M. Zeelenberg, W. W. van Dijk, and A. S. R. Manstead (1998, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 254-272) recently reported an altered replication of our earlier study (T. Connolly, L. D. Ordóñez, & R. Coughlan, 1997, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73-85) concerning the effects of decision agency on regret and outcome evaluation. Our earlier study had found no such effect, but Zeelenberg et al. did. In two new experiments, we have largely confirmed Zeelenberg et al.'s result but have shown that, contrary to most theory, regret (a) can appear even in the absence of decision agency, (b) can be unrelated to outcome evaluations, and (c) may be more influenced by the experience of gains or losses from the status quo than by any decisional responsibility for those changes. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
Groupthink theory has continued relevance to organizations because of the organizational trend toward self-managing work teams. A typology is developed linking the key differentiating characteristics of self-managing teams to groupthink antecedents of group cohesion, structural faults of the organization, and provocative situational context. Building upon this framework, we more specifically examine variables that will impact the occurrence of groupthink within self-managing teams. Implications for the prevention of groupthink in self-managing teams are discussed. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
People are typically overly optimistic when evaluating the quality of their performance on social and intellectual tasks. In particular, poor performers grossly overestimate their performances because their incompetence deprives them of the skills needed to recognize their deficits. Five studies demonstrated that poor performers lack insight into their shortcomings even in real world settings and when given incentives to be accurate. An additional meta-analysis showed that it was lack of insight into their own errors (and not mistaken assessments of their peers) that led to overly optimistic estimates among poor performers. Along the way, these studies ruled out recent alternative accounts that have been proposed to explain why poor performers hold such positive impressions of their performance.
Heinrich's (1931) classical study implies that most industrial accidents can be characterized as a probabilistic result of human error. The present research quantifies Heinrich's observation and compares four descriptive models of decision making in the abstracted setting. The suggested quantification utilizes signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). It shows that Heinrich's observation can be described as a probabilistic signal detection task. In a controlled experiment, 90 decision makers participated in 600 trials of six safety games. Each safety game was a numerical example of the probabilistic SDT abstraction of Heinrich's proposition. Three games were designed under a frame of gain to represent perception of safe choice as costless, while the other three were designed under a frame of loss to represent perception of safe choice as costly. Probabilistic penalty for Miss was given at three different levels (1, .5, .1). The results showed that decisions tended initially to be risky and that experience led to safer behavior. As the probability of being penalized was lowered decisions became riskier and the learning process was impaired. The results support the cutoff reinforcement learning model suggested by Erev et al. (1995). The hill-climbing learning model (Busemeyer & Myung, 1992) was partially supported. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
Subjects screened a set of jobs, retaining those for which they wished to apply and rejecting those that were no longer under consideration. In Experiment 1, subjects who indicated the jobs for which they would apply/not apply screened out fewer jobs than those with instructions to reject/not reject or those with instructions simply to screen (control). There were no differences between the reject and control conditions. Experiment 2 used a design similar to that of Experiment 1, but subjects were made accountable for their screening judgments. The reject-apply discrepancy remained, but the accountability manipulation made the subjects more stringent in their screening compared to those who were not accountable for their judgments. In Experiment 3, subjects were told to consider either the regret resulting from retaining a bad option (regret bad) or the regret from rejecting a good option (regret good). Subjects in the regret bad condition rejected more jobs than did subjects in the regret good condition, but not more than subjects in the control condition. As predicted by image theory, the normal screening process appears to be to screen out the bad options rather than screen in the good options. This is demonstrated by screening in the control condition being similar to screening under the reject instructions (Experiment 1) and under regret bad instructions (Experiment 3), since these conditions were shown to focus attention on the bad options. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
In this paper, we argue that judgment biases in negotiation are perpetuated by underlying cultural values and ideals, and therefore, certain judgment biases will be more prevalent in certain cultural contexts. Based on theory in cultural psychology (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), we considered the notion that fixed pie error, a judgment bias in which negotiators fail to accurately understand their counterparts' interests (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), would be more prevalent at the end of negotiations in the United States, an individualistic culture, than Greece, a collectivistic culture. The results of a 2-week computer-mediated intercultural negotiation experiment, which took place between American students in Illinois and Greek students in Athens, supported this view. Theoretical implications of culture and cognition in negotiation are also discussed. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
This study investigated features of the value function for voice using subjects from four countries: Great Britain, Mexico, The Netherlands, and the United States. Across these four groups of subjects the shape of the value function was found to be similar, though differences in the estimated reference points were detected. Consistent with predictions derived from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) the relationship between the value of voice and the magnitude of voice was found to be direct, monotonic, and nonlinear. The largest increment in value occurred when the magnitude of voice shifted from mute to some voice. Thereafter, increments in value tended to decline in magnitude suggesting diminishing marginal returns on the response measure of procedural fairness. An unexpected finding was that the final segment of the value function was convex indicating increasing marginal returns as the magnitude of voice shifted from its penultimate level to its maximum possible level. The study also investigated whether subjects' reported expectations of voice correspond to the value function reference point as theorized in the literature. Findings suggest that self-reported expectations of voice are higher than the estimated value function reference point.
This research examined the effects of mastery vs. performance training goals and learning and performance goal orientation traits on multidimensional outcomes of training. Training outcomes included declarative knowledge, knowledge structure coherence, training performance, and self-efficacy. We also examined the unique impact of the training outcomes on performance adaptability by predicting generalization to a more difficult and complex version of the task. The experiment involved 60 trainees learning a complex computer simulation over 2 days. The research model posited independent effects for training goals relative to goal orientation traits and independent contributions of training outcomes to the performance adaptability of trainees. The findings were consistent with the proposed model. In particular, self-efficacy and knowledge structure coherence made unique contributions to the prediction of performance adaptability after controlling for prior training performance and declarative knowledge. Implications and extensions are discussed. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
J. Rosse and H. Miller (1984, in P. Goodman, R. Atkin et al., Absenteeism: New Approaches to understanding, measuring, and managing employee absence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass) have proposed a model of employee adaptation that hypothesizes multiple withdrawal behaviors and attempts to change working conditions as alternative forms of adaptation to a dissatisfying work environment. Negative health outcomes are also hypothesized consequences of dissatisfaction with work. In this longitudinal study of 42 new hospital employees, intention to quit, turnover, absence, attempts to change the job, and heatlh disorders were negatively correlated with job satisfaction; lateness and self-report avoidance scale were not. Use of adaptive behaviors was also found to have remedial effects for employee health. Implications for a general model of adaptation are discussed.
This research investigated gender differences in the overlooked context of individual adoption and sustained usage of technology in the workplace using the theory of planned behavior (TPB). User reactions and technology usage behavior were studied over a 5-month period among 355 workers being introduced to a new software technology application. When compared to women's decisions, the decisions of men were more strongly influenced by their attitude toward using the new technology. In contrast, women were more strongly influenced by subjective norm and perceived behavioral control. Sustained technology usage behavior was driven by early usage behavior, thus fortifying the lasting influence of gender-based early evaluations of the new technology. These findings were robust across income, organization position, education, and computer self-efficacy levels. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
People received advice from four sources and used it to produce a judgment. They also assessed the quality of advice by estimating the probability that it would be correct. They were better at assessing than at using advice: combinations of advice based on their assessments were superior to their judgments. Order of assessing and using advice, superficial differences between advisors, and using other methods of advice assessment had no significant effects on this superiority of advice assessment over advice use. However, use but not assessment was improved when some advisors exhibited biases opposite to those that people typically show. It appears that using advice imposes a heavier processing load than assessing its quality and that this load can be lightened by including advisors who exhibit unusual behavior. Their salience may help people working under a heavy processing load make appropriate pairings between advisor weights and advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
The relationship between trust, confidence, and expertise in Judge-Advisor Systems is examined in two experiments with Judge-Advisor pairs, one with strangers and another with participants in ongoing relationships. There was expertise asymmetry so that Judges had less expertise than their Advisors. The dyads could receive money for accurate Judge decisions. Either the Judge or Advisor had the power to allocate this money between dyad members, before task interaction in study one and after task completion in study two. Because Judges were more dependent on Advisors than vice versa, it was predicted that trust would be more important to Judges. Results were supportive. Judges had higher and more variable ratings of trust in their partner than did Advisors, suggesting that Judges were more motivated to evaluate trust. High confidence by Advisors had a positive impact on Judges' ratings of trust and tendency to follow their advice. Judges' trust in their Advisors was significantly related their taking the advice and being confident in their final decisions. Although participants in study two had higher levels of trust in their partners, they allocated less money to them. The implications for establishing trust are discussed. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
In decisions under uncertainty, decision makers confront two uncertainties: the uncertain linkage between actions and outcomes and the uncertain linkage between these outcomes and his or her affective responses to them. The two studies reported here examine affective responses to expected and unexpected outcomes in various settings. In Study 1, a scenario-based laboratory experiment (N = 149), we examined subjects' predicted responses to a range of outcomes, as a function of how surprising the outcome was. Study 2, a field study (N = 127), involved the expectations of bowlers about their scores in an upcoming game and about their responses to various outcomes at, above, and below expectations. We also measured actual affective reactions after the bowlers had completed their games. Findings suggest that subjects both expect and experience a loss-averse, expectation-based value function broadly of the Prospect Theory type. They also anticipate, and experience, an amplifying effect of outcome surprise, though they underestimate its size. We argue that such underestimation, together with overtight prediction ranges, may expose subjects to much larger affective variation with outcome variability than they anticipate. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
This research investigates how choice-process satisfaction is influenced by limitation of choice option and by the types of features used to represent the options. Studies of choice satisfaction have focused on how satisfied the decision maker feels about the choice that has been made and have overlooked the importance of the process through which the decision maker makes a choice, i.e., choice-process satisfaction. We show that the comparability of choice options through alignable features increases choice-process satisfaction, whereas option limitation (i.e., making one option unavailable from a set of equally attractive options) decreases choice-process satisfaction. Further, this decrease in satisfaction, relative to all options being available, occurs for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are alignable (i.e., differences of a corresponding dimension) but not for people who are given a set of options in which the difference features are nonalignable (i.e., differences of unique dimensions). We propose that alignable differences are easier to compare and have more weight in people's attribute processing, and thus give rise to a perception of a greater amount of information about the option set that is relevant for choice. Making an option unavailable in this case would have a bigger impact than in a situation in which all options have nonalignable differences. Nonalignable differences are difficult to process and are less likely to make people aware that there is very much information about the options for decision making. This explanation and the interaction effect between option limitation and feature alignability are tested in four experiments. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
This article provides a summary of empirical research on groupthink theory. Groupthink research, including analyses of historical cases of poor group decision making and laboratory tests of groupthink, is reviewed. Results from these two research areas are briefly compared. Theoretical and methodological issues for future groupthink research are identified and discussed. I conclude that groupthink research has had and continues to have considerable heuristic value. A small, but growing, body of empirical literature has been generated. In addition, groupthink research has stimulated a number of theoretical ideas, most of which have yet to be tested. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
In this series of experiments we investigate two commonly used methods of assigning numerical values (i.e., decision weights) to attributes in order to signify their perceived relative importance. The two methods are to ask people to directly rate each of the attributes in turn (Rating), or to allocate a budget of points (typically 100 points) to the attributes (Point Allocation or PA). These procedures may seem to be minor variants of one another, yet they produce very different profiles of decision weights. The differences are predicted by a simple, idealized model of weighting, from which Rating and PA, in different ways, exhibit consistent elicitation-dependent bias.
The current study examined the strategies used by people to solve resource-allocation problems. Verbal protocols were recorded as participants provided meal choices for seven consecutive days with limited resources available to spend on meals and with daily constraints imposed on meal consumption. None of the participants incorporated the established mathematical procedures (i.e., Linear Programming) to arrive at the optimum number of meals possible in a week. However, the strategies they did use enabled them to achieve meal totals on average at 94% of this optimal amount. A few participants attempted to first solve the maximum meals possible in a week before scheduling this solution across the seven days (solve-and-schedule strategy), but the majority of participants simply selected meals on a day-to-day basis while checking resource availability each day to allow for full resource consumption (consume-and-check strategy). The findings of this study provide a preliminary step toward understanding how people make intuitive resource-allocation decisions. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
Recent research has demonstrated that the perceived certainty of a focal outcome depends not only on the overall amount of evidence supporting the alternatives to the focal outcome, but also on how that evidence is distributed across those alternatives (e.g., Windschitl & Wells, 1998). Three experiments replicated this alternative-outcomes effect across a variety of evidence distributions and investigated a heuristic comparison account for the effect. Participants provided gut-level certainty estimates for winning hypothetical raffles in which they and several other players held specified numbers of tickets. Results revealed that alternative-outcomes effects are not dependent on variations in the rank-order status of the focal outcome (Experiment 1) and are reliable but reduced in magnitude when the focal outcome is the least likely outcome (Experiment 2). Also, consistent with a core premise of the heuristic comparison account, evidence supporting the strongest alternative outcome was shown to play the primary role in producing alternative-outcomes effects (Experiment 3). Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
Within the context of decision analysis, the aim of this work is to discover whether the structure of objectives generated with value-focused thinking (VFT) is different from the structure generated with alternative-focused thinking (AFT). In the first of two studies, two different groups of subjects created a structure of objectives for the same decision problem. Fourteen independent assessments were made for each group. After the terms used by the two groups, were standardized, it was found that the group using VFT generated a more extensive and hierarchical structure than the AFT group. With regard to the content of the objectives, it can be stated that the VFT structure covered aspects of the problem not covered by AFT. In the second study, structures representative of the two approaches were judged by a group of decision-makers-actually involved in the problem-with respect to several qualities. It was found that the structure generated by VFT was equal or superior to that generated by AFT in all qualities judged. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
The author examines the influence of experienced regret on the selection of the reference point used in post-choice valuation. He incorporates two reference points, expected performance and performance of the forgone alternative, the former affecting the amount of satisfaction and the latter affecting the amount of regret experienced by a decision maker. Prior research on regret has assumed only a two-alternative choice set with the forgone alternative being the reference point for measuring regret. The author relaxes that assumption and develops hypotheses to examine the selection of the reference point in cases that more closely represent real-life experience (i.e., choice sets with more than two alternatives). Two studies are reported. The results from the first study support most of the hypotheses. The second study further investigated the selection of a reference point. Several theoretical and managerial implications are discussed and future research directions are suggested. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
This research investigates preferences and judgments under ambiguous vs conflicting information. Three studies provided evidence for two major hypotheses: (1) Conflicting messages from two equally believable sources are dispreferred in general to two informatively equivalent, ambiguous, but agreeing messages from the same sources (i.e., conflict aversion); and (2) conflicting sources are perceived as less credible than ambiguous sources. Studies 2 and 3 yielded evidence for two framing effects. First, when the outcome was negative, subjects' preferences were nearly evenly split between conflict and ambiguity, whereas a positive outcome produced marked conflict aversion. Second, a high probability of a negative outcome or a low probability of a positive one induced conflict preference. However, no framing effects were found for source credibility judgments. Study 3 also investigated whether subject identification with a source might affect preferences or credibility judgments, but found no evi dence for such an effect. The findings suggest cognitive and moti vational explanations for conflict aversion as distinct from ambi guity aversion. The cognitive heuristic is that conflict raises suspicions about whether the sources are trustworthy or credi ble. The motivational explanation stems from that idea that if sources disagree, then the judge not only becomes uncertain but also must disagree with at least one of the sources, whereas if the sources agree then the judge may agree with them and only has to bear the uncertainty. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
The purpose of this experiment was to explore the possibility that the inconsistent findings of Brehmer and Hagafors (1986, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38, 181-195), Sniezek and Buckley (1995, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 159-174), and leader-member exchange research regarding leaders' propensity to differentially and accurately weight staff input can be explained as a result of experience, the availability to the leader of staff member judgment confidence, and the cumulative past accuracy of each staff member. The availability to the team leader of staff member past judgment accuracy and staff member judgment confidence was provided in an environment in which differential staff weighting was the appropriate staff utilization strategy. Eighty-four leaders of four-person decision-making teams performed 63 decisions on a computerized decision-making task. Both experience and providing leaders with cumulative staff past accuracy information were related to greater staff weighting variability and greater staff weighting accuracy. Although positively related to staff weighting, staff confidence information did not improve leader weighting variability nor actual staff weighting accuracy. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
Preferences often fluctuate as a result of transient changes in hunger and other visceral states. When current decisions have delayed consequences, the preferences that should be relevant are those that will prevail when the consequences occur. However, consistent with the notion of an intrapersonal empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996) we find that an individual's current state of appetite has a significant effect on choices that apply to the future. Participants in our study made advance choices between healthy and unhealthy snacks (i.e., fruit and junk food) that they would receive in 1 week when they were either hungry (late in the afternoon) or satisfied (immediately after lunch). In 1 week, at the appointed time, they made an immediate choice, an opportunity to change their advance choice. Our main predictions were strongly confirmed. First, advance choices were influenced by current hunger as well as future hunger: hungry participants chose more unhealthy snacks than did satisfied ones. Second, participants were dynamically inconsistent: they chose far more unhealthy snacks for immediate choice than for advance choice. An additional hypothesis related to gender differences was also confirmed. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
Individuals do not seek help, even when help is needed and available, because help seeking implies incompetence and dependence, and therefore is related to powerlessness. It was hypothesized that gender, status, and organizational norms affect the importance of maintaining and accruing power, which in turn affect help seeking behaviors. A laboratory and a field study showed that there was more help seeking between equal-status than unequal-status individuals. Further, both studies revealed that males sought more help in collective than individualistic organizational norms, though the trend was not apparent for females. These results shed light on the psychological mechanisms underlying help seeking behaviors and have practical implications for developing steps to foster help seeking in organizations. Copyright 1997 Academic Press.
Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. We still find systematic differences between confidence and accuracy, including an overall bias toward overconfidence. However, these effects vary greatly with the type of judgment. There is little general overconfidence with two-choice questions and pronounced overconfidence with subjective confidence intervals. Over- and underconfidence also vary systematically with the domain of questions asked, but not as a function of difficulty. We also find stable individual differences. Determining why some people, some domains, and some types of judgments are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how confidence judgments are made. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
Goals are central to current treatments of work motivation, and goal commitment is a critical construct in understanding the relationship between goals and performance. Inconsistency in the measurement of goal commitment hindered early research in this area but the nine-item, self-report scale developed by Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (1989b), and derivatives of that scale, have become the most commonly used measures of goal commitment. Despite this convergence, a few authors, based on small sample studies, have raised questions about the dimensionality of this measure. To address the conflicting recommendations in the literature regarding what items to use in assessing goal commitment, the current study combines the results of 17 independent samples and 2918 subjects to provide a more conclusive assessment by combining meta-analytic and multisample confirmatory factor analytic techniques. This effort reflects the first combined use of these techniques to test a measurement model and allowed for the creation of a database substantially larger than that of previously factor analyzed samples containing these scale items. By mitigating sampling error, the results clarified a number of debated issues that have arisen out of previous small sample factor analyses and revealed a five-item scale that is unidimensional and equivalent across measurement timing, goal origin, and task complexity. It is recommended that this five-item scale be used in future research assessing goal commitment. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
We examined conditions under which contextually activated information affects strategic decision-making and found that the subjective framing of organizational issues may be affected by variables other than semantic manipulation. Context information may be used as an interpretation frame (and lead to assimilation) or as a reference frame (and lead to contrast). Whether context information instigates assimilative interpretation or contrastive comparison processes may depend on the level of categorical context-target similarity. This is demonstrated in three experiments in which participants read an unambiguous business threat or opportunity scenario prior to judging an ambiguous, strategic issue. Findings are discussed in the light of previous judgment and decision-making studies of framing and context effects. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (LSG, 1998) have distinguished among three types of framing-risky choice, attribute, and goal framing-to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature. In the research reported here, we focus on attribute and goal framing. LSG propose that positive frames should be more effective than negative frames in the context of attribute framing, and negative frames should be more effective than positive frames in the context of goal framing. We test this framework by manipulating frame valence (positive vs negative) and frame type (attribute vs goal) in a unified context with common procedures. We also argue that the nature of effects in a goal-framing context may depend on the extent to which the research topic has "intrinsic self-relevance" to the population. In the context of medical decision making, we operationalize low intrinsic self-relevance by using student subjects and high intrinsic self-relevance by using patients. As expected, we find complete support for the LSG framework under low intrinsic self-relevance and modified support for the LSG framework under high intrinsic self-relevance. Overall, our research appears to confirm and extend the LSG framework. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
Making external attributions for negative events, though often considered "self-serving," also implies that the attributor is not in control of critical resources. We hypothesized that making external attributions for negative events will lead to impressions of powerlessness. Because individuals in high-status roles are expected to have power and control, external attributions may violate these role expectations; thus, we further hypothesized that status would moderate the relationship between attributions and interpersonal outcomes. Specifically, more negative impressions and affect will be directed toward high-status individuals who make external attributions than toward their lower status counterparts. Three studies were conducted, one using a role-play methodology, one using an experimentally created hierarchy, and one using vignettes. The results supported our hypotheses: external attributions can be highly disserving for people in high-status positions. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
Unlike solo negotiators, members of negotiating teams may for strategic reasons choose to play different roles; the familiar "good cop/bad cop" distributive bargaining tactic is one example of role differentiation designed to enhance a team's success at the bargaining table. In two empirical studies about a hypothetical three-person work group, we examined the cognitive processes underlying this tactic using a social-cognitive decision model (Brodt & Duncan, 1998) that conceptualizes the negotiators' decision tasks and persuasion processes. Results generally supported the model except for an intriguing asymmetry depending on a person's initial inclination (accepting, rejecting). This research extends findings on the tactic and on contrast effects (Cialdini, 1984) and supports the model's usefulness as an approximate representation of negotiator cognition. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
People have been shown to view their beliefs as being prototypical (modal) but their abilities as (falsely) unique (above or below average). It is possible that these two viewpoints - self as prototypical and self as unique - can be reconciled. If the distribution of ability for a given skill is skewed such that many others have high (low) ability and few others have low (high) ability, it is possible that a majority of peoples' self-assessments can be above (below) average. Participants in 5 studies demonstrated an understanding that various skills have skewed ability distributions and their self-assessments were related to distribution shape: high when negatively skewed and low when positively skewed. Further, participants tended to place themselves near the mode of their perceived skill distribution. Participants were most likely to think that they were good at skills for which they thought that most others were also good.
Two experiments tested a sequential bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting. The findings suggest that although the comparative statics of the normative model are somewhat descriptive of the qualitative features of the data, bargainers do not conform to the signaling process that underlies bargaining models with incomplete information. Rather than assess and refine a probabilistic assessment of the private information based on the informed bargainer's behavior, uninformed bargainers infer their opponents' competitiveness. Further, bargainers are unable to use cost of delay in the strategic manner dictated by the equilibrium solution. The evidence suggests that although bargaining behavior is primarily determined by situational constraints, bargainers attribute their opponents' behavior to personal disposition, such as their level of competitiveness. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
This article introduces the study of frame choice in negotiation. Here, the selection of a procedural frame is treated as a dependent variable-a choice that bargainers make in addition to determining their offers. The empirical focus of the article is on whether, when given a choice between two alternative versions of the ultimatum bargaining game, negotiators choose the description that maximizes their expected payoffs. For example, in one frame-choice task, negotiators assigned to the Player 1 role were asked to select between framing the game as "Player 1 proposes a division and Player 2 accepts or rejects it" or "Player 1 makes a claim from a common pool and Player 2 makes a counterclaim." Past research has shown that the second frame leads to higher expected payoffs for Player 1 than does the first. Across four studies and three established framing effects, it is found that participants consistently fail to select the procedural frames that optimize monetary outcomes. Subsequent analyses suggest that this tendency is due to two factors: (a) nonmonetary motivations, such as fairness and respect, that influence frame-choice preferences and (b) cognitive limitations that inhibit the ability to accurately predict the effect of alternative procedural frames on opponents' responses Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
The effects of sex and behavioral flexibility on leader perceptions were examined in small groups performing under two task conditions. We predicted, based on theory and previous empirical research, that leadership perceptions would be higher for: (1) persons higher in three indicators of behavioral flexibility (self-monitoring, self-reported behavioral capabilities, and androgyny), (2) males in general, and (3) tasks that were sex-congruent. Results showed significant, strong support for behavioral flexibility and sex effects and weak support for the effects of sex-congruent tasks. Exploratory analyses showed that perceived target capabilities mediated the effects of sex and behavioral flexibility. The discussion is organized around a theoretical model which suggests that target behavior and sex-based cues leading to leader categorization are in part mediated by inferred target capabilities. These capabilities show parallels to leadership-relevant traits such as masculinity, dominance, extroversion, and adjustment, identified in early leadership research. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
The authors investigate two competing hypotheses about how chronic vividness of imagery interacts with the vividness and salience of information in decision making. Results from four studies, covering a variety of decision domains, indicate that chronic imagery vividness rarely amplifies the effects of vivid and salient information. Imagery vividness may, in fact, attenuate the effects of vivid and salient information. This is because, relative to nonvivid imagers, vivid imagers rely less on information that appears obvious and rely more on information that seems less obvious. This tendency is so robust that vividness of imagery may amplify the effects of vivid information only when this information is the only information available in the decision field. The findings seem to reflect vivid imagers' tendency to totally immerse themselves in a decision problem and scrutinize the available information creatively. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
Common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas constitute a class of social dilemmas in which equilibrium behavior results in Pareto deficient outcomes that are not at all desirable by the group. We focus on a class of CPR dilemmas that, in addition to strategic uncertainty about the harvesting behavior of the other group members, include environmental uncertainty about the size of the CPR. In an attempt to decrease the rate of requests from the common pool, and thereby increase individual payoffs, we extend previous research-both theoretically and experimentally-in two different directions. In the bonus treatment, a reward is given to the agent(s) who requests the least, and in the penalty treatment, a charge is imposed on the agent(s) who requests the most. We show that under equilibrium play the bonus treatment decreases total group request, whereas the penalty treatment increases it. Our experimental results do not support this prediction. Rather, both treatments considerably decrease the rate of request and, therefore, increase the rate of provision. The penalty treatment is shown to be more effective in reducing individual requests and enhancing provision rates than the bonus treatment. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
Results of this experiment demonstrate that individualists and collectivists react differently to minority influence. Based on the distinction between objectivity and preference norms in the minority influence literature, we hypothesize that individualism and collectivism influence (A) responses to minority influence (focusing on the target of influence) and (B) effectiveness of minority influence (focusing on the influence agent). Our results replicate past research and demonstrate improved decision quality for individuals exposed to a minority perspective. Moreover, minority influence targets with high horizontal individualism and low horizontal collectivism made higher quality decisions. Influence targets with high vertical collectivism demonstrated higher quality decisions when the influence agent held a high status position in the group. Results also demonstrate that influence agents with high vertical individualism experienced less role stress than those with low vertical individualism. Finally, influence agents with low role stress were more effective in influencing the decision making of others. We discuss our findings in terms of boundary conditions to the minority influence process. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
Decision makers in dynamic environments (e.g., stock trading, inventory control, and firefighting) learn poorly in experiments where feedback about the outcomes of their actions is delayed. In searching for ways to mitigate these effects, this paper presents two computational models of learning with feedback delays and contrasts them against human decision-makers' performance. The no-memory model hypothesizes that decision makers always perceive feedback as immediate. The with-memory model hypothesizes that, over time, decision makers are able to develop internal representations of the task that help them to perform with delayed feedback. As borne out by human subjects, both models predict that a display of past history improves learning with delay and that increasing delay increasingly degrades performance. Even though the length of training in this task exceeds that used in many laboratory-based dynamic tasks, neither the two models nor the subjects are able to effectively learn without decision aids when faced with feedback delays. When given an amount of training that more closely approximates that provided in functioning dynamic environments, the with-memory model predicts that human decision makers may learn without decision aids over the long term if feedback delays are simple. These results raise several issues for continued theoretical investigation as well as potential suggestions for training and supporting decision makers in dynamic environments with feedback delays. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
This study investigated whether calibration and discrimination are distinct or related aspects of probability judgment accuracy by examining the effects of two different training techniques. Participants received either performance feedback or environmental feedback, and we measured their improvement in calibration and discrimination as a function of feedback type. Whereas performance feedback reduced participants' overconfidence and environmental feedback improved discrimination, neither type of feedback led to an improvement on the other component. In fact, environmental feedback led to an increase in overconfidence. We take these results as evidence that calibration and discrimination are dissociable abilities that require separate training techniques for improvement. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
A policy capturing method combining human judgment with ridge regression is offered which results in superior judgment policy models. The new method (termed smart ridge regression) was tested against four others in seven judgment policy capturing applications. Performance criteria were two cross-validation indices: cross-validated multiple correlation and mean squared error of prediction of new judgments. Smart ridge regression was found to outperform ordinary least squares regression and conventional ridge regression, as well as subjective weighting and equal weighting of cues.
When six equally qualified candidates compete for the same position, p = 1/6 for each. People seem to accept this principle more readily for numerical than for verbal probabilities. Equal chances with three to six alternatives are often verbally described in a positive vein as "entirely possible" or "a good chance" and rarely negatively as "doubtful" or "improbable." This equiprobability effect of verbal probabilities is demonstrated in five studies describing job applicants, lottery players, competing athletes, and examination candidates. The equiprobability effect is consistent with a causal (propensity) view of probabilities, where chances are believed to reflect the relative strength of facilitating and preventive causes. If important conditions in support of the target outcome are present (the candidate is qualified for the position), and there is little to prevent it from occurring (no stronger candidates), chances appear to be good. In the presence of obstacles (one stronger candidate), or in the absence of facilitating conditions (the candidate is poorly qualified), chances appear to be poor, even when numerical p values remain constant. The findings indicate that verbal and numerical probability estimates can reflect different intuitions. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
The term "diversification bias" refers to the tendency for people to take more variety when choosing several items simultaneously than when choosing them sequentially. In this article, we investigate whether this really is a bias by measuring evaluations of sets chosen simultaneously or sequentially. In Experiment 1 participants made two choices between audio tracks for consecutive consumption. Participants liked low-variety sets most and were more likely to choose high-variety sets in simultaneous choice. In Experiment 2 participants chose between three gambles which varied in the probability of winning and their expected value. Again, simultaneous choices seemed worse than sequential ones: The simultaneous-choice groups took far more low expected value gambles than did sequential-choice subjects and rated their enjoyment as lower. We conclude that simultaneous choice often leads to outcomes that are worse than sequential choice and discuss the circumstances when this is likely to be true.
This study contributes to the new and growing body of research on shared cognition by examining how individuals entering a group decision-making context with different perspectives of the issues to be discussed arrive at cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus refers to similarity among group members regarding how key matters are conceptualized and was operationalized as shared assumptions underlying decision issues in the present research. Utilizing 37 student groups participating in a multi-issue decision-making exercise, the study investigated antecedents and correlates of cognitive consensus. Results revealed that unanimity decision rule groups achieved more cognitive consensus than majority rule groups. In addition, group members inquiring concerning the reasons underlying others' decision preferences, accepting others' viewpoints as legitimate, and incorporating others' perspectives into their own interpretations of the issues was positively related to arriving at a greater degree of cognitive consensus. Cognitive consensus also positively influenced expectations regarding decision implementation and satisfaction. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
The basic elements of social decision scheme (SDS) theory are individual preferences, group preference compositions (distinguishable distributions), patterns of group influence (decision schemes, social combination rules), and collective responses (group decisions, judgments, solutions, and the like). The theory provides a framework for addressing two fundamental questions in the study of group performance: How are individual resources combined to yield a group response (the individual-into-group problem)? What are the implications of empirical observations under one set of circumstances for other conditions where data do not exist (the sparse data problem)? Several prescriptions for how to conduct fruitful group research are contained in the SDS tradition: make precise theoretical statements, provide strong and competitive tests of theories, and interpret empirical findings in the context of robust process models. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
The primary purpose of this research was to subject Conlon and Garland's (1993; Garland & Conlon, 1998) project completion hypothesis to a stronger test than it has faced in the past. We conducted an experiment in which we manipulated the degree of completion, sunk-cost amount, and anticipated sales price for a hypothetical real estate development project. The sales price information allowed participants to calculate the economic value of the project. Participants were also held "accountable" in the sense that they had to explain the reasoning behind their decisions to the experimenter. Together, the sales price information and accountability stipulation created an inducement to engage in an economically rational decision process. In spite of this inducement, participants were unduly affected by the project's closeness to completion. In fact, when the project was close to being finished, they often recommended completing the project even when it was economically unwise to do so. While the effects of the project completion manipulation were surprisingly strong, the sunk-cost manipulation had virtually no effect. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
When testing hypotheses, rare or unexpected observations are normatively more informative than common observations, and recent studies have shown that participants' behavior reflects this principle. Research has also shown that, when asked to test conditional hypotheses ("If X, then Y") that are abstract or unfamiliar, participants overwhelmingly consider a supporting observation mentioned in the hypothesis (X&Y) to be more informative than a supporting observation not mentioned ( approximately X approximately Y). These two empirical findings would mesh well if conditional hypotheses tend to be phrased in terms of rare, rather than common, events. Six experiments are reported indicating that people do have a tendency-often a very strong one-to phrase conditional hypotheses in terms of rare events. Thus, observations mentioned in conditional hypotheses might generally be considered highly informative because they usually are highly informative. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
We propose that managers have norms (standards of appropriate behavior) for resolving conflict, that these norms are culturally based, and that they explain cultural differences in conflict management outcomes. We confirm that the traditionally American norms of discussing parties' interests and synthesizing multiple issues were exhibited more strongly by American managers than by their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. In addition, we confirm that the traditionally Chinese norms of concern for collective interests and concern for authority appeared more strongly among Hong Kong Chinese managers than among their American counterparts. American managers were more likely than Hong Kong Chinese managers, to resolve a greater number of issues and reach more integrative outcomes, while Hong Kong Chinese managers were more likely to involve higher management in conflict resolution. Culture had a significant effect on whether parties selected an integrative outcome rather than an outcome that involved distribution, compromise, higher management, or no resolution at all. Conflict norms explained the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching an outcome involving distribution, compromise, or higher management; however, conflict norms did not fully explain the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching no resolution. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
Time constraint can impair decision performance: time-constrained decision makers process information faster, process less information, and use less rigorous decision strategies. On the other hand, properly designed decision support systems (DSSs) can induce decision makers to process more information and use more rigorous decision strategies, which can result in enhanced performance. In this study, we investigate, drawing on bounded rationality and cost-benefit theories of DSS use, whether these salutary effects of DSSs still hold in time-constrained environments. Our experimental results replicate past research regarding the effects of time constraint and DSSs taken separately and also show that the positive effects of DSSs are maintained when decision makers are under time constraint. That is, consistent with hypotheses, time-constrained participants processed information in a more compensatorylike manner when aided by DSSs than when not. Some of the results suggest that the negative effects of time constraint can be mitigated or even eliminated by the use of DSSs, but some participants did not take full advantage of the DSS to combat time constraint. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.