Perspectives on Psychological Science

For centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories often attribute it to an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great deal of attention across disciplines, most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely on an ill-defined set of "homunculi" doing jobs like "response inhibition" or "updating" without explaining how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated that control takes place across different timescales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the mechanistic basis for the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends on three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes are modulated via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules maintained in working and long-term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions becomes automatized with practice and how people develop a control network. Finally, we discuss how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can increase our understanding of control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel behavioral change interventions.

Recent research shows that our actions can influence how we think. A separate body of research shows that the gestures we produce when we speak can also influence how we think. Here we bring these two literatures together to explore whether gesture has an impact on thinking by virtue of its ability to reflect real-world actions. We first argue that gestures contain detailed perceptual-motor information about the actions they represent, information often not found in the speech that accompanies the gestures. We then show that the action features in gesture do not just reflect the gesturer's thinking-they can feed back and alter that thinking. Gesture actively brings action into a speaker's mental representations, and those mental representations then affect behavior-at times more powerfully than the actions on which the gestures are based. Gesture thus has the potential to serve as a unique bridge between action and abstract thought.

The demand for researchers to share their data has increased dramatically in recent years. There is a need to replicate and confirm scientific findings to bolster confidence in many research areas. Data sharing also serves the critical function of allowing synthesis of findings across trials. As innovative statistical methods have helped resolve barriers to synthesis analyses, data sharing and synthesis can help answer research questions that cannot be answered by individual trials alone. However, the sharing of data among researchers remains challenging and infrequent. This article aims to (a) increase support for data sharing and synthesis collaborations among researchers to advance scientific knowledge and (b) provide a model for establishing these collaborations using the example of the ongoing National Institute of Mental Health's Collaborative Data Synthesis on Adolescent Depression Trials. This study brings together datasets from existing prevention and treatment trials in adolescent depression, as well as researchers and stakeholders, to answer questions about "for whom interventions work" and "by what pathways interventions have their effects." This is critical to improving interventions, including increasing knowledge about intervention efficacy among minority populations, or what we call "scientific equity." The collaborative model described is relevant to fields with research questions that can only be addressed by synthesizing individual-level data.

Self-serving judgments, in which the self is viewed more favorably than other people, are ubiquitous. Their dynamic variation within individuals may be explained in terms of the regulation of affect. Self-serving judgments produce positive emotions, and threat increases self-serving judgments (a compensatory pattern that restores affect to a set point or baseline). Perceived mutability is a key moderator of these judgments; low mutability (i.e., the circumstance is closed to modification) triggers a cognitive response aimed at affect regulation, whereas high mutability (i.e., the circumstance is open to further modification) activates direct behavioral remediation. Threats often require immediate response, whereas positive events do not. Because of this brief temporal window, an active mechanism is needed to restore negative (but not positive) affective shifts back to a set point. Without this active reset, an earlier threat would make the individual less vigilant toward a new threat. Thus, when people are sad, they aim to return their mood to baseline, often via self-serving judgments. We argue that asymmetric homeostasis enables optimal vigilance, which establishes a coherent theoretical account of the role of self-serving judgments in affect regulation.

Current theory and research on emotion and aging suggests that (1) older adults report more positive affective experience (more happiness) than younger adults; (2) older adults attend to and remember emotionally-valenced stimuli differently than younger adults (i.e., they show age-related positivity effects in attention and memory); and (3) the reason that older adults have more positive affective experience is because the positivity effects they display serve as emotion regulatory strategies. It is suggested that age differences in cognitive processes therefore lead to the outcome of positive affective experience. In this paper, we critically review the literature on age differences in positive affective experience and on age-related positivity effects in attention and memory. Furthermore, we question the extent to which existing evidence supports a link between age-related positivity effects and positive affective outcomes. We then provide a framework for formally testing process-outcome links that might explain affective outcomes across adulthood. It may be that older adults (and others) do sometimes use their cognition as a regulatory tool to help them feel good, but that can only be demonstrated by specifically linking cognitive processes, such as age-related positivity effects, with affective outcomes. These concepts have implications for cognition-emotion links at any age.

Persons with more types of social relationships live longer and have less cognitive decline with aging, greater resistance to infectious disease, and better prognoses when facing chronic life-threatening illnesses. We have known about the importance of social integration (engaging in diverse types of relationships) for health and longevity for 30 years. Yet, we still do not know why having a more diverse social network would have a positive influence on our health, and we have yet to design effective interventions that influence key components of the network and in turn physical health. Better understanding of the role of social integration in health will require research on how integrated social networks influence health relevant behaviors, regulate emotions and biological responses, and contribute to our expectations and world views.

Some individuals, despite facing recurrent, severe adversities in life such as low socioeconomic status (SES), are nonetheless able to maintain good physical health. This article explores why these individuals deviate from the expected association of low SES with poor health, and outlines a "shift-and-persist" model to explain the psychobiological mechanisms involved. This model proposes that in the midst of adversity, some children find role models who teach them to trust others, better regulate their emotions, and focus on their futures. Over a lifetime, these low SES children develop an approach to life that prioritizes shifting oneself (accepting stress for what it is and adapting the self to it) in combination with persisting (enduring life with strength by holding on to meaning and optimism). This combination of shift-and-persist strategies mitigates sympathetic-nervous-system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical responses to the barrage of stressors that low SES individuals confront. This tendency vectors individuals off the trajectory to chronic disease by forestalling pathogenic sequelae of stress reactivity, like insulin resistance, high blood pressure, and systemic inflammation. We outline evidence for the model, and argue that efforts to identify resilience-promoting processes are important in this economic climate, given limited resources for improving the financial circumstances of disadvantaged individuals.

Maslow's pyramid of human needs, proposed in 1943, has been one of the most cognitively contagious ideas in the behavioral sciences. Anticipating later evolutionary views of human motivation and cognition, Maslow viewed human motives as based in innate and universal predispositions. We revisit the idea of a motivational hierarchy in light of theoretical developments at the interface of evolutionary biology, anthropology, and psychology. After considering motives at three different levels of analysis, we argue that the basic foundational structure of the pyramid is worth preserving, but that it should be buttressed with a few architectural extensions. By adding a contemporary design feature, connections between fundamental motives and immediate situational threats and opportunities should be highlighted. By incorporating a classical element, these connections can be strengthened by anchoring the hierarchy of human motives more firmly in the bedrock of modern evolutionary theory. We propose a renovated hierarchy of fundamental motives that serves as both an integrative framework and a generative foundation for future empirical research.

Our everyday surroundings besiege us with information. The battle is for a share of our limited attention and memory, with the brain selecting the winners and discarding the losers. Previous research shows that both bottom-up and top-down factors bias competition in favor of high priority stimuli. We propose that arousal during an event increases this bias both in perception and in long-term memory of the event. Arousal-biased competition theory provides specific predictions about when arousal will enhance and when it will impair memory for events, accounting for some puzzling contradictions in the emotional memory literature.

ABSTRACT Institutional review boards (IRBs) are primarily prevention-focused, avoiding damage to human subjects and averting ethical infractions, thereby protecting participants, researchers, and universities. Yet, the cost of prevention focus is simply avoiding negative outcomes and is enacted through control, risk-aversion, security, detail-orientation, reactivity, anxiety, avoidance, punishment, negative possibilities, and seizing on a single dominant solution. These endanger the research enterprise. An alternative promotion focus is more advantageous as it seeks positive outcomes and thus facilitating research, which is the IRB's second duty. This alternative guides recruiting and training of staff, panel, and researchers; orienting to and reinforcing promotion norms; creating well-known, transparent, responsive, and efficient processes; and understanding the IRB's boundaries. Promotion balances prevention to make IRBs support research and protect subjects.

The results from a large body of family-based research studies indicate that modifying the environment (specifically dimensions of the social environment) through intervention is an effective mechanism for achieving positive outcomes. Parallel to this work is a growing body of evidence from genetically informed studies indicating that social environmental factors are central to enhancing or offsetting genetic influences. Increased precision in the understanding of the role of the social environment in offsetting genetic risk might provide new information about environmental mechanisms that could be applied to prevention science. However, at present, the multifaceted conceptualization of the environment in prevention science is mismatched with the more limited measurement of the environment in many genetically informed studies. A framework for translating quantitative behavioral genetic research to inform the development of preventive interventions is presented in this article. The measurement of environmental indices amenable to modification is discussed within the context of quantitative behavioral genetic studies. In particular, emphasis is placed on the necessary elements that lead to benefits in prevention science, specifically the development of evidence-based interventions. An example from an ongoing prospective adoption study is provided to illustrate the potential of this translational process to inform the selection of preventive intervention targets.

Recent research shows that even preschoolers are skeptical; they frequently reject claims from other people when the claims conflict with their own perceptions and concepts. Yet, despite their skepticism, both children and adults come to believe in a variety of phenomena that defy their first-hand perceptions and intuitive conceptions of the world. In this review, we explore how children and adults acquire such concepts. We describe how a similar developmental process underlies mental representation of both the natural and the supernatural world, and we detail this process for two prominent supernatural counterintuitive ideas-God and the afterlife. In doing so, we highlight the fact that conceptual development does not always move in the direction of greater empirical truth, as described within naturalistic domains. We consider factors that likely help overcome skepticism, and in doing so promote belief in counterintuitive phenomena. These factors include qualities of the learners, aspects of the context, qualities of the informants, and qualities of the information.

Researchers have proposed different accounts of the development of prosocial behavior in children. Some have argued that behaviors like helping and sharing must be learned and reinforced; others propose that children have an initially indiscriminate prosocial drive that declines and becomes more selective with age; and yet others contend that even children's earliest prosocial behaviors share some strategic motivations with the prosociality of adults (e.g., reputation enhancement, social affiliation). We review empirical and observational research on children's helping and sharing behaviors in the first 5 years of life, focusing on factors that have been found to influence these behaviors and on what these findings suggest about children's prosocial motivations. We use the adult prosociality literature to highlight parallels and gaps in the literature on the development of prosocial behavior. We address how the evidence reviewed bears on central questions in the developmental psychology literature and propose that children's prosocial behaviors may be driven by multiple motivations not easily captured by the idea of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation and may be selective quite early in life. © The Author(s) 2015.

How do stressful events and negative emotions influence the immune system, and how big are the effects? This broad question has been intensely interesting to psychoneuroimmunology researchers over the last three decades. Many promising lines of work underscore the reasons why this question is still so important and pivotal to understanding and other advances. New multidisciplinary permutations provide fresh vistas and emphasize the importance of training psychologists more broadly so that they will be central and essential players in the advancement of biomedical science.

Throughout the history of psychology, the path of transforming the physical (muscle movements, verbal behavior, or physiological changes) into the mental has been fraught with difficulty. Over the decades, psychologists have risen to the challenge and learned a few things about how to infer the mental from measuring the physical. The Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and Pashler (2009, this issue) article points out that some of these lessons could be helpful to those of us who measure blood flow in the brain in a quest to understand the mind. Three lessons from psychometrics are discussed.

There is clear evidence that sustained experiences may affect both brain structure and function. Thus, it is quite reasonable to posit that sustained exposure to a set of cultural experiences and behavioral practices will affect neural structure and function. The burgeoning field of cultural psychology has often demonstrated the subtle differences in the way individuals process information-differences that appear to be a product of cultural experiences. We review evidence that the collectivistic and individualistic biases of East Asian and Western cultures, respectively, affect neural structure and function. We conclude that there is limited evidence that cultural experiences affect brain structure and considerably more evidence that neural function is affected by culture, particularly activations in ventral visual cortex-areas associated with perceptual processing.

For almost 5 decades, the scientific study of emotion has been guided by the assumption that categories such as anger, sadness, and fear cut nature at its joints. Barrett (2006a) provided a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from the study of emotion in humans and concluded that this assumption has outlived its usefulness. Panksepp and Izard have written lengthy papers (published in this issue) containing complementary but largely nonoverlapping criticisms of Barrett (2006a). In our response, we address three of their concerns. First, we discuss the value of correlational versus experimental studies for evaluating the natural-kind model of emotion and refute the claim that the evidence offered in Barrett (2006a) was merely correlational. Second, we take up the issue of whether or not there is evidence for "coherently organized neural circuits" for natural kinds of emotions in the mammalian brain and counter the claim that Barrett (2006a) ignored crucial evidence for existence of discrete emotions as natural kinds. Third, we address Panksepp and Izard's misconceptions of an alternative view, the conceptual act model of emotion, that was briefly discussed in Barrett (2006a). Finally, we end the article with some thoughts on how to move the scientific study of emotion beyond the debate over whether or not emotions are natural kinds.

Psychological states such as thoughts and feelings are real. Brain states are real. The problem is that the two are not real in the same way, creating the mind-brain correspondence problem. In this article, I present a possible solution to this problem that involves two suggestions. First, complex psychological states such as emotion and cognition an be thought of as constructed events that can be causally reduced to a set of more basic, psychologically primitive ingredients that are more clearly respected by the brain. Second, complex psychological categories like emotion and cognition are the phenomena that require explanation in psychology, and, therefore, they cannot be abandoned by science. Describing the content and structure of these categories is a necessary and valuable scientific activity.Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world.-Einstein & Infeld (1938, p. 33)The cardinal passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate, hope, and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream (and he goes on to say, feel) are the only facts of a subjective order…-James (1890, p. 195).

Studying how genetic predispositions come together with environmental factors to contribute to complex behavioral outcomes has great potential for advancing our understanding of the development of psychopathology. It represents a clear theoretical advance over studying these factors in isolation. However, research at the intersection of multiple fields creates many challenges. We review several reasons why the rapidly expanding candidate gene-environment interaction (cGxE) literature should be considered with a degree of caution. We discuss lessons learned about candidate gene main effects from the evolving genetics literature and how these inform the study of cGxE. We review the importance of the measurement of the gene and environment of interest in cGxE studies. We discuss statistical concerns with modeling cGxE that are frequently overlooked. And we review other challenges that have likely contributed to the cGxE literature being difficult to interpret, including low power and publication bias. Many of these issues are similar to other concerns about research integrity (e.g., high false positive rates) that have received increasing attention in the social sciences. We provide recommendations for rigorous research practices for cGxE studies that we believe will advance its potential to contribute more robustly to the understanding of complex behavioral phenotypes.

Valid causal inference is central to progress in theoretical and applied psychology. Although the randomized experiment is widely considered the gold standard for determining whether a given exposure increases the likelihood of some specified outcome, experiments are not always feasible and in some cases can result in biased estimates of causal effects. Alternatively, standard observational approaches are limited by the possibility of confounding, reverse causation, and the nonrandom distribution of exposure (i.e., selection). We describe the counterfactual model of causation and apply it to the challenges of causal inference in observational research, with a particular focus on aging. We argue that the study of twin pairs discordant on exposure, and in particular discordant monozygotic twins, provides a useful analog to the idealized counterfactual design. A review of discordant-twin studies in aging reveals that they are consistent with, but do not unambiguously establish, a causal effect of lifestyle factors on important late-life outcomes. Nonetheless, the existing studies are few in number and have clear limitations that have not always been considered in interpreting their results. It is concluded that twin researchers could make greater use of the discordant-twin design as one approach to strengthen causal inferences in observational research.

In this article, we make two points about the ongoing debate concerning the purported increase in narcissistic tendencies in college students over the last 30 years. First, we show that when new data on narcissism are folded into preexisting meta-analytic data, there is no increase in narcissism in college students over the last few decades. Second, we show, in contrast, that age changes in narcissism are both replicable and comparatively large in comparison to generational changes in narcissism. This leads to the conclusion that every generation is Generation Me, as every generation of younger people are more narcissistic than their elders.

The gene-environment interaction effect in the development of conduct disorder is one of the most important discoveries of the past decade, but the mechanisms through which this effect operates remain elusive. I propose a model of these processes that focuses on the individual's response to a threatening stimulus in ongoing social interaction. The individual's response coordinates three interrelated systems: neural, autonomic, and information-processing. In each system, adaptive, evolutionarily selected response patterns characterize normal responding, but in psychopathology these patterns have gone awry. Antecedents of individual differences in these response patterns arise from genetic polymorphisms, adverse environmental experiences early in life, and their interaction. Programs of research are proposed to test hypotheses in the model through longitudinal, experimental, and clinical intervention methods. This model can serve as a template for inquiry in other forms of developmental psychopathology.

Can intuition be taught? The way in which faces are recognized, the structure of natural classes, and the architecture of intuition may all be instances of the same process. The conjecture that intuition is a species of recognition memory implies that human intuitive decision making can be enormously enhanced by virtual simulation.

There is a great deal of interest in the analysis of genotype by environment interactions (GxE). There are some limitations in the typical models for the analysis of GxE, including well-known statistical problems in identifying interactions and unobserved heterogeneity of persons across groups. The impact of a treatment may depend on the level of an unobserved variable, and this variation may dampen the estimated impact of treatment. A case has been made that genetic variation may sometimes account for unobserved, and hence unaccounted for, heterogeneity. The statistical power associated with the GxE design has been studied in many different ways, and most results show that the small effects expected require relatively large or non-representative samples (i.e., extreme groups). In this report, we describe some alternative approaches, such as randomized designs with multiple measures, multiple groups, multiple occasions, and analyses to identify latent (unobserved) classes of people. These are illustrated with data from the HRS/ADAMs study, examining the relations among episodic memory (based on word recall), APOE4 genotype, and educational attainment (as a proxy for an environmental exposure). Randomized clinical trials (RCT) or randomized field trials (RFT) have multiple strengths in the estimation of causal influences, and we discuss how measured genotypes can be incorporated into these designs. Use of these contemporary modeling techniques often requires different kinds of data be collected and encourages the formation of parsimonious models with fewer overall parameters, allowing specific GxE hypotheses to be investigated with a reasonable statistical foundation.

Psychological scientists, like lay people, often think in categorical dichotomies that contrast men and women and exaggerate the differences between groups. These value-laden divides tend to privilege one side over the other, often to the advantage of the scientists' own identity group. Besides balancing perspectives in the academic marketplace of ideas, scientists can recognize the complexity of stigma. Gender, like many categories, entails two fundamental dimensions that characterize intergroup stigma (and all interpersonal perception): perceived warmth and competence. These dimensions identify groups viewed with ambivalence (e.g., traditional women are stereotypically warm but incompetent, whereas professional women are allegedly competent but cold). In gender and in other areas, psychological scientists can go beyond value-laden dichotomies and consider the fundamental, continuous dimensions along which we think about stigma.

Mental disorders are prevalent and lead to significant impairment. Progress toward establishing treatments has been good. However, effect sizes are small to moderate, gains may not persist, and many patients derive no benefit. Our goal is to highlight the potential for empirically-supported psychosocial treatments to be improved by incorporating insights from cognitive psychology and research on education. Our central question is: If it were possible to improve memory for content of sessions of psychosocial treatments, would outcome substantially improve? This question arises from five lines of evidence: (a) mental illness is often characterized by memory impairment, (b) memory impairment is modifiable, (c) psychosocial treatments often involve the activation of emotion, (d) emotion can bias memory and (e) memory for psychosocial treatment sessions is poor. Insights from scientific knowledge on learning and memory are leveraged to derive strategies for a transdiagnostic and transtreatment cognitive support intervention. These strategies can be applied within and between sessions and to interventions delivered via computer, the internet and text message. Additional novel pathways to improving memory include improving sleep, engaging in exercise and imagery. Given that memory processes change across the lifespan, services to children and older adults may benefit from cognitive support.

Over the past quarter century a body of parent training programs has been developed and validated as effective in reducing child behavior problems, but few of these have made their way into routine practice. This article describes the long and winding road of implementation as applied to children's mental health. Adopting Rogers' (1995) diffusion framework and Fixsen and colleagues' implementation framework (Fixsen, Naoom, Blase, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005), we review more than a decade of research on the implementation of Parent Management Training - Oregon Model (PMTO(®)). Data from US and international PMTO implementations are used to illustrate the payoffs and the challenges of making empirically supported interventions routine practice in the community. Technological advances that break down barriers to communication across distances, the availability of efficacious programs suitable for implementation, and the urgent need for high quality mental health care provide strong rationales for prioritizing attention to implementation. Over the next quarter of a century, the challenge is to reduce the prevalence of children's psychopathology by creating science-based delivery systems to reach families in need, everywhere.

The notion of innate ideas has long been the subject of intense debate in the fields of philosophy and cognitive science. Over the past few decades, methodological advances have made it possible for developmental researchers to begin to examine what innate ideas-what innate concepts and principles-might contribute to infants' knowledge acquisition in various core domains. This article focuses on the domain of physical reasoning and on Spelke's (1988, 1994) proposal that principles of continuity and cohesion guide infants' interpretation of physical events. The article reviews recent evidence that these two principles are in fact corollaries of a single and more powerful principle of persistence, which states that objects persist, as they are, in time and space.

How do infants represent objects, actions, and relations in events? In this review, we discuss an approach to studying this question that begins with linguistic theory-specifically, semantic structures in language. On the basis of recent research exploring infant cognition and prominent linguistic analyses, we examine whether infants' representations of motion events are articulated in terms of the components proposed by Talmy (1985; e.g., path, manner) and whether infants' event representations are defined in terms of broad semantic roles (agent, patient, source, goal) as proposed by Jackendoff (1990) and Dowty (1991). We show how recent findings in infant cognition are consistent with the idea that the infant's representation of events is a close reflection of the linguistic categories. We especially highlight research that is explicitly guided by linguistic categories likely to have correlates in nonlinguistic cognition to illustrate the usefulness of using language to pose questions about early conceptual representations.

The primary goal of instruction should be to facilitate long-term learning-that is, to create relatively permanent changes in comprehension, understanding, and skills of the types that will support long-term retention and transfer. During the instruction or training process, however, what we can observe and measure is performance, which is often an unreliable index of whether the relatively long-term changes that constitute learning have taken place. The time-honored distinction between learning and performance dates back decades, spurred by early animal and motor-skills research that revealed that learning can occur even when no discernible changes in performance are observed. More recently, the converse has also been shown-specifically, that improvements in performance can fail to yield significant learning-and, in fact, that certain manipulations can have opposite effects on learning and performance. We review the extant literature in the motor- and verbal-learning domains that necessitates the distinction between learning and performance. In addition, we examine research in metacognition that suggests that people often mistakenly interpret their performance during acquisition as a reliable guide to long-term learning. These and other considerations suggest that the learning-performance distinction is critical and has vast practical and theoretical implications. © The Author(s) 2015.

In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a major theoretical debate in the memory domain regarding the multiple memory systems and processing modes frameworks. The components of processing framework argued for a middle ground: Instead of neatly divided memory systems or processing modes, this framework proposed the existence of numerous processing components that are recruited in different combinations by memory tasks and yield complex patterns of associations and dissociations. Because behavioral evidence was not sufficient to decide among these three frameworks, the debate was largely abandoned. However, functional neuroimaging evidence accumulated during the last two decades resolves the stalemate, because this evidence is more consistent with the components framework than with the other two frameworks. For example, functional neuroimaging evidence shows that brain regions attributed to one memory system can contribute to tasks associated with other memory systems and that brain regions attributed to the same processing mode (perceptual or conceptual) can be dissociated from each other. Functional neuroimaging evidence suggests that memory processes are supported by transient interactions between a few regions called process-specific alliances. These conceptual developments are an example of how functional neuroimaging can contribute to theoretical debates in cognitive psychology.

For centuries, the mathematical aggregation of preferences by groups, organizations, or society itself has received keen interdisciplinary attention. Extensive theoretical work in economics and political science throughout the second half of the 20th century has highlighted the idea that competing notions of rational social choice intrinsically contradict each other. This has led some researchers to consider coherent democratic decision making to be a mathematical impossibility. Recent empirical work in psychology qualifies that view. This nontechnical review sketches a quantitative research paradigm for the behavioral investigation of mathematical social choice rules on real ballots, experimental choices, or attitudinal survey data. The article poses a series of open questions. Some classical work sometimes makes assumptions about voter preferences that are descriptively invalid. Do such technical assumptions lead the theory astray? How can empirical work inform the formulation of meaningful theoretical primitives? Classical "impossibility results" leverage the fact that certain desirable mathematical properties logically cannot hold in all conceivable electorates. Do these properties nonetheless hold true in empirical distributions of preferences? Will future behavioral analyses continue to contradict the expectations of established theory? Under what conditions do competing consensus methods yield identical outcomes and why do they do so? © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

In this article, we provide an overview of what various philosophers throughout the ages have claimed about the nature of happiness, and we discuss to what extent psychological science has been able to substantiate or refute their claims. We first address concerns raised by philosophers regarding the possibility, desirability, and justifiability of happiness and then turn to the perennial question of how to be happy. Integrating insights from great thinkers of the past with empirical findings from modern behavioral sciences, we review the conditions and causes of happiness. We conclude our discussion with some thoughts about the future of happiness studies.

The optimal moment to address the question of how to improve human decision making has arrived. Thanks to 50 years of research by judgment and decision-making scholars, psychologists have developed a detailed picture of the ways in which human judgment is bounded. This article argues that the time has come to focus attention on the search for strategies that will improve bounded judgment because decision-making errors are costly and are growing more costly, decision makers are receptive, and academic insights are sure to follow from research on improvement. In addition to calling for research on improvement strategies, this article organizes the existing literature pertaining to improvement strategies and highlights promising directions for future research. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases. © The Author(s) 2012.

Psychologists too often rely on only one source of evidence to affirm the validity of a construct. However, they usually do not know all the conditions that can produce the evidence they gather. Hence, the inference is often limited to the data gathered and does not generalize to other categories of information. Examples of this habit are presented along with the suggestion that all social scientists should affirm the utility of their concepts with more than one class of information. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily because people in such societies expect their fellow members to contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies? In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18 societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather than low trust. © The Author(s) 2013.

Since Gordon Allport (1954) identified Triplett's (1898) study as the first social psychological experiment in his handbook chapter on the history of social psychology, most social psychology textbooks have been repeating this claim. They typically add that it was also the first study demonstrating social facilitation. According to their descriptions, Triplett (1898) had children reel in fishing lines and he found that their performance improved when this task was performed in the presence of another child rather than alone. None of this is correct. Triplett's study was not the first social psychology study (it was not even the first study on social facilitation), the experimental task was described wrongly, and the evidence for social facilitation was overstated. Because correct information about the historical status of the Triplett study has been available for many decades, this type of misinformation raises questions about whether psychologists attach sufficient importance to the history of their discipline. © Association for Psychological Science 2012.

Social commentators have argued that changes over the last decades have coalesced to create a relatively unique generation of young people. However, using large samples of U.S. high-school seniors from 1976 to 2006 (Total N = 477,380), we found little evidence of meaningful change in egotism, self-enhancement, individualism, self-esteem, locus of control, hopelessness, happiness, life satisfaction, loneliness, antisocial behavior, time spent working or watching television, political activity, the importance of religion, and the importance of social status over the last 30 years. Today's youth are less fearful of social problems than previous generations and they are also more cynical and less trusting. In addition, today's youth have higher educational expectations than previous generations. However, an inspection of effect sizes provided little evidence for strong or widespread cohort-linked changes. © The Author(s) 2010.

Innovations in science can be divided into at least four major types: radical revolutions (such as Copernican and Darwinian theory), technical revolutions (led by scientists such as Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein), controversial innovations (for example, Semmelweis's theory of puerperal fever), and conservative innovations (eugenics and various vitalistic doctrines). Biographical predictors of support for scientific innovations are distinctly different depending on the type of innovation, as are the predictors of who initially engineers such innovations. A meta-analytic approach assessing each new scientific theory according to its salient features (including epistemological, ideological, and technical attributes) is required to make sense out of the varied predisposing factors associated with the origins of these innovations. These predisposing factors are not neatly classifiable in terms of Simonton's (2009, this issue) hierarchical model of domain-specific dispositions, although this model is applicable under some conditions. Instead, the principal sources of scientific achievement are largely a product of person-by-situation interaction effects that are dictated by the nature of the particular innovation. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

Simonton's (2009, this issue) hierarchical model represents a useful contribution to studies of creativity and eminence. Simonton breaks all kinds of new ground by extrapolating the hierarchy to the arts and humanities, interpolating it within disciplines, and relating it to family background and disposition. This commentary poses a few questions about the hierarchical model and proposes an alternative. I also introduce a candidate for a simple theory of creativity that focuses on a universally shared capacity. This simple theory complements Simonton's hierarchical view, though his applies best to actual performance and the simple theory of creativity applies to creative potential. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

One key assumption of the psychology of science is that psychological factors make certain interests, talents, and abilities more likely and others less likely (Feist, 2006). The line of argument that Simonton (2009, this issue) puts forth-integrating and uniting the meta-literatures on dispositional and developmental influences on scientific and artistic creativity-is not only consistent with this assumption from the psychology of science, but it is also a breeding ground for a host of testable hypotheses and calls for future empirical investigations. Given Simonton's own extraordinary levels of scientific creativity, indeed it would be interesting to turn his ideas back on him to see how his science is a product of his own developmental and dispositional experiences. We'll leave that, however, for future biographers and psychologists of science. © 2009 Association for Psychological Science.

Norton and Ariely's (2011, this issue) finding that people prefer relatively equal distributions of wealth begs for further research. It is one thing to argue, as T. Frank (2004) has, that people vote against their interests. But Norton and Ariely seem to show that people vote against their preferences. What does that even mean, and how does it happen? © The Author(s) 2011.

We argue that seemingly deep-seated partisan divisions may be built on a foundation of surprising consensus, not only in terms of the wealth distributions that people prefer (Norton & Ariely, 2011, this issue), but also in the gut-level moral reactions and beliefs about money and happiness that may underlie those preferences. © The Author(s) 2011.

Norton and Sommers (2011, this issue) find that Whites see discrimination as a zero-sum game that they are now losing. This psychological finding has serious implications for antidiscrimination law. This commentary briefly traces the relevant, recent history of antidiscrimination law and explains the consequences of the zero-sum finding in three related areas: affirmative action, disparate treatment, and disparate impact. In all three areas, the zero-sum finding-and the presumption of intentional discrimination against Whites that it indicates-upsets the structure of antidiscrimination law traditionally designed to remedy discrimination against historically disadvantaged racial minorities. Moreover, the zero-sum finding suggests that recent ballot initiatives banning affirmative action and recent, pivotal Supreme Court opinions limiting antidiscrimination laws that were originally erected to prevent the exclusion of racial minorities are not just the product of voters in a handful of states, of a few disgruntled White employees or university applicants, or of a few justices, but rather are reflective of a more widespread societal sentiment. © The Author(s) 2011.

Despite the suggestiveness of their empirical findings, I argue that the implications of Norton and Ariely's work are unclear, both morally and politically. © The Author(s) 2011.

Clinical psychology as a profession owes much to the recognition of the psychosocial needs of servicemen and women returning from World War II and the Korean conflict. The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent another opportunity for substantial advancements in assessment and treatment practices. Stimulated by the prescient article by Kazdin and Blase (2011), we briefly describe innovations in evidence-based practices currently being implemented in the Veterans Health Administration to best serve the more than 2 million returning servicemen and women. The largest healthcare system in the nation, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs began a wide range of innovations early this century to include dissemination of evidence-based mental health treatments, the use of anonymous Internet-based interventions to reach large numbers of military personnel who may not otherwise present for mental health service, the use of videoconferencing to deliver assessment and treatment to individuals residing in remote locations, and the use of laypersons (e.g., peers) for treatment delivery. In addition to describing the strengths of these efforts to reduce mental health burden, we also discuss persisting barriers and limitations of these innovative efforts within this system of healthcare. © Association for Psychological Science 2011.

Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011, this issue) propose a useful model for thinking about transdiagnostic processes involved in mental disorders. Here, we argue that their model is naturally compatible with a network account of mental disorders, in which disorders are viewed as sets of mutually reinforcing symptoms. We show that network models are typically transdiagnostic in nature, because different disorders often share symptoms. We illustrate this by constructing a network for generalized anxiety and major depression. In addition, we show that even a simple network structure naturally accounts for the phenomena of multifinality and divergent trajectories that Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins identify as crucial in thinking about transdiagnostic phenomena. © Association for Psychological Science 2011.