Despite the widespread adoption of generative transformer large language models and the interest of the global legal community, discussions about the models in philosophy of law mainly have been focusing on what LLMs cannot do. In making the first steps towards a philosophical analysis of the capabilities of AI models in the field of law, we follow the basic idea of Turing’s „imitation game“. Proceeding from the frequently raised characterization of legal reasoning as „artificial“, the paper identifies the undisputed minimum core of the „artificiality“ thesis and asks to what extent it can be imitated by artificial intelligence. To answer this question, we test the legal reasoning capabilities of ChatGPT, the most advanced, up-to-date LLM version of artificial intelligence. The conclusion is that in all relevant types of activities usually associated with legal reasoning – fact-finding, interpretation, qualification, and decision-making – ChatGPT can generate outcomes as if it reasons legally.

Linguistic arguments are paramount in legal interpretation. They are widely used by judges and considered to be ubiquitous across jurisdictions. It is claimed that they are decisive and limitative in the judicial interpretation of the law. The claims have long been subject to theoretical scrutiny and, recently, testing within experimental jurisprudence. In this paper, we analyse the judicial reasoning in a landmark Italian case from the end of the nineteenth century concerning Lidia Poët, an aspiring practising female lawyer. The case was decided in the last instance by the Turin Court of Cassation. We give a detailed argumentative analysis of the reasoning of the Court of Cassation in Turin in the Lidia Poët case and show that the crucial linguistic and systematic arguments used are not grounds for the interpretative decision to exclude women from the denotation of the word “lawyer.” We conclude that the linguistic arguments employed by courts often do not do the argumentative work they are expected to do. Instead, they cover the substantial views that have determined the ascription of normative meaning to a term or sentence.

This paper (1) analyzes the existing theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between the judicial performance and judicial efficiency, (2) compares the judicial performances in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, France, Austria, and Norway for the year 2020, (3) compares the judicial performances in different instances in Serbia for the same year, and (4) examines the performance standards that are set by law for Serbian judges. The authors conclude that in 2020 Serbian judges resolved more cases in all instances (there is a higher number of resolved cases per judge only in Austria, in first instance), while at the same time falling short of the caseload standards set in Serbian law. Also, the study found excessive difference in the performance of Serbian courts, but that does not affect the evaluation of judges , since 485 evaluated judges out of 505 got the rating "exceptionally successfully performs the function of judge" for the year 2020.

The paper discusses evolutionary and static theories of interpretation. 1) In the first part, I explain the distinction between static and evolutionary theories of interpretation, as well as originalism and living constitutionalism as the leading contemporary positions that correspond to the distinction. 2) In the second part, argue that legal texts are synchronically subject to multiple plausible interpretations leading to multiple normative meanings. Then, I explain the change of meaning in time using contemporary historical linguistics and the idea of legal doctrinal change. 3) In the third part of the paper, I claim that static interpretation is unfeasible because semantic meaning and doctrinal meaning cannot be divorced, and that meaning is not objectively recoverable. 4) Finally, I argue that evolutionary interpretation can constrain interpreters as much as a static interpretation by adopting some minimal normative commitments.