dialectica

Published by Wiley
Online ISSN: 1746-8361
Print ISSN: 0012-2017
Publications
What is it that ties together the two subjects figuring in the title of this section, language and reality? I shall not propose a general answer to this question, at least not on my own authority. Instead of putting forward a theory, I shall try to propose a model or paradigm for future theories falling within the purview of my title. I shall suggest that the most instructive actual examples of ties or links between a part of language and that aspect of the world which it can convey information about (or otherwise facilitate our dealings with) are to be found in what I have ventured to call semantical games. In order to arrive at this answer in a natural way, it is nevertheless advisable to start by considering some of the other answers to the same question. In fact, this paper is much less of an exposition of the theory of semantical games than an attempt to relate them to somewhat different approaches to the same subject, viz. to the different approaches Wittgenstein proposed at the different stages of his philosophical activity.
 
The syntax and semantics of quantifiers is of crucial significance in current linguistic theorizing for more than one reason. The last statementof his grammatical theories by the late Richard Montague (1973) is modestly entitled 'The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English'. In the authoritative statement of his 'Generative Semantics', George Lakoff (1971, especially pp. 238-267) uses as his first and foremost testing-ground the grammar of certain English quantifiers. In particular, they serve to illustrate, and show need of, his use of global constraints governing the derivation of English sentences. Evidence from the behavior of quantifiers (including numerical expressions) has likewise played a major role in recent discussions of such vital problemsas the alleged meaning-preservation of transformations, co-reference, the role of surface structure in semantical interpretation, and so on.
 
It is shown that the concept of understanding cannot be reduced to a combination of knowing that, knowing how, and knowledge by acquaintence. First, it is shown that understanding and knowledge have different objects. Then “understanding what” is analyzed along Aristotelian lines. In the central part of the paper it is shown that understanding objects defined by constitutive rules involves a non-propositional component. This notion of “understanding” is shown to cut across the humanist-scientist dichotomy.RésuméĽauteur montre que le concépt de comprehension ne peut pas être réduit à une combinaison de savoir que, de savoir comment et de connaissance par familiarisation. Tout ?abord, il montre que la compréhension et le savoir ont des objets différents. Ensuite, lecomprendre que≪ est analysé dans une perspective artisotélicienne. La partie centrale de Particle montre que la compréhension ?objets définis par des régies constitutives a une composante non propositionnelle. Cette notion de ≫compréhensionignore la dichotomie humanisme-science.ZusammenfassungEs wird gezeigt, dass der Begriff des Verstehens nicht auf eine Verbindung von ≫wissen, dass≪, ≫wissen, wie≪ und Wissen durch unmittelbare Bekanntschaft zurückge-führt werden kann. Zuerst wird gezeigt, dass Verstehen und Wissen verschiedene Gegenstände haben. Es wird dann der Begriff des ≫Verstehens wie≪ in Aristotelischer Weise analysiert. Im Hauptteil des Aufsatzes wird nahegelegt, dass das Verstehen von Gegenständen, die durch konstitutive Regeln definiert sind, ein nicht-propositionales Moment involvieren. Dieser Begriff des Verstehens setzt sich über die Dichotomie zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften hinweg.
 
Ohne einen speziellen philosophischen 〈ismus〉 zu akzeptieren und zu bevorzugen, werden die Begriffe 〈Phänomen〉 und 〈Realität〉 vom Stand-punkt der täglichen Praxis des Physikers analysiert. Die logische Struktur der physikalischen Theorien, einschliesslich ihre charakteristischen Bezie-hungen zu Beobachtung und Experiment, wird kurz aufgezeigt an Hand der klassischen Mechanik, der klassischen relativistischen Feldtheorie und Quantenmechanik als Beispiele. Es wird nachdrücklich betont, dass die Physiker ihre Wissenschaft als in Entwicklung begriffen ansehen. Das Problem stellt sich deshalb nie so, ob die gegenwärtigen Theorien gleich bleiben werden, wie sie jetzt sind oder nicht, sondern vielmehr, in welcher Richtung sie sich ändern werden.
 
RésuméDe l'delimination des causes finales par la mathématisation de la physique à l'hypothèse de Kant-Laplace sur la formation du système solaire, puis au développement des sciences de la vie qui déterminent un nouveau champ de rationalité, le théme de la création au 18ème siècle est parti-culièrement apte a manifester l'évolution des rapports entre sciences, philosophie et métaphysique, jusqu'à son progressif effacement dans des philosophies aussi differentes que celles de Diderot, Hume et Kant.SummaryThe topic of creation in 18th century is particularly suitable to illustrate the evolution of the relationships between science, philosophy and metaphysics. We consider the elimination of final causes by the mathematization of physics, the Kant-Laplace hypothesis of the formation of the solar system, and the development of life sciences which determine a new field of rationality. We notice the disappearance of the idea of creation in different philosophies as the ones of Diderot, Hume and Kant.ZusammenfassungVon der Elimination der Endursachen durch die Mathematisierung der Physik zu der Kant-Laplaceschen Hypothese fiber das Entstehen des Sonnensystems und zur Entwicklung der biolo-gischen Wissenschaften, die einen neuen Rationalitätsbegriff bestimmen, ist das Thema der Schdpfung besonders geeignet, um die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Metaphysik – bis zu ihrem allmählichen Verschwinden in so verschiedenartigen Philosophien wie denjenigen von Diderot, Hume und Kant – darzulegen.
 
In 1946 Ferdinand Gonseth founded, together with Paul Bernays, Karl Dürr (the only Swiss representative of logical positivism), and Sir Karl Popper, the International Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science. In the next year the first number of Dialectica, a philosophical review devoted mainly to epistemological subjects, was issued. Gonseth's bibliography presents more than 190 items — roughly 25 books, several prefaces, and, for the rest, papers published in numerous reviews. A good deal of his publications concern mathematics — he was appointed professor of mathematics first in Berne and then in Zurich at the well-known Swiss Federal Institute of Technology — but he has never completely separated his mathematical activities from his philosophical work.
 
In the unpublished work Theory of Knowledge† a complex is assumed to be “anything analyzable, any- thing which has constituents” (p. 79), and analysis is presented as the “discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex” (p. 119). The notion of complex is linked in various ways with the notions of relating relation, logical form and proposition, taken as a linguistic expression provided with meaning. This paper mainly focuses on these notions, on their links and, more widely, on the role of logical form, by offering a new way of understanding what Russell was doing in TK as concerns the logical-ontological matter of this manuscript. In particular, a new account of Russell's theory of judgment will be given, by taking a stand with respect to the main accounts already given, and it will be argued for the presence in TK of a notion of type different from the one applied to propositional functions in ML and PM.
 
RésuméSoixante-cinq ans après sa publication, la controverse que l'article #Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen (EPR, 1935) suscita à propos de I'image de l'univers physique (Weltbild et Weltanschauung) suggérée par le formalisme de la théorié quantique n'est pas close. Elle oppose une minorité«localiste», petit cercle de physiciens réalistes partisans de la localitéd’ Einstein, á une majorité«non localisten» adepte – non uniformément, cependant – des prédictions non locales de la thhrie quantique et de l'Interprétation dite positiviste de Copenhague érigée principalement sur la philosophie de Bohr et de Heisenberg.Les arguments, les modèles avands par des physiciens de ces deux camps philosophiques et les tests expkrimentaux, passb ou futurs, destinb depuis les InBgalités de Bell (1964) à trancher cette controverse sont présidera à la lumière de I'enjeu percu par une minorité d'entre eux: quelle définition du réalisme physique: Locale on non-locale, présidera à la construction de l'«image du monde», (Weltbild et Weltanschauung) requise par la théorie quantique?
 
This essay argues that 20th century analytic philosophy can be fruitfully divided into two periods, the Russell-based extension list philosophy of the first half of the century and the Marcus-based intension list philosophy of the second half of the century. The difference between these two philosophical periods is illustrated by the different analyses Russell and Marcus give to the sentence “Scott is Scott” and the different meanings they assign to the sentence “Identity statements between names are necessarily true if true”. Russell's influential role in analytic philosophy in the first half of this century is well-known, but it has not been until the mid-1990s that the decisive role that Marcus' philosophy has played in analytic philosophy during the second half of the century has begun to be widely recognized.
 
SummaryA short exposition is given of the foundation of the causal description in classical physics and the failure of the principle of causality in coping with atomic phenomena. It is emphasized that the individuality of the quantum processes excludes a separation between a behaviour of the atomic objects and their interaction with the measuring instruments denning the conditions under which the phenomena appear. This circumstance forces us to recognize a novel relationship, conveniently termed complementarity, between empirical evidence obtained under different experimental conditions. An appropriate tool for a complementary mode of description is provided by the quantum-mechanical formalism which allows us to account for regularities of definite or statistical character beyond the grasp of classical physical explanation. – N. B.RésuméUn court exposé est donné du fondement de la description causale en physique classique et de ľincapacityé du principe de causalitéà maîtriser les phénoménes atomiques. On souligne que ľindividualité des processus quantiques exclut toute séparation entre un comportement des objets atomiques et leur interaction avec les appareils de mesure définissant les conditions sous lesquelles apparaissent les phénoménes. Cette circonstance nous oblige à reconnaître une nouvelle relation qu'on peut appeler complémentarité entre les résultats empiriques obtenus dans des conditions expérimentales diflérentes. Un instrument appropriéà un mode de description complémentaire est iourni par le formalisme de la mécanique quantique qui nous permet de rendre compte de régularités de caractére défini ou statistique au delà de la portée des explications physiques classiques. – N. B.ZusammenfassungDie Grundlagen der kausalen Beschreibungsweise in der klassischen Physik und das Versagen des Kausalitätsprinzipes beim Ertassen atomarer Phänomene werden kurz erörtert. Grundsätzlich schliesst die Individualität der Quantenprozesse eine Trehnung aus zwischen einem Verhalten atomarer Objekte und der Wechselwirkung mit den Messinstrumenten, welche die Bedingungen festlegen, unter denen die Phänomene erscheinen. Dieser Umstand zwingt uns zur Konzeption einer neuartigen Beziehung zwischen Beobachtungsergebnissen, die unter verschiedenen experimentellen Bedingungen gewonnen werden; diese Beziehung wird als Komplementaritat bezeichnet. Ein ange-messenes Mittel für eine komplementäre Beschreibungsweise liefert der quantenmecha-nische Formalismus, der es uns ermöglicht, Gesetzmassigkeiten jenseits des klassisch-physikalischer Erklärung zugänglichen Bereiches zu beschreiben. – N. B.
 
The conspicuous role of taxonomy and debates about taxonomy in the well-established physical science of pedology throws into question the Popperian rejection of definition and classification. Le rôle important de la taxonomie et les débats à propos de la taxonomie dans cette science bien établie qu'est la pédologie (étude des sols) remet en question le rejet, par Popper, des définitions et des classifications. Die wichtige Rolle der Taxonomie für die Pedologie und die Diskussion, die sie in dieser bewährten Wissenschaft auslöst, stellen Poppers Venverfung der Definitionen und Klassifikationen in ein fragwürdiges Licht.
 
ZusammenfassungNach einer historischen Übersicht über die Entwicklung der naturwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten wird auseinandergesetzt, dass wir seit der Quantentheorie einige frühere Theorien, wie etwa die Newton'sche Mechanik, als abge-schlossene Theorien bezeichnen. Der Sinn dieser Begriffsbildung wird besprochen, ebenso die Bedingungen, unter denen eine Theorie als abgeschlossen bezeichnet werden kannSummaryThe author presents a survey of the development of the disciplines of natural science in past centuries and states that since the appearance of quantum mechanics some earlier theories, e. g. Newtonian mechanics, have been considered as closed. The author discusses the meaning of such a concept, as well as the conditions under which a theory may be considered as closed.RésuméAprès avoir retracé?un point de vue historique le développement des disciplines scientiflques au cours des siècles passés, ľauteur montre que, depuis ľavènement de la théorie des quanta, certaines théories plus anciennes, telles que la mécanique newtonienne, peuvent etre dites fermées. La signification de cette notion est indiquee, de même que les conditions dans lesquelles une théorie peut être considérée comme fermée.
 
RésuméĽauteur tente ?abord de restreindre la notion de réalisme scientifique. ll montre ensuite que sa version relativisée de la philosophic transcendentale et la philosophic ouverte de F. Gonseth ne sont pas à ranger parmi les conceptions réalistes, mais bien dans la tradition du pragmatisme.SummaryThe author first proposes a more restrictive conception of scientific realism than the usually accepted one. He then shows that his own relativized version of transcendentalism and F. Gon-seth's open philosophy are not to be classified as realistic but belong to a brand of pragmatism incompatible with scientific realism in the strict sense described.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser versucht zunächst, den Begriff des wissenschaftlichen Realismus enger zu fas-sen, als dies üblich getan wird. Er zeigt dann, dass seine relativierte Version der Transzendental-philosophie und die offene Philosophie von F. Gonseth nicht der realistischen, sondern der prag-matischen Tradition zuzuordnen sind.
 
In order to use modern infinitary mathematics in the natural sciences, human beings have developed a corresponding picture of the world. The gnomes have made a similar step for their trade — books e.g. are sold and bought in infinite sets. In a gnomic-human dialogue the problems arrising from such attitudes are discussed and a path from modern to postmodern mathematics is sketched. Um in den Naturwissenschaften die moderne infinitäre Mathematik verwenden zu können, haben sich die Menschen ein entsprechendes Weltbild zurechtgelegt. Die Gnomen haben einen ähnlichen Schritt im Handel vollzogen — Bücher zum Beispiel werden in unendlichen Mengen umgesetzt. In einem gnomisch-humanen Dialog werden die dadurch entstehenden Problem erörtert, und es wird nach einem Weg in die Postmoderne gefragt. Afin d'appliquer la mathématique infinitaire moderne dans les sciences naturelles, les êtres humains se sont constitué une image correspondante du monde. Les gnomes ont suivi une évolution pareille dans le commerce — ainsi —, dans le négoce du livre, on expédie des commandes infinies. Les problèmes qui s'en suivent sont abordés dans une conversation de gnome à homme au cours de laquelle se dessine un chemin vers la mathématique postmoderne.
 
Benacerraf challenges us to account for the reliability of our mathematical beliefs given that there appear to be no natural connections between mathematical believers and mathematical ontology. In this paper I try to do two things. (1) I argue that the interactionist view underlying this challenge renders inexplicable not only the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, construed either platonistically or naturalistically (following Maddy), but also the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics. (2) I attempt to counter Benacerraf's challenge by sketching an alternative conception of reliability explanations which renders explicable the reliability of our beliefs in physics and in mathematics but in which mathematical and formal considerations themselves play a central role. My main thesis is that abstract objects do not strike us, but that this is irrelevant to the reliability of our mathematical and physical beliefs.
 
summaryThis paper discusses objections against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use. Sct. 1 accepts Rundle's point that ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are used differently, but insists that this is compatible with holding that use determines meaning, an therefore holds the key to conceptual analysis. Scts. 2–4 rebut three lines of argument which claim that linguistic philosophy goes astray by reading into the meaning of words non-semantic features of its use: Searle's general speech act fallacy charge, Hacker's use of the Frege-point against Wittgenstein's account of avowals, and Grice's attack on Wittgenstein's discussion of ‘trying’. Sct. 5 argues that Grice's doctrine of conversational implicature fails to show that the features he disregards are pragmatic rather than semantic. Sct. 6 ends with some suggestions about how use can be related to meaning without being abused.
 
AbstractI look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues that incompatibilist arguments employing such externalist theses are at their strongest, and conclusively show that privileged access must be rejected. While I agree on the truth of the relevant externalist theses, I show that all plausible versions of the incompatibilist reductio argument as applied to such theses are fundamentally flawed, for these versions of the argument must make assumptions that lead to putatively absurd knowledge of the external world independently of the thesis of privileged access.
 
Interpreted distributively the sentence‘Indiana is a member of the class of American federal states’means the same as‘Indiana is an American federal state’. In accordance with the collective sense of class expressions the sentence can be understood as implying that Indiana is a part of the country whose capital city is Washington. Neither interpretation appears to accommodate all the intuitions connected with the informal notion of class. A closer accommodation can be achieved, it seems, if class expressions are interpreted as verb-like expressions of a certain kind available within the framework of Lesniewski's Ontology. Interprétée de façon distributive, la phrase “Ľ Indiana est un membre de la classe des Etats fédérés américains” dit la mëme chose que “Ľ Indiana est un Etat fédéré ameAricain”. Mais, dans le sens collectif des expressions de classes, la phrase peut être interprétéé comme impliquant que ľ Indiana est une partie du pays dont la capitale est Washington. Aucune des deux interprétations ne paraît rendre compte de toutes les intuitions liées à la notion informelle de classe. Dans le cadre de ľ ontologie de Leśniewski, ľ interprétation des expressions de classes comme des expressions quasi verbales ? un certain type représente apparemment un traitement plus fidèle. Distributiv interpretiert bedeutet der Satz‘Indiana ist ein Element der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika’dasselbe wie‘Indiana ist ein amerikanischer Bundesstaat’. Im kollektiven Sinne von Klassenausdrücken kann der Satz so verstanden werden, dass er impliziert, Indiana sei ein Teil des Landes, dessen Hauptstadt Washington ist. Keine dieser Interpretationen scheint all die Intuitionen, die mit dem nicht-formalen Begriff der Klasse verbunden sind, zu erfassen. Man kann dadurch eine bessere Anpassung erreichen, dass man Klassenausdrücke als verbartige Ausdrücke einer bestimmten Art interpretiert, die im Rahmen von Leśniewskis Ontology zur Verfügung stehen.
 
Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the challenge. Section 8 presents my new proposal, which can meet the challenge. Section 9 concludes the discussion.
 
AbstractI aim to draw the reader's attention to an easily overlooked account of perception, namely that there are no perceptual experiences, that to perceive something is to stand in an external, purely non-Leibnizian relation to it. I introduce the Purely Relational account of perception by discussing a case of it being overlooked in the writings of G.E. Moore, though we also find the same move in J. Cook Wilson, so it has nothing to do with an affection for sense-data. I then discuss the relation between the PR account and recent disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, and note that the PR account has some claim to be the only one that truly respects the directness of perception. The paper does not aspire to persuade the reader of the correctness of the neglected PR account, merely that it should be treated as a serious candidate in philosophical debates about perception.
 
Looking at proof theory as an attempt to ‘code’ the general pattern of the logical steps of a mathematical proof, the question of what kind of rules (introduction, elimination, reduction) can make the meaning (use) of a logical connective completely explicit does not seem to have been answered satisfactorily. The lambda calculus seems to have been more coherent simply because the use of ‘λ’ together with its projection 'apply' is specified by what can be called a 'reduction' rule: β-conversion. We attempt to analyse the role of proof rules, making use of a set of formal rules designed to capture both the notions of proof theory and those of the lambda-calculus: Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory.
 
Sometimes we remember past objects or events in a vivid, experiential way. The present paper addresses some fundamental questions about the metaphysics of such experiential or ‘recollective’ memories. More specifically, it develops the ‘Relational Account’ of recollective memory, which consists of the following three claims. (1) A subject who recollectively remembers (or ‘R-remembers’) a past object or event stands in an experiential relation (namely, a ‘recollective relation’) to the relevant past object or event. (2) The R-remembered object or event itself is a part of the R-memory; that is, the subject's present R-memory is partly constituted by the relevant past object or event. (3) When a subject R-remembers a past object, the past object is a constitutive part of the conscious experience itself; that is, the object is immediately available to the subject in conscious experience. In developing the Relational Account, the present paper hopes to make a substantial contribution to any attempt to account for the nature of recollective memory. Furthermore, in order to explain how a subject could understand the beliefs that she forms about the past on the basis of an R-memory, and how a subject could, on the basis of an R-memory, gain any knowledge about the past, we arguably also need to rely on the Relational Account of recollective memory. Thus, the Relational Account will also play an important role in an attempt to account for various other ways in which a subject might be related to the past in general, and to her own past in particular. Standing in such relations to the past is, in turn, a central feature of our human existence. Ultimately, therefore, the Relational Account of recollective memory should also play a crucial role in furthering our understanding of ourselves, and of our own existence in time.
 
Laudan and Leplin have argued that empirically equivalent theories can elude underdetermination by resorting to indirect confirmation. Moreover, they have provided a qualitative account of indirect confirmation that Okasha has shown to be incoherent. In this paper, I develop Kukla's recent contention that indirect confirmation is grounded in the probability calculus. I provide a Bayesian rule to calculate the probability of a hypothesis given indirect evidence. I also suggest that the application of the rule presupposes the methodological relevance of non-empirical virtues of theories. If this is true, Laudan and Leplin's strategy will not work in many cases. Moreover, without an independent way of justifying the role of non-empirical virtues in methodology, the scientific realists cannot use indirect evidence to defeat underdetermination.
 
In his Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, Wittgenstein holds that in studying or interpreting a language and associated activities we should not attempt to explain what goes on, just describe, for description is able to give us everything we could ask for. He seems to presents two arguments for this descriptivist approach. I criticize both. Generally, I argue that Wittgenstein's position seems to presuppose a radical distinction between description and explanation that cannot be supported. Specifically, I show that Wittgenstein's first objection to explanatory concerns in interpretive contexts is an overly quick generalization from limitations in Frazer's early attempts at explanation. The inadequacy of one attempt at explaining some phenomena hardly implies that it is wrong to attempt an explanation of that phenomena. Nor does the fact that a false explanation may support a false description of some phenomena show that a correct explanation would not support a correct description. Wittgenstein's second, and most important, objection turns on the crucial claim that correct description is at least as satisfying as explanation. There is one significant respect in which I agree this claim, and another in which I disagree. I show that, on Wittgenstein's view, a description is a perspicuous story about an effect and its antecedents. It answers a “why”‐question. This is to say, a good description is something of a condensed explanation. Now, when description is so understood, it would be foolish to deny that description is as satisfying as explanation, for here, description is not just theory‐laden, it is also explanation‐laden. However, I argue that in contexts where reliability worries become pressing, the more familiar, explicit, forms of explanation have important advantages.
 
Common sense explanations of human action are often framed in terms of an agent's beliefs and desires. Recent widely received views also take believing and desiring (as well wishing, intending and even thinking) as attitudes of an agent to linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities. It is here claimed that such a narrow view of cognitive attitudes is not supportable, since even among lingual non-verbal responses are often overriding evidence for belief and desire, even where they run counter to sincere verbal assents. The view is also curiously non naturalistic in that it disallows ascribing beliefs and desires altogether to non-lingual and pre-lingual. In the present paper a “common sense” explanation of action in accordance with the triad Desire, Belief, Action, is seen as a useful phenomenological “theory” provided that language centrality is not taken as essential.
 
Im Gegensatz zu Beck und Allison, die dem Gefühl der Achtung eine mehr psychologische oder pädagogische Rolle zuschreiben, wird zu zeigen versucht, dass dieses ebenfalls eine wichtige systematische Funktion zu erfüllen hat: als Triebfeder artikuliert es den heiklen Übergang von der noumenalen zu den phänomenalen Sphäre. In dieser Weise wird erst erklärt, wie es überhaupt möglich ist, dass das Sittengesetz einen Einfluss auf menschliche Handlungen haben kann. Kants System wird dabei im strengen Sinne als Dualismus betrachtete – ein charakteristischer Zug, der nicht durch Interpretationen der Art wie die Zwei-Aspekten-Lehre verwischt werden sollte. In contrast to Beck and Allison, who ascribe a more phenomenological role to the feeling of respect for the moral law, it is shown that this notion has also a very important systematic function: as incentive it articulates the problematic transition from the noumenal to the phenomenal realm. Only in this manner can it be explained how it is possible that the moral law has an influence on human actions. Kant's system is considered as strictly dualistic– a characteristic feature which should not be blurred by interpreting it on the basis of an Two-aspects-doctrine. Contrairement à Beck et Allison, qui attribuent au sentiment de respect un rôle psychologi-quc ou pédagogique, l'auteur montre que celui-ci joue également un rôle systématique important: il constitue le ressort permettant le délicat passage de la sphère noumenale á la sphère phènomé-nale. Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'on peut expliquer comment la loi morale peut avoir une influence sur les actions humaines. Le systeme kantien apparaît sous cet angle comme un dualisme, trait caractéristique qui ne devrait pas être occulté par des interprétations du type de la « doctrine des deux aspects».
 
The paper defends a theory of mind according to which certain sorts of acts are real material relations and compares this theory to causal theories of reference and perception. All mental acts are dependent for their existence upon the subject (person, organism) whose acts they are. Relational acts are dependent also on intended objects in the world. The relational theory thus implies a rejection of the Cartesian thesis to the effect that we could in principle have exactly the same thoughts even though the objects of these thoughts did not exist. It implies thereby also a rejection of Husserlian phenomenology. Husserľs earlier work on the formal ontology of part, whole and dependence nevertheless provides a framework which can allow a precise formulation of the relational theory.
 
A partir ?une expérience de mécanique quantique, on pose la question de la table des catégories requises et ľon esquisse la comparaison entre trois tables de catégories: celle ? Aristote, celle de Kant et celle de Dirac. On tente ? analyser ce qu'a de spécifique le concept contemporain ?être-en-puissance compareéà son homologue aristotélicien pour caractériser l'état ? un système physique. Starting from a mechanical quantum experiment, the table of categories required is questioned and the comparison of three tables of categories, those of Aristotle, Kant and Dirac, has been sketched in. The author attempts to analyse what is specific in the contemporary concept of “power potential” compared with its corresponding homologue in the Aristotle approach in order to characterise the state of a physical system. Ausgehend von einem quanten-mechanischen Experiment stellt sich die Frage nach den benötigten Kategorien. In einer Skizze liefert der Autor einen Vergleich zwischen den Kategorientafeln von Aristoteles, Kant und Dirac. Um den Status eines physikalischen Systems zu charakterisieren, versucht er im Vergleich mit der aristotelischen die spezifischen Merkmale der gegenwärtigen Konzeption von Kraftpotential zu analysieren.
 
The philosophical core of a psychological theory of cognitive (thought) processes (Aebli 1980/81) is developped and commented, focussing on the problem of intentionality, this term being taken in the normal and in the phenomenological (Brentano/Husserl) sense. Actions, perceived processes, their states and results, operations (sensu Piaget) and concepts are seen as related insofar as they all establish relations between elements, are generated by construction and can be objectivated. These acts and/or the objectives that control them, are intentional insofar as their structure is activated. Such activation is characteristic of living systems. Intentionality sensu Brentano/Husserl is limited to acts of presentation, a contemplative conception which lacks the constructivity and the dynamism of our pragmatistic concept of action and thought.
 
The rationality assumptions that are made when one interprets texts or explains actions have been regarded as necessary (Davidson, Dray), empirical (Hempel), superfluous (Popper), or false (Donagan). After a survey of different notions of rationality and the role that each of them plays in interpretation and in the explanation of action, the author's view is presented in four theses: (1) some degree of rationality is necessary, (2) reasons for actions should always be included in their explanation, even where purely causal factors would suffice to explain them, (3) explanations should not seek to maximize rationality, and (4) man is striving to be rational. Les présupposés de rationalité faits lorsqu'on interprète des textes ou explique des actions ont été considérés comme nécessaires (Davidson, Dray), empiriques (Hempel), superflus (Popper) ou faux (Donagan). Aprés un inventaire des différentes notions de rationalité et du rôle que chacune d'elles joue dans l'interprétation et l'explication de Taction, la position de l'auteur est présentée en quatre théses: (1) un certain degré de rationalite est nécessairé, (2) les raisons des actions devraient toujours ětre incluses dans l'explication de cellesci, même si des facteurs purement causals devaient suffire pour les expliquer, (3) les explications ne devraient pas tendre à maximiser la rationalité, et (4) l'homme tend àêtre rationnel. Die Rationalitätsvoraussetzungen, die man beim Interpretieren von Texten oder bei der Erklarung von Handlungen macht, sind als notwendig (Davidson, Dray), empirisch (Hempel), überflüssig (Popper) oder falsch (Donagan) betrachtet worden. Nach einem Überblick über verschiedene Begriffe von Rationalität und der Rolle, die diese bei der Interpretation und Erklärung von Handlung spielen, legt der Verfasser vier Thesen vor: (1) Ein gewisser Grad von Rationalität ist notwendig, (2) Griinde für Handlungen sollten bei ihrer Erklärung immer berücksichtigt werden, sogar wenn rein kausale Faktoren für die Erklärung genügen wiirden, (3) Erklärungen sollten nicht darauf ausgerichtet sein, Rationalität zu maximie-ren und (4) der Mensch strebt danach, rational zu sein.
 
Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means-end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire-belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re-affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re-adapt to the environment and re-establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division.
 
L'analyse du développement des activités électriques du cerveau chez l'enfant au moyen d'examens électro-encéphalographiques répétés en série longitudinale nous donne l'occasion d'exprimer quelques considérations générales sur les notions d'organisation, de continuité et discontinuité (stades) du développement des fonctions cérébrales. Du point de vue méthodologique, une premihre difficulté provient de ce que la technique utilisée est à la fois objective et subjective: objective en tant qu'elle comporte un enregistrement physique très exact des activités physiologiques du cerveau, exprimées par des variations de potentiel électrique (méthode électroencCphalographique = EEG), subjective du fait que les tracCs obtenus doivent être analysCs et interprétés empiriquement par un spécialist.e expérimenté. Même si I'on recourt à certains procédés physiques d'analyse des tracés (analyseurs automatiques de fréquences, corrélateurs ou intégrateurs), on ne peut définir objectivement que certains parametres élémentaires, tels que la fréquence, le voltage et les relations de phase. Ces méthodes d'analyse objectives restent incapables toutefois d'exprimer le 〈pattern〉, c'est-à-dire la configuration temporo-spatiale de l'activité Clectrique dans ce qu'elle à d’〈essentiel〉 et de 〈général〉; elles ne peuvent se substituer entibrement à l'analyse qualitative et subjective. Une autre difficulté technique réside dans le fait que si les examens ne sont pas répétés à des intervalles suffisamment courts (quatre mois) et égaux ou si un examen est omis, il peut résulter d'un intervalle trop grand entre deux examens une impression inadéquate de discontinuité du développement.
 
In this article the thesis is defended that all objects of intentional attitudes are of one sort, while the thesis is rejected that epistemic attitudes can be assimilated. L'auteur examine les thèses selon lesquelles ?une part tous les objets attitudes intentionnelles, ?autre part toutes les attitudes intentionnelles elles-mêmes sont de même type. La première thèse est défendue, la seconde rejetée également en ce qui concerne les attitudes cognitives. In dieser Abhandlung wird einerseits die These geprüft, ob alle Gegenstände von intentionalen Einstellungen gleichartig sind, und andererseits, ob alle Einstellungen von gleicher Art sind. Die erste These wird verteidigt, die letztere auch in bezug auf erkenntnismässige Einstellungen verneint.
 
The purpose of this article is to provide a non-contradictory interpretation of sentences such as “Smith's murderer might not have murdered Smith”. An anti-actualist, two-dimensional framework including partial functions provides the basis for my solution. I argue for two claims. (1) The modal profile of the proposition (truth-condition) expressed by “The F might not have been an F” (where “F” is an empirical predicate) is complex: at any world where there is a unique F the proposition is true; at any world without a unique F the proposition has no truth-value; hence, at no world is it false. It remains an open semantic and epistemological question which of the first two kinds of world the actual world is. (2) The semantic method should be based on explicit intensionalization in lieu of actualism. Actualism accords a privileged role to the actual world. Explicit intensionalization places all possible worlds, including the actual one, on an equal footing. Syntactically, a lambda-bound world variable replaces the (explicit or implicit) actual-world constant or operator, while the other world variable is existentially bound.
 
This paper outlines a three‐part analysis of the traditional informal fallacy of ad ignorantiam. As initially characterized, the fallacy consists in arguing that failure to prove falsity (truth) implies the truth (falsity) of a proposition. First, the fallacy is located within confirmation theory as a confusion between the categories of “lack of confirming evidence” and “presence of disconfirming evidence”. Second, the structure of the fallacy can be seen as an illicit negation shift in Hintikka‐style epistemic logic. Third, the fallacy can be studied as an attempt to unfairly shift the burden of proof in a dialectical game. We suggest that research on ad ignorantiam needs a broadening of the scope of philosophical logic to encompass concepts of correct argument in these three contexts.
 
RésuméLes tentatives modernes entreprises pour fonder définitivement les mathématiques ont mis à nu la situation suivante:si l'on essaie d'éliminer les antinomies et les concepts «trop forts» de la théorie des ensembles tout en conservant un point de vue platonicien analogue au point de vue classique, on est forcé de recourir à des restrictions motivées de façon purement dogmatique;si, d'autre part, l'on essaie d'adopter un point de vue formaliste intégral, on se heurte à la nécessité d'envisager des «vérités platoniciennes» relatives aux systèmes formels;enfin l'essai hilbertien d'envisager la théorie de ces systèmes formels comme une théorie d'objets concrètement donnés ne tient visiblement pas compte des réalités.Il s'ensuit que les méthodes usuelles de la théorie moderne des fondements des mathématiques ne permettent pas d'accéder à un point de vue objectif sans cornposante dogmatique — ceci pour des raisons de méthode primaires par rapport aux détails des solutions proposées.Il est alors nécessaire d'envisager un type tout à fait différent de théorie des fondements des mathématiques. La réflexion mathématique sur des objets abstraits apparaît comme une donnée épistémologique qu'il faut étudier en tant que telle — antérieurement à toute interprétation, platonicienne ou autre. Une telle étude partira de la constatation que par le fait même de disposer de certains concepts, nous disposons de certaines connaissances. Elle cherchera à faire une étude épistémologique de celles-ci.Cette façon de poser le problème déborde nécessairement le cadre des mathématiques. Elle nous réfère à une étude épistémologique du langage.SummaryThe modern attempts to establish a deflnitive foundation for mathematics have laid bare the following situation:if one tries to eliminate the antinomies and the 6 very strong R concepts of set theory whilst preserving a Platonist standpoint analogous to the classical one, one is obliged to establish restrictions that are justified only by dogmatic reasons;on the other hand if one tries to maintain a purely formalist point of view, one finds oneself confronted with the necessity of introducing «platonic truths» with respect to the formal systems;finally the Hilbertian attempt to build the theory of these systems as a theory of concretely given objects is obviously not based on facts.The consequence of all this is that the usual methods in the foundations of mathematics do not enable us to reach apurely objective standpoint devoid of dogmatic components. - The reason for this lies in questions of method which are of a primary nature as compared with the details of the various solutions that have been brought forth.This entails the necessity of taking into account quite a different type of theory for the foundations of mathematics. Mathematical reflection about abstract objects appears as an epistemological dafum that ought to be studied on its own account - previous to any interpretation, Platonist or not. The starting-point of such a study will be the fact that merely by disposing of certain concepts we dispose already of a certain knowledge. Its object will be an epistemological study of this knowledge.This way of posing the problem necessarily takes us beyond the limits of a purely mathematical-logical investigation; it refers us to an epistemological investigation of human language.
 
Top-cited authors
Sabine Döring
  • University of Tuebingen
Dagfinn Follesdal
  • Stanford University
Barry Smith
  • University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
Pierre Grenon
  • University College London
Timothy Williamson
  • University of Oxford