The Contemporary Pacific

"There is concern that Pacific Island economies dependent on remittances of migrants will endure foreign exchange shortages and falling living standards as remittance levels fall because of lower migration rates and the belief that migrants' willingness to remit declines over time. The empirical validity of the remittance-decay hypothesis has never been tested. From survey data on Tongan and Western Samoan migrants in Sydney [Australia], this paper estimates remittance functions using multivariate regression analysis. It is found that the remittance-decay hypothesis has no empirical validity, and migrants are motivated by factors other than altruistic family support, including asset accumulation and investment back home."

This study examines the importance of remittances from emigrants to the economies of Pacific island states. The author considers two basic questions: "Are there enough island-born or island-linked people in the labor forces of industrialized countries to generate a given level of remittances to the island states?...[and] Will those who are able to sustain the flow be willing to? In this paper I examine the case of remittance flows between New Zealand and Western Samoa."

Meeting of the Fishes Ink on paper, 2006, 219 cm x 114 cm. Photo by Oceania Centre staff. Ram, my best friend, is unwell. High blood pressure, failing kidneys, and rampant diabetes have all taken their toll on his health. "Not long to go, Bhai," he said to me the other day, managing a characteristically resigned smile. He is living by himself, alone, in a one-bedroom rented apartment in Bureta Street, a working-class suburb of Suva. I visit him most evenings, have a bowl of grog, and talk long into the night about the old days. Both he and I know that the end is near, which makes each visit all the more poignant. As Ram often says, repeating the lines of Surendra's immortal fifties' song, "Hum bhor ke diye hain, bhujte hi ja rahe hain." We are the dawn's candle, slowly going out (one by one). Ram and I go back a long way. We were fellow students at Labasa Secondary in the late sixties. He was easily the best history and literature student in the school. He knew earlier than anyone of us what Lord of the Flies and Lord Jim were about, the two books we were studying for the exams. I often sought his assistance with my English assignments, and helped him with geography, at which he was curiously hopeless. I still have with me the final-year autograph book in which he had written these lines: "When they hear not thy call, but cower mutely against the wall, O man of evil luck, walk alone." Ekla Chalo, in Mahatma Gandhi's famous words; Walk Alone. We both went to university on scholarship to prepare for high-school teaching in English and history. I went on to an academic career while Ram, by far the brighter, was content to become and remain a high-school teacher. One day we talked about Malti. "I wonder where she is now?" I asked. "Married and migrated," Ram said. "No contact?" "No. There was no point. It was all too late." Ram and Malti were "an item" at school. Their developing love for each other was a secret we guarded zealously. We had to. We knew that if they were caught, they would be expelled, just like that, no compassion, and no mercy. Labasa Secondary was not for romantics. It was a factory that prepared students for useful careers, and measured its self-esteem by the number of "A" graders it had in the external exams, and where it ranked in the colonial educational hierarchy with other notable secondary schools such as Marist Brothers, Suva Grammar, and Natabua High. Malti failed her university entrance exam, and her cane-growing parents were too poor to support her at university. Jobs in Labasa were few, so Malti stayed at home. Ram was distraught, but there was little he could do but go to university. At the end of the first year, he received a sad letter from Malti telling him that she was getting married to an accountant at Morris Hedstrom. After all these years, Ram still had the letter, quoting lines he had once recited to her. "You will always be my light from heaven, a spark from an immortal fire." "Byron, did you know?" "I didn't. You are the poet, man. I am a mere garden-variety academic." Then Ram recited Wordsworth's poem "Lucy": "A violet by a mossy stone, / Half hidden from the eye." Such aching pain, endured through the years. After completing university, Ram married Geeta. Both were teaching at Laucala Bay Secondary. Geeta came from a well-known Suva merchant family. She married Ram not out of love but convenience, I always thought, after her long love affair with a fellow teacher had come to an abrupt end. Ram was a good catch, a university graduate, well spoken, handsome, employed, and well regarded. Geeta was stylish, opinionated, and ambitious. But Ram was in no hurry to get anywhere soon. As long as he had his books and his music, he was happy. Whatever money he could spare, he would spend on books ordered from Whitcomb and Tombs...

The reasons behind Fiji’s military coup of 19 May 2000 are complex, and cannot be fully understood on a purely rational or empirical level. An interdisciplinary approach that embraces culture and history, informed by fiction, poetry, and drama, as well as personal experience, offers insights into Fijian-Indian relations. In this paper I explore the nature and usefulness of the interdisciplinary process in helping to make sense of a specific event in Fiji’s history; I also seek to better understand the guiding principles that might inform future interdisciplinary research and writing. This does not mean that the approach here is necessarily applicable to understanding other similar events or topics. My primary goal is not to lay down principles set in stone but rather to stimulate discussion and debate on interdisciplinary approaches to Pacific studies.

The Contemporary Pacific 12.1 (2000) 260-263 This is a big, dense book, one of the most impressive pieces of historical scholarship to come out of Papua New Guinea. Its author, August Kituai, who has an Australian PhD, is an academic historian at the University of Papua New Guinea. The book deals with the nature of the Papua New Guinean police force recruited by the Australian colonial regimes in Papua and New Guinea from 1920 to the 1960s. If that sounds a rather wooden topic, a dry administrative history, don't be fooled. This is a book full of rich stories, synthetic histories of colonial rule, photographs of the men Kituai has been able to interview, tables, maps, a set of extensive appendixes, a glossary, list of references, and an index. On the outside its structure looks simple: nine chapters, with an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 1 deals with the role of the Australian district officers, the kiaps, and discusses their background and the nature of their work and assesses their efficiency. Chapters 2 and 3 cover recruiting and training of the police force. These are based on interviews with twenty-eight former policemen who, in chapters 4 and 5, talk about their roles in exploration and pacification. Chapter 5 deals with the police force during World War II, chapters 7, 8, and 9 with perceptions of the police held by a series of groups and individuals (Goilala and Gende villagers; Australian officers) who came up hard against them over the longer period. On the inside, things are a little more complicated. In the introduction Kituai discusses the numbers of men involved (1,200 in Papua by 1960; 1,800 in New Guinea, with just over 100 officers from Australia), and draws a brief summary of colonial rule. He describes an intrusive system, based on direct, not indirect rule, that used force at points that the colonial rulers could control. Sir William MacGregor introduced village constables to Papua in 1892, the Germans following within a few years with their system of luluais and tultuls throughout the New Guinea mainland and the island sphere. These men, the new authority figures of brash young colonial powers, created the frontiers through policing patrols and punitive expeditions. There were lots of little colonial wars in Melanesia. Make no mistake, argues Kituai, major force was used and should not be underestimated by historians. A culture of violence was at the heart of colonial rule, and the native police were integral to it, trained as physically super-fit and superbly disciplined instruments of order and mobilization. In the first chapter Kituai deals also with the kiaps, the patrol officers who gave the orders. He uses patrol reports and the data from a questionnaire, reproducing the pick of these, by Rick Giddings, as an appendix. Beside the kiaps, behind them, shaping the patrols and the quality of contact that the kiaps managed with local villagers, were the policemen. Chapter 2 looks at their recruitment and uses individual interviews with old police about the induction procedures. The author collected oral evidence and did archival searches during fourteen months of fieldwork from 1985 to 1989. Certain districts had reputations that made their people preferred recruits. Men from the Western Division of Papua were preferred because they met the requirements laid down in six deceptively simple categories (be of superior physique and intelligence; able to converse in any one or combination of English, Tok Pisin, and Motu; etc) and because they had a reputation for taking command easily, even over their kinsmen. Central Division men, on the contrary, simply objected to the life and discipline and automatic respect for the masta expected of all recruits, and refused to join; they had a reputation among the colonials for "cheek." Further north...

Why did festivals proliferate in all urban centers in Fiji in the late 1950s and 1960s to the extent that one official talked about “festival mania”? Today the Hibiscus Festival in Suva, the Sugar Festival in Lautoka, the Bula Festival in Nadi, and various other festivals have become natural parts of the national culture. However, when the festivals were started they were constructed as tourist attractions that should lure tourists to Fiji. Thus, the development of the festivals from being constructed tourist events to become part of the national culture points to some of the unexpected ways in which tourism links up with national identity. From 1950 to independence in 1970 three parallel processes of change took place in Fiji: Tourism became a major industry thus alleviating the economic dependence on sugar-production, urbanization created a new urban space for social interaction and public discussion, and a national identity had to be created as it became apparent that Fiji would cease to be a British colony and become independent. In this paper I will discuss how these processes of change condensed into “festival mania” focusing on the years from 1950 to independence in 1970.

In 1967 the transnational mining company Freeport was the first foreign company to sign a contract after Sukarno was sidelined by Suharto. Eventually, Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, through its subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia, came to operate the biggest gold mine and lowest extraction-price copper mine in the world in the isolated mountains of the Indonesian province of West Papua. It also became politically and economically significant to the Suharto regime. In the absence of the central government, the American mining company became the de facto developer and administrator of its concession in West Papua while in the United States it served as an important political lobby group for Jakarta. With Freeport becoming the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, one of the largest employers, and eventually running one of the largest socioeconomic programs in the republic, it was described by Suharto as essential to the nation's economy. Freeport's importance encouraged the development of mutually beneficial and supportive relationships between the company, the Indonesian president, his military, and the nation's political elite. In return, Freeport was politically and physically protected by the regime. Eventually, Freeport's financing of the president and his cronies' interests in the company threatened to see Freeport violating the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Today Freeport's past relationship with Suharto has made it a high-profile target for anticorruption reformers in Indonesia. Because of the pivotal economic role the company continues to play in Jakarta and West Papua, any question of future independence for the province will be inextricably linked to the company.

There has been a resurgent interest in traditional "chiefs" in eastern Melanesia, both as symbols of identity and power, and as agents for the facilitation and legitimization of postcolonial reform. However Papua New Guinea seems to have made relatively little use of such models of authority. This paper argues that the distribution of Austronesian and non-Austronesian languages within Melanesia helps account for this difference. Austronesian languages appear to be characterized by what is called "a lexicon of hierarchy," in which concepts related to chiefly models of authority are not uncommon, whereas non-Austronesian languages generally lack such terms. Speakers of Austronesian languages predominate in Fiji, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands, whereas nonAustronesian languages predominate in Papua New Guinea. Chiefly models seem to arise periodically in Papua New Guinea in Austronesian contexts, but are rejected by non-Austronesian-speaking cultures when an attempt is made to apply the models more broadly. Results have important implications for the practical implementation of legal and political reform in contemporary Papua New Guinea.

This paper considers the links between religion and disaster relief through a detailed case study of the activities of Christian churches following the Aitape tsunami of 1998 in northwest Papua New Guinea. Based on primary fieldwork data, we argue that Christian religion was central to the way in which the Combined Churches Organization conducted its relief work and to why it sought to undertake it in the first place. A comparison of the perspectives of this organization and of other religious and governmental organizations as to the causes of this disaster and what remedies they should undertake suggests that greater attention should be paid—both by aid and development researchers and practitioners—to aspects of religious belief and the way they inform theory and practice. Much remains to explore concerning the ways religion informs the theory and practice of aid and development, particularly in the Pacific. Through the detailed case study offered here, this paper adds to the fledgling debate engaging with the links between religion and development and calls for the initiation of an agenda toward that end.

The Contemporary Pacific 12.2 (2000) 498-506 Among the wider political and social forces that influence the Pacific Islands, none mattered more in 1999 than globalization, and in particular the globalization agenda now embraced by regional organizations such as the South Pacific Forum. If globalization is the ever-increasing integration of economies across territorial borders, then the globalization agenda is the set of economic policies that effect such integration. Among these are free trade, privatization, public service reform and harmonization by different governments of their customs procedures, product standards, trade regulations, and laws relating to investment, communications and the enforcement of property rights. In the last few years the South Pacific Forum has endorsed, advocated, and disseminated the globalization agenda in the region; meetings of Forum economic and trade ministers have overshadowed that of the Forum itself, and the Forum has defined key issues of concern to the region as mostly economic. It was hardly a surprise, then, that the Forum Trade Ministers Meeting in Suva in July made the most important regional decision of the year when it endorsed a Forum Island Countries Free Trade Area to be phased in during the first decade of the new century. By the time regional leaders met for the thirtieth South Pacific Forum in Palau in October and themselves endorsed the proposal, the Forum Secretariat had refined it so that free trade would be implemented in stages. Developing Forum island states would commit themselves to free trade by 2009 while smaller island states and least developed countries in the region would reach the goal by 2011. Forum leaders will consider a detailed draft agreement on free trade at their meeting in 2000. The significance of the free trade decision does not lie primarily in the fact that Forum island countries will be trading freely among themselves by 2011. After all, those countries trade far more with the rest of the world than with each other. The decision is rather meant to reassure aid agencies, foreign investors, and international institutions -- above all the World Trade Organization (WTO)--that the region is serious about the globalization agenda. As Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat Noel Levi told a meeting on Post Lomé Trade Arrangements in July, the plan for a free trade area "signals our region's willingness to consider new measures for dealing with globalisation and trade liberalisation, through regional integration." Levi emphasized the importance of the World Trade Organization: Following the Forum's free trade decision, the World Trade Organization funded a week-long seminar on trade negotiations for officials from the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The Forum also undertook to establish a Forum delegation in Geneva for the specific purpose of keeping abreast of developments in the World Trade Organization. The Forum's move to free trade is linked to longer-term prospects for integrating the South Pacific into other free trade areas. In time the FIC Free Trade Area is almost certain to be combined with the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations arrangements that have already made trade almost free across the Tasman Sea. The FIC Free Trade Area will then be a Forum Free Trade Area, with island countries imposing no tariffs on imports from Australia and New Zealand. Tariffs will diminish as a source of government revenue for a number of island governments, compelling them either to curtail their spending or seek revenue elsewhere. The second prospect is that the FIC Free Trade Area will become the basis for a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA) with...

The Contemporary Pacific 13.2 (2001) 510-528 Security was the key concern for the region in the year 2000 in the wake of coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, burgeoning demands for independence in West Papua, and continuing efforts to find a lasting political settlement on Bougainville. These political and security crises are examined individually. The timeliness and efficacy of the response by Australia, the regional heavyweight, and by the Forum is then assessed. Finally a broad comparison of regional crises is undertaken to ascertain whether any trends are emerging with respect to the role of ethnicity and other factors in causing conflict, as well as to illuminate ways to deter the resort to illegal means, including violence, to achieve political ends. First, however, is an update on efforts to promote environmental dimensions of security, notably the coordinated management of regional fisheries and the latest outcome in international efforts to combat climate change. The negotiation process known as the Multilateral High Level Conference for Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was launched in 1997 and concluded with a convention open to signature on 5 September 2000 after its seventh and final session in Honolulu. All sixteen Forum Fisheries Committee members attended, as did France and the French territories and the eight distant-water fishing nations. The quest to adopt the convention by consensus proved impossible and it was finally put to a vote with 19 in favor, 2 against (Japan and South Korea), and 3 abstentions (China, France, and Tonga). It was subsequently signed by 11 states and ratified by Fiji. Japan, in particular, was dissatisfied with numerous aspects of the final draft, including the boundaries of the convention area and decision-making procedures that Japan considered discriminatory against the minority, namely Asian distant-water fishing nations. In the end a compromise formula was adopted in which chambers of Forum and non-Forum members of the proposed commission would each need to support a decision by a three-fourths majority in order for it to pass. This would provide decisions with sufficient clout to implement them but also prevent individual countries from exercising veto power. To address widely held concerns that France would secure more votes for itself by virtue of its three territories, it was decided that separate rules of procedure be drawn up to specify the extent of participation by overseas territories. Finalizing the convention is a major step in formalizing cooperation between the Pacific Islands and distant-water fishing nations over sustainable fisheries management. However, it is just the beginning of a long and challenging process to implement the agreement. In the short term, decisions must be reached on the location of the permanent headquarters of the commission. Entry into force then requires ratification by 3 distant-water fishing nations and 7 coastal states, or, if after three years enough distant-water fishing nations have not ratified, with 12 ratifications. Realistically, the convention will not work without the majority of the distant-water fishing nations supporting it, and northeast Asian participation still remains doubtful. Financing the commission is also a vexed issue, as those distant-water fishing nations that ratify are loath to bear a disproportionate burden. Compliance and enforcement provisions constitute one of the biggest tasks for the future commission, especially with respect to those that do not ratify. Equally demanding is the commission's crucial role in determining how to allocate fishing opportunities and how to accommodate the entry of new distant-water fishing nations. Notwithstanding the challenges facing implementation, the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks is a remarkable achievement. "It includes the large interlocking EEZS of the Pacific Islands, as well as vast stretches of high seas. . . . opportunities [have been] created through the convention to manage and conserve the highly valuable, as well as highly migratory, fish stocks of the western and central Pacific. The convention also provides a framework and forum for the resolution of conflicts between the fishing nations and coastal states of the region. . . . the convention is an important step towards fulfilling the legally prescribed, yet politically fraught, duty to cooperate" as laid down by the United Nations (Tarte 2000b). News...

The Contemporary Pacific 14.2 (2002) 426-438 This review assesses recent economic trends with particular emphasis on changes to official development assistance strategies and the regional free-trade agenda. These issues are examined from different perspectives including those of donors, the Pacific Islands Forum, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in the field. In particular, a milestone was reached at the Forum with the signing of the Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement. In relation to aid, Australia has developed a unique strategy for exporting its refugee problem by inducing island states to host detention centers. The merits of the now infamous "Pacific Solution" are assessed. Finally, developments in West Papua are examined, as this has significant ramifications for human rights and regional security. It is well nigh impossible to obtain reliable economic statistics from the Pacific Island countries for the immediately preceding year. Discussions of economic performance and trends must therefore rely on data up to two years old. Moreover, it is not particularly instructive to merely examine economic indicators from one year in isolation. For these reasons, the following analysis draws on statistics collected in the late 1990s to ascertain broad patterns and their significance. In recent years several of the region's major donors—including Australia, the United States, the European Union, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—have undertaken reviews of economic development and aid. The peak nongovernment aid body, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), has also engaged in an assessment of overseas development assistance and the role of nongovernment organizations in providing support including aid to the Pacific. It is timely to analyze the state of the debate concerning Pacific Islands development and aid. An assessment by the Asian Development Bank concluded that economic performance in its twelve member Pacific Island countries was disappointing in the 1990s, notably when measured in terms of growth in gross domestic product. The average growth rate in the 1990s was around 3.5 percent. However, the late 1990s were volatile due to the combined effects of the Asian economic crisis and natural disasters, resulting in a negative regional growth rate of 3.2 percent in 1997. Papua New Guinea recorded almost zero growth in the five years ending in 1999. Conversely, 1999 was identified as the year of recovery for the Pacific overall. Papua New Guinea and Fiji beganto improve after an extended downturn. With the exception of Papua New Guinea, inflation declined in the Pacific Island countries in the late 1990s mainly due to deflationary pressures in the world economy. The overall balance of payments position of most Pacific Island countries improved. The Asian Development Bank attributed the improved outlook largely to the fact that several Pacific Island countries engaged in economic reforms, which began to reap benefits by the end of the decade (ADB2000, 1-2). Notwithstanding the region's chronic dependence on imports and aid, the economic outlook was generally positive in the late 1990s. This was shattered by political instability and violence in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in mid-2000, with devastating economic effects that rippled through the region as a whole (see von Strokirch 2001).Both countries experiencednegativegrowth,unemployment, loss of business confidence, strains on government finances, and severe balance of payments difficulties. In the Solomon Islands the key export-earning industries of palm oil, gold, fish canning, and tourism shut down altogether as a consequence of the crisis. Statistics on growth and financial management do not accurately portray quality of life. There is agreement among analysts, including the Asian Development Bank, AusAID, and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, that poverty is on the increase in the Pacific Islands. The Pacific Island countries still enjoy relatively high per capita incomes, high per capita aid, and productive subsistence sectors by global developing country standards. However, high costs, weak economic performance, aging infrastructure, rapid population growth, urban drift, widening inequality, and the erosion of traditional support networks have all combined to exacerbate poverty. Of course the Pacific Island countries experience poverty to differing degrees. The populous Melanesian states of Solomon Islands,Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea are worst off and rate very poorly in measurements of both human development and poverty according...

The Contemporary Pacific 14.2 (2002) 439-446 Fiji seemed to come full circle in 2001. The year began with the nation nervously awaiting the outcome of a Court of Appeal hearing on the fate of the interim government installed after the 2000 coup. It ended in a similar way, with the same Court of Appeal preparing to rule on the future of the newly elected government of Laisenia Qarase. Throughout 2001, Fiji's political course followed surprising and at times startling directions, as the country picked its way through the debris and rubble left by the crisis of 2000. The legal challenge to the interim government had come when dairy farmer Chandrika Prasad, whose property was stolen and family terrorized after the coup in May 2000, successfully obtained a ruling in the High Court in November 2000 that declared the 1997 constitution extant and the interim government without any legal basis. The government appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeal because, as Interim Prime Minister Qarase explained, "We need confirmation so that we can progress Fiji further towards parliamentary democracy" (Post,28 Feb 2001, 3). The lead-up to the Court of Appeal hearing in February was marked by heightened tensions, as nationalist Fijian leaders warned of bloodshed and chaos should the ruling go against the interim government. Ema Druavesi, a spokeswoman for the former governing party (Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei, or SVT) predicted that "if you force the Gates (High Court) judgement upon the Fijian people against their will our chances of returning to democracy will be destroyed for a long time" (Sun,18 Jan 2001, 1). In an unusual show of unity, Fijian political parties issued a joint statement demanding the continuation of the interim government. They warned that any attempts to "derail Fijian leadership" would be strongly resisted. Meanwhile the Taukei Movement was reported to be mobilizing its supporters to oppose the reinstatement of the 1997 constitution. Provincial councils and chiefs also denounced the intervention by the courts. According to one chief: "We will die defending the President and Interim Government against rulings detrimental to us as a race" (Times,26 Jan 2001, 3). While a Fiji Times editorial dismissed such threats as "empty political posturing," it pointed to the military as being the final arbiter of the interim government's and hence nation's future. There were indications, in an army briefing to the president leaked to the media, that the military intended to "uphold the rule of law—even if that means upholding the Gates ruling" (Times,24 Jan2001, 1). However, army statements also reaffirmed its "steadfast support" for the president and interim government, and the position that national security remained its "paramount concern." It was in this atmosphere of tension and uncertainty that the Court of Appeal began its hearing on 19 February. The interim government's case was that the 1997 constitution had indeed been abrogated according to the doctrine of necessity—to avert further threats to peace and security; and that a new legal order was now in effective control, commanding the acceptance if not approval of a wide section of the population. The respondents (Chandrika Prasad's lawyers) claimed that there was no necessity for the purported abrogation of the constitution—that such a step was "irrational and disproportionate." They further argued that no new legal or political order was in place (the fact that the interim government had submitted to the courts was evidence of that). Nor was the interim government in effective control, since it lacked both legal and political legitimacy. In a landmark ruling handed down on 1 March 2001 the Court of Appeal dismissed the interim government's appeal. It declared that the 1997 constitution remained the supreme law of the country; that parliament was not dissolved but prorogued for six months; and that the office of president only became vacant on 15 December 2000 with the resignation of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Accordingly, Ratu Josefa Iloilo was still acting in the position. The court argued that that there was no justification for abrogation of the constitution, and that the interim government had failed to demonstrate or prove effective control. One of the lawyers...

The Contemporary Pacific 15.2 (2003) 424-439 The Pacific has been portrayed as a sea of islands, whose peoples' identity, culture, and livelihood are fundamentally defined by their relationship with the marine environment. Islanders have always relied on the sea as a source of food and as a conduit for trade and communication with the outside world. In the contemporary Pacific, successful development depends on the ability of sectors such as tourism, fisheries, and aquaculture to sustainably manage the marine environment. Pacific Islanders at all levels of government and civil society have focused much of their lobbying and diplomatic energies on measures to preserve the natural environment. In no area has the regionalism of the Pacific Islands shown such unity of purpose as in the campaign to protect the marine environment from undue exploitation and pollution, especially by outsiders. In the past this unity was evident in the campaign to end nuclear testing and prevent nuclear waste dumping in the Pacific. Today it is apparent in regional efforts to coordinate monitoring and management of water, waste, coastal areas, coral reefs, and the high seas, notably with respect to tuna stocks. Antinuclear sentiment has persisted in opposition to nuclear shipments through the region. Climate change is an enduring concern. In 2002 these issues provided a focus for regional lobbying and action at several international forums. The 2002 Pacific Islands Forum leaders summit adopted an important initiative in the form of a Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy. The policy's vision is to maintain "a healthy Ocean that sustains the livelihoods and aspirations of Pacific Island communities." It emphasizes the economic opportunities offered by the ocean but draws attention to the increasing number and severity of threats to its long-term integrity. The new policy is a framework of guiding principles for collaborative action to promote sustainable management of the ocean's resources. It is meant to prevent a fragmentation of programs and conflict between different sectors as use of oceanic resources escalates. New Zealand offered to assist with setting up the initiative (PIF, 2002 annex 2). The overriding "goal of the policy is to ensure the future sustainable use of our Ocean and its resources by Pacific Islands communities and external partners. The guiding principles to achieve this goal are: improving our understanding of the Ocean; sustainably developing and managing the use of ocean resources; maintaining the health of the ocean; promoting the peaceful use of the ocean; creating partnerships and promoting cooperation." The document outlines specific actions to be taken nationally and regionally to realize these principles over the next five years. The principles and actions form the basis for a Pacific Ocean initiative, a regional summit to define current knowledge and activities, a review process, and an integrated framework of existing programs and future actions (PIF, 2002 annex 2). No sector depends more on collective environmental management than the region's fisheries, and this sector is in turn the linchpin of many economies. The alarm has been raised over a persistently low replacement rate of tuna stocks in recent years. This is largely due to juvenile tuna being caught inadvertently by purse-seining nets. Forum leaders urged distant-water fishing nations to increase the mesh size of nets to reduce the destructive by-catch (PIF 2002 , para 47-48). Leaders welcomed the extension until 2013 of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty governing fishing access fees paid since 1987bythe UnitedStates to the fourteen Forum Fisheries Agency member states. Other distant-water fishing nations have sought to lower fisheries access fees paid in their bilateral agreements with island states (already at only 5 percent of catch value) on the grounds of low market prices for tuna and increasing fuel costs. However, under the new agreement, fees paid by the United States were increased by $3 million compared to the previous treaty, for a total of $21 million per annum: $18 million paid by the US government and $3 million by the fishing industry (Tarte pers comm 2003). The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries (WCPF ) Convention is the most significant initiative in the world to manage migratory fish. It is the first regional agreement to implement the United Nation's agreement on...

The Contemporary Pacific 17.1 (2005) 160-167 The many ongoing issues and problems during the year under review included recovery from natural disaster, preservation of culture, allegations of government corruption, budget cuts, the struggle to lead the economy onto a healthier path, and escalating youth violence. The people of Guam showed their resilience, forging ahead, helping those on and off island, and celebrating the successes of community members. In December 2003, a year after typhoon Pongsona, millions of dollars of repairs had yet to be done. Hundreds of individuals on island still lacked power and water. There were other infrastructural woes as well, many of which were long-standing. New construction, storm activity, and unchecked vegetation growth contributed to the flooding of roads, bridges, and properties (PDN, 17 May 2004). Despite the abundance of water in some locales, other parts of the island, especially in the south, suffered another year of continuous water supply outages. Guam's cultural crops and wildlife took some hits. As of May 2004, one-fourth of the island's betel nut trees, which produce treasured pugua (betel nut), were affected by a fungal infection (PDN, 24 May 2004). A program of injecting fungicide and burning infected trees is expected to prevent the decimation that the pugua trees suffered on Saipan a few years ago. On the positive side, mealybug-infested papaya trees were declared in August 2003 to be recovering well (PDN, 5 Aug 2003). And in the US legislature, work continues on a bill that would create a committee dedicated to controlling the island's pervasive, destructive brown tree snake population. The fate of the island's free-ranging carabao, which the US Navy regarded as problematic, was especially controversial this year. Islanders questioned the navy's decision to cull the carabao herds and wondered if they should step up efforts to have Chamorros adopt the culturally significant animals instead. Hundreds are said to be on the carabao adoption waiting list. Inserted in the debate is the continuing dialogue concerning the US military's seeming insensitivity toward local concerns. In other cultural news, August 2003 saw hundreds of community members assisting Guam's Palauan Association to raise money for a new abai (the Guam version of the Palauan term bai) meetinghouse. The structure will eventually be a "multicultural center for the Pacific" (PDN, 24 Aug 2003). In early 2004, the Micronesian Community Outreach Program held its first meeting. The program is designed to help migrants from other parts of Micronesia adjust to life on Guam. The program also works to dispel the negative stereotypes of Micronesians held by many on Guam (PDN, 27 March 2004). In his regular contributions to the Pacific Daily News, self-described second-generation Guam Filipino Norman Analista covered topics ranging from taking local pride in Pinoy culture to the benefits of establishing a Filipino Federal Credit Union. Also speaking to and for Guam's sizable Filipino community, "local Filipino celebrity and icon" Prospero "Popoy" Zamora is once again hosting a show on Guam's public television channel (PDN, 27 July 2003). The need to promote and preserve the Chamorro language was discussed in the media throughout the year. Some worry about the deterioration of the Chamorro language and the consequences thereof. Sagan Fin'nå' Guen Fino' Chamoru Day Care, which conducts its daily activities solely in Chamorro, was featured in the media (PDN, 28 March 2004). The University of Guam (UOG) sponsored its first Fino' Chamoru Na Kompitision (Chamorro Language Competition), with participants from both Guam and Northern Mariana schools. UOG language professors developed and produced an instructional Accelerated Learning method Chamorro text and CD set. Others wrote to the newspaper to suggest increasing the number of Chamorro-language public signs and defended the reinstatement of proper Chamorro place, village, or other names. And for everyday listening, radio station KISH102.9 began operations in late June 2003 ; it is "all Chamorro, all the time" and provides a selection of over 2,000 Chamorro songs (PDN, 17 July 2003). Land issues are also close to Chamorro hearts. Land that was taken or otherwise obtained by the US government some sixty years ago, ostensibly to strengthen the...

The Contemporary Pacific 16.2 (2004) 370-381 This year's review focuses on Australian policy toward the Pacific Islands, as there were important developments concerning Canberra's role in regional security and in the Pacific Islands Forum. Because Australia is the region's primary aid donor and leads in setting the political agenda, shifts in its national policy warrant careful consideration. In 2003 Australian Prime Minister John Howard took unprecedented interest in the region. He became much more assertive in pursuing Australia's agenda for the microstates, notably with regard to intervening in Solomon Islands, advocating good governance, and taking measures against terrorism. This review explores the shifts in rhetoric, policy, and processes, and weighs their impact for Australia's relations with the region. To establish the context for policy shifts, it is useful to begin by examining a recent, wide-ranging, and timely report on relations with the region by an Australian Senate committee. In August 2003, the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade References Committee produced a comprehensive 312-page report on Australia's relations with the region. The committee reviewed the performance of past policies, made recommendations for improvements in current practices, and proposed innovations. In the political domain, the committee repeatedly alluded to the need for Australia to relate to the region on the basis of an "equal partnership" and thereby dispel concerns about a "big brother syndrome" ( FADTR2003, 156, 158). The current government was criticized for its inattention to the region and its disregard for cultivating relations with Pacific leaders. In this respect Howard's absences from the Forum early in his tenure were noted. Overall the report reflected a perceived need for greater engagement with the region on the part of Australian ministers and parliamentarians. Australia's policy of processing asylum seekers in the microstates, otherwise known as the Pacific Solution, also came under fire (see von Strokirch 2002 ). It was argued that this policy "feeds the perception within the region that Australia's domestic political considerations are more important than broader regional issues" ( FADTR2003, xxvii). Questions were also raised about the strategy's lack of transparency, its effect on political stability, and its long-term social impact ( FADTR2003, xxvii). The committee recommended that the policy be terminated. Another example of Australia's apparently uncaring attitude toward its neighbors was its refusal to countenance Tuvalu's request to consider accepting environmental refugees as a result of rising sea levels associated with climate change. The committee suggested that Australia give assurances to Tuvalu that assistance would be forthcoming ( FADTR 2003, 170). In the economic domain, the Senate committee made several practical recommendations including reduction of non-tariff barriers to regional trade; a long-term plan for regional cooperation to promote tourism; and a pilot program allowing Pacific Islanders to undertake seasonal work in Australia. With regard to good governance and development policy, the committee emphasized that Australia must be better informed about country-specific culture and politics in order to tailor policies accordingly. Indeed, the report set an example by devoting a substantial section to country case studies. The need for local consultation and participation in aid planning and delivery was stressed. The tendency for Australian aid to be crisis driven was also criticized for distorting and skewing priorities. Aid should not be diverted from long-term development strategies to address periodic crises; instead, an emergency fund should be set up for this purpose. The committee noted Australia's preoccupation with reform of central governments in the Pacific. It observed that this was occurring at the expense of equally important rural development programs ( FADTR2003,xv-xxi). The Senate committee believed that many of the weaknesses in the relationship stemmed from widespread ignorance and lack of interest in the Pacific Islands on the part of Australians (including politicians and media) and an overall neglect of bilateral, people-to-people links. The committee recommended the establishment of an Australia-Pacific Council to enhance awareness, interaction, and understanding between Australia and the region. The functions of such a council could include promotion of visits and exchanges; institutional links in the areas of politics, culture, commerce, and media; and Pacific studies...

In a year leading up to the 2014 municipal and provincial elections and a possible choice to hold a referendum on independence (or another negotiated accord), French loyalists and Kanak nationalists debated and postured, with some crossover on particular issues, while questions of sustainable development and reducing inequalities loomed in the background. The most dramatic event of the year was a massive protest against the high cost of living, as autonomy powers continued to devolve from Paris, which maintained its high levels of financial and technical aid. Defining local citizenship and voting rights became contentious, and environmental concerns haunted the expanding nickel mining and processing industry that fuels much of the local economy. It was also a year of commemorations, reconciliations, and regionalism. In a survey conducted by the local government (nc , 27 Feb 2013), only three political leaders garnered public confidence ratings of 40 percent or higher: Paul Neaoutyine (47 percent), the pro-independence president of the Kanak-ruled Northern Province; Philippe Gomès (44 percent, though 40 percent said they distrusted him), deputy to the French National Assembly and leader of the loyalist Calédonie Ensemble (ce , Caledonia Together) party; and Gaël Yanno (40 percent), who had lost his deputy seat to Gomès in 2012, became a dissident within the loyalist Rassemblement-Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (rump ), and finally created his own party, the Mouvement Populaire Calédonien (mpc ), as well as a new coalition against independence, the Union pour la Calédonie dans la France (ucf ). Taken together, these leaders represent the three largest political groupings in the country today, though Neaoutyine’s Parti de Libération Kanak (Palika) is rivaled in the independence movement by leaders such as Rock Wamytan of the Union Calédonienne (uc ), who is president of the Congress of New Caledonia, and Yanno is challenging his former rump boss, Senator Pierre Frogier. The pro-independence Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks ), of which the uc and Palika are the largest of five member parties, has been trying to act together, but the loyalist factions of Gomès, Yanno, and Frogier have been waging bitter internecine politics for some time now. The ce has accused the rump of working in ad hoc coalition with the uc-flnks (that combination brought down the Gomès presidency of the executive cabinet in 2011), while Yanno’s mpc/ucf has accused Gomès of agreeing too often with Palika on socioeconomic issues. In September 2013, cabinet president Harold Martin of the Avenir Ensemble party (ae , Future Together, an ally of the rump ) closed the doors of Congress temporarily after political disputes over whether to finance moderate rental housing, leading the local paper to ask, “Is the country ungovernable?” (nc , 11 Sept 2013). In view of the 2014 elections, it may become a challenge to elect a new cabinet president. Yet the delegation of governing powers from Paris to Noumea continues, in compliance with the 1998 Noumea Accord. The Overseas Ministry of the Socialist government in Paris created a new structure to “accompany” New Caledonia as new administrative authority was being granted to the country, such as control over secondary and higher education, commercial and civil law, accident insurance, audiovisual communications, maritime and domestic aviation security, and civil defense (including fire departments). Because some transfers have been controversial or have languished for lack of preparation, a special delegate of the ministry will supervise and facilitate administrative reorganization and personnel training (nc , 19 April 2013). Commissioners sent by the French Parliament to examine the local situation expressed regrets that so little groundwork had been done since 1998 to enable such devolutions, which they had hoped would help the country to reduce socioeconomic inequalities. They concluded that local political quarrels over the country’s future status had become an impediment to addressing problems of high living costs and unemployment, so Paris needed to take a more active role in pursuing a “decolonization” that offered better wealth distribution (nc , 9 Sept 2013). The French Parliament passed a special law that enables New Caledonia to create “independent” institutions as needed, such as a local antitrust authority to promote more competition. Deputy Gomès in the...

The Contemporary Pacific 17.2 (2005) 416-433 What ails the Pacific and what are the remedies? These are perennial and much debated questions for Islanders and their principal aid donors. A conventional diagnosis focuses on the tyrannies of distance and small economies of scale. This perspective has prompted the Pacific Islands Forum ( PIF ) to revisit the merits of deepening regionalism as a means to overcome national weaknesses. To this end the past year has seen agreement on wide-ranging reform of the Forum to facilitate regional integration and cooperation. Another long-standing school of thought attributes blame for contemporary ills on the economic and political structures imposed by departing colonial powers and their uneasy coexistence with tradition. One way of rectifying, or at least mitigating, negative aspects of this legacy is the donor-inspired agenda to promote good governance, notably to tackle corruption. The ubiquitous practice of corruption is an ongoing preoccupation of aid donors, Pacific leaders, and civil society, yet policies to combat it have delivered variable outcomes. A recent study of corruption in the Pacific recommends a change in strategy. In the security domain, violent conflicts have arisen in the Pacific for a range of reasons (see von Strokirch 2001), but there is no doubt that the impact of these conflicts has been more profound and their duration prolonged as a result of access to guns. The proliferation of small arms and their illicit use has to date been most marked in Melanesia. Nevertheless, throughout the Pacific the potential for conflicts involving arms must be prevented with effective regional action rather than just reaction to crises after they occur. The scope of the problem, lessons from past conflicts, and the merits of emerging international strategies are assessed here. Developments concerning health trends are rarely addressed in any depth in this annual review, but the pandemic of HIV/AIDS warrants an exception to the rule. Current trends and risk factors suggest that the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa and Asia could be replicated in the Pacific. Unlike the recent tsunami in Asia, HIV/AIDS is not a natural disaster beyond human control. Rather it is predominantly a sexually transmitted infection, control of which is highly amenable to concerted prevention strategies. Notwithstanding delays in responding to the problem in the Pacific, the regional anti- HIV/AIDS campaign has recently gained momentum and substance at all levels of politics and civil society. Regardless of ideological perspectives and associated whole of government prescriptions, there is widespread agreement on the profoundly negative impact of corruption, small arms, and HIV/AIDS on Pacific societies and economies. These trends are worsening and inexorably undermine—indeed cancel out—efforts to promote peace and development. All three issues have recently been addressed with varying degrees of commitment in global, regional, and donor strategies to enhance human security and development. The nature and efficacy of these strategies provide a thematic focus for analysis of this year in review. First, however the latest attempt to reform the preeminent regional institution warrants analysis. On the initiative of the PIF chair, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, the 2003 leaders' meeting in Auckland mandated an Eminent Persons Group ( EPG ) to review the Pacific Islands Forum's role, function, and Secretariat. The Eminent Persons Group reported in April 2004 to a Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders' Retreat, which in turn adopted its key recommendations in the Auckland Declaration and Leaders' Decisions ( PIFSLR2004 ). Most of the sixty-page EPG report provided a broad overview of diverse challenges facing the Pacific Islands region and as such was not stating anything controversial ( EPG2004 ). The same could be said of the resulting "Pacific Vision" to guide forum actions and policies. The vision was essentially a "motherhood statement" by leaders, typical of multilateral organizations, emphasizing the pursuit of security and prosperity, valuing of cultures, and promotion of good governance, sustainable development, democracy, and human rights ( PIFSLR2004, paragraph 1). The EPG report made reference to the Pacific Way's acceptance of diversity and parallel commitment to unity and consensus, yet simultaneously asserted the need to openly and respectfully deal with problems of governance ( EPG2004, 20). In doing...

The last decade has seen an escalation of social, political, and economic changes in Tonga, but the events of the past year have been extraordinary: Thousands of people participated in numerous protest marches, climaxing in a general strike that held the government hostage for six weeks; royal family insiders spoke publicly against the authority of the king; the first elected and commoner member of Parliament was named prime minister; the first woman was appointed to cabinet; and the king gave his assent to the National Committee for Political Reform. It has been a dramatic, traumatic, and emancipatory year for Tonga, and in these respects the con-sequences of the popular uprisings of 2005–2006 constitute a political, social, and psychological coup for Tongans at home and abroad.

The world’s natural forests are under unprecedented strain in the twenty-first century. Recent global and Pacific reports document the appalling extent of logging in the tropics and its negative effects on communities, ecosystems, and developing economies. For the rural majority in Melanesia, uncontrolled logging has profound consequences for subsistence, traditional culture, health, income, and civil rights. Causes of the tropical forest crisis are multidimensional. These range from inefficient harvesting and processing, misguided forestry policy, and relentless demand for timber, to inadequate regional and global governance. The crux of the problem lies with unsustainable yields, destructive methods, and illegal company practices, facilitated by official corruption. The United Nations (UN) is attending to deforestation because of its global ramifications for development, climate change, and biodiversity. Non-government organizations have long been sounding the alarm. Bilateral and multilateral donors are incorporating sustainable forestry into aid programs. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (spc) is promoting national reform and liaising with global forest agencies. Despite this flurry of activity and the rapid pace of deforestation in Melanesia, forest policy has been a blind spot for the Pacific Islands Forum (pif). The Forum has devoted high-level policy direction to the management of tuna stocks (von Strokirch 2007), including major pronouncements at its last meeting in Tonga. Forests urgently warrant a comparable spot on the regional agenda, with concerted reforms in this vital but ailing sector. This review outlines current deforestation rates in the world, Pacific trends, the importance of forestry to regional economies, and the socioeconomic and environmental costs of prevailing industry practices. Unsustainable forestry practices are analyzed, including the role of Malaysian companies, the insidious forms taken by illegal logging, associated corruption, and the complicity of consumer nations in the trade. A brief chronology of global institutions, milestones, and debates on forests is followed by a focus on recent developments in 2007. The agenda of global agencies and donors illuminates options for the Pacific to develop a regional forest policy and the external sources of support they can draw on. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (fao) described the gravity of trends: “The world has just under 4 billion hectares of forest, covering 30 percent of the world’s land area. From 1990 to 2005, the world lost 3 percent of its forest area, a decrease of some 0.2 percent per year” (fao 2007, ix). In the period 2000 to 2005, about 13 million hectares of forest cover were cleared each year, or 73,000 football fields per day. Of 1.6 billion trees removed globally each year, almost 1 billion are not replaced (ago 2007). It is estimated that only 12 percent of the world’s forests are under sustainable management (unff 2007, 35). Forest cover has stabilized or increased in developed countries with temperate climates, mainly in North America and Europe, where environmental awareness is higher, plantations are widespread, and forestry institutions strong. Developing countries with tropical forests experienced a persistent net loss of tree cover. According to the International Tropical Timber Organization (itto)—whose members account for 76 percent of tropical timber production and 90 percent of trade—in itto producers, forest cover has declined from 52 percent in 1985 to 46 percent in 2005. itto member production of tropical logs totaled 137 million cubic meters in 2006 (itto 2007, 20, 21). In Southeast Asia, net forest loss accelerated. Several countries, notably Indonesia, lost total forest cover at rates exceeding 1.5 percent a year. Loss of primary forests (not counting plantations) in Southeast Asia was even more disturbing at 2 percent a year. Oceania, including the Pacific Islands, Australia, and New Zealand, incurred net losses of 0.17 percent a year from 2000 to 2005. After a recovery in the 1990s, Oceania’s natural forests have experienced a decline since 2000 (fao 2007, 16). Net losses to forest cover in Melanesia are ongoing. Fiji’s forest totals about 1 million hectares, with only small remnants of primary forest; most natural forests have been logged or converted to other land use. Deforestation in Fiji during the 1990s averaged 2,000 hectares, or 0.2 percent per annum. Vanuatu has a forest sector similar in size to Fiji...

Throughout 2008, Pacific regionalism was buffeted by a series of crises. Regional unity was stressed by administrative, budgetary, and leadership problems in intergovernmental agencies; by tensions between Pacific Islands Forum member countries over climate change and trade; and by unresolved debate over the relationship between the Forum and Fiji, after the 2006 coup led by Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama. At the same time, elections in Australia (November 2007), New Zealand (November 2008), and the United States (November 2008) have transformed the regional landscape, as the incoming governments push new policies on development assistance, climate, and regional engagement. In less than a year, the incoming Australian government led by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd improved the atmospherics of Australia's engagement with the Pacific Islands. By the end of the conservative government of former Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007), relations with key Pacific governments were in tatters. Relations with Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands were soured by the pursuit by Australian officials of Julian Moti (an Australian lawyer who was advisor and subsequently attorney general for Solomon's Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare) over alleged criminal offenses. Australian ministerial contact with Papua New Guinea was banned after Prime Minister Michael Somare authorized the use of a PNG military flight to transport Moti to Solomon Islands to avoid Moti's extradition to Australia. Fiji's interim administration was angry over "smart sanctions" introduced by Australia and New Zealand, and John Howard's refusal to act on global warming dismayed the small island states that are already suffering adverse climate impacts. In 2008, regular diplomatic visits by new Foreign Minister Stephen Smith and parliamentary secretaries Bob McMullan (for aid) and Duncan Kerr (for Pacific Island affairs) have reinforced key policy decisions by the Rudd government. These changes—some symbolic, some substantial—have changed the mood in the region: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; the Stolen Generations apology; closing the Pacific Solution detention center in Nauru; promises of increased aid, A$150 million in climate adaptation funds; and a new A$200 million Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF). Following years of lobbying, Pacific governments also welcomed Australian and New Zealand programs to open their labor markets to unskilled workers from the Pacific. New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) program for seasonal workers brings nearly 5, 000 Islanders a year to pick fruit in orchards and vineyards around the country. The August announcement of a pilot study for an Australian seasonal workers program means 2, 500 Pacific workers will come to Australia over the next three years to work in horticulture and fruit picking (Maclellan 2008). Relations with Port Moresby have improved, with a major joint ministerial meeting in March and the inclusion of Papua New Guinea in Australia's new seasonal workers scheme. At the August 2008 Forum leaders meeting in Niue, Prime Ministers Rudd and Somare signed the first of a series of "Pacific Partnerships for Development"—bilateral agreements that Australia will negotiate over the next year with all Forum island countries. By January 2009, these bilateral agreements had been finalized with Papua New Guinea, Sāmoa, Kiribati, and Solomon Islands. The New Zealand elections saw the defeat of the Labour Party government led by Prime Minister Helen Clark, and the election of a coalition government under National Party Prime Minister John Key. The Māori Party, winning five seats, has taken up ministerial posts in the National-led government with Dr Pita Sharples as minister of Māori affairs and associate minister for health and corrections, and Mrs Tariana Turia as minister for the community and voluntary sector, associate minister of health, and associate minister for social development and employment. Incoming Foreign Minister Murray McCully stated that the New Zealand government would increase its focus on aid and trade with the Pacific, and "saw a much higher level of engagement with the Pacific nations" (Wilson 2008, 16). New Minister for Pacific Islands Affairs Georgina Te Heuheu stated that the government would consider expanding New Zealand's RSE seasonal worker program (Wilson 2008, 15). While maintaining its longstanding ties to Polynesia, New Zealand has increased economic and trade links with Melanesian countries, with trade increasing from NZ$385 million in 1987 to...

Reviews of Vanuatu and West Papua are not included in this issue. Fiji's military-backed government dug in its heels during 2008, defying pressure to hold elections. At home, interim Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama courted popular backing for a "People's Charter" and sought to restructure the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). Externally, relations soured further with Australia and New Zealand over the breach of the commitment to hold elections by March 2009, several death threats directed at Australian High Commissioner James Batley, and the expulsion of additional journalists and diplomats. The economy fared poorly, despite the recommencement of gold mining at Vatukoula and some recovery in tourist arrivals. The inner circle around Bainimarama tightened after the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) ministers—including party leader Mahendra Chaudhry—left the cabinet. In October, a panel of three judges sitting on the high court in the Qarase v Bainimarama case ruled that post 2006 coup presidential decrees were lawful, thus legitimizing the actions of the interim government. In January 2008, the National Council for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) held its first meeting. Opening the proceedings, Catholic Archbishop Petero Mataca echoed the position of his co-chair Frank Bainimarama by rejecting calls for a speedy return to the polls on the grounds that "elections alone will not bring about democracy nor guarantee stability or end all coups" (Fiji Times, 18 Jan 2008). His statement set the tone for what became the core NCBBF message—an insistence on far-reaching electoral reforms to eliminate racism recycled as justification for the regime's resisting pressure to hold fresh elections by March 2009. Invitations to join the council were refused by deposed Prime Minister Qarase's Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party and the Methodist Church, indicating that the majority of indigenous Fijians remained deeply opposed to the interim government's initiatives. Both of the major North Indian organizations, the Arya Samaj and the Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha, took up seats on the national council. So too did Mahendra Chaudhry's Fiji Labour Party, which had been backed by the vast majority of Fiji Indians at the elections two years previously. A small but vocal minority of Fiji Indians remained aloof; the National Federation Party refused to participate, as did the main South Indian organization, the Then India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam, and the Fiji Muslim League. In response, the regime cultivated rival South Indian and Muslim groups (for details, see Prasad 2009). The draft People's Charter, released in August, proposed a set of core shared values including sustainable democracy, a common national identity, enlightened leadership, poverty reduction, and economic development (NCBBF 2008a). Most were grand statements of principle that could have been embraced, at least rhetorically, by all of Fiji's post-independence governments, and the document was largely silent on concrete steps to be taken. A few proposals stood out. "Mainstreaming of indigenous Fijians in a modern, progressive Fiji" was to be promoted by adoption of a common name—"Fijian"—for all citizens (in contrast to the more usual everyday usage of "Fijian" to refer to the indigenous community and "Indian" to refer to those descended from migrants from the Subcontinent). Indigenous Fijians would henceforth be referred to as "i-Taukei" rather than "Fijian." That sparked a familiar debate and was predictably condemned by Qarase and the Methodist Church. In the mid-1990s reformists had encouraged usage of "Indo-Fijian" for those of Indian descent and "Fiji Islander" for all Fiji citizens. But those terms never caught on in everyday speech within Fiji, instead becoming confined largely to polite liberal and scholarly discourse. The new terminology is unlikely to acquire any greater currency. The People's Charter included proposals for a radical overhaul of the electoral system. The complex preferential system used at the elections of 1999, 2001, and 2006 was to be dropped and replaced by an open-list, proportional-representation system, as used in Finland and Sri Lanka. Communal constituencies, in which citizens vote separately according to ethnic origins, were to be replaced by a fully common roll system, and the voting age was to be reduced from 21 to 18. These were sensible proposals, which had been...

Male to female cross-dressing and performing have a long indigenous history in the Cook Islands. In recent years, Western-style drag shows have also been included in the Cook Islands cross-dressing repertoire. This article takes the highly cosmopolitan vehicle of the drag show and uses it to track the relationship between local and global models of gender and sexuality. It examines ways in which the iconography of domesticity and motherhood has been used to signify an uneasy relationship between local and global ideas of sexuality and gender

In this paper, I critically examine a number of notions about interdisciplinary research approaches to the challenges posed by the world today. I juxtapose this critique with a discussion of interdisciplinary developments in Pacific studies, raising questions as to how deeper dialogues between academic disciplines and the worldviews of Pacific Islanders may be reached. While interdisciplinarity is widely seen as a politically correct agenda for contemporary research on processes of globalization and development, caution is needed against prevailing optimism about the potential for solving multidisciplinary problems through interdisciplinary innovation. Such optimism may overrate the potentials of broad (as opposed to deep) research approaches and may reflect disregard, if not arrogance, toward the complexity of the matters addressed. The drive in some European countries for research on “sustainable development” indicates close ties between interdisciplinary aspirations and the bureaucratic ambitions of research administrators. Under such circumstances interdisciplinarity becomes an object of institutional conflict and internal debate between institutions, as well as between bureaucrats and scientists, more than a question of creative epistemological contact between plural knowledges in and beyond academic disciplines in a search for increased knowledge more generally. The avoidance of such pitfalls in the further development of Pacific studies requires close attention to and appreciation of initiatives from within Oceania, coming from beyond the domains of conventional disciplines. In this paper, such paths toward interdisciplinarity are exemplified in a discussion of epistemological encounters between Oceanic and western knowledges, and with reference to the emerging currents of “Native Pacific Cultural Studies.”

Since the start of the Ok Tedi mining project in Papua New Guinea in 1981, Broken Hill Proprietary has operated it. Weak environmental protection laws and a series of ecological disasters have endangered the greater Ok Tedi and Fly River socioecological region. A grassroots indigenous popular ecological resistance movement made an out-of-court settlement with the mining company in Melbourne in 1996. Early in 2000 the indigenous movement took Broken Hill Proprietary back to court in Melbourne to block the company’s attempt to abandon the Ok Tedi mine. Research started with Wopkaimin subsistence ecology in the 1970s. Later the political ecology of the Ok Tedi crisis was evaluated, as was ecological change in social terms; both are illustrated through the politics of cultural and ecological representation. After the successful convergence of radical environmentalists and indigenous popular ecological resistance against the Ok Tedi mine, research shifted to liberation ecology to study the emancipatory potential of struggles and conflicts against environmental degradation. The responsibilities of academics conducting research in the Ok Tedi crisis are examined. The Ok Tedi crisis challenges the proposition that academics can act as honest bro k e r s t h rough mining companies to negotiate deals for local communities. Academics engaged by mining companies as consultants or employees must work according to managed science and circumscribed briefs. The approach of critical liberation ecology, which directs research to community empowerment, represents a freedom of critical inquiry only available in the academy.

The Contemporary Pacific 16.2 (2004) 358-366 The writings of Māori novelist Witi Ihimaera, whose flamboyance matches his fame, and who, in public interviews and personal letters, frequently dubs his involvement with literature "a magnificent accident," can indeed be considered, if not magnificent, then at least magical. Born in 1944 into the Te Aitanga A Mahaki, Rongowhakaata, and Ngati Porou tribes, Ihimaera is a controversial thinker, who, despite constantly comparing "profane" English with "sacred" Māori, nevertheless wins the hearts of readers with stories written in that very same "profane" English. While some of Ihimaera's achievements owe themselves to twists of fate (for example, as we found out from our interview with him, his first collection of short stories being noticed by a prime minister), his enormous productivity can be credited mostly to hard work. Indeed, Ihimaera has tried his hand at novels, poems, plays, librettos, and children's books. It seems perfectly natural that Ihimaera, who has identified magic realism as one of the cornerstones of his writing quests, attributes his success not to himself personally but to "an accident." Perhaps by somehow overshadowing his own will in becoming a writer, he appears to tap indirectly into the cosmic, supernatural powers responsible for the prosperity of Māori arts. It is not by chance that Ihimaera sometimes refers to Māori historical hero Te Kooti and his prophecy about the future triumph of the Māori . Te Kooti is a founder of the Ringatu religion to which Ihimaera's family belongs, and Ihimaera, who encourages Māori writers to take a cooperative rather than a competitive approach to their task, sees himself as a vessel assuring this future triumph. Metaphorically, the texts of Ihimaera can be seen as a grandmother's keepsake box filled with myths, amulets, prophecies, and legends rooted in Māori tradition. The American poet Stanley Kunitz once proclaimed that in his poetry he makes his life into a legend. Ihimaera does not need to create any legends; he was born into them. For instance, once he quoted his relatives as saying that an ancestor came to Aotearoa (New Zealand's native name) on the back of a whale. This episode later evolved into the story about a little girl, the heroine of the novel The Whale Rider, who proved her leadership as the would-be chief of her tribe by rescuing and riding a whale (Ihimaera has a special talent for depicting strong and driven females). Even though Ihimaera—who refers to himself as an author struggling "with the dilemma of being Māori in a postmodern world"—knows that writing is a power in itself, he takes an active part in New Zealand's cultural and political life. To say that he is only a writer is not enough; he is much more. As a member of the Te Haa Māori writing committee, he makes sure that no young talent is being overlooked; as an editor, he checks that all Māori writing is being collected in representative anthologies; as a professor at Auckland University, he instills in his students pride for belonging to the Māori tradition and assures that this tradition is being continued and passed on to the next generations. He is a true modern Māori man. Fascinated by his writing, we were inspired to interview Ihimaera, who currently is being flooded by interview requests from the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, and other countries where the movie Whale Rideris being shown. The release of the movie, which has won several awards, has once again confirmed Ihimaera as a leading Māori novelist and has motivated publishers to reissue the novel on which the movie is based. This interview, conducted by e-mail in August 2002, provides a glimpse into the cultural and political context of Ihimaera's writing, covering such topics as Māori culture and language, the role of women in Māori society, Māori acceptance of gays, Māori literature, immigration, and western values. MM and AM We would like to know your opinion about the following statement by New Zealand...

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, people moved from the Pacific Islands to New Zealand in the expectation that their children would enjoy improved life chances, which they believed would follow from improved quality and availability of formal education in New Zealand. The greater educational opportunities would be translated into improved opportunities in the labor market in the form of higher incomes, higher levels of labor market participation, and upward occupational mobility. This paper explores the origins of these beliefs about education and uses statistical data to establish whether the migrants’ expectations were realized.