Journal of Financial Economics

Published by Elsevier
Print ISSN: 0304-405X
We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.
This paper presents a regression approach to measuring the information in forward interest rates about time varying premiums and future spot interest rates. Like earlier work, the regressions identify variation in the expected premiums on longer-maturity Treasury bills. The more novel evidence concerns the forecasts of future spot rates in forward rates. The regressions provide evidence that the one-month forward rate has power to predict the spot rate one month ahead. During periods preceding 1974, forward rates have reliable forecast power for one-month spot rates up to five months in the future.
This paper investigates the effect of California's Proposition 103 on the market value of publicly traded property- and liability-insurance companies. The passage of this referendum on November 8, 1988 moved California from a market-oriented to a heavily regulated insurance-pricing system. During the period surrounding the election, the average stock price of insurance companies doing business in California declined by 6.91%. The decline is positively related to the proportion of a firm's premiums affected by the referendum and the proportion generated in other states where insurance regulation is likely to change, and negatively related to the firm's profitability.
We examine a sample of 459 firms filing for Chapter 11 during the period 1991-1998 and find that our sample firms experience significant improvements in their operating performance during Chapter 11. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11, if anything, provides net benefits to bankrupt firms. In the cross section, firms with higher debt ratios experience greater improvements in operating performance, and the complexity of the renegotiation process negatively affects the improvement. We find no relationship between Chapter 11 outcome and changes in risk-adjusted firm value in Chapter 11.
Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy illustrates the devastating effect of court-sponsored asset stripping-using creditors' collateral to invest in negative net present value "lottery ticket" investments-on firm value. During bankruptcy, Eastern's value dropped over 50%. We show that a substantial portion of this value decline occurred because an over- protective court insulated Eastern from market forces and allowed value-destroying operations to continue long after it was clear Eastern should be shut down. The failure of Eastern's bankruptcy demonstrates the importance of the court's role in protecting a distressed firm's assets, not only from a run by creditors, but also from overly optimistic managers.
Bali and Hite (1998) and Dubofsky (1992) propose models in which market microstructure effects play a role in the ex-dividend day price drop anomaly. Bali and Hite suggest that the anomaly is caused solely by price discreteness, while Dubofsky suggests that NYSE Rule 118 is also involved. We test these models by examining cum- to ex-day price drops during the one-eighth, one-sixteenth, and decimal tick size regimes. While the evidence is qualitatively consistent with Dubofsky's predictions, neither model is satisfactory in a quantitative sense. One of our main empirical findings is that no significant decline was evident in the magnitude of the ex-day anomaly after the tick size reduction.
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.
Descriptive statistics for sample of 56 Pennsylvania firms and a control sample of 56 non-Penn- sylvania firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange."
This study investigates the impact of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 on the share prices of Pennsylvania corporations. Considered the most severe of the second-generation antitakeover laws, the statute limits the ability of shareholders to challenge management through the proxy process and eliminates the traditional fiduciary obligation of directors to promote shareholders' interests. We find that PA SB1310 significantly decreased share values, and estimate the loss to shareholders of Pennsylvania firms at $4 billion. However, firms with antitakeover charter amendments already in place were less affected, and firms that exempted themselves from PA SB1310 recovered a portion of shareholders' wealth.
We develop an equilibrium model to understand how the efficiency of capital allocation depends on outside investor protection and the external financing needs of firms. We show that when capital allocation is constrained by poor investor protection, an increase in firms' external financing needs may improve allocative efficiency by fostering the reallocation of capital from low to high productivity projects. We also find novel empirical support for this prediction.
I document the shift of high-yield issuance from the public to the Rule 144A private placement market and exploit data on credit spreads to investigate whether investors regard disclosure in the two markets as comparable. The key implications of the inadequate-disclosure hypothesis are that investors require premiums on 144A securities and that such premiums are largest for first-time bond issuers and privately owned firms about whom less information is publicly available. I find that 144A premiums, though positive initially, have vanished over time, and I find no evidence of larger 144A premiums for first-time issuers or private firms. Investors do, however, require premiums of first-time issuers, and to a lesser extent of privately owned firms, regardless of whether securities are issued in the 144A or public market. These findings imply that sophisticated investors do not value the incremental information provided by securities registration, but do value ongoing disclosure.
We study corporate bond default rates using an extensive new data set spanning the 1866–2008 period. We find that the corporate bond market has repeatedly suffered clustered default events much worse than those experienced during the Great Depression. For example, during the railroad crisis of 1873–1875, total defaults amounted to 36 percent of the par value of the entire corporate bond market. We examine whether corporate default rates are best forecast by structural, reduced-form, or macroeconomic credit models and find that variables suggested by structural models outperform the others. Default events are only weakly correlated with business downturns. We find that over the long term, credit spreads are roughly twice as large as default losses, resulting in an average credit risk premium of about 80 basis points. We also find that credit spreads do not adjust in response to realized default rates.
This paper examines empirically whether the short-swing rule (Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act) deters managers from trading before mergers. Since a merger forces the sale of the target's outstanding equity, insider purchases within six months before the merger cannot escape this rule. We examine the 1941–1961 period when no other insider trading laws were enforced. Consistent with 16b's deterrent effect, managers' purchases drop significantly before the announcement. Before completion, the decrease occurs only in the 1941–1955 period. Surprisingly, pre-announcement sales do not decline, even though 16b cannot punish deferral of planned sales.
This paper examines the effects of over 1,800 U.K. takeovers on shareholder wealth in the period 1955–1985. It shows that around the merger announcement date targets gain 25 to 30 percent and bidders earn zero or modest gains. The U.K. data allow independent tests of many issues addressed in studies of U.S. takeovers. Target gains are higher in the U.K. after 1968, suggesting that increases in U.S. target gains at the same time may not be attributable to the Williams Act. Postmerger share-price performance suggests that acquisitions follow favorable developments in bidder's equity prices.
The performance of Value Line Investment Survey recommendations made between 1965 and 1978 is evaluated by applying a future benchmark technique. The future benchmark technique avoids selection bias problems associated with using historic benchmarks as well as known difficulties of using Capital Asset Pricing Model benchmarks. Potential problems (implicit in the technique) are discussed and resolved within the conduct of the experiment. Results indicate statistically significant abnormal performance when future benchmarks are computed using a market model.
Data for the 516 papers published in volumes 1–30 of the Journal of Financial Economics in the period 1974–91 are analyzed. 477 authors from 136 institutions contributed papers, and these papers received 16,231 citations according to the Social Science Citation Index. Lists of authors and institutions who have contributed the most papers to the JFE and a list of the mostly highly-cited JFE papers show why the Journal has been successful in influencing the finance and economics literature during its first 18 years.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contains several provisions that can affect the cost of producing loans for financial intermediaries. In a competitive lending market the additional monitoring and expected foreclosure costs imposed by the change in the bankruptcy law should be passed on to the borrower. Using survey data from a sample of small business loans from commercial banks, evidence is presented that the enactment of the new law resulted in higher contract rates of interest.
Mayers and Rice do not resolve the basic problem in portfolio performance evaluation with the securities market line, the ambiguity introduced by being obliged to choose a market index. Other performance evaluation techniques exist and possess some superior qualities. The Mayers-Rice discussion of my critique of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) fails to recognize the CAPM's unusual testing implications and ignores the existence of alternative asset pricing theories. Residual analysis should give approximately correct estimates of the abnormal returns caused by specific events if it is conducted with the market model.
This paper studies managerial compensation, financial reporting, and dividend policies of the seven major domestic steel producers during requests for union concessions. Substantial layoffs, reported losses, and sacrifices by nonunion stakeholders buttressed managers' case for union concessions. From 1980 to 1988, sample firms reduced their work force by about 300,000 (almost two-thirds) and annual wage payments from $16.1 to $8.6 billion. Reported income is lower during union negotiations, controlling for cash flows, as is managerial pay, with average CEO salary plus bonus declining 18%. Dividend reductions and white-collar pay cuts are substantial, pervasive, and clustered during union negotiations.
The 1987 market crash was associated with a dramatic and permanent steepening of the implied volatility curve for equity index options, despite minimal changes in aggregate consumption. We explain these events within a general equilibrium framework in which expected endowment growth and economic uncertainty are subject to rare jumps. The arrival of a jump triggers the updating of agents' beliefs about the likelihood of future jumps, which produces a market crash and a permanent shift in option prices. Consumption and dividends remain smooth, and the model is consistent with salient features of individual stock options, equity returns, and interest rates.
We present evidence that a tax bill containing antitakeover provisions proposed by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee on October 13, 1987 and approved by the Committee on October 15 was the fundamental economic event causing the greater than 10% decline in the stock market on October 14–16, which arguably triggered the October 19 crash. The bill, which eventually passed without most of the antitakeover provisions, would have limited the deductibility of interest on debt incurred to finance corporate takeovers, leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, and imposed other restrictions on hostile takeovers.
This paper analyzes a proxy solicitation and subsequent restructuring at Honeywell Inc. in 1989. The solicitation was financed and led by noninstitutional investors and co-sponsored by two public pension funds. The solicitation and restructuring both appear to increase firm value, though the effects of the restructuring are much larger. The voting records of Honeywell's 72 largest institutional shareholders reveal that banks and insurance companies are significantly more supportive of two management-sponsored antitakeover proposals than public pension funds add independent investment managers. Existing business ties between Honeywell and its institutional investors, however, do not appear to explain these voting differences.
Not necessarily: a firm's fundamental value increases with uncertainty about average future profitability, and this uncertainty was unusually high in the late 1990s. After calibrating a stock valuation model that takes this uncertainty into account, we compute the level of uncertainty that is needed to match the observed Nasdaq valuations at their peak. The uncertainty we obtain seems plausible because it matches not only the high level but also the high volatility of Nasdaq stock prices. In general, we argue that the level and volatility of stock prices are positively linked through firm-specific uncertainty about average future profitability.
Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES) allows orders to be submitted by computer, thereby assuring rapid execution at quoted prices. We examine trading in the 20 largest Nasdaq stocks around the time of a rule change that reduced the largest SOES trades from 1000 to 500 shares. We show that SOES trades contain information about short-term price movements and that SOES trading declined dramatically with the rule change. However, quoted and effective spreads were unaffected by the rule change.
In this paper we examine tender offer share repurchases to differentiate between the information signaling and free cash flow hypotheses. Previous work in this area has focused on announcement period returns. While we also examine announcement returns, our primary emphasis is on operating performance changes surrounding repurchases. We argue that the information contained in changes in operating performance, and its determinants, enables us to differentiate between the two hypotheses. Our primary finding is that operating performance following repurchases improves only in low-growth firms, and that these gains are generated by more efficient utilization of assets, and asset sales, rather than improved growth opportunities. Thus, repurchases do not appear to be pure financial transactions meant to change the firm's capital structure but are part of a restructuring package meant to shrink the assets of the firm. This evidence leads us to conclude that the positive investor reaction to repurchases is best explained by the free cash flow hypothesis.
Recent studies argue that the spread-adjusted Taylor rule (STR), which includes a response to the credit spread, replicates monetary policy in the United State. We show (1) STR is a theoretically optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous loan interest rate contracts in both discretionay and commitment monetary policies, (2) however, the optimal response to the credit spread is ambiguous given the financial market structure in theoretically derived STR, and (3) there, a commitment policy is effective in narrowing the credit spread when the central bank hits the zero lower bound constraint of the policy rate.
We make two contributions to the study of interest rates. The first is to characterize their dynamics in a new way. We estimate forecasting relations based on one-period changes in forward rates, which are more easily compared than earlier work on yields to the stationary theory of bond pricing. The second is to approximate these dynamics and other salient features of interest rates with an affine model. We show that models with “negative” factors come closer to accounting for the properties of interest rates, including their dynamics, than multifactor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross models.
We present a new approach for positioning, pricing, and hedging in incomplete markets that bridges standard arbitrage pricing and expected utility maximization. Our approach for determining whether an investor should undertake a particular position involves specifying a set of probability measures and associated floors which expected payoffs must exceed in order for the investor to consider the hedged and financed investment to be acceptable. By assuming that the liquid assets are priced so that each portfolio of assets has negative expected return under at least one measure, we derive a counterpart to the first fundamental theorem of asset pricing. We also derive a counterpart to the second fundamental theorem, which leads to unique derivative security pricing and hedging even though markets are incomplete. For products that are not spanned by the liquid assets of the economy, we show how our methodology provides more realistic bid–ask spreads.
We propose an equilibrium model in which competitive arbitrageurs exploit the wedge that supply shocks induce between the prices of twoidentical risky assets. The arbitrageurs are financially constrained in that their positions cannot exceed a multiple of wealth. We find that the arbitrageurs' positions have a risk management component, and can make the wedge between asset prices more sensitive to supply shocks. Moreover, they involve externalities and can be excessively risky relative to the social optimum.
This paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups. The results show that firms where the largest shareholders act as top executives, have a firm lock on control and own less than 50 percent of the firm's cash-flow rights exhibit poor governance, as measured by a lower sensitivity of turnover to performance and a lower Q ratio. JEL classification: G34, J63, L14 Keywords: Management turnover, corporate governance, pyramidal groups Author's address: Institute of Finance and Accounting, London Business School, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom. E-mail: Acknowledgements: Ithank an anonymous referee, Julian Franks, Rafael La Porta, Marco Pagano, Henri Servaes, Andrei Shleifer, and participants at seminars at Harvard University, London Business School and London School of Economics for helpful comments. I also thank Richard Frost and Samanta Padalino for editing suggestions. I acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship program and the JP Morgan Chase Research Fellowship at London Business School. 1 1.
We study the relative risk of value and growth stocks. We find that time-varying risk goes in the right direction in explaining the value premium. Value betas tend to covary positively, and growth betas tend to covary negatively with the expected market risk premium. Our inference differs from that of previous studies because we sort betas on the expected market risk premium, instead of on the realized market excess return. However, we also find that this beta-premium covariance is too small to explain the observed magnitude of the value premium within the conditional capital asset pricing model.
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.
This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.
We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956). However, fifty years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase EPS. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role. This is the final working paper version of our 2005 publication in the Journal of Financial Economics.
The regulations governing asset distributions from many retirement plans give participants the option to time retirement or rollovers from the plan strategically. They possess a long-lived put option, whose exercise price resets periodically to the current value of the assets in the plan. I derive a recursive closed-form valuation formula for the option and develop a numerical algorithm for implementing the result. I find that, for reasonable assumptions about volatility and life expectancy, the option's value may approach 40% of the value of the assets in the plan, financed entirely by those still contributing. This wealth transfer can, however, be easily avoided by making a simple change to the current regulations governing valuation and payout of these retirement plans.
We analyze the impact of a Web-based trading channel on trader behavior and performance in two large corporate 401(k) plans. After 18 months of Web access, trading frequency at sample firms doubles relative to a control group of firms without a Web channel. Web trades tend to be smaller than trades made through other channels and Web traders tend to have smaller portfolios than other traders, so the Web's impact on portfolio turnover is substantially smaller than its effect on trading frequency. There is no evidence than any of this new trading on the Web is successful.
We study the proposal of manager-sponsored compensation plans linking pay to performance by S&P 500 firms in the 1990s. We examine the market perception of these proposals and the characteristics of the firms that propose them. Shareholders gain at the announcement of the plans, especially when the plans are directed toward the firm's top executives. Proposing firms are those that can most benefit from the plans, given their asset type and agency considerations. Firms with more potential agency costs have the highest vote-for percentages for the plans. However, shareholders are less approving of plans with negative features such as high dilution levels. Our work suggests that stock-based compensation plans are helpful in improving managerial efforts to increase shareholder wealth.
We investigate whether investors price the option to abandon a firm at its exit value. Theory prices this real option as an American put with both a stochastic strike price (exit value) and a stochastic value of the underlying security (the value of cash flows). The empirical implications are that firm value increases in exit value, after controlling for expected going-concern cash flows, and that more generalizable assets produce more abandonment option value. Using discounted earnings forecasts to proxy for expected cash flows and prior literature to categorize asset generalizability, we find strong support for the predictions of abandonment option theory.
This paper analyzes the empirical behavior of stock-return volatilities prior to and subsequent to the ex-dates of stock splits. The evidence demonstrates rather unambiguously that there is, on the average, an approximately 30% ‘arbitrary’ increase in the return standard deviations following the ex-date. The increase holds for both daily and weekly data, and it is not temporary. No explanatory confounding variables, such as institutional frictions affecting price observations, have been identified. We view the findings as being essentially inconsistent with the notion of ‘rational pricing’.
We investigate the robustness of the long-term underperformance of initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned equity offering (SEO) firms from 1975-1992. The conclusion that issuer underperformance is unique is questioned by our results. We find that underperformance is largely concentrated in the smallest issuing firms. IPO firms perform similarly to nonissuing firms matched on the basis of firm size and book-to-market ratios. SEO firm returns can be priced by four factor regression models indicating common covariation in SEO returns with nonissuing firms. Furthermore, SEO underperformance disappears for issuances beyond the first SEO. We find that the results are robust to purging benchmarks and factor returns of IPO and SEO firms.
The tax law confers upon the investor a timing option - to realize capital losses and defer capital gains. With the tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half the short term rate, the law provides a second timing option - to realize losses short term and gains long term, if at all. Our theory and simulation over the 1962–1977 period establish that taxable investors should realize long term gains in high variance stocks and repurchase stock in order to realize potential future losses short term. Tax trading does not explain the small-firm anomaly but predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices, the January anomaly, only if investors are irrational or ignorant of the price seasonality.
A highly controversial issue in financial economies is whether stocks overreact. In this paper we find an economically-important overreaction effect even after adjusting for size and beta. In portfolios formed on the basis of prior five-year returns, extreme prior losers outperform extreme prior winners by 5–10% per year during the subsequent five years. Although we find a pronounced January seasonal, our evidence suggests that the overreaction effect is distinct from tax-loss selling effects. Interestingly, the overreaction effect is substantially stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms. Returns consistent with the overeaction hypothesis are also observed for short windows around quarterly earnings announcements.
We develop and test the Acquisition Probability Hypothesis, which asserts that rivals of initial acquisition targets earn abnormal returns because of the increased probability that they will be targets themselves. On average, rival firms earn positive abnormal returns regardless of the form and outcome of acquisition. These returns increase significantly with the magnitude of surprise about the initial acquisition. Moreover, the cross-sectional variation of rival abnormal returns in the announcement period is systematically related to variables associated with the probability of acquisition. In addition, rivals that subsequently become targets earn significantly higher abnormal returns in the announcement period.
Abnormal returns earned by target firms at the time of initial acquisition announcements are related to form of payment, degree of resistance, and type of offer. Results indicate that interdependence among these characteristics is important. Previous research suggests that tender-offer targets earn higher abnormal returns than merger targets. After controlling for payment method and degree of resistance, however, the difference in abnormal returns between tender offers and mergers is insignificant. Resisted offers are associated with insignificantly higher returns than unresisted offers. Abnormal returns associated with cash offers are significantly higher than those associated with stock offers.
Numerous studies observe abnormal returns after the announcement of quarterly earnings. Ball (1978) suggests those returns are not evidence of market inefficiency, but instead are due to deficiencies in the capital asset-pricing model. This paper tests whether abnormal returns are observed when steps are taken to reduce the effect of deficiencies in the capital asset-pricing model. Significant abnormal returns are observed, but do not cover the transactions costs unless one can avoid direct transactions costs (e.g., a broker). The paper also investigates whether those abnormal returns can be attributed to a deficiency in the capital asset-pricing model. The conclusion is they cannot.
This study examines the empirical relation between stock returns and (long-run) dividend yields. The findings show that much of the phenomenon is due to a nonlinear relation between dividend yields and returns in January. Regression coefficients on dividend yields, which some models predict should be non-zero due to differential taxation of dividends and capital gains, exhibit a significant January seasonal, even when controlling for size. This finding is significant since there are no provisions in the after-tax asset pricing models that predict the tax differential is more important in January than in other months.
This paper evaluates a new nonparametric rank test for abnormal security-price performance in event studies. Simulations with daily security-return data show that the rank test is better specified under the null hypothesis and more powerful under the alternative hypothesis than the parametric t-test. Unlike previous nonparametric tests, this rank test does not require symmetry in cross-sectional excess returns distributions for correct specification.
We analyze the empirical power and specification of test statistics in event studies designed to detect long-run (one- to five-year) abnormal stock returns. We document that test statistics based on abnormal returns calculated using a reference portfolio, such as a market index, are misspecified (empirical rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates) and identify three reasons for this misspecification. We correct for the three identified sources of misspecification by matching sample firms to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. This control firm approach yields well-specified test statistics in virtually all sampling situations considered.
Top-cited authors
Kenneth R. French
  • Dartmouth College
Andrei Shleifer
  • Harvard University
Nicolas Majluf
  • Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Randall Morck
  • University of Alberta
Rene M. Stulz
  • The Ohio State University