This paper examines China's dirigiste approach to financing innovation policy, contributing to debates on the derisking state, neo-developmentalist alternatives and economic statecraft. The focus of the paper is on the pivotal role of Chinese Government Guidance Funds (GGFs)-jointly owned by a broad spectrum of state entities-in terms of their distinctiveness from government-owned venture capital vehicles in the European derisking state or liberal-developmental states like Korea. By making the case for the adoption of a financial statecraft perspective in the comparative study of these funds, the paper argues that three defining features set Chinese GGFs apart: strong sectoral innovation targets subject to strong disciplining by the state, the conversion into risk capital of both state fiscal resources and state assets in state-owned firms, and the adoption of geographic investment conditionalities to spread innovation while enduring central control. Our analysis reveals that these features are derivative of both the structural features of the Chinese political economy and the fast institutional innovations of the Chinese innovation bureaucracy. Their role is not merely financial but also strategic, with governments at many levels actively steering the funds to meet politically chosen