How and how far foreign aid has affected Pakistan’s industrial performance is the fundamental question of this study. It examines the history of aid flows to Pakistan; their interaction with economic growth and planning in the country; the role of foreign aid in the balance of payments and external indebtedness; and the reciprocal links between aid on the one hand and income, employment, investment and the structure of Pakistani industry on the other. The assistance programmes of selected donor countries and institutions are emphasized, with a view to explaining the aid-giving process and tracing its effects on various segments of Pakistan’s industrial activity. The authors conclude that the flows of aid have been particularly significant during the second five-year plan. They also reach conclusions about the impact of the flows on Pakistan and the implications of this experience for aid policies in general.
Financial Integration in East Asia, first published in 1999, examines the degree of domestic and financial openness in ten Asian countries (Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) and the effect financial openness has on the structure of the macroeconomy. After examining the reasons behind the 1997/98 financial crisis, Dr de Brouwer puts these in context by summarising the literature on the costs and benefits of financial reform. He then assesses the information that interest rate parity conditions have for financial openness, and sets out theoretical and empirical models to explore the link between market interest rates and intermediated interest rates on deposits and loans. Financial Integration in East Asia also contains reviews of the literature and regional developments, with clear policy analysis throughout.
This report has three objectives: to describe the situation confronting the region's borrowers, devise approaches to better deal with the present and future water related problems that affect their well-being and equip the staff to actively participate in the regional and World Bank-wide efforts to strengthen the sector. The principal water resources problems and issues have been placed in four categories: institutional, long-term management and planning, real-time management and operations, and financial. Such an arrangement provides a perspective for examining concerns across all economic sectors and allows formulation of solutions that will constitute a truly comprehensive, balanced approach to the critical situation encountered in managing these resources. The proposed strategy for the Bank to use in addressing the challenges at the regional and the country department levels comprises fundamental policy and program changes tailored to each individual country and is built into each respective country strategy. -from Authors
This book tells the story of Australia’s integration into the international economy. It traces the Australian economy from Federation to its inevitable downturn in the 1970s and assesses the current state of play as Australia struggles under the pressures of economic globalisation. Bob Catley argues that the insistent protection of domestic commodity industries has left Australia tied to slow growth industries at the expense of expanding the manufactured goods and services industries which now make up the bulk of world trade. Topics include the inadequacies of the dirigiste dual economy, the necessary rise of economic rationalism, demographic and geographic repercussions of globalisation, and the implications for Australian international relations of the emerging power of the Asia-Pacific region. Catley argues that structural changes are still required to ensure a competitive Australian economy in the world market.
CRTAs have become a main feature of South Korea's newly found enthusiasm for a multi-track FTA strategy. In this study, we examine the rise of South Korea's aggressive FTA initiatives, with a special focus on the first cross-Pacific FTA, namely the South Korea-Chile FTA, and draw implications for South Korea's other RTA initiatives. South Korea's motivations to pursue CRTAs are complex. These include economic, political and diplomatic/leverage motives. South Korea's policy departure from its long-standing support for the multilateral trading system began with its FTA negotiations with Chile, a country located on the opposite side of the globe. Aside from the South Korea-Chile FTA, South Korea has been negotiating a number of other CRTAs. Most importantly, South Korea and the US began to negotiate a bilateral FTA in June 2006, the successful conclusion of which will have significant economic and strategic repercussions not only for South Korea but also for its neighbouring East Asian countries. The economic and strategic motivations of the political leadership, as well as the new bureaucratic balance of power centred on the Office of the Minister for Trade, have played a significant role in South Korea's dramatic rush toward RTAs. Although South Korea's pursuit of RTAs does not necessarily mean that it has completely abandoned the multilateral trading system, the policy departure is increasingly becoming obvious and significant.
Inflation control is deeply political because it has distributional implications. This paper studies the characteristics of the Chinese political system and their impact on controlling inflation demand--the state-sectoral investment component of the aggregate demand. The paper first shows (1) the connections between inflation demand and investment and (2) the divergence in inflation preferences between central and local authorities. Five investment hypotheses are proposed to link two bureaucratic variables of local officials--integration and stability--with preference divergence and monitoring. Preference divergence and monitoring, by theoretical conjectures, are linked with local investment behavior. Evidence from panel data suggests strongly and consistently that integration and instability reduce investment shirking and hence inflation demand. The cross-sectional evidence on provinces is then reconciled with China's aggregate inflation performance and the paper suggests that China's relatively good macroeconomic performance is due to the strength of its political institutions.
This study maintains that China’s system of economic planning tends to mitigate the trade-off between economic growth and equity that has been found to prevail in the early stages of development in most less developed countries. The analysis focuses on the Chinese leadership’s attempt to improve economic efficiency by decentralizing economic management without encouraging, as a consequence, increased economic inequality among different regions. By examining the budgetary and planning process, focusing in particular on the fiscal relations between the centre and the far-reaching degree of resource redistribution undertaken by the central government through its control of interprovincial and intersectoral resource transfers. Professor Lardy’s analysis highlights the essential features of Chinese economic growth and relates these to the experience of both developing and Soviet-type economies.
From the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, Japan grew faster than any other major industrial economy, displacing the United States in dominance of worldwide manufacturing markets. In the 1970s and 1980s, many books appeared linking the apparent decline of the United States in the world economy to "unfair" Japanese practices that closed the Japanese market to a wide range of foreign goods. Dollar and Yen analyzes the friction between the United States and Japan from the viewpoint of exchange rate economics. The authors argue against the prevailing view that the trade imbalance should be corrected by dollar depreciation, saying that adjustment through the exchange rate is both ineffective and costly. Stepping outside the traditional dichotomy between international trade and international finance, they link the yen's tremendous appreciation from 1971 to mid-1995 to mercantile pressure from the United States arising from trade tensions between the two countries. Although sometimes resisted by the Bank of Japan, this yen appreciation nevertheless forced unwanted deflation on the Japanese economy after 1985--resulting in two major recessions (endaka fukyos). The authors argue for relaxing commercial tensions between the two countries, and for limiting future economic downturns, by combining a commercial compact for mutual trade liberalization with a monetary accord for stabilizing the yen-dollar exchange rate.
In the past decade, a number of Third World countries have emerged from their economic status as sources of raw materials or as sweatshops in which low-wage, low-skilled workers produced goods for the richer nations. Now they are themselves manufacturing and consuming high-quality, high-technology products and are establishing foreign subsidiaries, most often in other developing countries. This book is the first to study the significant-growth in foreign direct investment by such countries and its impact on the international economic order. Third World Multinationals explores the question of why firms based in developing countries have chosen to invest in branches, joint ventures, and wholly-owned subsidiaries overseas rather than simply export goods or enter into licensing arrangements abroad. In addition to the cost of transport, tariff barriers, and import restrictions, it identifies a number of less apparent factors, such as the motivations of managers in wanting to go abroad, the meshing of technological levels, ethnic ties, and the desire to protect proprietary processes and competitive advantages. The book compares the similarities and differences between these firms and their more established counterparts from the industrialized countries, both large and small. It examines the implications of these developments on the relations between specific home and host countries, and on North-South relations and South-South relations in general. In the face of scarce and unreliable figures, the author has compiled a considerable amount of validated data and viable estimates from numerous world sources. The cases and examples are taken mainly from South America and South and Southeast Asia, those regions that have put forth the largest number of multinational offshoots.
The analysis attempts to bring out how the links between the various sectors of the economy impinge on the development process. It is shown that moving labour from agriculture into industry is a key element in improving the well-being of the poor. The analysis brings out why growth in agricultural productivity is another key to the elimination of poverty. It is demonstrated that industrial progress by itself cannot benefit the poor, in the absence of progress in the agricultural sector. The question of how trade with the developed countries can benefit or hurt India is also considered. It is shown that by exporting industrial goods, the labour force employed in agriculture can be reduced and the poor in India made better off. Finally, the book examines why India's industrial policy from Independence until very recently has stifled entrepreneurship and undermined technical change in industry.
This book examines the behaviour of private industrial investment in Pakistan in the 1960s, in the first half of which it rose at an unprecedented rate, followed by sharp decline, and then stagnation for the rest of the period. The approach adopted is institutional and empirical. The developments studied appeared to be very much the product of the institutional setting of Pakistan, which was different from that of most advanced countries but possibly riot so dissimilar from that in many other developing countries.
Psychologists from nineteen countries in Asia and Oceania report on the expansion of western psychology in the region at both the academic and the professional levels. With its own network of associations, conferences, and journals, the community of psychologists in the East has braved new frontiers for the discipline, yet its achievements are little known to the rest of the world. The contributors adopt a socio-historical orientation for their discussion of how the essentially western discipline of psychology has been accepted and modified in cultures quite different from each other and vastly different from those of the West. One major point of controversy is whether western applications are appropriate in Asian settings or if scholars and practitioners should develop distinctive indigenous varieties according to the idiosyncrasies of the local cultures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
A study of China's defense of its "maritime frontier" in the period from 1902 to 1937, including the establishment of self-recognized sovereignty rights over the South China Sea archipelagos, provides a good illustration of how the country has dealt with relevant issues of international politics during the twentieth century.The article intends to show that throughout the period between the fall of the Qing dynasty, the consolidation of power of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, and up to just before the Pacific War, the idea of a maritime frontier, as applied to the South China Sea, was deeply subordinated to the political needs arising from the power struggle within China and to the precarious position of the country vis-à-vis world powers. Therefore, the protection of rights over the Spratly and Paracel Islands was not a priority of the Chinese government's foreign policy agenda during the first three decades of the republic. However, in contrast to the probable involvement of Sun Yat-sen in a scheme with Japanese nationals in the early 1920s, intended to yield rights for economic exploitation in the Southern China littorals and islands, the Nanjing government's defense of the maritime frontier in Guangdong province since 1928 marked the first precedent in China's self-definition as a modern oceanic nation-state pursuing her own maritime-territorial rights against world powers that had interests in the region.
Why are there no legally constituted institutions in the Asia-Pacific? Some analysts have argued that this situation is a result of US foreign policy, which promoted bilateralism in Asia in order to ensure its dominance in the aftermath of World War II. Focusing on Japan's first regionalism during the 1950s, this article aims to show that this line of argument should be modified. A close analysis of US foreign policy in the region during this period reveals that, rather than attempting to contain Asian regionalism, influential US policy makers repeatedly pursued it. This pursuit gave impetus to Japan's attempts to revive its regional agenda, which during the war had taken form as the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and which now seemed possible in a different form, most notably in gaining financial support from the United States, Japan's former wartime enemy. However, at this particular juncture in history, the diversity of South and Southeast Asian countries and their nation-building priorities inhibited regional economic cooperation. A “pan-Asian-feeling” did not exist. Rather, mutual suspicion of each other's motives and ambitions, and various political rivalries and antagonisms, collectively prevented cooperation between countries in the region. Such different political regimes made it difficult, if not impossible, to establish a multilateral institution. These obstacles led the US to abandon multilateralism in favour of bilateralism as its preferred strategy in the Asia-Pacific until the end of the 1980s.
In contemporary news coverage and in the academic historiography, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is often described as the victim in most clashes between the ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, through a detailed review of the tensions in the late 1960s, this article argues that the ROK was never entirely innocent in various security crises on the Korean Peninsula, and that a contextual analysis in historical and contemporary settings is far more useful in understanding the nature of the ROK-DPRK tensions than the clichéd denouncements of an "evil" regime.The number of clashes between the ROK and the DPRK in 1967 shot up tenfold compared to the year before. These security dilemmas created an unfavourable situation for the US government, in that they prevented the ROK from dispatching further combat troops to Vietnam. The combination of pre-emptive incursions and aggressive acts of retaliation launched by the ROK troops against the DPRK further aggravated the situation, resulting in an ever-greater divide between the perspectives of the North and the South. On the one hand, the ROK government believed that the security problem would invite more assistance from the US; on the other, for the US officials, the ROK's attacks meant that the ROK government was actually the source of trouble.Ultimately, the evidence examined in this article suggests that the crisis of 1968 can be understood as an inevitable extension of the clashes in 1967. The current paper argues that the role played by the ROK government in igniting the crisis was anything but passive and that the strategy taken by the ROK government during this brief period led to a significant deterioration of the US-ROK relationship throughout the 1970s and onward.
This paper examines North Korean economic and policy changes since 1984 from an institutional perspective by focusing on the following four critical junctures: the Law of the Management of Joint Ventures in 1984; the policy of special economic zones in 1991; the mass starvation from 1995 to 1998; and the Economic Improvement Measures in 2002. How did broad situational change play a role in the North Korean government's policy changes and how did the policy changes contribute to institutional change in the North? Were there any policy conflicts among the North Korean elite? How did power struggles among the elite influence policy outcomes? The paper argues that a specific institutional area's arrangement is broadly divided into two categories of rules and norms: one set of hegemonic and several sets of non-hegemonic rules and norms. The hegemonic rules and norms define the main features of an institutional order. Each set of non-hegemonic rules and norms compete with the hegemonic for the dominant status in institutional settings. This competition between hegemonic and non-hegemonic rules and norms functions as the medium of institutional development. Since 1984, the contention between hegemonic socialist and non-hegemonic capitalist rules and norms has defined economic institutional change in North Korea.
This article discusses the ways in which the military regime in Burma has used its "vertical power" to constrain the "horizontal power" of the population of Rangoon, the country's capital and largest city. In March 1988, a small incident between university students and local residents led to student protests, which were violently suppressed by the authorities. The cycle of protest and state violence escalated, resulting in demonstrations that by summer 1988 involved hundreds of thousands of Rangoon residents and crossed class and occupational lines. On 18 September 1988, a new military junta seized power and "pacified" the city.
The post-1988 regime transformed the city, imposing a "strategic redesign" of its public and private spaces to prevent a recurrence of "Democracy Summer." This included the forced relocation of residents from the city centre to remote satellite towns and the closing down of sites associated with "revolutionary nationalism," such as the main campus of Rangoon University. At the same time, a post-socialist, commercialized Rangoon emerged, funded by new sources of capital such as foreign investment and laundered "narco-dollars." In an effort to win legitimacy for itself, the junta also sponsored ambitious Buddhist projects, such as renovation of the revered Shwe Dagon Pagoda. This article calls into question the salience of ethnic politics in Burma, since in Rangoon as in minority areas, the state's relationship with society is defined by its determination to maintain a power monopoly.
Taiwan's effort to carry on diplomatic relations in the face of hostility from China has collided with Australia's reform agenda for the Pacific Islands. This issue is particularly acute in Solomon Islands, which has longstanding ties with Taiwan and a close association with Australia. In the lead-up to the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, a local politician accused Taiwan of funding candidates. The same politician later stated that popular anger towards Taiwan sparked the post-election riot that devastated Honiara's Chinatown. Although neither of these accusations was supported with evidence, they prompted Australia to publicly criticize Taiwan's involvement in Solomon Islands. This article argues Australia's reaction was due to existing Australia-Taiwan tension over the South Pacific, and because Australian policymakers found Taiwan a more palatable focus than acknowledging the ambitious reach of Australia's reform efforts. Australia's rhetoric drew a negative reaction from Taiwan, which believed Canberra was seeking a scapegoat to deflect from its inability to anticipate or control the riot. The incident also contributed to the Taiwan government's perception of Australia as increasingly pro-China. Despite subsequent efforts from Taiwan and Solomon Islands to improve accountability for Taiwan's aid, the differing interests of Australia and Taiwan continued to be an issue as funding from Taiwan became more important to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare during his dispute with Australia. This article examines the interaction between Australia and Taiwan over Solomon Islands, and considers its significance to wider Australia-Taiwan involvement in the South Pacific.
Using the Philippines as a case study, this article addresses two theoretically relevant questions regarding alliance durability. First, why does a state, given a choice between autonomous defense (by dipping into its own domestic resources for arms build-up) and seeking allies (to provide military resources and guarantees), opt for an alliance? And two, under what conditions will a state favour alliance over autonomous defense? After nearly three decades of security efforts directed at strengthening its alliance with the United States, the Philippines in the early 1990s decided to embark on a modernization programme to provide its armed forces with an autonomous defense capability. However, a lack of financial resources and political will have prevented the Philippine government from implementing the plan. The article maintains that the Philippine government's inability to develop an independent defense posture will bind the country to its alliance with the US, the only viable current option for ensuring its security in an evolving and uncertain international system.
While Asia remains an exception to the global trend towards the abolition of capital punishment, South Korea has suspended executions for the past ten years. The purpose of this article is to explain the change in South Korea's death penalty practice, which is largely associated with democratic development and the observance of international human rights standards. Who are the leading figures in constructing and advancing abolitionist discourse and efforts in South Korean society? What are the major rationales for their advocacy? What significance does the possibility of South Korea's formal abolition have in terms of Asia's ongoing practice of the death penalty? This article seeks answers to these questions, highlighting South Korea's recent abolitionist movement.
This article addresses recent claims of right-wing nationalism in Japan made in journalistic and academic commentary. It re-examines a broad range of evidence used to depict rising Japanese neo-nationalism and concludes that despite popular notions about a re-emergence of militarist attitudes, such currents are not as entrenched in Japanese public discourse as some commentators suggest. After a brief theoretical discussion of nationalism, we examine (1) opinion in Japan regarding constitutional change, (2) statements by elite policy makers which are often the focus of media and academic attention, (3) the debate surrounding the notorious New History Textbook and (4) war memory in popular culture—more specifically, manga. A detailed reading of these examples suggests that right-wing discourse is less prevalent in Japan than is often assumed.
This paper describes how small union and social movement support for plaintiffs in recent court cases has helped shape public discourse regarding excess work hours in Japan. Analysis of lawsuits involving two prominent Japanese corporations, Toyota and McDonald's Japan, brings to light seven common strategies Japanese firms use to extract uncompensated “service” overtime and links them with violations of labour laws and damage to worker health. These cases reveal the alignment and relative strength of forces in Japan's work-hour controversy, highlighting the role of civil society groups such as community unions and labour rights groups in supporting plaintiffs, and in keeping issues and their broader social consequences before the public. However, the cases also show the limits of activist pressure. Judges issued clear decisions favouring the plaintiffs, and the cases garnered considerable public sympathy. But even as the outcomes became front-page news, employers countered by attempting to re-legitimize the very overtime practices that had caused worker injury. Without the support and resources of major unions, political parties or government, campaigners for shorter work hours appear destined to struggle to transform overwork from a private problem into a public issue.
This research focuses on the adaptation and self-identity of young Taiwanese immigrants to Australia. The study is based on in-depth interviews and observation of young Taiwan-born immigrants in Melbourne, Australia. Participants were initially exposed to Chinese values as part of their education in Taiwan, both in schools and in their families. On moving to a multicultural country with many ethnic groups, immigrants had to learn to communicate with people in English and encountered many problems in their schooling and interpersonal relationships due to language deficiencies. Responses to these difficulties ranged from studying the English language harder to retreating to the use of Chinese to make friends, mainly within the Taiwanese community. However, families of young immigrants may have influenced their choice of friends and therefore also their identity. Families also influenced the young immigrants' choice of a university major. In turn this influenced their careers after graduation. Family influences lessened over the years, and young immigrants eventually adapted to the Australian career environment. However, due to their dual or multicultural backgrounds, those young immigrants became competitive not only in Australia, but also in Taiwan, Mainland China, Asia, and elsewhere in the world.
In the Philippines, skepticism about private sector participation in urban water provision became increasingly pronounced as missed service targets and regulatory battles plagued governmental relations with the two companies (Manila Water and Maynilad) granted concessions for water provision in the capital, Manila. A comparative study of these two public-private partnerships (PPPs) reveals the challenges of reconciling bureaucratic and organizational dynamics with public suspicion of the private sector. This study draws on interviews and observations with corporate and government officials, academics, journalists, non-governmental organizations and civil society members in the Philippines, almost a decade after the initial privatization. This paper furthers our understanding of the outcomes in Manila—and PPPs more generally—by addressing the tension between credible commitment in contractual arrangements and flexibility for responding to economic and environmental shocks. It argues that adversarial interactions between the private corporations and regulators hindered the collaborative negotiations needed to respond to the currency crisis. Fear of public backlash against price increases and contract adjustments prevented the government and companies from engaging in meaningful joint problem solving. The differential outcomes of the companies illustrate the relevance of specific contractual arrangements and leadership in determining the impact of unforeseen shocks. However, the problems experienced by both companies indicates the need—if the private sector is to equitably and efficiently provide public goods—to redesign PPPs to increase transparency and to develop true partnerships.
The idea of the state has shown remarkable resilience over the last couple of decades, despite assaults on it from neoliberal doctrines and the forces of globalization. During this period, the abiding presence and role of the state has been particularly evident in the contemporary political
life of the Asia Pacific region. This article pays special attention to the contemporary Indian state in the context of development. It reflects upon the ways in which the state is experienced, by focusing on questions of marginality, agency and power as they intersect the politics of development.
By reading the empirical insights documented within this special issue against a rich trajectory of scholarship on the Indian state, the article argues that there has been a recent qualitative change in the way in which the contemporary Congress-led UPA government has presented itself to the
common person. The implementation of pro-poor and more inclusive policies has altered the discursive landscape within which state-society interactions have taken place over the last five years. Importantly, these policies have functioned to reconfigure not only the material interactions
between the state and India's marginalized, but also the imagined spaces within which marginal groups renegotiate their relationships with the state.
Over the past quarter of a century, China's economic growth, its transition from a socialist to a market-based economy and the integration of the Chinese economy into the global economic system have all progressed significantly. On the other hand, during the same period Japan has been the single largest source of foreign aid to China of all donor nations and international aid organizations, by providing more than half of China's total bilateral aid receipt. This article looks at the role of Japanese foreign aid in China's economic growth and increasing openness, and explains Japan's grand strategy in implementing its aid policy to China. My analysis suggests that there is a positive, albeit indirect, link between Japanese development fund, which is widely known as yen loans, and the growth and increasing openness of the Chinese economy. The evidence also indicates that the link between Japan's provision of yen loans to China and Japan's immediate corporate gains is surprisingly weak. Indeed, Japan has benefited indirectly because yen loans have contributed to the economic growth and openness of China, which in turn make it a better economic partner and more responsible regional neighbour for Japan. In the end, China's economic development, the incorporation of the Chinese economy into the global economic framework and China's transition to a market economy are in Japan's national economic as well as political interests.
This article surveys the free trade agreement (FTA) initiatives of three governments: Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. It examines each in a search for motives, not only for negotiating FTAs within the region but also for reaching outside Asia to find negotiating partners. It finds
that the presumption of economic gain as the primary motive must be qualified because the markets of many of the extra-regional partners are relatively small in Asian terms, and their trade and investment barriers are already amongst the lowest in the world. This is especially true of New
Zealand and Chile, which nevertheless are becoming popular extra-regional partners for Asian governments. While the national and sectoral economic motives announced by the trade spokespeople for Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia are acknowledged as predominant, this article goes beyond
such declarations to explore the explicit and implicit diplomatic, political and bureaucratic aims that could account more fully for these trade negotiation initiatives. In accordance with the conceptual analysis presented by Solís and Katada in this issue of Pacific Affairs,
the drivers of FTAs are grouped into three broad categories: 1) economic motives; 2) security and diplomatic motives; and 3) leverage motives. Seven hypotheses derived from these categories are employed to guide this survey of recent FTA initiatives by Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, and
to explore their reasons for engaging with FTA partners both outside and within the Southeast Asian region.
Given the rise of major economic powers in the Asia-Pacific that rely on energy imports to sustain their economic growth, the Indian Ocean region has assumed a new importance. Various powers are once again vying for the control of the waves in this part of the world. This article examines the emerging Indian approach towards the Indian Ocean in the context of India's rise as a major regional and global actor. It argues that though India has historically viewed the Indian Ocean region as one in which it would like to establish its own predominance, its limited material capabilities have constrained its options. With the expansion, however, of India's economic and military capabilities, the country's ambitions vis-à-vis this region are soaring once again. India is also trying its best to respond to the challenge that growing Chinese capabilities in the Indian Ocean are posing to the region and beyond. Yet, preponderance in the Indian Ocean region, though much desired by the Indian strategic elites, remains an unrealistic aspiration for India given the significant stakes that other major powers have in the region.
Recently, many scholars have studied the burgeoning number of intimate relationships involving global migrations of people. They have demonstrated that cross-border liaisons of mixed nationalities are born not simply out of “love” but also of inequalities and power struggles occurring at crisscrossed intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, class and nationality. Yet, the existing literature on these associations has thus far tended to focus on adult relationships, and studies on children born to these couples continue to be scarce, especially, when children are born out of wedlock to border-crossing parents, the children's citizenship and other rights complicate the existing social system and may challenge national sovereignty. Based on ethnographic research conducted in the 2000s among children born to unwed Filipino women and Japanese men (JFC), this article details the processes of JFC's lawsuits against the Japanese state in order to reinstate their once-denied Japanese nationality. It then discusses some of the implications of their defiance to the state power for these children's citizenships beyond political entitlements by introducing several cases of the experiences of the children who grew up in Japan and those who recently gained entry to their pátria without fathers.
A key feature of East Asian FTA diplomacy remains unacknowledged and, therefore, unaccounted for: the activism displayed in seeking preferential trading relations with countries outside the region. While European and North American countries have also pursued cross-regional trade agreements (CRTAs), East Asia is unique in pursuing extra-regional partnerships before consolidating the regional trade integration process. This framework article identifies the common patterns and fundamental factors behind the East Asian governments' moves towards establishing CRTAs. After laying out the conventional arguments—ranging from the extra-regional market dependence, the region's security arrangements, and economic and political motives behind East Asia's extra-regional interests—the article introduces the novel concept of "leverage." This notion highlights how cross-regional and intra-regional FTA initiatives are intimately linked: East Asian countries frequently choose an extra-regional FTA partner in order to break regional inertias that hinder integration, to win domestic battles, and to appropriate extra-regional negotiation modalities that they can use in their subsequent intra-regional FTA negotiations. The article concludes with a summary of the findings from the country cases, and the policy implications of East Asia's porous regionalism, with its heavy doses of cross-regional trade initiatives.
This paper seeks to analyze the potential for violent conflict in the Republic of Vanuatu, a small island state in the South West Pacific. It examines the likelihood of state level conflict and investigates local factors which might contribute to state destabilization. It seeks to redress the relative absence of Pacific conflicts from the international discourse on conflict and conflict prevention.We argue that while Vanuatu possesses indicators of potential conflict, when violent conflicts have arisen in Vanuatu they have remained small scale and rapidly contained. In exploring this phenomenon, the paper charts factors such as formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, ethnic diversity, the availability of small arms and the incidence of violent crime. However, we note that strategies aimed at preventing the outbreak of violence may potentially create policy conflicts with other areas. In particular, we look at the effects of indigenous dispute resolution strategies on gender empowerment, one of the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals and a central premise of Australian Official Development Assistance to Vanuatu.
By mid-decade, Cambodia will likely begin production of offshore oil fields containing an estimated 700 million to two billion barrels of oil and significant quantities of natural gas. This long anticipated event has prompted considerable discussion of whether petroleum-derived wealth will be a blessing or a curse. Much of the discussion has been framed through the lens of the “resource curse” thesis. The purpose of this article is to consider how the notion of a resource curse has entered the Cambodian political arena and to examine the questions it has prompted Cambodia's ruling elite and external actors to ask concerning the management of petroleum resources. Based on a systematic examination of the evolution of government policy, and of external attempts to shape its development, I show how warnings of a “resource curse” have come to be deployed in different ways by reform promoting aid donors, civil society groups, and the ruling elite. The article concludes by noting that while these warnings have helped to highlight risks associated with the rapid exploitation of petroleum resources, little will or capacity exists either domestically or internationally to transcend technical fixes to the pathologies of petroleum revenue wealth and to press for a more transparent exploitation regime.
Although the migration of Koreans to Manchuria has a long history, the main influx occurred after 1910 when Korean agricultural peasants and industrial entrepreneurs migrated mostly to the area above the Korean peninsula and Harbin and Shenyang to seek newly emerging economic opportunities. Currently, there are approximately two million people of Korean ancestry living in China with the majority of that population concentrated in the Manchurian region. Recently, a considerable number of ethnic Koreans (Chosonjok), both female and male, have moved away to urban centres elsewhere in China in the midst of rapid urbanization and industrialization. Moreover, after normalization of diplomatic relations between the PRC and South Korea in 1992, some Chosonjok in China have travelled to South Korea as migrant workers, especially young Chosonjok women who have arrived as marriage partners for South Korean men. As the PRC developed economically and its international stature rose, younger ethnic Koreans found themselves faced with more choices. As well, the weak autonomy of civil society within the region has made it difficult to reinforce ethnic Korean identity through discursive means. With the migration and concurrent in-migration of Han-Chinese to Chosonjok villages and cities, many Chosonjok in the formerly homogenous communities are experiencing a loss of ethnic identity and solidarity. This produces a complicated feeling of nostalgia for the past among older Chosonjok and of anxiety and hope for the future among Chosonjok of all ages. Labour Recruit
Malaysia's trend of mounting religiosity should not be seen as merely stemming from political rivalry between its two biggest Muslim parties (UMNO and PAS) but also from another source, its Sharia-aspiring bureaucracy. The hegemony of this religious bureaucracy is based on its power as arbiter of the “right” or official Islam and its oversight over Sharia laws and Islamic public institutions. Insulated from voters' displeasure and, to a large extent through its strategy of invoking the immutability of Sharia, this bureaucracy has emerged as the lynchpin of Malaysia's state-driven Islamization. But even as Sharia proponents disavow secularism, the essence of Islamic legal and bureaucratic transformation is closer to a secularized adaptation than to a process of desecularization. Furthermore, as much as the bureaucracy is seemingly unstoppable, it is far from being fully stabilized as it confronts a dissenting section of the Muslim middle class who are also keen to capture the discursive, but highly fortified legal space of “authentic” Islam occupied by this bureaucracy. Ultimately, what surfaces in Islam's politicization is the contestation between a secularized Sharia bureaucracy and its juridical subjects, rather than a desecularization movement.
Regulators within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have heavily promoted investment in natural gas infrastructure to meet burgeoning demand for energy. By 2030, some analysts expect Southeast Asia to become “the Persian Gulf of Gas” and responsible for
one-quarter of the world's gas production and use. Perhaps no single project is more emblematic of the region's view of energy security and policy than the Trans-ASEAN natural gas pipeline (TAGP) system, a proposed network of natural gas pipelines to connect the gas reserves in the Gulf of
Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines to the rest of the region. Advocates of the TAGP expect it to promote economic development, earn foreign exchange, mitigate the risks of climate change, and enhance regional energy security. Drawing from field research and research interviews,
however, this article takes a critical look at the region's drive towards the TAGP and ASEAN's approach to energy security as a whole. The article argues that plans for the TAGP rest on too simple a notion of energy security: secure access to fuel. This conception of energy security ignores
important additional dimensions related to availability, affordability, efficiency and environmental and social stewardship. In contrast, the paper concludes that the TAGP is insufficient, expensive, inefficient, and environmentally and socially destructive.
China?s involvement in Central Asia occupies an under-researched and emerging area of Chinese foreign policy, one which primarily revolves around its attempts to maintain regional stability in and around its periphery, strengthen its energy security in the region and maintain stable relations with the United States. Through its codominance with Russia of the nascent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), it has and will likely continue to find cooperation with SCO member states over the former two issues, but will encounter some difficulty in finding cooperation regarding the latter. The PRC?s relations with Central Asia hold important short- and long-term implications for understanding the role of Xinjiang in China?s foreign relations, China?s energy security and its relations with the US. Furthermore, Sino-Central Asian relations function as a proving ground for testing the viability of China?s grand strategy, effectively articulated by Avery Goldstein, in a specific foreign policy setting. Beijing?s Central Asian policies reflect its larger geopolitical strategy, meant to ensure its peaceful rise to regional prominence, assuage fears of a China threat and focus on domestic development. This study concludes that China?s relations with Central Asia meet vital national interests in regional stability, energy security and stable US-China relations, while achiev_ing secondary benefits crucial to its grand strategy of a peaceful rise.
This commentary on the papers collected in this special issue identifies certain recurring themes from the papers and examines these in light of the urban transitions now being experienced by Vietnam and China, as elsewhere in Asia. These include: tensions in state-society relations as expressed in processes of periurbanization; the effects of the expansion of market relations in land and urban development; the persistence of the discursive categories traditional and modern in the analysis of periurbanization; and a consideration of what the periurban might imply vis-à-vis conventional notions of urban and rural, now and into the future. This discussion of recurring themes from the papers is prefaced by some reflections on how our choices of terminology may influence our theoretical understanding of a situation, event or condition. The specific question here is what is the difference between periurbanization and suburbanization, and it is argued that the distinction between the two may derive more from who is using the terms and the contexts within which they are situated than from specific denotative meanings of the words.
The concept of citizenship is fluid and constructed. State actors, societal actors, and courts play important roles in the construction and reconstruction of formal, substantive, and differentiated citizenship. The recent arrival of transnational gendered migration from neighbouring countries to East and Southeast Asia challenges pre-existing assumptions about how political communities are defined and how new members should be treated. This introductory chapter proposes an analytical framework to understand the politics of citizenship and transnational gendered migration within the context of East and Southeast Asia.
Unhealed wounds from past wrongs, committed during colonialism and war, have created regional animosity and stunted reconciliation in Northeast Asia. Claiming that continued disputes over historical injustice are not solely an intra-Asian issue, this article explores how the US can facilitate historical reconciliation in the region. It is necessary to recognize that the US played a significant role in dealing with historical issues in the aftermath of World War II. Aside from failing to fully address Japanese war crimes in the Tokyo Tribunal, the US was also pivotal in setting the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, a legal instrument that has been the historical precedent for expunging any sense of Japanese guilt and responsibility. Likewise, the US has yet to formally accept its own actions which could be perceived as “crimes against humanity”: the US atomic and carpet-bombing of Japanese cities. This article advocates a self-critical, self-reflective approach that would involve US acknowledgement of its own responsibility in handling or mishandling of history issues in Northeast Asia. More specifically, the article also evaluates recent proposals for a presidential visit to Hiroshima or Nagasaki as a means of recognizing the human suffering caused by the atomic bombing, and for a new interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to better enable victims of Japanese war crimes to air grievances. This article supports both proposals but also argues that they must be implemented with caution and within a larger regional historical framework rather than as an attempt to bolster solely US-Japanese relations.
How is East Asia responding to the rising China? Pertinent literature suggests that explicit balancing or containment has been rare and engagement, if not appeasement, appears to be East Asia's modus operandi. Yet, this study argues that certain, though subtle, variations are nevertheless discernible among the regional states in their responses to China's ascent. Focusing on 15 East Asian states for the period of 2004-2007, the article first presents a bird's-eye view of East Asia's responses to the rise of China. More specifically, inter-state variations are empirically demonstrated and four principal patterns—bandwagoning, hesitant hedging, active hedging and balancing—are distilled from the key responses of these 15 nations. The article then examines the sources of these inter-state variations, and argues that they are conditioned largely by three factors: alliances with the United States, regime characteristics and territorial disputes with China. The article concludes with some observations as to East Asia's complex responses to the rise of China and their security implications for the region as a whole.
This paper examines the regional environmental co-operation in East Asia at the local government level, focusing on the intercity environmental co-operation between the two cities in Japan and China—Kitakyushu and Dalian—as a case. Theoretically, this case demonstrates the dynamic nature of local government level environmental co-operation in the sense that all the three levels—government, local government, and private—are closely interconnected, and the major actors—the central government, the local government, and private actors like NGOs and/or firms—play a role in shaping the outcome of intercity co-operation. Also, in terms of policy implication, this case is important not just for East Asian but also global environmental politics because it is the co-operation between cities in China and Japan—the two most important countries in East Asia that affect regional and global environmental protections efforts seriously. In order to investigate the reasons of success, and the dynamic nature of intercity environmental co-operation, this paper suggests a framework for analysis on the relationship between multiple dimensions of regional environmental co-operation, and then, examines the historical process and the details of the case and explains why this case has been remarkably successful and produced significant outcome. Finally, it draws some theoretical as well as policy implications of this case in terms of possibilities for and limitations of East Asian regional environmental cooperation in the future.
By most accounts, Japan and Mexico remain distant economic partners with only a modest volume of bilateral trade and foreign direct investment, and a large geographical and cultural gulf between them. By this depiction, the Japanese decision to negotiate with Mexico is puzzling if not downright nonsensical: Why would Japan invest so much political capital in the negotiation of a complex free trade agreement (FTA) with a nation accounting for such a minuscule share of its international economic exchange? Solís and Katada challenge this interpretation of Japan's second bilateral FTA ever, and demonstrate that far from being irrational or insignificant, the stakes involved in the Japan-Mexico FTA were very high, and that this cross-regional initiative stands to exert powerful influence over the future evolution of Japan's shift towards economic regionalism. For a number of Japanese industries (automobiles, electronics and government procurement contractors) negotiating with Mexico was essential to level the playing field vis-à-vis their American and European rivals, which already enjoyed preferential access to the Mexican market based on their FTAs. For the Japanese trade bureaucrats, negotiations with Mexico offered an opportunity to tip the domestic balance in favour of an active FTA diplomacy, despite the opposition of the agricultural lobby. Negotiations with Mexico constituted a litmus test, both for the Japanese government and in the eyes of potential FTA partners in Asia, on whether Japan could offer a satisfactory liberalization package to prospective FTA partners to make these negotiations worthwhile.
This article joins the debate on transnational campaigns for Japanese historical wrongs in the Asia-Pacific by highlighting the collective “forgetting” on the part of the victims' society. Focusing on the Taiwanese “comfort women” issue, I argue that the “comfort women” campaign has been overshadowed by identity politics in Taiwan, and has subsequently lost ground to civil society debates about the KMT's repressive past. In the context of democratization and a growing political movement to emphasize a Taiwanese identity, I argue that a Chinese Other has been constructed to emphasize the island's distinctiveness from China. This, however, has entailed drawing attention to historical wrongs committed by the Nationalist Party (Zhongguo guomindang, or KMT) during Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian rule, as well as the emergence of a new historical narrative that emphasizes (relatively) benign Japanese colonial rule. This has had the unintended effect of drawing greater societal attention towards party political disputes over Taiwan's national identity and how history should be interpreted, rather than the redress for the former “comfort women.”
Throughout the past decade, the Chinese government's general policy towards "globalization" has been one of active engagement. Opening the country to global capital is seen by Chinese national leaders as a way to further China's market reform and economic development. This official view towards "globalization" has been articulated in the national leaders' rhetoric and communicated through the national media. Given the context, this article examines urban Chinese residents' attitudes towards globalization and the effects of national media consumption on such attitudes. We argue that media effects are likely to exist because of the existence of the conditions of monopoly and canalization. Analysis of a representative survey conducted in four major cities largely supports our arguments. The findings show that Chinese citizens generally believe in the benefits to China of engaging with globalization. Positive views are more strongly held among more educated people, people with stronger nationalistic sentiments, and heavy consumers of the national media. The implications of these findings, as well as the similarities and differences between China and other Asian countries, are discussed.
This paper questions whether China's "attracting-in" (selective introduction of inward foreign direct investment, foreign technologies and import) and "walking-out" (export and outward investment expansion) strategies have enabled it to achieve a leadership position in the world information and communication technology (ICT) industry. In 2004, China overtook the US to become the world's largest ICT exporter. The author argues that "attracting-in" has successfully created favourable conditions for the industry to grow out of China's transitional economic and political system, but has been unable to facilitate "walking-out" to enable Chinese enterprises to substantially achieve a real leadership position. This is because there is great uncertainty in how to adjust the industrial strategy of the East Asian "catching-up" era to meet the challenges raised by the dynamism of global competition today. Rather than provoking head-to-head competition, China's rise in the world ICT industry has complemented the increasing specialization of multinational corporations.
This study examines the bargaining interaction between host countries and multinational corporations over the life cycle of an investment project. During the early phase of an investment in an underdeveloped sector, market risks are high. Most foreign firms are reluctant to enter such an environment without guarantees. In the cases examined here, state protection was extended to automobile joint ventures so as to maximize returns. In this early phase, foreign firms were able to negotiate more favourable terms. However, once production developed, market risks began to decline. Consequently, host economies became attractive to other prospective investors and liberalization led to the influx of new foreign investment activity. The increase in new projects reduced state dependence and enabled host countries to play one MNC against another in order to increase their bargaining power.
In the late 1980s, the Dalai Lama first asserted that he was willing to no longer press for an independent Tibet. Until recently, however, scant progress was made toward negotiations between the Tibetan exiles and the government of the People's Republic of China: the PRC had shown no inclination to negotiate about matters beyond the Dalai Lama's own status, while the exiles had insisted that China renounce all control over affairs in Tibet, except foreign affairs and defense. In 2002, largely in response to external pressures, China invited one of the Dalai Lama's brothers to visit Tibet and in 2002-2005 the Dalai Lama's representatives have visited Tibetan areas of China on three occasions and, most recently, have met with PRC representatives in Switzerland. The Dalai Lama has since gone some way toward accommodating PRC pre-conditions for negotiations. He has acknowledged that Tibet is part of China and Tibetan culture part of Chinese culture, as well as refocusing his concerns away from political demands to questions of cultural and religious autonomy. Formidable obstacles to negotiations remain, including exile demands that they be about unification of all PRC Tibetan areas and the establishment of liberal democracy in Tibet. Compromise solutions are available, however, and China can take a number of steps that would facilitate acceptance of compromise in the exile community and that would substantially benefit Tibetans in Tibet.