to the attractive nature of gravitons. The receiver of the graviton must naturally experience a pulling force. Thus, the bodies can move towards each other gravitationally. (Note here also that electromagnetic wavicles too need not be absolutely source-independent. Maybe that the positional change causesd by the electromagnetic wavicle upon the source of emission is so minute that it is negligible.)
The emitter body may even experience a twitch in the direction opposite to that of propagation of each graviton wavicle. Determining between the two directions of twitch in the emitter body is difficult as of now, because we are yet in infancy with respect to gravitational research. I mean not researches on the effects and ways of manipulation and use of gravitation. Instead, as to what the stuff of gravitation is in its basic constituents.
But if the emitting body should experience a recoil against the direction of the propagation leaving the object, then it is perhaps the sign of anti-gravitons, and the leaving propagation should have been tearing apart every element in the emitter object. This is not the case because gravitons alone can explain the holding together of the internal parts of the object on a long-range basis. (Small-range forces too contribute to the holding together of objects, but this is at the sub-atomic level.) Hence, any theory based on the radiation of gravitons can also explain why there need not be anti-gravitons in nature at all.
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Non-Locality: Was Einstein a Monist? (long text)
50 replies
  • Raphael NeelamkavilRaphael Neelamkavil
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
1. Theoretical Foreword Indicating the Basic Presuppositions
I begin here with an allusion to the really possible but ever less experimentally observable near-infinitesimality of internal and external causal parts of influences in any object. These objects are the oft so-called fundamental particles / wavicles. The inventory of actually existent sub-microscopic processual entities need not have size limits in the line of infinitesimality.
But they are less and less experimentally observable. The varying measures of infinitesimality of internal and external causal influences in the so-called fundamental wavicles of any layer of observation must be considered as true, since anything is constituted and hence has some EXTENSION.
Every existent wavicle in Extension has some ability to impact some others at any given finite time. This impacting is CHANGE.
So, there is reason for there being actual but connected layers of sub-processes and the related possibility of observation like those of the macro-, meso-, micro-, nano-, and other ultra-quantal levels of existence and action for constructing a causal quantum physics (QM). If infinitesimality is acceptable at the fundamental level, no wave front is identical in measurement with any other of its kind on any absolute (infinite) scale, because each in all its parts is unique by reason of its unique and finite Extension-Change state measured in spacetime quantities in four dimensions.
That is, all token processes and members of each type of process are different by its own specific identity in Extension-Change. There are very close measurement affinities between the mutually approximating relevance of objects of one and the same layer of the quantal level, which we tend to measure off by common finite standards of reckoning, without taking access to all possible level of the near-infinitesimal causal effects behind any iota of motion. This does not preclude the necessity of there being causal influence on anti-particles even in experimentally controlled detection of causal action upon, around, and within a given particle.
All experiments need not directly involve anti-particles in the present physics’ ordinary causal manner that permits the transmission of causal influences only at the speed of light. Yet there can and must be some particle-influences on anti-particles as in the EPR experiments. At the outset of the present discussion, I suggest that the alleged fantastic “action-at-a-vacuous-distance” between any two such particles is realistically possible only if the action is causal influence between the particle and the anti-particle, propagating at superluminal velocities. I suggest also that this is a result where we owe much to the history of experiments and counter-experiments of the decades-long history of solutions of the EPR Paradox.
If an experimental-causal alternation of state is possible between a particle and its experimentally immediately and apparatus-wise related anti-particle, it shows the existence of a wavelike propagating, non-vacuous, and causal influence between the two. Physicists committed to the ultimacy of luminal velocity term it unscientifically as “instantaneous” without any evidence for it in a context where they presuppose luminal velocity as the only criterion. There cannot be energy or matter that propagates in the absolute straight line posited by Euclid in ideal geometry, because this presupposes infinite speed. Hence, all propagations must be four-dimensionally wavelike, which means they must move forward like a spring, without even defining a straight line.
Any infinitesimal nature in the train of particles in the four-dimensional wave-shape is not observable by arbitrarily setting up a final limit to velocity from within this island universe of ours. Hence, we must favour finite superluminal velocities to make possible the near-infinitesimally possible values of causal effects within wavicles of all layers of size of existence, i.e., issuing from all layers. Such velocities will allow interpretation of the concept of wavicles within the sub-nuclear and the quantal, without any limiting size wherein no more internal motion would be possible. To bring this about, let us attempt an objectual (i.e., non-vacuous) and ontological mode of understanding the so-called non-local causality – action-at-a-vacuous-distance – in QM.
Without further giving a detailed introduction to the EPR problem, we enter the core of it. Gell-Mann gives a simple explanation of the EPR experiment, as modified by Bohm. Hence, it is called the EPRB experiment. It deals with the decay of a particle into two anti-particles – in our case, two anti-photons:
If the particle is at rest and has no internal “spin”, then the photons travel in opposite directions, have equal energy, and have identical circular polarizations. If one of the photons is left-circularly-polarized (spinning to the left), so is the other; likewise if one is right-circularly-polarized (spinning to the right), so is the other. Furthermore, if one is plane-polarized along a particular axis (that is, has its electric field vibrating along that axis), then the other one is plane-polarized along a definite axis. There are two cases, depending on the character of the spinless particle. In one case the plane polarization axes of the two photons are the same. In the other they are perpendicular. For simplicity let us take the former case, even though in the practical situation (where the decaying particle is a neutral pi meson) the latter case applies.
[…] The setup is assumed to be such that nothing disturbs either photon until it enters a detector. If the circular polarization of one of the photons is measured by the detector, the circular polarization of the other is certain – it is the same. Similarly, if the plane polarization of one of the photons is measured, that of the other photon is certain – again, it is the same as that of the first photon. Einstein’s completeness would imply that both the circular and plane polarization of the second photon could then be assigned definite values. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 171.]
The measurement problem as implying the completeness axiom for physical theory is expressed with great clarity in the words of Gell-Mann:
If, by means of a certain measurement, the value of a particular quantity Q could be predicted with certainty, and if, by an alternative, quite different measurement, the value of another quantity R could be predicted with certainty, then, according to the notion of completeness, one should be able to assign exact values simultaneously to both of the quantities Q and R. Einstein and his colleagues succeeded in choosing the quantities to be ones that cannot simultaneously be assigned exact values in quantum mechanics, namely the position and momentum of the same object. Thus a direct contradiction was set up between quantum mechanics and completeness. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 168-69.]
It must be admitted here that scientism and scientific determinism are based on perspectival absolutism. They are a type of absolutism of the current and immediately possible scientific perspective and its measurementally fixed notions and definitions of physical quantities. This is not only concretism but also perspectival absolutism.
But Einstein stood for both realism and scientific determinism of the concretist variety in the expected result of the EPR thought experiment, but without holding perspectival absolutism. This is why he tried lifelong to show that “[…] if one believes the wavefunction exhausts all the statements that can be meaningfully asserted about a physical system, then one must also accept that the real physical state of the system depends on what befalls another system with which it has previously interacted, no matter how far apart the two systems may become.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 458.]
Any wavefunction has a grand causal horizonal history, which cannot be anything other than causal. All of them cannot be subsumed under the one wavefunction, because no measuremental instance can capture all that something is, by reason of the insufficiency of instantaneous or detailed measurements of its grand causal horizonal history. By our understanding of the infinitesimality and infinity of causal influences within and from without the wavicle, the wavefunction does not yield an exhaustive explanation. Peter Holland says that Einstein argues: “[…] [A]dherence to the completeness assumption compels one to adopt ‘unnatural theoretical interpretations’.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 458.]
Hence, one must relinquish one of the following assumptions: “(a) the description by means of the ψ-function is complete” (the ‘completeness’ assumption) and “(b) the real states of spatially separated objects are independent of each other” (the locality / separability criterion), under the concept of locality, i.e., “[t]he real, physical state of one system is not immediately influenced by the kinds of measurements directly made on a second system, which is sufficiently spatially separated from the first.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.]
It must be noted here that the locality condition means that, from within the criterion of luminal limit-velocity, each of the anti-particles experiences the action as local and separable from the other, and for the combined system of the two it is experienced as non-local. If the wavefunction is incomplete, it is possible to hold that the real states of spatially separated objects are independent of each other, but only under the assumption that the highest possible velocity in the universe is that of light. That is,
[…] for a ψ-function […] a measurement on 1 [a first atom or other particle] represents a physical operation which only affects the region of space where f1 is finite and can have no direct influence on the physical reality in the remote region of space inhabited by atom 2. Thus, the real state of affairs pertaining to atom 2 must be the same whatever action we carry out on 1 (including no measurement at all). Hence, the functions v-,v- [wavefunction in z-direction and eigenfunction in the z-direction of atom 1] must be simultaneously attributable to atom 2. But this is impossible, for these states differ by more than a trivial phase factor and represent different real states of affairs for 2. Einstein concludes that the coordination of several ψ-functions with what should be a unique physical condition of 2 shows that ψ cannot be interpreted as a complete description of the physical condition of a system. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.]
From this it is clear that Einstein believed that it is possible to isolate 1 from 2: physics itself would become an impossible enterprise if such a distant interconnectedness were admitted as a general property of nature, for it would deny the possibility of studying segments of matter in isolation, and physics would lose its empirical basis. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.] If he had attempted to provide a functional space at least in the concept for all possible causal effects on wavicles, and conceived these effects as epistemologically accessible or penetrable at least in part, he could have come up with an ontologically committed interpretation of the concept of the micro-worlds’ localized wavicles, because he had required realism out of QM.
But the fact remains that the micro-worlds’ localized wavicles are non-circumscribable by approximate meso-world appropriations and by the concept of localized sub-microworld wavicles that are non-circumscribable by micro-level approximations. This train of levels of non-circumscribability of much smaller than near-micro-world levels by use of micro-world levels has no end.
This would have inspired him to see the possibility of solving the question of positively superluminal yet finite distances between the anti-particles of the EPR paradox in a “local” but at the Extension-Change-level not fully isolable manner. Any amount of postulating “locally” justified superluminal velocities has the following reasons: the merely experimental status of the limit-velocity of light and the need to posit different past levels of finite amounts of near-infinitesimal causal influences within a given wavicle.
2. The EPR Paradox according to Murdoch
Murdoch clarifies the original intentions of the EPR argument and reformulates it into two parts. The first part explains the concept of completeness of theory and gives the condition necessary for completeness. Murdoch refers to EPR in Physical Review 47: “[…] [E]very element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory. What they [the authors: Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen] mean by ‘counterpart’ is that an element of physical reality should be represented in a state description within the theory.” [Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, Physical Review 47, cited in Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165]
This very condition tastes realistic classicism, and needs revision into ontological commitment to processes, instead of a vague counterpart in the physical theory – which musters some superluminal yet finite causal influence between a particle and its anti-particle, and naturally perhaps even between particles themselves and anti-particles themselves.
Before expatiating on this requirement towards the end of this section, we study the EPR. According to Murdoch, the first part of the argument is this:
(a) If a physical theory is complete, then, if xis an element of physical reality, there is a state description within the theory which includes x. (The completeness condition.) (b) There are elements x, y of physical reality that are not both included in any quantum-mechanical state description. (c) Therefore quantum mechanics is not a complete physical theory. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165.]
By advising to substitute the concept of prediction with the supposedly ontologically less misleading concept of determination, EPR facilitates understanding of the second part and gives a sufficient condition for the concept of ‘physical reality’: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166.]
This being the case, my subsequent argument – in partial digression – is that any determination of values (e.g., momentum, position, etc.) of any existent process is a truth-probabilistic determination, not only based on the probabilistic character of our determinations, but also based on the state of affairs that the very momentum and/or position of a wavicle lend themselves only to probabilistic determinations. That is, the difficulty that leads to the probabilistic character of our determinations of processes is not merely epistemological but also physical-ontological.
This does not mean that nature is in itself probabilistically ontological in the sense that what we probabilistically determine is as such the case out there in nature. The “exact” determination of any one of these quantities à propos the theoretical and experimental givenness of particle S1 of the pair of anti-particles is in fact a meso-world-, or even a micro-world-, sort of levelling out of the infinite number of infinitesimal causal influences within S1.
This does not also mean that all causal influences are levelled out in their very givenness in the mathematical functions used in order to represent them. There can be measurements of great certainty by which at least the fact of a certain level of influence is admitted; and there can be measurements of very little certainty. That is, eminently clear measurements of certain quantities are the touchstone of there being some causal influence (impingement by or transfer of physical elements) determinable in its ability to strike ontological commitment to certain real (physical) elements of that level of observation. This is the minimal level necessity in physics. What may be hoped for is augmentation in the capacities of theories and instruments to detect ever deeper and ever broader levels of causation in the cosmos.
We move now to the second part of the description of some rational aspects in EPR and understand it in Murdoch’s own words:
(1) We can determine either the exact position or the exact momentum of S2 at t, but not both. (2) The real physical state of S2 is the same, whether we determine the exact position or the exact momentum of S2. (3) Therefore there is at ta single real physical state of S2 in which position and momentum both have exact values. (4) Operators representing position and momentum are non-commuting. (5) Therefore, there exists a single physical state in which two physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators have exact simultaneous values. (6) The physical state of an object at any time is completely described by a single state vector. (7) Different non-commuting operators have no state vectors in common. (8) Therefore a physical state in which physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators have exact simultaneous values is not describable in terms of a single state vector. (9) But such a physical state exists, viz. the one referred to in premiss (5). (10) Therefore there are elements of physical reality, x, y, which are not included in any quantum-mechanical state description. (Premiss (b) of the previous argument.) [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165-66.]
This summary of the second part of the argument is straightforward, and hence we do not further discuss it by repeating its statements directly. We take for granted the state-of-the-art explanation. Now we move into Murdoch’s argument regarding the concept of measurement in Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen:
Referring now to the EPR experiment, the authors argue that since we can determine with certainty either the position or the momentum of S2at time t, on the basis of a measurement on S1, it follows via the criterion of physical reality that the position and momentum which can be determined with certainly for time t must be simultaneous elements of physical reality. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166.]
Murdoch opines that this is fallacious. He does this by being forgetful of the fact that what is at issue here is the speed of light taken in STR, GTR, and QM as the upper limit of all allowable speeds of communication between S1 and S2, and not the logical conjunctiveness of the negation of a disjunction, for no one measures with absolute exactitude any measurable quantity concerning a physical phenomenon. He shows the fallacy in EPR to be the following:
The truth of a disjunction does not entail the truth of the corresponding conjunction. From the fact that we can determine with certainty either the exact position or the exact momentum of S2 at time tit does not follow by way of the reality criterion that S2 has an exact position and an exact momentum at t. This argument, however, is not quite what Einstein had in mind. What he intended can be put as follows. Whether we determine at time tthe position or the momentum of S2, the physical state of S2at t remains the same, since neither a measurement on the distant S1nor the determination concerning S2 can have any effect on the physical state of S2. Hence, if we determine the position of S2 at t, then S2 must have at t whatever value of the momentum we would have determined had we so chosen; and conversely, if we determine the momentum of S2 at t, then S2must have at t whatever value of the position we would have determined had we chosen to determine the position. From what he says elsewhere, it is clear that this is the argument that Einstein had in mind. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166. Towards the end of this quote, he makes reference to Einstein, “Quantenmechanik und Wirklichkeit”, Dialectica, 2 (1948), 323.]
To clarify what might mislead the readers in the first sentence in the citation above: Einstein thinks that the following is what should follow from the fact of non-determination of position and moment at the same time. If I say that only either a or b is determinable, we need to only conclude that since the two are not determinable at the same given time, it need not be true that the second does not have a real positions although we are not able to determine them at a given time. While determining the position or momentum of S1, we realize that it has some sort of a position or momentum independently of the other, and while determining the position or momentum of S2independently of the other, we have such a realization about S2 and of nothing else.
How Gell-Mann counters Einstein’s demand for completeness is important:
But the value of the circular polarization and the plane polarization of a photon cannot be exactly specified at the same time (any more than the position and momentum of a particle can be so specified). Consequently, the requirement of completeness is just as unreasonable in this case, from the point of view of quantum mechanics, as in the case discussed by Einstein and his colleagues. The two measurements, one of circular and the other of plane polarization, are alternatives; they take place on different branches of history and there is no reason for the results of both to be considered together. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 171.]
This problem must be reflected upon and conclusions should be reached. These statements are forgetful of the fact that what in fact is at issue in the locality-criterion in EPR is the speed of light as the upper limit of speeds of communication between S1 and S2. I shall argue as follows:
The exchange particles between nucleons are μ-mesons. These constitute the strong force. Beneath them are quarks, which interact via gluons. As of the present scientific knowledge, these take subluminal velocities. By reason of the indefiniteness (not infinity) of the indefinite number of the near-infinitesimal, properly past, causal influences (from the indefinite causal sub-sub- … layers of the same particles and from their causal external vicinity) on the particles S1 and S2, we never have a measurement of absolute exactness.
We can ascertain only the most probable dimensions and variances of probable shapes of certain aspects of the wavicle motion of S1 and S2, which (the dimensions and variances) show up minutely causally at the microscopic or sub-microscopic or sub-sub-microscopic level associated to the wavicles by the respective theory. It is enough that we be able to assign at least the respective dimensions and variances of motions (and probable measurements in these dimensions and variances) to the wavicles. The causal influences over the two wavicles are quite similar, some quantities of which are opposite in direction.
3. Problems behind the EPR Assumptions and Conclusions
It should be admitted here that all agree that no physical change of dimension of motion happens without causal influences, since the very concept of causation is physical existence in Extension-Change. These influences are proper to the immediate causality in question at the micro-level. The presupposed exactness of measurement is also a culprit here. According to Gell-Mann, the crux of the measurement problem is this:
What is the actual relationship in quantum mechanics between a measurement that permits the assignment of an exact value to a particle’s position at a given time and another measurement that permits its momentum at the same time to be exactly specified? Those measurements take place on two different branches, decoherent with each other (like a branch of history in which one horse wins a given race and another branch in which a different horse wins). Einstein’s requirement amounts to saying that the results from the two alternative branches must be accepted together. That clearly demands the abandonment of quantum mechanics. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 169.]
The issue of interpretation here revolves around the question of whether positive-valued propagations could travel from the one to the other particle and vice versa – not merely at the time of causal intervention on the one, but always. These may be part of the undiscovered causal actions within and from without the particles. If the two branches measured did not belong to two totally unconnected branches of history, we can accept both together.
Einstein spoke of an isolable ‘element of reality’, thus giving rise to the possibility of Bohm’s hidden variables theory, which attempts to treat undiscovered causal events active from within the inner processual recesses of the particle: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 206.]
This is the viewpoint from which he argued for impossibility of the so-called non-locality – i.e., the so-called impossibility of local action of causal propagation under a positive superluminal velocity (because at least in his STR and GTR versions he did not think that superluminal velocities are possible) and of the natural absence of any propagation that miraculously brings in or witnesses an action or change in the second particle.
Before ever discussing the issue of non-locality and the contribution of John Clauser, Alain Aspect, and others to it, it should be known that the realism of locality for Einstein is equivalent to isolability of the concrete. This is the age-old classicism that mixes admitting physical-ontologically occurring (continuous near-infinitely and near-infinitesimally causal) causality along with absolute epistemological determinism.
Holding on to this assumption, the EPR article proposes (1) a necessary criterion of completeness: “Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” and (2) a sufficient criterion of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 461.]
This sufficiency condition is considered to be violated according to the results of later quantum experiments. That is, Einstein’s realism in the EPR is an epistemologically absolute deterministic concretism (that, ideally and given enough infrastructure, we can determine every causal possible influence in any concrete case) based on (1) the concept of exact measurability of the changes that are due to casual influences (which I object to due to epistemological and ontological reasons discussed elsewhere) and (2) the concept of impossibility of superluminal causal influences (which must be considered to have been proved otherwise from the merely suppositional status of luminal velocity in STR and GTR, and the defective nature of such suppositions in the Lorentz factor).
Bohr and others held that there is no simultaneous interaction between the two anti-particles and that the systems are causally separated – both of these on the basis of Einstein’s own putting a final limit to the speed of Extension-Change-wise existent electromagnetic propagation. But,
[…] the quantum potential implies that a certain kind of ‘signalling’ does, in fact, take place between the sites of distantly separated spin ½ particles in an entangled state, if one of the particles undergoes a local interaction. This transfer of information cannot, however, be extracted by any experiment which obeys the laws of quantum mechanics. The causal interpretation thus provides an explanation of how the correlations come about in each individual process, in a way that is consistent with the statistical noncommunication of information. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 476.]
If two systems are isolable and the light that we see has the highest permissible velocity in the cosmos, the superluminal exchange of causal propagations between the two systems is problematic. The same situation arises also when there is a total non-communication, whereby a miracle must be introduced in each such event in the cosmos. Yet, if there is some effect that is beyond the horizon of luminal exchange – be it causally superluminal and local in communication, or non-causally “non-communicative” – it must be reasonable and acceptable.
The possibility of nonlocal or non-communicative “exchange” or a miracle (if superluminal velocities are impossible, and everything is based only on luminal communication) in the EPR experiment implies the need to re-interpret the very ontology of QM, because this alone can account for the realistic case of continuous near-infinitesimal recesses of processual divisibility and the consequent ever more near-infinitesimal wavicle-existence of exchange particles in Extension-Change.
Bunge suggests a defective solution: “The original system becomes dismantled only when at least one of its original components gets integrated into another system – e.g. when it is captured or absorbed by another atom.” [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 215.] In this case, so long as such an absorption does not happen, the miraculous event continues to be a non-causal event and then it switches to being a luminally causal event!
This is worse than the admission of superluminal exchanges between S1and S2, because a non-causal action-at-a-vacuous-distance can be avoided only if there is some exchange-wavicle between them before one of them is captured or absorbed by another atom, in order for a real physical change to take place in the one particle system corresponding to the change in the other. This exchange-wavicle can cause an effect in the other particle system only if it is positive-valued and superluminal in velocity. The non-recognition of this fact makes Bunge to make the following conclusion about the issue:
In conclusion, (a) when two quantons interact, their state functions become entangled (not factorizable); (b) when the two quantons separate widely in space, they continue to form part of the original system although they do not act upon one another, much less at a distance and instantaneously […] (c) spatial separation is no cause for divorce: there is divorce only if there is new marriage; (d) non-separability is a consequence of the superposition principle and the Schrödinger equation; (e) non-separability is possibly ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics’ […] (f) the failure of classical separability or ‘locality’ (Einstein separability) confirms the systemic world view […] not however the holistic one, because we do succeed in conceptually analyzing the composition and structure of systems; (g) in quantum theory there is EPR distant correlation (or EPR effect) but there is no paradox: the paradox arises only if quantum theory is combined wit the classical principle of separability or ‘locality’. [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 215.]
We do not admit a miracle, i.e., a spooky action-at-a-vacuous-distance without any medium of communication of causal influence. No physics can accept such a miracle. If it is admitted that the exchange is positive and superluminal, it must also be taken as causal, just to keep it natural and physical – for until then luminal communications have been positive-valued and causal. The facts of continuous near-infinite and near-infinitesimal sub-, sub-sub-, … -quantal causal influences within wavicles S1 and S2, if read together with the need to keep physical (Extension-Change level) exchange between the two temporal light cones of the EPR experiment causal, Einstein should have been persuaded of the possibility of superluminal velocities, continuous sub-, sub-sub-, … -quantal causal influences and a multitude of values of the different universal constants in actually existent worlds.
This fully “local” interpretation, happily, does not violate the discreteness- / discontinuity assumption in QM quanta for this world, but may violate the assumption of absolute discontinuity between quantum values in QM for the infinite multiverse if that is the case.
It violates also the speed barrier in STR, which can duly be clarified at discussion of the question of superluminal velocities in the foundations of STR and GTR. If there is no upper limit for superluminal velocities, there is absolute causal continuity of causal origin of all kinds of particle-values and values of constants in Reality. This is so despite the fact that quantum values in each world considered in isolation remain discrete with respect to the totality of values of constants available therein.
In this case it suffices to say that Bohr’s statistical instrumentalist interpretation does not do justice to the inner causal processes of particles that may be pinpointed through the connection of each entity with all realized entities in the proper past of the contemporary world of that entity. Here, discreteness of values in QM breaks down on the large-scale Extension-Change-wise existence proper to an infinite multiverse.
4. Einstein’s Extreme Monism vs. the Meaning of Genuine Holism
In this context, notice also that Einstein unconsciously oversteps his classicist concretist determinism and suggests a surprisingly unitary (or, physically extremely monistic and incapacitating physics to differentiate between its parts) system of the physical universe: “Nature as a whole can only be viewed as an individual system, existing only once, and not as collection of systems.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 570.] The physics proper to it is beyond all imagination.
This shows that “[…] the state of the whole is prior to that of the parts ([…] the parts are not physically determined as aspects of the whole, as they would be in a unified field theory, for instance).” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 568.] Bohm says: “The relationship between parts of a system described above implies a new quality of wholeness of the entire system going beyond anything that can be specified solely in terms of the actual spatial relationships of all the particles.” [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 58.]
This is monism of the worst kind, not holism of any kind, as seen in Śaṅkara Vedānta. Clearly, Einstein’s dearest philosopher was Spinoza, and from this the reason for his physical monism is clear enough. In the holism of Reality that I propose, universes or physical systems are never completely unified, because no communication can travel at infinite velocity. If there is a maximal velocity in a universe or group of universes, others will have other criterial velocities. There can anyway be some causal connections between many neighbouring universes or groups of them.
This holism pivots around the highly probable fact that there is continuity of universal constants in a system that includes the existing and future universes together. As against this, Einstein’s monism would have to admit infinite velocities and complete mutual identity of Extension-Change-wise existent regions.
To concentrate more on the continuity principle, I leave out Bell’s contributions to justification or non-justification of the “locality” standpoint. Instead of studying the involving descriptions of Bell’s inequalities, I deem it sufficient to mention that Bell’s understanding of realism is a determinist (and concretist) realism, and that this is a presupposition that d’Espagnat takes as a loophole to argue against him:
However, if we examine the proof of Bell’s inequality more carefully, the assumption of realism really is one of the premises of a local realistic theory, but this premise is only a special form of realism, the deterministic realism, i.e., the existence of a hidden parameter. So that the violation of Bell’s inequality cannot be regarded as a violation of realism in general, e.g. a general statement, such as ‘disagreeing with the doctrine that the world is independent of mind’! [Zuoxiu, “On the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen Paradox and the Relevant Philosophical Problems”, 301.]
Let us briefly study the experimental demonstration by Aspect, Clauser etc., of what they call ‘non-locality’ in nature, in order for me to suggest a causal-continuous phenomenal-noumenal interpretation. Aspect and others [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 144-45.] have experimentally tested that there are (causal or non-causal?) correlations between particles S1 and S2even when the events of detection of the two photons are for him outside each other’s light cones. This violates the Bell’s inequality for locality (which shows that the disturbance from 1 is not communicated beyond the light cone of 1). Even the criticism by others of Aspect’s experiments (saying, the photon detector’s efficiency was not close to unity) may be found to be a contrivance to save the phenomena. [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 144-45.] Aspect and others have also insisted that, if there are hidden variables, they are non-local under the assumption of the generally presupposed impossibility of superluminal velocities.
But I argue that, if the light cone of S1 is transgressed by the communication of the disturbance between S1 and S2, then the fixed velocity of light has been violated by a positive-valued communication that has gone superluminal.
Another matter to be discussed here is the possibility of tachyons that E. C. G. Sudarshan and others proposed based on the assumption of the velocity of light as a velocity barrier between two systems and two universes. This is still based mathematically on the questionable way of measurement of motion by the criterion of the very velocity of photons (in the Lorentz factor) that one aims at measuring. Hence, the mathematical physics behind the concepts of tachyons and photons is equally questionable. The question of superluminal velocities must therefore be discussed for its own sake in the various versions of the Theories of Relativity. The presently suggested interpretation of the EPR will be complete only after we study the possibility of superluminal velocities in the discussion on STR.
The continuity between subluminal and superluminal worlds will then follow. This is sufficient support for the phenomenal-noumenal continuity via the relativization of the macro-, meso-, micro-, sub-quantal and other perspectives based on the ontological tenability of there being Reality as extra-phenomenal, and hence in the sense of a totalized existing, things-in-themselves, which can show itself phenomenally.
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.
Source of Major Flaws in Cosmological Theories: Mathematics-to-Physics Application Discrepency
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  • Raphael NeelamkavilRaphael Neelamkavil
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.
The big bang theory has many limitations. These are,
(1) the uncertainty regarding the causes / triggers of the big bang,
(2) the need to trace the determination of certain physical constants to the big bang moments and not further backwards,
(3) the necessity to explain the notion of what scientists and philosophers call “time” in terms of the original bang of the universe,
(4) the compulsion to define the notion of “space” with respect to the inner and outer regions of the big bang universe,
(5) the possibility of and the uncertainty about there being other finite or infinite number of universes,
(6) the choice between an infinite number of oscillations between big bangs and big crunches in the big bang universe (in case of there being only our finite-content universe in existence), in every big hang universe (if there are an infinite number of universes),
(7) the question whether energy will be lost from the universe during each phase of the oscillation, and in that case how an infinite number of oscillations can be the whole process of the finite-content universe,
(8) the difficulty involved in mathematizing these cases, etc.
These have given rise to many other cosmological and cosmogenetic theories – mythical, religious, philosophical, physical, and even purely mathematical. It must also be mentioned that the thermodynamic laws created primarily for earth-based physical systems have played a big role in determining the nature of these theories.
The big bang is already a cosmogenetic theory regarding a finite-content universe. The consideration of an INFINITE-CONTENT universe has always been taken as an alternative source of theories to the big bang model. Here, in the absence of conceptual clarity on the physically permissible meaning of infinite content and without attempting such clarity, cosmologists have been accessing the various mathematical tools available to explain the meaning of infinite content. They do not also seem to keep themselves aware that locally possible mathematical definitions of infinity cannot apply to physical localities at all.
The result has been the acceptance of temporal eternality to the infinite-content universe without fixing physically possible varieties of eternality. For example, pre-existence from the past eternity is already an eternality. Continuance from any arbitrary point of time with respect to any cluster of universes is also an eternality. But models of an infinite-content cosmos and even of a finite-content universe have been suggested in the past one century, which never took care of the fact that mathematical infinity of content or action within a finite locality has nothing to do with physical feasibility. This, for example, is the source of the quantum-cosmological quick-fix that a quantum vacuum can go on create new universes.
But due to their obsession with our access to observational details merely from our local big bang universe, and the obsession to keep the big bang universe as an infinite-content universe and as temporally eternal by using the mathematical tools found, a mathematically automatic recycling of the content of the universe was conceived. Here they naturally found it safe to accommodate the big universe, and clearly maintain a sort of eternality for the local big bang universe and its content, without recourse to external creation.
Quantum-cosmological and superstrings-cosmological gimmicks like considering each universe as a membrane and the “space” between them as vacuum have given rise to the consideration that it is these vacua that just create other membranes or at least supplies new matter-energy to the membranes to continue to give rise to other universes. (1) The ubiquitous sensationalized science journalism with rating motivation and (2) the physicists’ and cosmologists’ need to stick to mathematical mystification in the absence of clarity concurring physical feasibility in their infinities – these give fame to the originators of such universes as great and original scientists.
I believe that the inconsistencies present in the mathematically artificialized notions and in the various cosmogenetic theories in general are due to the blind acceptance of available mathematical tools to explain an infinite-content and eternally existent universe.
What should in fact have been done? We know that physics is not mathematics. In mathematics all sorts of predefined continuities and discretenesses may be created without recourse to solutions as to whether they are sufficiently applicable to be genuinely physics-justifying by reason of the general compulsions of physical existence. I CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER WHERE THE DISCREPENCIES LIE. History is on the side of sanity.
One clear example for the partial incompatibility between physics and mathematics is where the so-called black hole singularity is being mathematized by use of asymptotic approach. I admit that we have only this tool. But we do not have to blindly accept it without setting rationally limiting boundaries between the physics of the black hole and the mathematics applied here. It must be recognized that the definition of any fundamental notion of mathematics is absolute and exact only in the definition, and not in the physical counterparts. (See: Mathematics and Causality: A Systemic Reconciliation, https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematics_and_Causality_A_Systemic_Reconciliation)
I shall continue to add material here on the asymptotic approach in cosmology and other similar theoretical and application-level concepts.
(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.
(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.
(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.
(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.
(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.

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