In this paper "reasons for inevitable defects in the census count are listed in the first section; the second section reports efforts by the U.S. Census Bureau to identify sources of error in census coverage, and make estimates of the size of the errors.... The paper describes the conflict between statistical practices, laws and public policy about census adjustment in the United States, and concludes by considering the extent to which causes [of error] in America are likely to be found in other countries."
The author asserts that the problems posed by demographic aging in developed countries have been overstated, noting instead that "the transition to an older population will be gradual enough to allow time to plan. The importance of the shift in the so-called 'dependency ratio' is exaggerated because 'dependency' is unsatisfactorily defined. Nor is there clear evidence that as more people live to be older health and social service costs will rise accordingly: people are remaining fit to later ages and there is strong evidence that they can continue to make a positive contribution to the economy as workers and as consumers until relatively late ages. Social services can also be redesigned to maximize the independence of the elderly while minimizing costs."
Policy theory suggests that coherent statutes--those with precise, clear goals, supported by an adequate causal theory, with clear administrative responsibilities, clear implementation rules, and assigned to committed agencies--are more likely to have their intended impact. This paper examines US family planning policies with a pooled time series analysis from 1982-88 using the Mazmanian and Sabatier policy implementation framework. Of the four family planning statutes (Title V, Title X, Title XIX, and Title XX), only Title X, the categorical grant program, meets the criteria of a coherent statute. The study reveals that a dollar spent through Title X has a much greater impact on births, abortion rates, late prenatal care, and infant neonatal mortality than does a dollar spent through other programs. The findings are strong evidence in support of designing policies with coherent statutes.
This paper discusses the impacts of a range of economic and social policies on family and household formation and dissolution, with particular reference to Great Britain. While this focus was suggested by the author's familiarity with developments in the United Kingdom, it also represents a particularly interesting case since there have been many important policy changes there in the past fifteen years which have affected marriage, fertility, divorce and household formation. During the 1970s, equal pay policies altered the timing of marriage and fertility, and they may have affected the likelihood of divorce. Reform of the law concerning divorce accelerated the upward trend in divorce, and monetary and fiscal policies designed to reduce inflation have also increased unemployment. Lower inflation and higher unemployment have tended to alter the timing of childbearing and the likelihood of divorce. Housing policies have continued to influence the timing of marriage and childbearing and the patterns of household formation by "marginal" groups such as the young and the elderly. Attempts have been made to measure these impacts, but much more research is necessary in order to properly assess the impact of government policy in a range of areas on patterns of family and household formation and dissolution.
The EMU fiscal adjustment paths of the four Southern Europe members (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal – SE-4) vary along two dimensions: a) cross-temporal (pre- and post-EMU accession) and b) cross-country. We account for the cross-temporal variation by distinguishing between the ‘hard’ and ‘softer’ EMU conditionality of the pre- and post-accession stage. External constraints in the form of the Maastricht eligibility criteria constituted a significant common ‘push’ factor in the fiscal stabilization process of EMU candidate countries throughout the 1990s. However, their potent does not necessarily lead to fiscal sustainability as demonstrated by the postaccession budgetary outlook of the SE-4. We account for the crosscountry variation by introducing additional ‘pull’ factors related to the reform content, context and capability (such as unemployment, the level of social concertation, and government effectiveness). Only in cases where such factors were at work did governments engage in structural reforms to consolidate public finances instead of the less controversial path of macroeconomic policy reform.
This paper investigates the conditions under which political framing can render welfare restructuring more palatable. I start by asking two research questions. What are the necessary (albeit perhaps insufficient) conditions that allow leaders successfully to frame welfare reform? To what extent are these conditions evident across welfare regimes? I identify four variables that affect leaders' opportunities for framing social policy: (1) extant frames, (ii) actors, (iii) institutions and (iv) policy arena. After examining the four dominant types of frames found across affluent societies, I review the discursive politics surrounding ThePersonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportunityReconciliationAct as a case where all four conditions for framing welfare reform coalesced.
The regulation of media markets at the national level is under severe pressure, due to technological change, the existence of open markets, and international competition. The European Union's Television Without Frontiers (1989) Directive provided a framework which facilitated regulatory competition in the media field, particularly in satellite regulation. The paper will examine evidence of 'investment flight' towards lax regulatory jurisdictions resulting in an erosion of regulatory restrictions on broadcasting at national levels, particularly those relating to content, advertising and ownership. A political backlash, prompted by fears of 'race to the bottom' scenarios, has resulted in efforts at regulatory co-operation at national and European levels. Policy makers have looked towards the European Union level for measure to counteract 'unfair' regulatory competition and provide a European framework for media regulation.
The monetary implications arising from EMU for Swiss monetary policy show up primarily in the exchange rate. Until now, fluctuations in the Swiss franc against the euro have been surprisingly moderate. The Swiss franc has thus tracked the euro's decline against the US dollar without experiencing strong inflationary pressure and a convergence in the interest-rate differential: a paradoxical result for a small open economy. This paper examines critically whether the recent record reveals information about a change in SNB monetary policy. It also attemps to shed light on the SNB's ability to implement an independent monetary policy with the new landscape defined by EMU. Four hypotheses of euro tracking are considered.
Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
Coordination of macroeconomic policies among countries is not as straightforward in practice as it appears in theory. This paper discusses three obstacles to successful international coordination: (1) uncertainty as to the correct initial position of the economy, (2) uncertainty as to the correct objective, and (3) uncertainty as to the correct model linking policy actions to their effects in the economy. Previous results (NBER Working Paper No. 2059) showed that coordination under conditions of policy-maker disagreement about the correct model could very well reduce national welfare rather than raise it. This paper extends those results to allow for explicit policy-maker recognition of uncertainty regarding the correct model, as well as uncertainty regarding the model to which other policy-makers subscribe. It also shows that the potential gains from coordination, even when positive, are usually small relative to the gains from unilateral policy changes based on improved knowledge of the model.
Now that four years have passed since the introduction of the euro as a commercial currency, it has become possible to assess many arguments made in the abstract during the 1990s about the implications of monetary union. This contribution does precisely that. In brief, the euro zone still falls short as an optimal currency area in most respects. In particular, an empirical analysis of labor-market developments shows no progress toward flexibility or integration. The findings undercut assertions that the euro will force a liberalization of labor markets, so that they can serve as the principal vector of adjustment in the new currency area. Instead, a “rigidity trap” has developed in the euro area—which consists of relatively tight monetary policy, forced fiscal consolidation, and the virtual elimination of the gap between the real and the nominal wage—making structural adjustment in labor markets more difficult.
This paper approaches the study of national adaptation to the EU as a process involving institutional constraints and actors’ interactions across levels of decision-making. The argument is that domestic adaptation to the EU is a matter of ability and willingness to conduct integrative political bargaining rather than a matter of matching institutional structures. The paper provides an empirical case study of the Norwegian adaptation to EU energy sector legislation, denoted as the Internal Energy Market (IEM). The various outcomes to different directives in this sector indicate that the structural feature of a particular state or policy sector is inadequate to fully explain variations in national and domestic adaptation to EU legislation. Thus, the paper focuses on characteristics of the process of adaptation itself, focusing on issues like affectedness, policy similarities, bargaining opportunities, and potential for arbitration.
The command and control approach to government regulation of pollution is clearly not working for many problems. While the theoretical case for applying market mechanisms to control pollution as an alternative is persuasive, there are several stumbling blocks which arise in their application. This paper examines some of the key implementation issues which must be addressed in designing a marketable permit scheme. The issues are brought into focus by considering a particular example – the control of sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles.
Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.
There is very little research by policy scholars about public policy pathologies and virtually no research that delves into the nuances of policy overreaction. To bridge this gap, this conceptual article links overconfident behavior by policy makers and groupthink over positive and negative events to modes of policy overreaction, and gauges the mechanisms for changing or coordinating people’s behavior that characterize each mode of policy overreaction. The analytical framework advanced here revolves around two key dimensions of policy overreaction: (i) the effects of positive and negative events, and (ii) the effects of overestimation and accurate estimation of information. Based on these dimensions, the article identifies and illustrates four distinct modes of policy overreaction which reflect differences in the nature of implemented policy. It argues that the policy tools menu utilized in each mode of policy overreaction is dominated by unique mechanisms for changing or coordinating the behavior which, once established, produce excessive — objective and/or perceived — social costs.
The establishment of capitalist democracies in East-Central Europe raises the question of whether existing accounts of varieties of capitalist democracy need to be revised. This article provides a systematic quantitative comparison of varieties of capitalist democracy in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland with 19 other OECD countries. It finds that the East-Central European cases constitute a distinctive cluster; that they have much in common with Greece, Iberia and Ireland and that they are closer to the continental European than the liberal variety of capitalist democracy. These results have important implications for the internal politics of the European Union, prospects of an East-Central European repeat of the relative success of Ireland and the Mediterranean in the European Union, and debates about the influence of neo-liberalism on public policy.
This paper examines the determinants of Japan's most serious postwar blunder: failure to define and implement effective and timely countermeasures to deal with its change from deficit to surplus international monetary status during the 1969-1971 period. It concludes that intense bureaucratic compartmentalization and a lack of supra-ministerial leadership of national policy were key determinants of this failure, leaving Japan's political system dependent upon irresistible external pressure (gai-atsu), in this case from the United States, to define and force implementation of necessary policy changes. This critical but largely ignored episode illustrates a negative aspect of the traditional insulation of Japan's national bureacracy from political (as opposed to administrative) interference in the definition and pursuit of basic national policy objectives.
In the next 30-40 years, past changes in fertility and mortality will lead to a significant increase in the share of the elderly. This study suggests that these demographic trends may lead to a decline in the G-7 private savings rate after 2000, compounding the impact of social expenditure pressures on the government`s deficit. Moreover, public pensions may decline as a share of the consumption needs of the elderly, leading to financial pressures to reduce their consumption. The reduced burden of child support on the working population will not offset the increased burden of societal support for the elderly.
States with direct democracy routinely ask voters to modify their states’ laws and constitutions and to authorize the raising of billions of dollars in bonds and taxes. In recent elections, voters in many American states have also voted on important social policies that redefine civil liberties within their state. Do voters know enough about these social policies to make an informed decision? The common wisdom is that when choosing between candidates, voters rely on information shortcuts in lieu of extensive knowledge about the issues. Unlike candidate elections, however, ballot measures lack some useful information shortcuts such as party identification. Using data from an election survey, we test the hypothesis that voters use shortcuts to make reasoned decisions on two ballot measures central to today’s policy debates: California’s Proposition 4 (2008) on parental notification for abortion and Proposition 8 (2008) on same-sex marriage. We show that voters do not use cues universally, and furthermore, the amount of factual information a voter possesses has almost no effect on her decisions.
Theories of political accountability assume citizens use information
about the performance of government to hold public officials accountable, but
whether citizens actually use information is difficult to directly examine. We take
advantage of the importance of citizen-driven, performance-based accountability
for education policy in Tennessee to conduct a survey experiment that identifies
the effect of new information, mistaken beliefs and differing considerations on the
evaluation of public officials and policy reforms using 1,500 Tennesseans. Despite
an emphasis on reporting outcomes for school accountability policies in the state,
mistaken beliefs are prevalent and produce overly optimistic assessments of the
institutions responsible for statewide education policy. Moreover, individuals
update their assessments of these institutions in an unbiased way when provided
with objective performance data about overall student performance. Providing
additional information about race-related performance differences does not alter
this relationship, however. Finally, support for specific policies that are intended
to improve student performance is unchanged by either type of performance
information; opinions about policy reforms are instead most related to race and
existing partisan commitments.
This article looks at the impact of multilevel governance structures on state-society relations. It contends that rather than focusing on relations between state actors and societal actors, it is more useful to look at shifts between competing advocacy coalitions in a given issue area. It argues that the impact of multilevel governance structures on domestic advocacy coalitions depends on the political opportunity structure provided at the international level, the types of policy outputs international institutions can deliver, and the extent to which members of an advocacy coalition have the organizational capacities to be active at the international level. These factors are explored in two cases of public health policy: anti-smoking policy and alcoholism policy. Moreover, both cases show that multilevel governance structures offer better opportunities for challengers than for defenders of the domestic status quo.
Activists try to use high profile trials to promote their policy agendas, occasionally succeeding in promoting policy reforms. There are many high profile trials but few successful reform efforts. If the drama and spotlight of a high profile trial creates an opportunity for activists pressing a cause, it is one that is only occasionally exploited successfully. Here our goal is to understand why activists are sometimes successful in using a high profile trial to promote a policy agenda, believing this investigation will shed light on the policy process in general, agenda setting in particular, and the dynamics of activism in the United States. We begin by reviewing relevant literature on agenda setting and social problem construction, conceptualizing high profile trials as “critical events” that offer activists a chance to advance their agendas. We next outline the case of the feminist movement against sexual violence as a particularly useful example of activists trying to use trials for their own political purposes. Using events data from the New York Times and secondary treatments of thirteen high profile sex crimes trials from 1970-1997, we examine the factors that help or hinder activists’ efforts to use the public attention of a trial to forward their cause. We will see that both the nature of the particular case and the political context surrounding it affect the likelihood that a movement gains control of its meaning and secures policy reform. We conclude with a discussion of what this analysis says about activists and the policy process, calling for more research on the world outside a high profile trial.
This paper provides a positive analysis of the evolution of competence allocation within the EU Competition Policy System. In the EU, competition policy competences are ascribed both to the European level and to each Member State. In regard to securing a sound antitrust system, the allocation and delimitation of these competences plays an important role. Accordingly, competence allocation has been a major issue in the recent reforms of cartel policy enforcement and merger control. Instead of normatively analysing the characteristics of optimal competence allocation, we positively identify the self-interest of the interacting groups of agents (European Commission and Courts, national authorities, business associations) as a major-driving force of the reform process. We show that, as a consequence, the interest-driven outcomes of this process are largely ineffective and deficient - even if evaluated against the background of the publicly-announced reform goals. This stands in accordance with longer-term patterns in competence allocation evolution in the EU Competition Policy System.
In the last decade regulatory reforms have focused increasingly on efforts to improve regulatory quality. As part of that development policymakers have been encouraged to consider fiscal, socio-economic and administrative effects of proposed legislation when making policy choices. The Central and East European EU member states have adopted regulatory impact analysis (RIA) mechanisms but so far there has been little analysis of their implementation. This article first compares the manner in which RIAs have been institutionalised in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. Second, it explores how differences in institutionalisation have affected RIA performance. The paper concludes that there are marked differences in the RIA quality across Central and Eastern Europe, notably as a consequence of national differences in institutional and administrative contexts and capacities.
There are good reasons to suppose that the non-poor will infiltrate welfare programmes originally targeted on the poor. This paper discusses this phenomenon of ‘creeping universalisation’ and provides a number of possible explanations for it. Evidence is used from Australia to show that creeping universalisation does indeed occur, and to test the competing explanations. It is concluded that the most likely explanation for the phenomenon is individual behavioural responses: that is, the non-poor respond to the imposition of a means-test by re-arranging their affairs, legitimately or illegitimately, so as to pass the test.
The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.
The inauguration of Germanys grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) raises questions about the public policy performance of a coalition of ideological opposite. This paper turns attention to influence of coalition governments on the size of government in the German Laender from 1992 to 2005. We investigate whether grand coalitions at the sub-national level in Germany systematically affect government spending for education (including cultural affairs) and internal security. The article argues that the effects of grand coalitions on the size of the public sector are moderated by partisan politics but sometimes in unexpected ways. For example, government spending in the field of education is reduced when leftist parties are powerful in the Laender.
This research explores the impact of gender representation in the state and local level on social welfare services provided by the local governments in California. Hypotheses are tested across 58 counties in California over 10 years between 2001 and 2010. According to the fixed effect models, women in state legislature leadership positions had a positive effect on local welfare spending with statistical significance, while women on county boards had no significant effect. In the model with an interaction term, however, the moderating effect of the county leadership role during the economic hardship was found. Three categories of control variables include institutional factors as the introduction of Proposition 1A, chartered or general law counties; political factors as political preference of each county’s residents and strength of nonprofit organizations; socioeconomic factors such as intergovernmental revenues, unemployment rate and demographics. Counties with more intergovernmental revenues and supporters of Democratic presidents are likely to spend more on welfare services.
Most models of public opinion assign a fundamental role to ideological predispositions. Moreover, the literature usually portrays ideology as a stable phenomenon at the individual-level, one that is mainly shaped by socio-economic class experiences and pre-adult socialisation, and that is likely to grow stronger in intensity – rather than change – over the life-course. However, less is known about the scope of, or reasons for, ideological change in adult life. This paper uses Swedish panel data to investigate the interrelation between evaluations of government performance and ideological left-right related orientations. There is some support for “the socialisation school,” in that ideological positions and values display considerable short-term stability (though less stability over a four-year period).Moreover, there is evidence of short-run selective perception, with those close to the government at t1 being more likely than others to form more positive performance perceptions between t1 and t2. Interestingly however, over a four-year period this tendency was not statistically significant. Moreover, there is also clear support for a “revisionist” interpretation of left-right ideology. Such orientations do change at the individual level, change which is systematically affected by how people perceive incumbent government performance, an impact which does not depend on political sophistication.
Incl. tables, bibl. The writer examines the impact of decentralization and privatization policies on the education system in Chile. Although decentralization had some positive effects--such as greater administrative and productive efficiency--government size, as measured by the total personnel working in the education sector, increased under decentralization. Privatization has created a kind of voucher system, in that educators have been made more accountable to parents, but schools do not necessarily respond to the threat of competition by promoting better quality education. Although comparisons of student performance in public and private schools in Chile are not conclusive, national average performance scores have not risen, despite a dramatic expansion in the private provision of education and a waning of public education. The writer concludes that both decentralization and privatization have generated greater inequities in terms of expenditures and the performance of students from different income categories.
The Conservative Government elected in Britain in 1979 wished to change the extent and pattern of government expenditure. We use econometric techniques to investigate whether it did so in the period up to 1984, concentrating attention on the welfare state. We also test the hypothesis that the observed changes favoured the middle classes. After discussing the channels by which the middle classes influence government policy, a model of government behaviour is outlined. The theoretical model indicates the forms of specification error that we might expect in our econometric results, which, in turn, suggest that the Conservatives tended to favour the middle classes, while the previous Labour administrations did not. However, the estimates for the Labour period appear to be misspecified, but those for the Conservative period survived tests of misspecification.
The literature on risk regulation often assumes a direct link between public pressure and regulatory responses. This article investigates whether the direction of regulatory response is related to public argumentation as expressed in the national print media. Three approaches are explored: national policy patterns, political panics expressed in Pavlovian politics, and policy responses shaped by universal policy paradigms. It assesses these three approaches in comparative perspective by looking at scandals in food safety regulation in Denmark, Germany and the US, looking at argumentation patterns in the national print media and using a coding system derived from grid-group cultural theory and regulatory responses. While all three countries display mostly hierarchical argumentation patterns, their actual regulatory responses point to diverse patterns.
Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with ‘races’ and ‘final outcomes’ of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.
The theory of regulatory competition suggests a race to the bottom of environmental standards. This theory, however, has not found much empirical support. Several attempts to account for this theoretical failure have been made in the literature, which mainly refer to the underlying assumptions of the theory. In this article, we present an alternative explanation. We argue that in reality regulatory competition is overlapped by other mechanisms affecting the adjustment of national policies. Most important are the effects emerging from regulatory cooperation at the level of the European Union (EU). To arrive at more precise theoretical predictions, we therefore not only analyze the individual effects of competition and cooperation on national policies, but also the impact of their interaction.
Through the lens of a traditional rationalist principal-agent framework, the development of the European Community's competition policy could be read as a straightforward story of agency loss. However, with the recent overhaul of competition policy, which the Community presented in terms of a decentralisation, the story seems to have changed as we are confronted with the uncommon event in which an agent (the European Commission) returns some of its powers to the principals (the member states). This paper resolves the puzzle by highlighting the role of the Commission and of European courts. It has become part of the Commission's strategy to pursue its objectives through legally non-binding instruments such as notices or guidelines or even through co-operation in networks. For the Commission, these instruments have the advantage that they do not need the approval of the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. With the Commission's promotion of new modes of governance, the link between sectoral governance (in terms of regulation specific to competition policy) and the governmental shadow of hierarchy shifted, to an ever-larger extent, to the mechanism of judicial review by European courts. Alongside this shift, the character of judicial review has changed in the direction of judicial control, as European courts no longer restrict themselves to review of the legality of Commission actions, but engage in assessing the facts themselves.
Can governments increase tax compliance by rewarding honest taxpayers? We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment comparing tax compliance under a “deterrence” baseline with tax compliance under two “reward” treatments: a “donation” treatment giving taxpayers a say in the spending purposes of their payments and a “lucky” treatment giving taxpayers the (highly unlikely) chance of winning a lottery. The reward treatments significantly affected tax behaviour but not in a straightforward manner. Although female participants altered their behaviour as expected and complied somewhat more, men strongly reacted in the opposite manner: they evaded a much higher percentage of taxes than under the baseline. Apparently, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to boost tax compliance.
Governments in the advanced industrial countries increasingly rely on supply-side reforms to intervene in the economy. This article examines one such reform, that of vocational education and training in France, whose successful implementation required that private actors cooperate not with the state, but with each other. As demonstrated through an empirical analysis of two employment zones, theories of institutional design that underscore the necessity of sanctioning cannot explain the successful emergence of cooperation, because new sanctioning regimes lack credibility under the uncertain conditions of economic reform. The primary obstacle to successful implementation of these reforms is uncertainty about the consequences of reciprocal cooperation, and the article highlights the mutual roles of states and employers' associations in overcoming this uncertainty. Active collaboration between policymakers and employers' associations, which have uniquely good access to private information about firms, is necessary to enable state policies to target those firms which are the most likely potential cooperators.
In times of an alleged waning of political business cycles and partisan policymaking, vote-seeking policymakers can be expected to shift the use of political manipulation mechanisms towards other policy domains in which the macro-institutional environment allows them greater leverage. Public employment generally, and police employment specifically, are promising domains for such tactics. Timing the hiring of police officers during election periods may increase votes, as these are ‘street-visible’ jobs dealing with politically salient issues. Law-and-order competence signaling makes police hiring especially attractive for conservative parties. Testing these electioneering and partisanship hypotheses in the German states between 1992 and 2010, we find that socio-economic variables such as population density strongly determine police employment. But incumbents also hire more police officers before elections, while conservative party power increases police numbers. Subjectively ‘immediate’ forms of crime (issue salience) and perceived causes of crime such as immigration are also positively associated with police numbers.
Recent decades have witnessed the remarkable rise of a kind of market authority almost as centralized as the state itself - two credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. These agencies derive their influence from two sources. The first is the information content of their ratings. The second is both more profound and vastly more problematic: ratings are incorporated into financial regulations in the United States and around the world. In this article we clarify the role of credit rating agencies in global capital markets, describe the host of problems that arise when their ratings are given the force of the law, and outline the alternatives to the public policy dilemmas created when ratings receive a public imprimatur. We conclude that agencies designated for regulatory purposes should be required to provide more nuanced ratings exposing their perceptual and ideological underpinnings (especially for sovereigns), and facilitating consideration of alternatives to ratings-dependent regulation.
The successful performance of the Danish economy in the 1990s has encouraged scholars to talk about a . This article investigates why Danish governments have been able to govern the economy so successfully in the 1990s. It argues that two factors have been important. First, the bargaining position of minority governments has been strengthened. Today, Danish minority governments can enter agreements with changing coalitions in the Danish parliament, as a result of changes in Danish party politics and in the functioning of Danish parliamentarianism. The article thus challenges the conventional wisdom about minority governments as weak in terms of governing capacity. Second, the changed socio-economic strategy of the Social Democrats returning to power in 1993 has been important, because it has created a political consensus around a number of controversial reforms.
Irrespective of views about equity, social insurance has a major efficiency role. Because of technical problems in private markets, neither unemployment nor inflation are risks against which private markets can supply actuarial insurance, and medical insurance cannot cover all risks for all types of individual. The existence of social insurance is therefore supported on the grounds that it does things which private, actuarial insurance would either not do at all or would do inefficiently.
This article considers attempts to incorporate lessons and transfer policies from Britain in the reconstruction of Higher Education in Kosovo after 1999. In doing so, it employs aspects of the lesson-drawing framework developed by Rose (1991 and 2001) and the related concepts of policy transfer and policy diffusion. Drawing on contributions from anthropology and democratization studies, we suggest development of the public policy frameworks for lesson drawing and policy transfer in circumstances characterised by asymmetric interdependence, in which the tactics and strategies of policy resistance by ‘subordinate’ recipient actors can be crucial. This article details the nature of policy resistance and sets out hypotheses for future research.
In technically complex areas, political actors increasingly rely on private actors to shape public policy. This is due to the greater expertise of the private actors, mostly industry. This article theorizes and empirically investigates the conditions under which self-regulation by industry (governance) emerges in environmental policy at the European level and asks how effective it is. Is 'a shadow of hierarchy' (governmental intervention) needed to ensure the emergence and effectiveness of voluntary agreements? We show that the willingness to engage in self-regulation is prompted by a regulatory threat with governmental action. Once legislation has been pre-empted, environmental self-regulation is implemented under a weak 'shadow of hierarchy'. We identify the causes of this 'weak' control and explain the differential performance in the two sectors on the basis of different market incentives.
Full-text of this article is not available in this e-prints service. This article was originally published following peer-review in Journal of Public Policy, published by and copyright Cambridge University Press. The EU plays a significant role in public policy aspects of Internet governance, having created in the late 1990s the dot eu Internet Top Level Domain (TLD). This enables users to register names under a European online address label. This paper explores key public policy issues in the emergent governance system for dot eu, because it provides an interesting case of new European transnational private governance. Specifically, dot eu governance is a reconciliation resulting from a governance cultural clash between the European regulatory state and what can be described broadly as the Internet community. The EU has customised the governance of dot eu towards a public–private dispersed agencification model. The paper extends the evidence base on agencification within trans-European regulatory networks and the emergence of private transnational network governance characterised by self-regulation.
This special issue about sectoral governance in the shadow of hierarchy focuses on two sets of questions. Firstly, do new modes of sectoral governance in themselves contribute to the efficacy of policymaking or do they require the shadow of hierarchy, i.e. legislative and executive decisions, in order to deal effectively with the problems they are supposed to solve? And, secondly, what are the institutional links between sectoral governance and territorially bounded democratic governments? How do different links contribute to the efficacy of policymaking and how do they change over time? Is there a retreat of government from policymaking and a corresponding increase of sectoral governance, or just the opposite?
This paper argues that we need to bring government back into discussions about network governance, via the concept of metagovernance which uses water reform in an Australian state as an example. Metagovernance is defined as the government of governance, and is a vital but under researched and under theorised problem because it is difficult and contentious. The paper identifies a range of metagovernance failures in this case and suggests that the lessons learnt by the Australian authorities from the experience have led to some rethinking about the benefits and desirable scope of network governance.