Journal of World-Systems Research

Published by University Library System, University of Pittsburgh
Online ISSN: 1076-156X
-Global Disparities in PCI: Aggregate Views Lead over Periphery (Ratio)
-Global Disparities in PCI: Regional Patterns US Lead over Different Regions (Ratio)
-Global Disparities by Income Categories
This paper reviews the growing body of evidence on the relative economic standing of different regions of the world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In general, it does not find support for Eurocentric claims regarding Western Europe’s early economic lead. The Eurocentric claims are based primarily on estimates of a per capita income, which are plagued by conceptual problems, make demands on historical data that are generally unavailable, and they use questionable assumptions to reconstruct early per capita income. A careful examination of these conjectural estimates of per capita income, however, does not support claims that Western Europe had a substantial lead over the rest of the world at the beginning of the nineteenth century. An examination of several alternative indices of living standards in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries – such as real wages, labor productivity in agriculture, and urbanization – also fails to confirm claims of European superiority. In addition, this paper examines the progress of global disparities – including the presence of regional patterns – using estimates of per capita income.
Argentina Current Account 1992-2002
Ecuador Inflation (1998-2006).
Argentina and Ecuador (1998-2006).
Current Account with (CAR) and without Remittances (CAWR) (1980-2006).
The paper sheds light on the apparent success of dollarization in Ecuador. The experience of Argentina with convertibility is used to anchor the analysis. Two key factors are seen to play the most important role; first, the behavior of the real exchange rate and second, the source of external resources. The papers explains that exogenous determinants of the real exchange rate- productivity growth, the value of the dollar, commodity prices- have tended to behave very differently over the respective life spans of the Argentine and Ecuadorian monetary regimes. Trends in these exogenous variables have favored positive trends in the Ecuadorian current account. However, as the paper shows, the critical element informing the sustainability of the currency remains the source of external funds. Whereas in Argentina the IMF and international capital flows were central in propping up the flawed regime, the fate of Ecuadorian experiment relies heavily on a surprising factor, remittances. Reliance on remittance income is seen as a stop gap that cannot secure sustainability of the monetary system and implies longer run consequences for lost development potential.
History continually messes up the neat conceptual frameworks and the more or less elegant theoretical speculations with which we endeavor to understand the past and forecast the future of the world we live in. In recent years, two events stand out as eminently subversive of the intellectual landscape: the sudden demise of the USSR as one of the two main loci of world power and the gradual rise of East Asia to epicenter of world -scale processes of capital accumulation. Although each event has received more than its due of scholarly attention, it is their joint occurrence that has the most significant conceptual and theoretical implications.
The article furthers the claim that many of the weaknesses of Marxist theory that constituted the starting point of critical approaches from Latin American dependency theory to world-systems analysis had been addressed in very similar terms as early as the 1900s. The focus is on intellectual debates in early twentieth-century Romania, especially as engendered by the theory of “forms without substance“ as an alternative project of modernization for the periphery and the follow-up confrontation between the socialist Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea and the Poporanist Constantin Stere on the issue of social and economic development.
This article examines the concept of the ‘external arena’ and the role of the ‘information network’ in the expansion of the world-system and incorporation of new regions. To address systemic incorporation, I reference research on nested networks of interaction, and echo criticisms that the impact of myth and misinformation has been underappreciated as an element of incorporation. Significant alteration occurs well-prior to the point at which most world-systems literature considers a region incorporated. I offer the concept of “protoglobalization” as a means of conceptualizing this early, overlooked social, economic, and political change. Abyssinia is of interest because it offers a rare case of cross-systemic incorporation. The region was historically part of the Red Sea trade complex, had linkages throughout the interior of Africa, and existed on the periphery of the Indian Ocean world-system. So while initially outside the realm of European contact, this case offers an example of successful resistance to incorporation and how that process can be understood. Additionally, it offers a case study of crosssystemic incorporation, which has been lacking in the literature. As such, it also contributes to the concept of a ‘contested periphery’. The case reaffirms the significant impact external regions can have on the functioning of “internal” system actors; the mere myth of Prester John spurred significant effort by European powers to locate his legendary Christian Kingdom. Finally, the article uses the methodological innovation of historical maps to trace the border of the ‘information network’, which allows for a refinement of our understanding of the complex process of incorporation and an improved model of the relationship between networks of interaction, frontiers, contestation, and incorporation.
This paper claims that, since many of the concepts relevant to our analysis of systemic change were coined in and about the core, the potential with which solutions to worldsystemic crisis are credited in the long run should be assessed differently depending on the structural location of their origin. In the periphery, such concepts as conservatism, socialism and even liberalism took forms that often retained nothing of the original model but the name, such that strategies of applying them to (semi)peripheral situations ranged from “stretching the ideology” to “discarding the (liberal) myth” altogether. In a first step, “the hypothesis of semiperipheral development” (Chase-Dunn and Hall), according to which the semiperiphery represents the most likely locus of political, economical, and institutional change, is amended to say that, at least for the late modern world-system, the strength of the semiperiphery resides primarily in the cultural and epistemic sphere. In a second step, this contention is illustrated with the help of major challenges that the Eastern European and Latin American (semi)peripheries have posed to the worldsystem’s political fields and institutional settings both in the past and to date—with different degrees of success corresponding to their respective structural position. In light of these examples, it is argued that a comparative analysis of continuities among political epistemologies developed in the semiperiphery can help us understand the ways in which similar attempts can become antisystemic today.
I argue that international politics – and globalization in particular – must be understood by tracing their historical development. Many of the present phenomena of ‘globalization’ have their roots in the expansion of the European state system. I trace the process of incorporation, and develop a refined model of incorporation, including the development of a ‘zone of ignorance’ beyond the ‘known’ world which serves as an enabling mechanism for actors promoting incorporating behavior (i.e., exploration, colonization, conquest). I argue that significant socio-cultural, political, and economic change occurs upon contact between civilizations, and that these early changes have been largely overlooked in current international relations and ‘modern’ globalization literature. Quite simply, the rules of the game and the agenda for negotiations are solidified rather early, well before most scholars examine the processes associated with globalization.
The recent shift from ‘global villageism’ to the ‘new wars’ revealed a deep crisis in heterodox political economy. The popular belief in neoliberal globalization, peace dividends, fiscal conservatism and sound finance that dominated the 1980s and 1990s suddenly collapsed. The early 2000s brought rising xenophobia, growing military budgets and policy profligacy. Radicals were the first to identify this transition, but their attempts to explain it have been bogged down by two major hurdles: (1) most writers continue to apply nineteenth century theories and concepts to twenty-first century realities; and (2) few seem to bother with empirical analysis. This paper offers a radical alternative that is both theoretically new and empirically grounded. We use the ‘new wars’ as a stepping stone to understand a triple transformation that altered the nature of capital, the accumulation of capital and the unit of capital. Specifically, our argument builds on a power understanding of capital that emphasizes differential accumulation by dominant capital groups. Accumulation, we argue, has little to do with the amassment of material things measured in ‘utils’ or ‘dead labour.’ Instead, accumulation, or ‘capitalization,’ represents a commodification of power by leading groups in society. Over the past century, this power has been re-structured and concentrated through two distinct regimes of differential accumulation – ‘breadth’ and ‘depth.’ A breadth regime relies on proletarianization, on green-field investment and, particularly, on mergers and acquisitions. A depth regime builds on redistribution through stagflation – that is, on differential inflation in the midst of stagnation. In contrast to breadth which presupposes some measure of growth and stability, depth thrives on ‘accumulation through crisis.’ The past twenty years were dominated by breadth, buttressed by neoliberal rhetoric, globalization and capital mobility. This regime started to run into mounting difficulties in the late 1990s, and eventually collapsed in 2000. For differential accumulation to continue, dominant capital now needs inflation, and inflation requires instability and social crisis. It is within this broader dynamics of power accumulation that the new wars need to be understood.
-The Transnational Capitalist Class
Globalization is a relatively new idea in the social sciences, although people who work in and write about the mass media, transnational corporations and international business have been using it for some time. The purpose of this paper is to critically review the ways in which sociologists and other social scientists use ideas of globalization and to evaluate the fruitfulness of these competing conceptions. The central feature of the idea of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately studied at the level of nation-states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, they need to be conceptualized in terms of global processes. Some have even gone so far as to predict that global forces, by which they usually mean transnational corporations and other global economic institutions, global culture or globalizing belief systems/ideologies of various types, or a combination of all of these, are becoming so powerful that the continuing existence of the nation-state is in serious doubt. This is not a necessary consequence of most theories of globalization. The argument of this paper is that much of the globalization literature is confused because not all those who use the term distinguish it clearly enough from internation-alization, and some writers appear to use the two terms interchangeably. I argue that a clear distinction must be drawn between the inter-national and the global. The hyphen in inter-national is to distinguish (inadequate) conceptions of the global' founded on the existing even if changing system of nation-states, from (genuine) conceptions of the global based on the emergence of global processes and a global system of social relations not founded on national characteristics or nation-states. This global system theory is the framework for my own research. Globalization studies can be categorized on the basis of four research clusters:1. The world-systems approach; 2. The global culture approach; 3. The global society approach; 4. The global capitalism approach;The body of the paper is an exposition and critique of these approaches. The paper argues that the global capitalism approach is most productive for theory and research in globalization and concludes with a brief discussion of resistances to globalization.
In this paper, I argue that it is possible to enrich world-systems analysis with a heterodox Keynesian monetary theory of production known as the Theory of Money Emissions, based on the views put forward by the French economist Bernard Schmitt. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, I aim to rehabilitate and adapt the old Keynesian proposal of an international clearing union to the modern world-system by providing a rationale behind a common world currency and a renewed perspective on money and transnational production.
1 Chronological development from 1945-1995 of US payoffs
1 Equilibrium characterization for c=4.2
3 Equilibrium characterization for c=6
The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of 'size' into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo-institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multiple leaders may jointly provide public goods. A game-theoretic model is developed illustrating with Nash equilibria the conditions under which a hegemon rationally switches from hegemony to leadership. It also shows why followers rationally switch from free-riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading, in the sense of contributing to covering the cost of the production of the public goods. The emergence of joint leadership leads to multiple equilibria in the sense of allowing for multiple stable leadership constellations. The actors are in a mixed-motive or coordination game where they have different preferences for the equilibria, and thus different preferences for which strategies to choose, and for who is to take part in covering the cost of the production of the public goods. Two aspects of joint leadership 'after hegemony' are treated, namely coercive and benevolent leadership on the one hand, and collective action in the sense of joint leadership on the other hand. Finally, future leadership constellations and the quest for international order are discussed.
This article examines the concept of the ‘external arena’, the relationship it holds to the expansion of the modern world-system, and the process of systemic incorporation. In order to address the notion of systemic expansion, I examine how boundaries of the system are de?ned by networks of exchange and interaction and I echo criticisms that information and luxury goods networks exert important systemic impacts. Signi?cant change occurs well prior to the point at which traditional world-systems literature considers an arena ‘incorporated’. The case of the sea-otter fur trade and the relationship with the natives of the Northwest coast of America is used as an example of these processes of change in action. This case isselected because there is no question that the area is ‘pristine’; initially it is outside the realm of European contact. This region characterizes a ‘zone of ignorance’ beyond the traditional world-system that must undergo a signi?cant ‘grooming process’ before incorporation is more fully expanded, and this process is partially operationalized by the use of historically contemporary maps. Finally, the case o?ers a good example of the impact that external regions can exert on internal systemic behavior, as European powers were pushed to the brink of war in their e?orts to exploit the resources and peoples of the Nootka Sound region. I conclude by o?ering a more developed conceptualization of the process of incorporation and related concepts.
Some of the most insightful work in the political economy of the world-system area has been produced by researchers whose extensive fieldwork offers them deep familiarity with people and locales. Few other methods are as useful to understand the impacts of structural change on daily life and the ways agents resist, alter, and shape emerging structures. Yet such structural fieldwork is marginalized by the over-reliance of pedagogical materials on social constructionist, social psychological, or interactionist perspectives and also in world-systems research and writing by the privileging of long durée historical or quantitative cross-national methods. This paper introduces the concept of structural fieldwork to describe a qualitative field methodology in which the researcher is self-consciously guided by considerations emerging out of macro- sociological theories. We identify four advantages of structural fieldwork: the illumination of power’s multiple dimensions; examination of agency and its boundaries or limitations within broad political and economic structures; attention to nuances of change and durability, spatial and temporal specificities, and processes of change and durability; and challenging and extending social theory. These advantages are illustrated in select examples from existing literature and by discussion of the two author’s fieldwork-based research. The paper concludes that explicit attention to fieldwork may strengthen political economy and world-systems research and also de-marginalize political economy informed by structural fieldwork.
Let me begin by thanking everyone who commented on my ASA paper, "Toward a Praxis of World Integration," both those who were generally sympathetic to its thesis and those who were not. It is inconceivable to me that any two freethinking human beings living in our time could share the same preferred model of the good society. So of course I am not surprised that no one found every aspect of my vision appealing or that some found almost nothing to applaud. I would probably react to each of your utopias in muchthe same ways. Nonetheless, our species needs, perhaps more than anything else, to think together about where we want to go, and how, and why. Without tclos, how can we speak of praxis? And without praxis, what use is analysis? The point is to change the world and change it for the better.
The world-system idea has been used to explain a great deal about national institutional life, from rates of economic growth to changing patterns of schooling. One of the newer areas of interest is the environment. In the following review we examine scholarship that deals with environmental problems from a distinctly world systemic perspective.
Power polarity in the Far Eastern macro-social system is assessed at twenty five year intervals 1050 BC-AD 1850. Consistent with analysis of Indic system data, there is no support for the theory that the normal world-system power configuration is multipolar, hegemonic, or universal-empire. Instead several different "stability epochs" are discerned.
The attacks of September 11 are explored from the perspective of three temporalities—that of US hegemony (roughly the last 50 years), that of the history of modernity (roughly the last three hundred and ?fty years) and that of the ‘clash’ between Western and non–Western civilizations (roughly the last one thousand years). The attacks are symptomatic of the emergence of regional, networked actors that the US is not well prepared to address and which disrupt the national–developmental world order organized under US hegemony. By demonstrating one of the unintended consequences of modernity—the democratization of means of destruction—the attacks mark another nail in the co?n of the idea that progress can be attained through technological breakthroughs and the rational organization of the world (which we call hegemonic rationalistic modernity). The attempt to galvanize the Islamic community through an assault on its perceived rivals parallels the strategy of the Christian crusades 1000 years ago. The attacks mark a moment in the declining ability of the West to control the non–Western world. In conclusion, world order is likely to be reconstructed only if there is a move beyond US hegemony, rationalistic modernity, and the presumption of Western supremacy that characterize the contemporary world.
Workers and environmentalists in the United States have often found themselves on opposite sides of critical issues. Yet at the WTO meeting in Seattle in November 1999, they came together in a historic protest many see as a watershed in the formation of a new blue-green “Seattle Coalition.” However the two camps are again in con?ict over substantive issues, and in the changed political climate of post 9-11, the question arises of the coalition’s durability. The paper ?rst brie? y reviews the history of labor-environment interactions in the United States. It then examines a series of problems and potential areas of promise for the movements: di?culties of coalition-building, expectations of reciprocation, local vs. national connections, and the question of di?ering class cultures and interests. Finally, three areas of potential research and action are suggested: new roles for the mainstream environmental groups, just transition alliances and climate justice alliances. We propose that the environmen-tal justice and environmental health wings of the green movement are more suited to making long-term coalitions with labor than are habitat-oriented green groups.
Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks has become a very important inspiration for the twentieth-century Marxist political thinkers around the world. ‘Using Gramsci A New Approach’ is one of the most recent additions to various works done around the Prison Notebooks of this Great Italian political theorist and cultural critics. Michele Filippini, a researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Bologna has come up with ‘a new approach’ on Prison Notebooks and has touched some major concepts that are previously given little attention by Gramscian scholars. By extending Gramsci’s concepts beyond Marxist perspective, Filippini’s book provides expert guides to key features and themes in Gramsci’s writing in combination with the pressing political, social and cultural struggles of our time. The author does not show a clear connection between those topics discussed in the book, but his work remains a valuable addition to Gramscian thoughts in the twenty-first century. Key Words: Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ideology, the individual, Society
The concept of Immanuel Wallerstein's refers to the world before the times of European hegemony. It was not a homogeneous economy. Regardless the scale and forms of activity, there existed separate, greater regions that were basically self-suf?cient. Apart from them there were areas where only local ties, based on the natural economy, functioned. Taking into account the above premises, Janet Abu-Lughod discussed the eight macro-regions which existed in Europe, Asia and Northern Africa in the 13th–14th century. They were mutually linked by communication routes and by the activities of the major economic centres, i.e. towns. Among these regions, the author listed the European region, extending along the axis connecting England with Italy, the Mediterranean region (from Spain to Crimea), the Mongolian region (from Bejing to Kiev) and the Egyptian region (ranging from East Africa to the Indian coast at Calicut). Different countries partially belonged to spheres which were well constituted internally by world economic entities preceeding the rise of a world system.
This article is the fifth in a series in which the political careers of civilizations/world systems receive snapshot codings of their overall power structures at feasible intervals. The narratives are produced by collating histories with large frames of reference. The codings are done using a nominal variable, polarity, with seven available values. Previous articles in the series have examined the Indic system 550 bc–ad 1800, the Far Eastern 1025 bc–ad 1850, the Southwest Asian c. 2700–1500 bc, and the Northeast African c. 2625–1500 bc. The Northeast African and Southwest Asian systems and sequences merge c. 1500 bc to form the Central system. In the current article, the power structure of the Central Civilization/ World System is appraised over its first 800 years at 10–year intervals, from 1500 bc to an arbitrary stopping point of 700 bc. The systemic power structure is evaluated in terms of its predominant forms andtheir stability. During this 8-century period, the Central world system showed a distinct individuality, or “character”: multipolar and unipolar structures predominated; there was limited variety in structure, with extreme forms excluded; there was substantial structural stability. Over time, the Central system “aged”: its already limited structural variety further diminished, while its structural stability increased. The sequence of power configurations in the Central system is compared to the expectations of several theories. Toynbee‘s revised civilizational model fares best, but leaves dynamical issues unaddressed; the classical European balance of power model matches the kinematics (the sequence of forms), but not the dynamics, of behavior of the Central system. Alternative future directions of inquiry are discussed.
This paper examines the Euro-Indigenous fur trade in northeastern North America, following Carlson's use of Chase-Dunn and Hall's nested interaction networks to examine a similar trade during roughly the same time period on the continent's other side. These network interactions took place on what became a contested periphery, and they shaped the development of states and the modem world-system , with Europeans contending with each other and with Native Americans for political and economic control, and at times mere survival. European political-military networks were essential to maintaining colonies, and in contrast to what the general interaction networks model posits, these were made up of or at least coterminous with nested prestige goods networks. Europeans were initially dependent upon prestige goods networks with Native Americans; indeed , the French political military network in North America was arguably formed by ( or at least supported by) the various Franco-Indigenous prestige goods networks. The French, Dutch, and British all attempted to transition their colonial economies from the extractive economies and low settler population densities typically associated with prestige goods networks to the agricultural economies and higher settler population densities of bulk goods networks. The paper traces the attempted colonial interaction network transitions from contested peripheries within Euro-Indigenous prestige goods networks to settled colonies within bulk goods networks and firmly within a given core powers' imperial political military network. The success ( or failure) of these network transitions helped determine the Euroamerican colonies ' geopolitical futures in the world-economy, as well as those of their indigenous neighbors and their struggles for physical survival and political sovereignty.
Recent years have witnessed a fairly dramatic upswing in the level of foreign direct investment, a phenomenon which has played an integral part in a larger process of globalization. While sociologists have devoted a good deal of attention to the consequences of direct investment for the developing hosts of foreign direct investment, much less attention has been paid to the implications of direct investment for the advanced industrial societies. ln this paper, I focus on one of the more interesting links that has been drawn between direct investment and its effects: that between the outflowof direct investment - often cast as "capital flight" - and deindustrialization. To examine this link I employ a pooled time-series of cross-sections dataset which combines observations on 17 OECD nations across the 1967-1990 period (N=408) . Random effects regression models, which control for unmeasured country-specific effects, reveal strong support for arguments which link direct investment to the relative decline of the labor force in manufacturing in core societies. ln addition, results show that deindustriali zation across this period is largely explained by a model that combines classic generalizations of the process of economic development with an attention to a range of more immediate factors identified by contemporary students of deindustrialization.
This article addresses the question of to what degree the concept of geoculture can be brought in line with research on Orientalist stereotypes and imaginary. Following Said’s original definition of orientalism discourses of the 18th-century political economy are reassessed by focusing on their perception of spatial hierarchies in Eastern Europe. This article reconsiders these discourses as an active factor in the struggle for power and a tool in the hands of the geopolitical interests of absolutist monarchs in Prussia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Russia in the age of mercantilism, as demonstrated by the Partitions of Poland-Lithuania. By focusing on the Habsburg Monarchy between the Spanish War of Succession and the Congress of Vienna, it is demonstrated here that, territorial landlocked empires within Europe used a similar language as colonial maritime empires in order to justify their geopolitical expansion and territorial domination of Eastern Europe. In a second step, it is shown that this discourse was part of the geopolitical culture of the World System and was instrumental in setting ideological conditions for cameralist-driven institutional transformations in favor of the core regions within the Habsburg dominions in Central Europe.
Destinations of British Exports and Imports (Yearly Averages in Pounds) 
This paper explores the process by which Great Britain rose to a position of global leadership in the 1800s. It examines the critical period from 1750 to 1792 when Great Britain moved from global leadership based on colonial/mercantile power to leadership based on industrial/commercial power. I hypothesize that the roots of the Pax Britannica of 1815-1873 have their source in the emerging liberal trading community created by the British in the fifty years before the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This coalition of states was created around a dominant new idea (economic liberalism) based in the distribution of positive benefits from inclusion in the community, and intended to provide an innovative solution to the problems of international political economy created by the burgeoning industrial revolution. The community was created through the actions of successive British governments throughout the period, and served as the basis for the British-led coalitions which emerged victorious from the global wars of 1792 to 1815. This case study helps answer important questions about how Great Britain was able to move from one period of global leadership to another, and on a more general level provides some insights into the role coalition-building plays in attaining and exercising global power.
Comruarison of site oo ulation densitv house lot size and anciJfarv features.
Distribution of M&tal and Glaz<>d
Location of the Study Arca
The conquest and colonization of Mesoamerica by Spain during the period AD 1519-1821 forms part of a macroregional interaction network known as the modern or capitalist world system. Regions incorporated within the world-system usually undergo economic change such that production and labor are increasingly commoditized, dramatically altering the productive strategies of households and communities. As Price (1986) observes, world systems theory is difficult to apply to prehistoric or precapitalist macroregional systems because the world systems analogy lacks referents to broader processes of state expansion, political-economic structure, and the corresponding archaeological record. This paper uses archaeological and historical data from the Parroquia de Yaxcaba, Yucatan, to explore the variable impact of political and economic change on the organization of production and labor of rural communities. Archaeological site structure and spatial organization are analyzed to assess the implications of world-system expansion for the archaeological record in a region where the market transitionultimately fails. Settlement patterns and site structure in Yaxcaba Parish suggest variation in production organization among communities that differs from historical reconstructions. Comparison of independent lines of evidence indicates that variation inthe processes of core-periphery integration are archaeologically recognizable.
Trends in Canadian and Mexican Export Partner Concentration (1-CON) Compared with U.S. Import Partner Concentration (HIRSCH), 1980-2008
Number of Countries Available by Year (with Explanatory Notes)
Trade partner concentration can be used to operationalize important concepts like dependency and globalization, but it can be very time-consuming to calculate concentration indices. In research for which export, import, or total trade partner concentration would be useful as one among many variables but is not the primary variable of interest, potential users of concentration indices are likely to be deterred by the high level of commitment required to process the raw data. In addition, the expense of acquiring the raw data can be a deterrent to some scholars. To address these problems and broaden access to data we report seven indices of export, import, and trade partner concentration for all 183 countries for which data are readily available for the years 1980-2008. The raw data underlying the indices are drawn from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. Details of data preparation and index construction are provided and basic characteristics of the resulting concentration indices described. The indices presented here are likely to find use in regression-based and time-trend studies of the structure and political economy of the contemporary world-system.
Recent accounts of constitutional development have emphasised commonalities among diverse constitutions in terms of the transnational migration of legal institutions and ideas. World-systems analysis gives critical expression to this emergent intellectual trajectory. Since the late 18th century, successive, international waves of constitution-making have tended to correspond with decisive turning points in the contested formation of the historical capitalist world-system. The present article attempts to think through the nature of this correspondence in the Irish context. Changes to the Irish constitution, I suggest, owed to certain local manifestations of anti-systemic movements within the historical capitalist world-system and to constitution-makers’ attempts to contain – militarily, politically and ideologically – these movements’ democratic and egalitarian ideals and practices. Various configurations of the balance of power in Irish society between ‘national’ (core-peripheral) and ‘social’ (capital-labour/‘other’) forces crystallised in constitutional form. Thus far, conservative and nationalist constitutional projects have tended to either dominate or incorporate social democratic and radical ones, albeit a process continually contested at critical junctures by civil society and by the organised left, both old and new.
This essay takes modern world-system theory and maps it into a political-economic field of power. This re-modeling of the theory better illustrates the diffuseness and the spatiality of the operations of global forces; thus, helping us have a greater appreciation of the durability and scope of Western economic and political hegemony across the world. Our exposition also tracks the structural transformation undergone by the Global Power-Field (GPF) throughout its history showing the evolving character of its dominance. Moreover, this field paradigm does not restrict its considerations to matters of political economy but also centralizes factors of politics and international relations that play a fundamental a role in driving historical dynamics. The workings of this emerging model are then illustrated by a historical case study from the Middle East: The nineteenth and early twentieth century Ottoman Empire.
Deepening neoliberal integration, the end of the Cold War, and the decline or compromise of communist and socialist parties, offer a window of opportunity for international labor politics. Why is it, then, that the comprehensive network of global and regional labor organizations continues to play a marginal role, even though they are clearly conscious of these developments, and have sought to respond to them? The answer to this question has important practical and theoretical implications. My general goal, therefore, is to situate the contemporary predicament of international labor organizations within its historical context. Activists would like to know whether labor organizations are basically sound but need to be reformed or fundamentally unsuitable for a vital international labor politics. Theoretically, international labor organizations provide us with a rich record through which to investigate cross-border relations at the level of society and state-society relations.
Top-cited authors
Edward Kick
  • North Carolina State University
Peter Grimes
Jeffrey Kentor
  • Wayne State University
Leslie Sklair
  • The London School of Economics and Political Science
Andrew Jorgenson
  • Boston College, USA