Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Online ISSN: 1460-2113
Print ISSN: 0026-4423
Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables are not influenced by future measurement settings. The assumption has sometimes been questioned, but the suggestion has been thought outlandish, even by the taxed standards of the discipline. (Bell thought that it led to fatalism.) The case for this reaction turns out to be surprisingly weak, however. We show that QM easily evades the standard objections to advanced action. And the approach has striking advantages, especially in avoiding the apparent conflict between Bell's Theorem and special relativity. The second part of the paper considers the broader question as to why advanced action seems so counterintuitive. We investigate the origins of our ordinary intuitions about causal asymmetry. It is argued that the view that the past does not depend on the future is largely anthropocentric, a kind of projection of our own temporal asymmetry. Many physicists have also reached this conclusion, but have thought that if causation has no objective direction, there is no objective content to an advanced action interpretation of QM. This turns out to be a mistake. From the ordinary subjective perspective, we can distinguish two sorts of objective world: one "looks as if" it contains only forward causation, the other ``looks as if'' it involves a mix of backward and forward causation. This clarifies the objective core of an advanced action interpretation of QM, and shows that there is an independent symmetry argument in favour of the approach. Comment: 35 pages, LaTex (forthcoming in MIND, July 1994; written for a philosophical audience, but perhaps of some interest here)
Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.
In this paper, an argument from Gauker against the so-called expressive theory of communication is reviewed and rejected. In particular, a case of miscommunication which Gauker thought to be problematic for the expressive theory is analysed in terms of what Gauker called the `neutral perspective' on miscommunication, a perspective which is shown to accord well with recent semantic theories of underspecified meaning as well as with the expressive theory. 1 Gauker on Domains of Discourse In a number of recent publications, including a paper in Mind titled "Domains of Discourse " (Gauker 1997), Christopher Gauker has chosen a powerful opponent which he calls the expressive theory of communication and which he characterizes as "(...) any conception of language according to which the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey propositions to hearers" (Gauker 1997, p.5). There and elsewhere (Gauker 1992, Gauker 1994(b)), Gauker has argued that the expressive theory ...
This chapter on conceptions begins by looking at their nature and formation and goes on to look at higher and lower conceptions. It then describes genus, species, essence, differentia, etc. Other distinctions in genus and species are presented. The three powers of conceptions are listed. Next, inverse ratio of extension and intension is explored. The chapter continues by discussing denomination, various kinds of terms, quality of conceptions, notative and symbolic, logical division, and definition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The paradox of the Unexpected Hanging, related prediction paradoxes, and the sorites paradoxes all involve reasoning about ordered collections of entities: days ordered by date in the case of the Unexpected Hanging; men ordered by the number of hairs on their heads in the case of the bald man version of the sorites. The reasoning then assigns each entity a value that depends on the previously assigned value of one of the neighboring entities. The final result is paradoxical because it conflicts with the obviously correct, commonsensical value. The paradox is due to the serial procedure of assigning a value based on the newly assigned value of the neighbor. An alternative procedure is to assign each value based only on the original values of neighbors---a parallel procedure. That procedure does not give paradoxical answers. 1 The Paradox A version of the well-known Unexpected Hanging Paradox is: Having been convicted of murder, Mr. Hyde hears the judge's sentence on Thursday,...
small' is just as vague as `small': both apply to 0 and apply exactly in the same way to all other integers. By contrast, when n is clearly not small, say n=10 , then the extension of the predicate `n-small' is determined exclusively by the `less than n' clause, and is therefore perfectly sharp: every integer less than is 10 -small, every other integer is not. Since there is no clear value of n which marks the difference between predicates of the first sort (with border cases) and predicates of the second sort (without border cases), one can now construct a soritical argument for `vague' that parallels (1a)--(1c): (3a) `1-small' is vague. (3b) For every integer n: if `n-small' is vague, then so is `n+1-small'. (3c) Therefore `10 -small' is vague. Consequently, `vague' is vague. Some commentators (for instance Deas 1989) have objected to this line of reasoning on account of its parasitic form. After all, the vagueness exhibited by (3a)--(3c) is really not a feature of
Book InformationIllocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. By William P. Alston. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London. 2000. Pp. xiii + 327. Hardback, £29.95.
Book InformationFoundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom. Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom Frederick Neuhouser Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press 2000 xiii + 337 Hardback £35.95, $52.50 By Frederick Neuhouser. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. Pp. xiii + 337. Hardback:£35.95, $52.50,
Book InformationPerforming Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the Ends of Art. Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the Ends of Art Richard Shusterman Ithaca and London Cornell University Press 2000 xii + 266 Hardback £33.80 Paperback £11.50 By Richard Shusterman. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London. Pp. xii + 266. Hardback:£33.80; Paperback:£11.50,
Book InformationCognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction. Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction by Deborah Achtenberg . Albany, NY: State University of New York Press , 2002 . xiv + 218 . H/b $62.50 , P/b $20.95 By Deborah Achtenberg. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Pp. xiv + 218. H/b: $62.50, P/b: $20.95,
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Book InformationMoral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. By Ted Lockhart. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xvi + 221. Hardback, £33.50.
Book InformationRoutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward Craig London and New York Routledge 1998 Ten vols. 8,680 Hardback or CD-ROM £2,450. Both £2,950 Edited by Edward Craig . Routledge. London and New York. Pp. Ten vols. 8,680. Hardback or CD-ROM:£2,450. Both £2,950,
Book InformationEpistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa . Oxford: Blackwell , 2003 . xii + 240 . H/b £50.00 , P/b £16.99 By Laurence BonJour. and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. Pp. xii + 240. H/b: £50.00, P/b: £16.99,
Book InformationEpistemic Justification. Epistemic Justification Richard Swinburne Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 262 Hardback £35.00 Paperback £14.99 By Richard Swinburne. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 262. Hardback:£35.00; Paperback:£14.99,
Book InformationReclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. Edited by Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman and Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1997. Pp. 415. Hardback, £60.00, $80.00.
Book InformationFinite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics by Robert M. Adams . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 1999 . xvi + 410 . H/b £35.00 By Robert M. Adams. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. xvi + 410. H/b: £35.00,
Book InformationFacing Facts. Facing Facts Stephen Neale Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 xv + 254 Hardback £25.00 By Stephen Neale. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. xv + 254. Hardback:£25.00,
Book InformationJokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters. Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters Ted Cohen Chicago University of Chicago Press 1999 xi + 99 Hardback $15.00 By Ted Cohen. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. Pp. xi + 99. Hardback:$15.00,
Book InformationKant and Modern Political Philosophy. By Katrin Flikschuh. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. viii + 216. Hardback, £35.00.
Book InformationNorms of Nature. Naturalism and the Nature of Functions. By Paul Sheldon Davies. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA. 2001. Pp. xiv + 234. Hardback, £20.50.
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