Competing predictions about the effect of social exclusion were tested by meta-analyzing findings from studies of interpersonal rejection, ostracism, and similar procedures. Rejection appears to cause a significant shift toward a more negative emotional state. Typically, however, the result was an emotionally neutral state marked by low levels of both positive and negative affect. Acceptance caused a slight increase in positive mood and a moderate increase in self-esteem. Self-esteem among rejected persons was no different from neutral controls. These findings are discussed in terms of belongingness motivation, sociometer theory, affective numbing, and self-esteem defenses.
Two meta-analyses found that young Americans increasingly believe their lives are controlled by outside forces rather than their own efforts. Locus of control scores became substantially more external (about.80 standard deviations) in college student and child samples between 1960 and 2002. The average college student in 2002 had a more external locus of control than 80% of college students in the early 1960s. Birth cohort/time period explains 14% of the variance in locus of control scores. The data included 97 samples of college students (n = 18,310) and 41 samples of children ages 9 to 14 (n = 6,554) gathered from dissertation research. The results are consistent with an alienation model positing increases in cynicism, individualism, and the self-serving bias. The implications are almost uniformly negative, as externality is correlated with poor school achievement, helplessness, ineffective stress management, decreased self-control, and depression.
In a recent article, Harris (2003) concluded that the data do not support the existence of evolved sex differences in jealousy. Harris' review correctly identifies fatal flaws in three lines of evidence (spousal abuse, homicide, morbid jealousy), but her criticism of two other lines of evidence (self-report responses, psychophysiological measures) is based, in part, on a mischaracterization of the evolutionary psychological theory and a misunderstanding of the empirical implications of the theory. When interpreted according to the correct criterion (i.e., an interaction between sex and infidelity type), self-report studies (both forced-choice and non-forced choice) offer strong support for the existence of sex differences in jealousy. Psychophysiological data also offer some support, although these data are weakened by validity-related concerns. In addition, some refutational evidence cited by Harris (responses to real infidelity, responses under cognitive load) actually does not refute the theory. An integrative model that describes how jealousy might result from the interaction of sociocultural variables and evolved sex differences and suggestions for future research directions are discussed.
This article seeks to combine the social psychologist's interest in articulating and testing concepts with the public policymaker's interest in the effective implementation of specific policies and programs. The first part of the article applies knowledge about distributive and procedural justice to understanding some of the opposition to affirmative action. The application also reveals some lacunae-specifically concerning rule change-in how social psychologists have looked at procedural justice issues. In the second part of the article, we discuss the problem of rule change and propose a set of conceptualizations about the conditions that govern people's reactions to rule change. We end by reflecting on some changes in our studies of procedural justice.
Abstraction and generalization constitute important aims of science (Kruglanski, 2001, in press), yet broad theorizing is rather rare in social and personality psychology. Some reasons for this state of affairs are examined, including the considerable staying power of insufficiently abstract theories and the broad resistance that abstract theories can incite. The trials and tribulations of abstract theorizing are considered, drawing on my own work on lay epistemics. Its problems and pitfalls notwithstanding, abstract theorizing is what our field needs more of if progress is to take place and social and personality psychology is to obtain the voice it merits in the general cultural dialogue about societal issues. To encourage such theorizing, 3 principles are offered, including the commonality focus (the horizontal voyage), the data focus (the vertical voyage), and the restructuration focus (the upstream voyage) principles.
In this article I argue for the benefits of an abstract functional analysis in theory construction, suggesting that an understanding of the nature of situations of interdependence will provide theoretical insights into basic processes in interpersonal relations. That is, mechanisms and basic processes such as social cognition are best understood by describing their functional relation to the social problems with which they were designed to cope, rather than studying them in their own right in isolation from the purpose they serve. I discuss the tenets of ecological psychology, the scientific philosophy underpinning this way of thought. I then link this approach to the development of my own theoretical ideas on trust in close relationships, providing a description of how a functional analysis rooted in the assumptions of interdependence theory shaped the questions I posed and the answers to which I was drawn.
The construction and development of theory is one of the central routes to scientific progress. But what exactly constitutes a good theory? What is it that people might expect from an ideal theory? This article advances a new model, which delineates truth, abstraction, progress, and applicability as standards (TAPAS) for a good theory. After providing the rationale for TAPAS, this article evaluates several social-psychological theories in terms of TAPAS, especially classic theories, and illustrates its utility with some more recent theoretical contributions of social psychology. This article concludes by outlining recommendations for effective theory construction and development, such as the utility of meta-analytic approaches for pursuing truth, the utility of theory-oriented courses and journals for pursuing abstraction, and the utility of adversarial collaboration for pursuing progress, and reaching out to major personal or societal issues for pursuing applicability.
The present review seeks to bridge research on accents, stigma, and communication by examining the empirical literature on nonnative accents, considering the perspectives of both speakers and listeners. The authors suggest that an accent, or one's manner of pronunciation, differs from other types of stigma. They consider the role of communicative processes in the manner in which accents influence people and identify social and contextual factors related to accents that affect the speaker, the listener, and the interaction between them. The authors propose a framework of stigma of accents and possible future avenues of research to examine the social psychological and communicative effects of accents. They also discuss implications for stigma of other types of accents (e.g., other native, regional, and ethnic). Understanding how stigma of accents and communication affect each other provides a new theoretical approach to studying this type of stigma and can eventually lead to interventions.
Three questions drawn from parental acceptance-rejection theory were addressed: (a) Are children's perceptions of parental acceptance transnationally associated with specific personality dispositions? (b) Are adults' remembrances of parental acceptance in childhood transnationally associated with these personality dispositions? and (c) Do relations between parental acceptance and offspring's personality dispositions vary by gender of parents? All studies used the child and adult versions of the Parental Acceptance-Rejection Questionnaires (PARQ) for Mothers and for Fathers, as well as the child and adult versions of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire (PAQ). Results showed that both maternal and paternal acceptance in childhood correlated significantly in all countries with all seven personality dispositions of adult offspring. Adults' remembrance of paternal acceptance in childhood correlated significantly with all adult personality dispositions except dependence.
Recall tasks render 2 distinct sources of information available: the recalled content and the experienced ease or difficulty with which it can be brought to mind. Because retrieving many pieces of information is more difficult than retrieving only a few, reliance on accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences leads to opposite judgmental outcomes. People are likely to base judgments on accessibility experiences when they adopt a heuristic processing strategy and the informational value of the experience is not called into question. When the experience is considered nondiagnostic, or when a systematic processing strategy is adopted, people rely on accessible content. Implications for the operation of the availability heuristic and the emergence of knowledge accessibility effects are discussed.
An accessible identity model (AIM) of justice reasoning is introduced to explain when people become concerned about justice and how they define what is fair or unfair once justice concerns are activated. This model has two core propositions: (a) People are most likely to think about justice and fairness when self-relevant values and goals are highly accessible or activated, and (b) how people define fairness depends on which aspect of the self (i.e., material, social, or personal and moral) dominates the working self-concept. A review of the literature indicates that this general model provides an integrative account for when and how people become concerned about both procedural and distributive justice, and provides a cogent explanation for known effects and results previously thought to be anomalies. Finally, the model generates novel hypotheses about how identity threat may lead to motivated perceptions of fairness or unfairness.
This article offers a new approach to Asch's (1956) influential studies relating physical and social perception. Drawing on research on values, conversational pragmatics, cross-cultural comparisons, and negotiation, the authors challenge the normative assumptions that have led psychologists to interpret the studies in terms of conformity. A values-pragmatics account is offered that suggests that participants attempt to realize multiple values (e.g., truth, social solidarity) in an inherently frustrating situation by tacitly varying patterns of dissent and agreement to communicate larger scale truths and cooperative intentions. Alternative theories (e.g., embarrassment, attribution) are compared and empirical implications of the values-pragmatics account are evaluated. The possibility of multiple strategies promoting group survival and the proper role of moral evaluation in social psychological research are considered.
Biologists call highly cooperative and socially integrated animal groups like beehives and ant colonies "superorganisms." In such species, the colony acts like an organism despite each animal's physical individuality. This article frames human sociality through the superorganisms metaphor by systematically reviewing the superorganismic features of human psychology. These features include (1) mechanisms to integrate individual units, (2) mechanisms to achieve unity of action, (3) low levels of heritable within-group variation, (4) a common fate, and (5) mechanisms to resolve conflicts of interest in the collective's favor. It is concluded that human beings have a capacity to partly and flexibly display each of these superorganismic properties. Group identification is a key mechanism that activates human superorganismic properties, and threats to the group a key activating condition. This metaphor organizes diverse aspects of human psychology (e.g., normative conformity, social identity processes, religion, and the "rally around the flag" reflex) into a coherent framework.
In this article, the authors review research showing the different roles that the self-concept can play in affecting prime-to-behavior effects. As an organizing framework, an Active-Self account of stereotype, trait, and exemplar prime-to-behavior effects is presented. According to this view, such primes can influence people's behavior by creating changes in the active self-concept, either by invoking a biased subset of chronic self-content or by introducing new material into the active self-concept. The authors show how involvement of the active self-concept can increase, decrease, or reverse the effects of primes and describe how individual differences in responsiveness of the self to change and usage of the self in guiding behavior (e.g., self-monitoring) can moderate prime-to-behavior effects. The Active-Self account is proposed as an integrative framework that explains how the self is involved in prime-to-behavior effects and helps predict how changes in the self determine which motivational and behavioral representations will guide behavior.
Self-regulation failure is often explained as being overwhelmed by impulse. The present article proposes a novel pathway, presenting a theoretical framework and empirical review of a justification-based account of self-regulation failure. With justification we refer to making excuses for one's discrepant behavior, so that when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, people resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifications that allow violations of the goal they endorse. Accordingly, rather than inhibiting motivations from the impulsive system, the reflective system can also facilitate them, leading to self-regulation failure. We bring together empirical evidence from various domains demonstrating that justifications can instigate self-regulation failure and rule out alternative accounts. Having established that justification processes contribute to self-regulation failure, we then propose several mechanisms that may fuel the effect. Finally, routes for future research and the conceptual and practical implications of these novel insights for self-regulation are discussed.
The authors characterize religions as social groups and religiosity as the extent to which a person identifies with a religion, subscribes to its ideology or worldview, and conforms to its normative practices. They argue that religions have attributes that make them well suited to reduce feelings of self-uncertainty. According to uncertainty-identity theory, people are motivated to reduce feelings of uncertainty about or reflecting on self; and identification with groups, particularly highly entitative groups, is a very effective way to reduce uncertainty. All groups provide belief systems and normative prescriptions related to everyday life. However, religions also address the nature of existence, invoking sacred entities and associated rituals and ceremonies. They are entitative groups that provide a moral compass and rules for living that pervade a person's life, making them particularly attractive in times of uncertainty. The authors document data supporting their analysis and discuss conditions that transform religiosity into religious zealotry and extremism.
Analysts of evil and violence express the concern that to explain harmdoing may result in a condoning attitude toward perpetrators. An examination of research relevant to this hypothesis suggests that there are a variety of cognitive and affective processes that may produce a relatively condoning attitude toward perpetrators as a result of explaining their actions. Evidence from 3 exploratory studies supported the exonerating effects of explanations. Participants generating explicit explanations of harmdoing displayed a more condoning attitude toward pelpetrators than did those forming impressions of perpetrators without first explaining the acts. Participants reading social-psychological explanations of harmdoing also judged the researcher to be more condoning of perpetrators than those reading dispositional explanations of the same behavior. Implications of these findings are discussed.
A meta-analysis was conducted of research on the relation between judges' accuracy at detecting deception and their confidence in their judgments. A total of 18 independent samples revealed an average weighted accuracy-confidence correlation of .04, a relation not significantly different from zero. However, confidence was positively correlated with judges' tendency to perceive messages as truthful, regardless of the actual truthfulness of the messages. Judges were also more confident when they really were rating truths compared to when they were rating lies. Also, men were more confident than women, and judges who had a closer relationship to the message sender felt more confident in their judgments of truths and lies. Methodological and theoretical explanations for these findings are discussed.
We analyze the accuracy of deception judgments, synthesizing research results from 206 documents and 24,483 judges. In relevant studies, people attempt to discriminate lies from truths in real time with no special aids or training. In these circumstances, people achieve an average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive and 61% of truths as nondeceptive. Relative to cross-judge differences in accuracy, mean lie-truth discrimination abilities are nontrivial, with a mean accuracy d of roughly .40. This produces an effect that is at roughly the 60th percentile in size, relative to others that have been meta-analyzed by social psychologists. Alternative indexes of lie-truth discrimination accuracy correlate highly with percentage correct, and rates of lie detection vary little from study to study. Our meta-analyses reveal that people are more accurate in judging audible than visible lies, that people appear deceptive when motivated to be believed, and that individuals regard their interaction partners as honest. We propose that people judge others' deceptions more harshly than their own and that this double standard in evaluating deceit can explain much of the accumulated literature.
Intimates typically are positively biased in their relationship evaluations. Given this fact, how can intimates regulate their esteem needs about their relationships and still function effectively, without risking later regret and disappointment? We address this issue by first reviewing work showing that because bias and accuracy are independent, they can co-exist. We next show how bias and accuracy are subject to different evaluative motives, relationship evaluations, and situations. It is argued that the pursuit of important goals is a time when people are motivated to feel good about their relationships. This is a time when relationship judgments are positively biased and relatively inaccurate. However, important choice points in the relationship are times when people are motivated to both accurately understand their relationships and to feel good about their relationships. These dual needs can be simultaneously met by becoming more accurate in epistemic-related relationship judgments while being more positively biased in esteem-related relationship judgments.
Since the 1940s, social psychologists have conducted research testing whether it is possible to accurately identify members of perceptually ambiguous groups. This study quantitatively reviews the research on the perception of ambiguous groups to better understand the human capacity to accurately identify others based on very subtle nonverbal cues. Standard random-effects meta-analytic techniques were used to examine the distinctions between different target groups in terms of their identifiability, as well as to compare rates of accuracy across perceptual modalities (e.g., photographs, audio, video) and other study design differences. Overall, the accuracy of identifying targets was significantly better than chance guessing (i.e., 64.5%). Furthermore, stimulus modality was found to be a moderator of accuracy. Other moderators (e.g., time of exposure, analytic approach) were identified and examined. These data help to document and characterize broad trends in the proliferating and expanding study of the perception and categorization of ambiguous social groups.
We review research on accurate social perception at zero acquaintance and apply a Gibsonian ecological approach to redress several shortcomings. We argue that recent use of Brunswik's lens model to determine what physical qualities accurately communicate psychological traits has limited utility because it fails to consider the structured information provided by configural physical qualities that is central to Gibson's (1979) theory. We elaborate a developmental model of relationships between physical and psychological qualities that highlights research needed to identify configural physical qualities that may inform accurate perceptions. This model and tenets of the ecological theory yield several hypotheses regarding such qualities. Finally, we advocate the value of studying perceived affordances (opportunities for acting, interacting, or being acted upon) because this will focus attention on the neglected issue of contextual influences on social perception accuracy, and because affordances may be perceived more accurately than global personality traits.
This article presents a review and conceptual analysis of the concept of deservingness that incorporates the effects of personal values, perceived responsibility, ingroup-outgroup relations, and like-dislike relations. Selected studies show that reactions to another's success or failure and to the rise or fall of "tall poppies" or high achievers depends on the degree to which the positive or negative outcome is seen to be deserved; that individual differences in personal values and in value syndromes may be assumed to affect deservingness via the subjective values assigned to actions and outcomes; that group membership, status, interpersonal liking-disliking, and perceived moral character also affect judgments of deservingness; and that deservingness is a key variable that mediates how observers react to penalties imposed on the perpetrators of different kinds of offense. It is argued that the inclusion of deservingness goes beyond approaches in which perceived responsibility is accorded central status by adding a further link in the causal chain, thus enabling a more complete consideration of the effects of justice and value variables on how people react to positive and negative outcomes for both self and other.
This article presents a meta-analysis of the experimental literature that has examined the effect of performance and mastery achievement goals on intrinsic motivation. Summary analyses provided support for the hypothesis that the pursuit of performance goals has an undermining effect on intrinsic motivation relative to the pursuit of mastery goals. Moderator analyses were conducted in an attempt to explain significant variation in the magnitude and direction of this effect across studies. Results indicated that the undermining effect of performance goals relative to mastery goals was contingent on whether participants received confirming or nonconfirming competence feedback, and on whether the experimental procedures induced a performance-approach or performance-avoidance orientation. These findings provide conceptual clarity to the literature on achievement goals and intrinsic motivation and suggest numerous avenues for subsequent empirical work.
This article presents a history of the study of motivation from approximately 1900-1975, focusing on achievement strivings and containing little-known and often surprising facts about the main contributors to this field. Four theorists are highlighted: David McClelland, Kurt Lewin, John Atkinson, and Fritz Heider, each associated with a different theoretical approach (respectively and in order of historical emergence: trait, Gestalt, expectancy/value, and attribution theory). A fifth conception, drive theory, is also represented. In addition, a number of individuals who influenced these theorists and others who followed them are discussed. The article emphasizes the interrelations between the theorists and the interaction between personal and scientific life.
Distrust and suspicion are common and recurring problems at all levels of social organization, ranging from the interpersonal to the collective. Unfortunately, our understanding of the origins and dynamics of such distrust and suspicion remains far from complete. A primary aim of this research, accordingly, was to articulate a new framework for conceptualizing a form of exaggerated distrust and suspicion termed paranoid social cognition. Drawing on recent psychological theory and research, this framework identifies the social cognitive underpinnings of paranoid cognitions. It also specifies some of the situational determinants of such cognition and elaborates on the psychological, behavioral, and social dynamics that sustain them.
Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between "emotional" and "rational/cognitive" processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain.
This article explores the synergies between recent developments in the social identity of helping, and advantaged groups' prosocial emotion. The authors review the literature on the potential of guilt, sympathy, and outrage to transform advantaged groups' apathy into positive action. They place this research into a novel framework by exploring the ways these emotions shape group processes to produce action strategies that emphasize either social cohesion or social change. These prosocial emotions have a critical but underrecognized role in creating contexts of in-group inclusion or exclusion, shaping normative content and meaning, and informing group interests. Furthermore, these distinctions provide a useful way of differentiating commonly discussed emotions. The authors conclude that the most "effective" emotion will depend on the context of the inequality but that outrage seems particularly likely to productively shape group processes and social change outcomes.
In this article the authors explore the social psychological processes underpinning sustainable commitment to a social or political cause. Drawing on recent developments in the collective action, identity formation, and social norm literatures, they advance a new model to understand sustainable commitment to action. The normative alignment model suggests that one solution to promoting ongoing commitment to collective action lies in crafting a social identity with a relevant pattern of norms for emotion, efficacy, and action. Rather than viewing group emotion, collective efficacy, and action as group products, the authors conceptualize norms about these as contributing to a dynamic system of meaning, which can shape ongoing commitment to a cause. By exploring emotion, efficacy, and action as group norms, it allows scholars to reenergize the theoretical connections between collective identification and subjective meaning but also allows for a fresh perspective on complex questions of causality.
When people furnish their goal intentions ("I intend to attain the goal x!") with implementation intentions ("I will initiate the goal-directed response y when situation z arises!"), the initiation of goal-directed responses becomes automatized. As this type of automaticity stems from a single act of will, it is referred to as strategic automaticity. We report various studies demonstrating that strategic automaticity leads to immediate and efficient responding, which does not need a conscious intent. In addition, the situational cues specified in implementation intentions seem to be easily detected and readily attended to. Further research indicates that the strategic automaticity induced by implementation intentions also helps resist temptations and fight bad habits. Following Nelson's (1996; Nelson & Narens, 1994) model of metacognition, we suggest that goal intentions and, in particular, implementation intentions are important components of the metacognitive control of action geared toward its initiation, continuation, and termination.
For obvious ethical reasons, experimental studies of severe harm-doing actions are precluded. What methods are available to experimental social psychologists for the study of harm- and evil-doing activities? Three are suggested: experiments that may have a component of role-playing but still can illuminate nodes in the socialization into harm-doing process, probes into the conceptual world of individuals who are enlisted into real-world harm-doing socialization processes, and secondary analyses of case studies written by those who have been caught up in harm doing. The methodological limits of each activity are examined, and it is argued that an approach in which combinations of methods are employed to arrive at theoretical constructions can both support generalizations that provide insights into the socialization process and be sufficiently rigorous to support prudent social action recommendations.
Countless studies have recently purported to demonstrate effects of goal priming; however, it is difficult to muster unambiguous support for the claims of these studies because of the lack of clear criteria for determining whether goals, as opposed to alternative varieties of mental representations, have indeed been activated. Therefore, the authors offer theoretical guidelines that may help distinguish between semantic, procedural, and goal priming. Seven principles that are hallmarks of self-regulatory processes are proposed: Goal-priming effects (a) involve value, (b) involve postattainment decrements in motivation, (c) involve gradients as a function of distance to the goal, (d) are proportional to the product of expectancy and value, (e) involve inhibition of conflicting goals, (f) involve self-control, and (g) are moderated by equifinality and multifinality. How these principles might help distinguish between automatic activation of goals and priming effects that do not involve goals is discussed.
This work describes an application of the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM) that allows researchers to test hypotheses in terms of interdependence theory (IT). The authors' goal is to move beyond the obvious similarities of these two frameworks by providing a detailed conceptual integration. This analysis demonstrates that aspects of APIM analysis reveal a useful perspective on interdependence not explicitly articulated by IT. They also expand on ideas presented by Kenny and Ledermann by exploring the relationship between their ratio parameter k and IT, and introducing two additional ratios (h and c) also suggested by IT. A complete worked example of APIM analysis from the perspective of IT, along with a SAS MACRO that produces confidence intervals for k, h, and c, is provided.
Although person perception is central to virtually all human social behavior, it is ordinarily studied in isolated individual perceivers. Conceptualizing it as a socially distributed process opens up a variety of novel issues, which have been addressed in scattered literatures mostly outside of social psychology. This article examines some of these issues using a series of multiagent models. Perceivers can use gossip (information from others about social targets) to improve their ability to detect targets who perform rare negative behaviors. The model suggests that they can simultaneously protect themselves against being influenced by malicious gossip intended to defame specific targets. They can balance these potentially conflicting goals by using specific strategies including disregarding gossip that differs from a personally obtained impression. Multiagent modeling demonstrates the outcomes produced by different combinations of assumptions about gossip, and suggests directions for further research and theoretical development.
Individual differences in religiousness can be partly explained as a cultural adaptation of two basic personality traits, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. This argument is supported by a meta-analysis of 71 samples (N = 21,715) from 19 countries and a review of the literature on personality and religion. Beyond variations in effect magnitude as a function of moderators, the main personality characteristics of religiousness (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) are consistent across different religious dimensions, contexts (gender, age, cohort, and country), and personality measures, models, and levels, and they seem to predict religiousness rather than be influenced by it. The copresence of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness sheds light on other explanations of religiousness, its distinctiveness from related constructs, its implications for other domains, and its adaptive functions.
Although norms can potentially serve useful constructs to understand human minds, being fundamentally social in evolutionary as well as cultural senses, there are as yet no useful psychological theories of adaptive norm development. This article provides an illustrative model about how a norm emerges in a society. We focus on the "communal-sharing norm" in primordial societies, a norm designating uncertain resources as common properties to be shared with other members. Based on anthropological findings, we develop a theory about how the communal-sharing norm emerges and is maintained. Then, using evolutionary computer simulations, we test several hypotheses about the conditions under which the norm will dominate social resource sharing. We further test behavioral implications of the norm, demonstrating that uncertainty involved in resource acquisition is a key factor that triggers the psychology of sharing even in highly industrialized societies. Finally, we discuss the importance of norm construct for analyzing the dynamic relation between minds and society.
In this article, existing theories of social anxiety are integrated within the framework of attachment theory, in particular, by means of the causal mechanism of internal working models of self and others. These models guide beliefs and expectations about social relationships and, thereby, contribute to social anxiety. They also contain procedural knowledge about the skills needed to initiate and maintain social relationships. A reconceptualization of social skill as the ability to regulate others' emotions and, thereby, their behavior is presented. It is suggested that deficits (real or imagined) in the ability to affect others' emotional states, and, thereby, achieve interpersonal goals, contribute to social anxiety. The integrated model is evaluated by a number of theory-goodness criteria, and directions for future research are discussed.
Connectionist modeling experiments tested anomalous-face and baby-face overgeneralization hypotheses proposed to explain consensual trait impressions of faces. Activation of a neural network unit trained to respond to anomalous faces predicted impressions of normal adult faces varying in attractiveness as well as several elderly stereotypes. Activation of a neural network unit trained to respond to babies' faces predicted impressions of adults varying in babyfaceness as well as 1 elderly stereotype. Thus, similarities of normal adult faces to anomalous faces or babies' faces contribute to impressions of them quite apart from knowledge of overlapping social stereotypes. The evolutionary importance of appropriate responses to unfit individuals or babies is presumed to produce a strong response preparedness that is overgeneralized to faces resembling the unfit or babies.
Interpersonal dynamics of self-esteem are explored. The author proposes that the desire to be seen as having positive qualities and avoid being seen as having dreaded qualities paradoxically leads to lowered self-esteem and lowered regard from others through its adverse effects on interpersonal relationships. The author also argues that the human capacity to transcend concerns with the images others hold of oneself, through caring about the well-being of other people, paradoxically leads to higher self-esteem and regard from others through its salutary effects on relationships. Data from two recent studies demonstrate these paradoxical effects and prompt questions about the nature of persons and situations, research methods, and the union between personality and social psychology. Accordingly, the author reflects more broadly on how people create their social situations, which in turn create the self, and what that means about the methods scholars use to understand social behavior.
The current article examines changes over time in a commonly used measure of adult attachment style. A cross-temporal meta-analysis was conducted on 94 samples of American college students (total N = 25,243, between 1988 and 2011) who chose the most representative description of four possible attachment styles (Secure, Dismissing, Preoccupied, and Fearful) on the Relationship Questionnaire. The percentage of students with Secure attachment styles has decreased in recent years (1988: 48.98%; 2011: 41.62%), whereas the percentage of students with Insecure attachment styles (sum of Dismissing, Preoccupied, Fearful) has increased in recent years (1988: 51.02%; 2011: 58.38%). The percentage of students with Dismissing attachment styles has increased over time (1988: 11.93%; 2011: 18.62%), even after controlling for age, gender, race, and publication status. Positive views of others have declined across the same time period. We discuss possible implications and explanations for these changes.
An integrative framework is proposed for understanding how multiple biological and psychological systems are regulated in the context of adult attachment relationships, dysregulated by separation and loss experiences, and, potentially, re-regulated through individual recovery efforts. Evidence is reviewed for a coregulatory model of normative attachment, defined as a pattern of interwoven physiology between romantic partners that results from the conditioning of biological reward systems and the emergence of felt security within adult pair bonds. The loss of coregulation can portend a state of biobehavioral dysregulation, ranging from diffuse psychophysiological arousal and disorganization to a full-blown (and highly organized) stress response. The major task for successful recovery is adopting a self-regulatory strategy that attenuates the dysregulating effects of the attachment disruption. Research evidence is reviewed across multiple levels of analysis, and the article concludes with a series of testable research questions on the interconnected nature of attachment, loss, and recovery processes.
Although research has examined associations between attachment dimensions and relationship outcomes, theory has ignored how these associations change over time in adult romantic relationships. We proposed the Temporal Adult Romantic Attachment (TARA) model, which predicts that the negative associations between anxious and avoidant attachment on one hand and relationship satisfaction and commitment on the other will be more negative as relationship durations increase. Meta-analyses largely confirmed that negative associations between both insecure attachment dimensions and both relationship outcomes were more negative among longer relationship durations in cross-sectional samples. We also explored gender differences in these associations. The present review not only integrates the literature on adult attachment and romantic relationship satisfaction/commitment but also highlights the importance of relationship duration as a key moderator of the associations among these variables. We discuss the broad implications of these effects and our meta-analytic findings for the TARA model, attachment theory, and romantic relationships.
Three separate sets of meta-analyses were conducted of studies testing for gender differences in adults' talkativeness, affiliative speech, and assertive speech. Across independent samples, statistically significant but negligible average effects sizes were obtained with all three language constructs: Contrary to the prediction, men were more talkative (d = -.14) than were women. As expected, men used more assertive speech (d = .09), whereas women used more affiliative speech (d = .12). In addition, 17 moderator variables were tested that included aspects of the interactive context (e.g., familiarity, gender composition, activity), measurement qualities (e.g., operational definition, observation length), and publication characteristics (e.g., author gender, publication source). Depending on particular moderators, more meaningful effect sizes (d > .2) occurred for each language construct. In addition, the direction of some gender differences was significantly reversed under particular conditions. The results are interpreted in relation to social-constructionist, socialization, and biological interpretations of gender-related variations in social behavior.
The authors argue that a new six-dimensional framework for personality structure--the HEXACO model--constitutes a viable alternative to the well-known Big Five or five-factor model. The new model is consistent with the cross-culturally replicated finding of a common six-dimensional structure containing the factors Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), eExtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to Experience (O). Also, the HEXACO model predicts several personality phenomena that are not explained within the B5/FFM, including the relations of personality factors with theoretical biologists' constructs of reciprocal and kin altruism and the patterns of sex differences in personality traits. In addition, the HEXACO model accommodates several personality variables that are poorly assimilated within the B5/FFM.
We propose that aesthetic pleasure is a function of the perceiver's processing dynamics: The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aesthetic response. We review variables known to influence aesthetic judgments, such as figural goodness, figure-ground contrast, stimulus repetition, symmetry, and prototypicality, and trace their effects to changes in processing fluency. Other variables that influence processing fluency, like visual or semantic priming, similarly increase judgments of aesthetic pleasure. Our proposal provides an integrative framework for the study of aesthetic pleasure and sheds light on the interplay between early preferences versus cultural influences on taste, preferences for both prototypical and abstracted forms, and the relation between beauty and truth. In contrast to theories that trace aesthetic pleasure to objective stimulus features per se, we propose that beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of the perceiver, which are in part a function of stimulus properties.
Recent U.S. history provides vivid illustrations of the importance of politicians' emotional displays in subsequent judgments of them. Yet, a review of empirical research on the role of affect (emotion, mood, and evaluation) in electoral politics reveals little work that has focused on the impact of candidates' emotional expression on voters' preferences for them. A theoretical framework is proposed to identify psychological mechanisms by which a target's displays of emotion influence judgments of that target. Findings from the emerging literature on emotions and politics challenge the traditional assumption of political science that voters make decisions based solely on the cold consideration of nonaffectively charged information. The affect and politics literature, although somewhat unfocused and broad, represents an interdisciplinary domain of study that contributes to the understanding of both electoral politics and social interaction more generally.
In this article, we review 4 classes of models of socially shared cognition and behavior: supraindividual models, information-processing models, communication models, and social interaction models. Our review draws on research and theory in social psychology, sociology, and organization behavior. We conclude that these innovative perspectives on socially shared behavior represent a new approach to the study of groups and are distinct from traditional models of the group mind and crowd behavior. The key processes implicated in these models focus on the potency of immediate interaction, reciprocal influence processes between individuals and groups, goal-directed behavior, negotiated processing of information and ideas, and the maintenance and enhancement of social identity. This approach to socially shared understanding is not antagonistic toward the analysis of individual-level processes but rather maintains that individual-level processes are necessary but not sufficient to build a social psychology of shared understanding.
Although people have been shown to rely on feelings to make judgments, the conditions that moderate this reliance have not been systematically reviewed and conceptually integrated. This article addresses this gap by jointly reviewing moderators of the reliance on both subtle affective feelings and cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval. The review revealed that moderators of the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings are remarkably similar and can be grouped into five major categories: (a) the salience of the feelings, (b) the representativeness of the feelings for the target, (c) the relevance of the feelings to the judgment, (d) the evaluative malleability of the judgment, and (e) the level of processing intensity. Based on the reviewed evidence, it is concluded that the use of feelings as information is a frequent event and a generally sensible judgmental strategy rather than a constant source of error. Avenues for future research are discussed.
A model called search for ideas in associative memory (SIAM) is proposed to account for various research findings in the area of group idea generation. The model assumes that idea generation is a repeated search for ideas in associative memory, which proceeds in 2 stages (knowledge activation and idea production), and is controlled through negative feedback loops and cognitive failures (trials in which no idea is generated). We show that (a) turn taking (production blocking) interferes with both stages of the process; (b) ideas suggested by others aid the activation of problem-relevant knowledge; and (c) cognitive failures are important determinants of brainstorming persistence, satisfaction, and enjoyment. Implications for group decision making and group recall are discussed.