Policy Quarterly

This article compares some key aspects of political finance regulation in Australia and New Zealand. It centres on public money and electioneering expenditure. These are treated in three sections: expenditure limits; incumbency benefits, such as government advertising and parliamentary entitlements; and direct public funding of electioneering. A comparison paper by Joo-Cheong Tham explores private money in politics, in particular donations and their disclosure.

The author's article titled "Whither the crown’s interest in South Island high country land reform?", attracted an article by Neil Quigley titled "Tenure review, property rights and public policy", which presented a different perspective. Brower wrote a short article in response titled "Response to Quigley", which is also archived here, from Policy Quarterly, v. 4, no. 1 (2008). The South Island high country has long been the subject of debate over resource use and ecological protection. Since early 2006, the ownership and relative value of property rights in high country pastoral leases have become controversial. This article reviews recent research (chiefly Brower (2006) and Brower, Monks and Meguire (in review)) on the law, politics and economics of land reform in the high country.

The proposed Regulatory Responsibility Bill amounts to a substantive constitutional change shifting power away from the executive branch of government towards the courts. It is a serious diminution in the range of ministerial responsibility, the prime instrument of accountability in our democratic framework. The Bill’s justiciable character opens a new dimension of court cases not hitherto contemplated in New Zealand. Courts and judges have handled the provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act very well. Both criminal lawyers and judges are familiar with matters such as search and seizure, arrest, legal advice, detention and police powers. In contrast, neither judges nor the legal profession are proficient in policy analysis of the type that leads to regulatory legislative proposals. The Bill brings the courts into areas of law making not within their province and for which they lack institutional competence. It amounts to a very significant transfer of power and will redefine the relationship between the three branches of government.History illustrates that the New Zealand Parliament is unwilling or unprepared to deal to the executive in the form of disallowing statutory regulations despite legislation intended to serve as a heavy check on executive power. Without the House of Representatives being prepared to exercise control over regulations in any meaningful way, it seems unlikely that ex ante legislative controls will rectify the situation.

Unpaid labour, notably caring labour, is one of the most important and productive sectors of our society. Its inherent and measurable value has been stressed by scholars and practitioners, feminists and those doing unpaid work for generations. Yet policymakers continue to sideline it. This article describes the improvements that would flow from recognising and responding to the importance of unpaid labour, the values and cultural narratives that help explain the lack of policymaking will, and the potential for counters to these narratives.

Decumulation in the retirement income context is the using up of retirement savings by way of drawing out regular income – for example, a fixed amount each month. It’s the converse of accumulating retirement savings while in paid work by regularly putting money aside. And return on investment plays its part in both: in the accumulation phase it enhances the amount saved; in the decumulation phase it enhances the regular amount that can be paid out.

This introductory article traverses the basic events since the outbreak of Covid-19 in China in December 2019, through its arrival in New Zealand and the nationwide lockdown and collective effort to eliminate it, up until the end of May 2020. The government acted decisively, with considerable public support and cooperation, and the overall response was therefore a success, albeit a very costly one.

The social and economic impact of a pandemic like Covid-19 was always going to require a multi-government response, and so it was in New Zealand. Despite the complexity that has historically characterised intergovernmental relationships, the impact of Covid-19 saw institutional arrangements quickly put in place that enabled a joined-up response from both local and central government. This article looks at how these arrangements worked and how they contributed to the provision of essential services through all levels of the lockdown.

This article first briefly describes pre-Covid-19 support for workers who lose their jobs in New Zealand, then outlines and evaluates the government response to potential and actual job loss in the Covid-19 emergency. The main response was a wage subsidy. Some aspects of it were highly effective; others were problematic and tolerable only because it was a crisis and temporary. It demonstrated the systemic weaknesses in New Zealand’s support for displaced workers. The article finally considers what is needed to prepare New Zealand better for times of job loss.

During the national lockdown, Cabinet exercised extraordinary authority in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This article summarises the circumstances leading up to the adjournment of Parliament in late March, and the decision-making processes in place during the lockdown. This includes the national security system and all-of-government response to the crisis, as well as the key legislative triggers for the government’s response: the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 (and the epidemic notice) and the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (and the state of national emergency). It also discusses decision making by the Covid-19 Ministerial Group and the Epidemic Response Committee while Parliament was adjourned. It argues that Cabinet exercised appropriate authority in response to the crisis and did not make significant, permanent or constitutional change.

This article is an edited version of the Sir Frank Holmes Memorial Lecture delivered by Sir David Skegg at Victoria University of Wellington on 12 November 2020.

Mäori infection rates from Covid-19 are perhaps the only example in Aotearoa New Zealand’s contemporary history where Mäori have achieved better social outcomes than non-Mäori. This remarkable, and unanticipated, outcome is potentially a golden precedent for policymakers if we can determine the critical factors that reversed embedded trends of disproportionate disadvantage. This article argues that, while the national lockdown and science-based approach were important enablers of these outcomes, the nationwide Mäori response to Covid-19 should also be recognised as critical. It describes the key components of the Mäori response to Covid-19 and argues that, in composite, the Mäori response demonstrates the value and positive impact of ‘strengths-based’ policy at scale, as well as providing insight into key policy settings that would enable the positive outcomes in respect of Covid-19 to be replicated across other important policy areas.

The long-term success of New Zealand’s Covid-19 elimination plan and the re-opening of fortress New Zealand rests on high population uptake of the Covid-19 vaccine. Understanding factors that contribute to vaccine hesitancy – and potential inequities in access and uptake – are consequently essential for the efficacy of the national immunisation programme which began rolling out to the general population in July 2021. Prior research on the New Zealand context has documented socio-demographic disparities in Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy (Horizon Research, 2020; Prickett, Habibi and Atatoa Carr, 2021; Thaker, 2021). However, little research has been undertaken to examine how psychosocial elements – such as people’s trust in institutions – might be associated with people’s vaccine intent and cast some light on the reasons underpinning their intent.

This article takes a public health perspective on New Zealand’s pandemic preparations, its pandemic response, and the successful outcome (as of June 2020) of its Covid-19 elimination strategy. The health outcome appears to be the best in the OECD, but some other countries made better use of certain control strategies. In the postpandemic era there are many emerging opportunities for society to be gained by embedding better plans for controlling future emerging diseases, strengthening public health infrastructure and consolidating the evident benefits of reduced pollution during the lockdown.

Parliament had to discharge its constitutional role in unprecedented conditions following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. How did it fare? This article assesses Parliament’s response to the pandemic across its core constitutional functions of legislating, scrutinising, financing, representing and providing a government. It argues that Parliament’s response was remarkably effective and resulted in meaningful permanent changes to the legislature’s operation. Nonetheless, the response also highlighted opportunities for further institutional strengthening regarding Parliament’s role in a national emergency.

A ‘young professional’ in the public service in 1912 had good cause for optimism. The Public Service Act 1912, which enacted most of the recommendations of the Hunt Royal Commission, had created a merit-based system with standardised conditions of employment, pay and pensions, and hiring, firing and promotion decided by the public service commissioner. That gave security and independence. There were yearly pay rises for new entrants (cadets); a capable officer could earn a respectable sum by his thirties (this was an overwhelmingly male service); there was annual leave and ‘liberal sick leave on pay’ and the opportunity to earn professional qualifications (Public Service Commissioner, 1920, p.6).

Few public servants in the post-war era have made such a significant contribution in so many fields or shown more vision than Ken Piddington. Tragically, Ken was killed in a motor accident near Sanson on 28 February 2014, while en route to his eco-friendly property near Mount Ruapehu.

This article summarises key findings from the strand of the Tai Timu Tangata. Taihoa e? project that examined the mechanisms of subnational population change in New Zealand for 143 towns, 132 rural centres and 66 territorial authority areas (hereafter TAs), for the 37-year period 1976-2013. Because of space constraints we present the information as a set of 10 summary observations.

This article examines the ways in which key environmental policies have been made in the past, and reflects on the present state of play with respect to these policies. The article draws on my experience with the Environmental Defence Society (EDS) since 1978 and the reflections are personal ones. The issues covered are: government agencies; climate change; oceans; freshwater; and resource management law. The objective of this discussion is to see if the past illuminates the present in any useful way.

When New Public Management (NPM) swept around the world in the 1980s the New Zealand public sector embraced its theories and embarked upon a rigorous reform process which brought both praise and some scepticism. New Zealand was seen at that time, by some observers, to be a ‘world leader’. However, in the years following the initial impact of NPM the euphoria has given way to a more rigorous analysis of the performance of the public sector and a re-examination of the functions and responsibilities of the public service.

New Zealand’s Commerce Act 1986 overturned both common law consumer protections and previous legislation that had spelled out procedures for identifying and sanctioning the abuse of market power. Inspired by Chicago School doctrines and an anti-state philosophy, the legislation opened the way for three decades of monopoly profiteering, exploitation of the weakest consumer groups and anti-competitive conduct, while regulation has been absent or ineffective. In this article, key weaknesses in the 1986 legislation are examined, and some remedies suggested.

Governments change the resources available to households through both spending and taxation. This article examines the extent to which the government redistributes from high-to low-income households, and how this has changed since 1988. As well as covering market outcomes and the effects of personal income tax and cash benefits on the disposable incomes of households, the distribution of indirect taxes and of government expenditure on in-kind social services is calculated. The results reveal how government affects the distribution of post-tax income received by households, when income is defined considerably more broadly than usual. This article extends Treasury’s previous fiscal incidence study of 1988 and 1998 using 2007 and 2010 data.1

This article analyses recent trends and determinants of chief executive (CEO) pay in the New Zealand public sector, and of numbers and pay of senior managers in the sector. Comparisons are made with the listed company private sector. It turns out that both CEO pay growth and numbers of senior managers in the public sector have lagged behind those in the private sector, while senior manager pay has moved ahead.

By July 2006 all 85 local authorities expect to have their 10-year Long Term Council Community Plans (LTCCPs) signed and sealed, and passing muster with an unqualified audit report. The new Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002) has provided councils with general empowerment and introduced a new purpose (section 3) for local government: to ‘promote the social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being of communities now and for the future’.

The call for greater efficiency in public spending is not new, but today has additional force: how can we deliver more for (even) less? A combination of high public expectations about service quality and prolonged fiscal constraint requires New Zealand government departments to focus on the highest spending priorities, find more innovative ways to deliver services, and create efficiencies wherever possible (State Services Commission, 2010a, 2010b). The urgent need to refocus on providing smarter, better public services for less was a consistent theme over the past few years in public statements made by the previous secretary to the Treasury, John Whitehead. Whitehead identified developments in the public sector in the United Kingdom as a potential model for New Zealand, particularly the speed with which ‘new thinking [was] converted into action’ in the pursuit of efficiency (Whitehead, 2010), and referenced in particular a programme launched in the UK in 2004 as an innovative public reform initiative from which New Zealand might learn (Whitehead, 2009a).

The diaspora is a long-term feature of New Zealand’s migration system and its political landscape. Yet the New Zealand government does not have a coherent approach towards it. Why not? It cannot be because nothing important is happening: around 850 New Zealanders emigrate in the average week, and around one in five New Zealanders now lives abroad. Moreover, while not a first-order policy issue in itself, this is important across a range of policy areas, and occasionally requires urgent government attention. A more likely explanation for the absence of coherence is that New Zealand still sees itself as a migrant-receiving country, and that the diaspora has been a political hot potato, making level-headed debate difficult.

This article describes income mobility patterns in New Zealand over the short to medium term. It uses a special dataset which tracks the Household Labour Force Survey over the period from 2007 to 2020, using 2013 census data. The measure of income is total family taxable income per adult equivalent person. The income unit is the individual. Just below half of those initially in the bottom decile remained either there or in the second-lowest decile over seven years, while about two-thirds of those initially in the top decile remained either there or in the second-highest decile. Income mobility was least for those in the top and bottom deciles. People also move below or above a low-income threshold over time. Of those who initially had incomes less than half of the median income per adult equivalent person, about half remained in that category after six to seven years. Unemployment and single parenthood were closely associated with longer-term low income. Policies that promote employment and education may be effective, yet not necessarily sufficient, in reducing low income and low-income persistence.

This article compares the proximate but not parallel trajectories of Canterbury Regional Council’s (ECan) and the Christchurch City Council’s changing authority to manage the urban and natural environment from 2010 to 2015. We ask why the trajectories are so far from parallel, and speculate as to why the central government interventions were so different. The apparent mismatch between the justifications for the interventions and the interventions themselves reveals important implications on the national and local levels. Nationally, the mismatch speaks to the current debate over an overhaul of the Resource Management Act. Locally, it informs current discussions in Wellington, Nelson, Gisborne and elsewhere about amalgamating district and regional councils.

This article considers how justice relates to and informs the structure of international climate change mitigation2 architectures under which burdens are assumed by individual states. The argument can be made that the structure of the current global architecture has, to a substantial extent, been determined in the domain of realpolitik, not justice. In the domain of realpolitik, states seek to maximise their national self-interest based on practical rather than ethical considerations. The more powerful the state, the more able it is to stay outside global regulatory systems if its perception of its national self-interest deems this appropriate. But if this is so, are considerations of justice relevant to the shape of future global climate change mitigation regimes? This article argues that they are.

A formidable number of complex issues will need to be resolved if a new global agreement on climate change is to be reached to cover the years immediately following the expiry of the first commitment (or ‘compliance’) period under the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. With little doubt, the most contentious issue will be how to allocate the burden of reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In short, there is a need for a fair sharing of the ‘effort’ between countries. But what is fair? What principles and considerations are relevant? And how should such principles and considerations be weighted?

Climate change issues have come to the forefront of international diplomacy and will increasingly dominate policy discussions, both within our countries and among them.1 New Zealand, like the EU, has engaged with the battle on climate change and is currently grappling with the complexities of putting in place an emissions trading scheme. The aim of this article is, first, to explain how the EU is contributing to the fight against climate change. In particular, I want to highlight how we already differentiate efforts within the EU among member states and different sectors, setting a real example of what could be done. Then I wish to outline some core elements for global burden sharing to be negotiated at the Copenhagen conference to be held under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in late 2009.

Global greenhouse gas emissions are on a steeper growth trajectory than assumed in most scenarios that underlie current international policy discussions and negotiations. Effective global climate change mitigation action will require speed, depth and breadth well beyond any efforts seen to date, and will need to involve all major emitters, including developing countries (Garnaut et al., 2008). To achieve a comprehensive global agreement at or after the Copenhagen climate conference, a principles-based framework for mitigation is needed. Here we outline a system that adds up to a global solution, and that could be broadly acceptable. It involves internationally tradable emissions rights allocated across countries, with allocations moving over time to equal per capita allocations. Developing countries would receive increasing emissions entitlements, linked to their GDP growth, for a transitional period. Binding emissions targets would apply to all developed and high-income countries plus China from the outset.

In March 2012 the Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (EAG) was established by the Children’s Commissioner to make recommendations that, if not fully ‘solving’ child poverty, would realistically reduce and mitigate its effects. The advice was to inform the Ministerial Committee on Poverty, whose focus was specifically on tangible gains ‘getting value for money in a tight economic climate’ (Commissioner for Children, 2012).

Since the dawn of the intergovernmental dialogue on climate change, countries have bickered over who should take responsibility, in what measure and under what conditions to avert climate change. At the heart of these questions in the ongoing negotiations on the post-2012 climate regime is the notion of “differentiation.” The Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, differentiate between developing and industrialized countries, and assign a leadership role in mitigation to industrialized countries. Should the post-2012 climate regime differentiate between developing countries, based on “objective criterion,” in determining who, amongst them, should take greater responsibility, perhaps even akin to the responsibility that industrialized countries have currently assumed?

The issue of climate change is a major challenge for humankind.1 It concerns the ways of survival and development. We need the common efforts of all members of the international community to tackle the problem. Climate change is, in essence, an issue about development. In the past 200 years the emissions of developed countries during the process of industrialisation have been the main contributor to climate change. Of the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels, developed countries contributed 95% from the Industrial Revolution to 1950, and 77% from 1950 to 2000. It has to be acknowledged, therefore, that developed countries should take the larger part of the responsibility for solving the problem due to their past emissions.

International interest in including a broad range of measures of well-being in national accounts and in using well-being research to inform policy making was greatly stimulated by the Stiglitz report (Stigliz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2008). The essential message of this report was that if we want wellbeing to feature as one of our country’s outcomes it has to be measured and monitored appropriately to test its responsiveness to public policy interventions. In order to bring these issues to a New Zealand audience, editors from the International Journal of Wellbeing organised the Wellbeing and Public Policy conference held at Victoria University of Wellington over the three days of 13–15 June 2012.

Every three years, under the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income is required to conduct a review of retirement incomes, to be submitted to the government. This article presents a summary and discussion of their 2013 report, entitled Focusing on the Future.

In 2012 Transparency International New Zealand (TINZ) decided that during 2013 it would conduct a National Integrity System (NIS) assessment for New Zealand. New Zealand has always rated highly on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, and in recent years has consistently ranked first or first equal. However, the CPI is precisely what its name suggests, an index based on perceptions of a country’s corruption status, the perceptions being those of a number of international agencies. TINZ considered the time was ripe to test the reality behind the perceptions and assess the strengths and weaknesses of New Zealand’s system.

Nearly four years ago, Prime Minister John Key announced a major reform of the welfare system. He defined the problem with the existing system in the following terms: The stand-out feature of New Zealand’s benefit system is how passive it is. For the most part it simply hands over benefits and leaves people to their own devices. Most beneficiaries are not expected to be available for work, or to take up work if it is offered to them. Naturally, many don’t.

The New Zealand public spoke and the pollsters listened: child poverty consistently ranks among the top concerns of New Zealanders (Levine, 2014). And the prime minister listened too. In September 2014, after securing a healthy election victory, he proclaimed that he was going to step in and tackle child poverty (Fox, 2014). The policy analysts in a range of government agencies were set a task: come up with a package for Budget 2015 that helps children in poverty, that doesn’t cost too much and that won’t reduce the incentive to work. This article will demonstrate that the policy analysts did the best they could with the brief they were given.

The 2015 Budget contained benefit rate increases for beneficiaries with children and some minor adjustments to work-based child-related tax credits. The significance of these increases when other policies are taken into account suggests a reshuffling of money in which much of the distributional effect will be minimal and offset. For children it resembles the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff rather than a structural review of child-related income policies that might be reformist, preventative and inclusive. The cost to society is more complexity in the benefit system and a cementing in of reliance on work-related child tax credits that have unproven worth either in incentivising work or in reducing child poverty. A rational policy-making approach with the clear aim of child poverty reduction, measurable outcomes, agreed criteria and a process for evaluation might have suggested that a different policy direction was more appropriate and more likely to be effective.

As APEC marks its third decade, a priority for the 21 member economies is to agree upon where the agency’s purpose and work programmes should focus over the next 20 years. APEC is the undisputed leading institution promoting Asia-Pacific economic growth. It is not a negotiating body but draws strength from its ‘value proposition’ built on members’ support for consultation, consensus and collaboration. The review of APEC’s future is occurring in the context of a global pandemic that has disrupted regional commerce, travel and community well-being. The preoccupation of APEC members is with economic recovery and renewed growth. The challenge for New Zealand as APEC chair in 2021 will be to gather collective commitment to further measures of regional economic integration, inclusivity and sustainability designed to stimulate recovery, and identify how a digitally enabled regional economy could contribute to that goal.

Hosting APEC in 2021 is a unique and timely opportunity for New Zealand to take responsibility for providing regional leadership that can advance and sustain APEC as an institution, including through its development of trade and economic policies that will support the region’s economic recovery from the effects of Covid-19. This article reviews why APEC matters to New Zealand and the international context which will influence New Zealand’s APEC host year. It outlines how New Zealand will approach its virtual hosting of APEC 2021, and the key themes which will inform our priorities.

Public and stakeholder involvement in nature conservation through conservation boards has been a distinctive feature of New Zealand’s statutory framework for conservation, put in place in 1987. Since their inception, effective boards established for the purpose of ensuring that conservation stakeholders’ voices inform conservation planning have been regarded, at least in official discourse, as a key mechanism for achieving conservation outcomes. They replaced the existing national parks boards and, like their parent body, the New Zealand Conservation Authority, were intended to focus on the entire conservation estate.

The main policy problems facing education in 2017 relate to its resourcing, its structure, and the measurement of its performance and impact. Underneath the questions of whether government funding matches the greater expectations placed on education over the last decade, and whether structures need changing, or new players introduced, lies the question of what should be given most priority. Should education be most valued in terms of its contribution to increasing New Zealand’s productivity and economic wellbeing, which has been more and more to the fore in tertiary policy? Should it be most valued in relation to what can be quantitatively measured, focusing on achievement in the traditional ‘3Rs’ through national standards, and secondary qualifications, the emphasis in the first set of Better Public Services targets? Should it be most valued in terms of how well students develop the capabilities to contribute as citizens, form flourishing families, think critically and creatively, problem-solve, and act well in the face of an increasingly volatile natural and human world?

In this lecture I will: comment on some of the complex challenges of the 21st century which cry out for effective global governance reflecting today’s geopolitical and other realities; and examine whether global governance institutions – particularly in the areas of peace and security, economic governance, sustainable development and climate change – have kept up with geopolitical changes and been able to tackle emerging challenges to ensure their continued effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability.

This lecture discusses the importance of strong families, and in particular the importance of early intervention and the role that government can play in this area. I want to begin, however, from another place entirely. Let me start by saying that if New Zealand is to compete globally in the future, I profoundly believe that we need to succeed socially. In the years ahead, the international labour market is going to become increasingly competitive because of population ageing and because the global workforce continues to be more mobile. A key challenge for New Zealand – and this is the case for many other OECD countries – will be to retain and attract the best skills and the best talent. We need to be thinking now about the best ways and means of ensuring that New Zealand is seen as one of the best places to work and live, and simply enjoy life. It may seem odd to start off a discussion on the importance of strong families by talking about global competitiveness, but I really believe that all of this is closely interconnected, and I think that when we talk about competitiveness we too quickly revert simply to the economy and we ignore the social dimensions. If we are going to attract and retain skills and talent in the future, we should be thinking about creating the best possible social conditions. This is really about creating a competitive advantage for New Zealand.

When New Zealand changed its electoral system from first-past-the-post (FPP) to mixed member proportional representation (MMP), the move was heralded as the end of old politics. Prime ministers and their Cabinet would no longer be the ‘elected dictatorship’. The executive would now be constrained by greater checks and balances. The two-party system that had held New Zealand politics hostage for at least 60 years would end and instead a greater diversity of interests would be represented in the House of Representatives, a House that could better hold the executive to account. This was the aim, but has it happened? This article examines recent instances of executive actions that are akin to those taken in the FFP era that MMP has been unable to eliminate. It also offers suggestions for how to increase the accountability of the executive by strengthening the constitution and other branches and offices of state.

Due to the long-standing absence of direct and legally binding competencies in tourism, European Union (EU) tourism policy has mainly influenced tourism governance through indirect interventions and non-binding instruments (Anastasiadou, 2006, 2008a, b; Halkier, 2010). For example, in October 2007 the European Commission adopted its ‘Agenda for a sustainable and competitive European tourism’ (European Commission, 2007). This communication proposed measures aimed at complementing the EU policy interventions that have consequences for tourism and its sustainability throughout Europe. However, its overall impact on tourism structures has been miniscule; instead, impact on tourism governance has come from elsewhere.

How do policy workers actually use academic research and advice? While there are several recent studies regarding this question from other Westminster jurisdictions (e.g. Talbot and Talbot, 2014, for the UK; Head et al., 2014, for Australia; Amara, Ouimet and Landry, 2004 and Ouimet et al., 2010, Canada), similar academic studies have been rare in New Zealand. So far, most of the local research in this field has been conducted by the prime minister’s chief science advisor and the Office of the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory Committee, with the particular instrumental purpose of improving the government’s ministries and agencies’ ‘use of evidence in both the formation and evaluation of policy’. However, none of these studies have asked how, and to what extent, policy workers in government are utilising academic research in their everyday work.

The Covid-19 pandemic has put the research–policy interface in the spotlight, exposing the synergies and tensions between researchand policy. The complexity of responding to Covid-19 has also highlighted the potential for research to inform responses to other major societal challenges. Researchers are enthusiastic about working with policymakers to ensure that policy is underpinned by robust evidence, while many in government see the importance of strong evidence underpinning policy. However, there are also significant challenges associated with connecting the complex domains of universities and central government.