Journal of Experimental Psychology General

Within a week of the attack of September 11, 2001, a consortium of researchers from across the United States distributed a survey asking about the circumstances in which respondents learned of the attack (their flashbulb memories) and the facts about the attack itself (their event memories). Follow-up surveys were distributed 11, 25, and 119 months after the attack. The study, therefore, examines retention of flashbulb memories and event memories at a substantially longer retention interval than any previous study using a test-retest methodology, allowing for the study of such memories over the long term. There was rapid forgetting of both flashbulb and event memories within the first year, but the forgetting curves leveled off after that, not significantly changing even after a 10-year delay. Despite the initial rapid forgetting, confidence remained high throughout the 10-year period. Five putative factors affecting flashbulb memory consistency and event memory accuracy were examined: (a) attention to media, (b) the amount of discussion, (c) residency, (d) personal loss and/or inconvenience, and (e) emotional intensity. After 10 years, none of these factors predicted flashbulb memory consistency; media attention and ensuing conversation predicted event memory accuracy. Inconsistent flashbulb memories were more likely to be repeated rather than corrected over the 10-year period; inaccurate event memories, however, were more likely to be corrected. The findings suggest that even traumatic memories and those implicated in a community's collective identity may be inconsistent over time and these inconsistencies can persist without the corrective force of external influences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

More than 3,000 individuals from 7 U.S. cities reported on their memories of learning of the terrorist attacks of September 11, as well as details about the attack, 1 week, 11 months, and/or 35 months after the assault. Some studies of flashbulb memories examining long-term retention show slowing in the rate of forgetting after a year, whereas others demonstrate accelerated forgetting. This article indicates that (a) the rate of forgetting for flashbulb memories and event memory (memory for details about the event itself) slows after a year, (b) the strong emotional reactions elicited by flashbulb events are remembered poorly, worse than nonemotional features such as where and from whom one learned of the attack, and (c) the content of flashbulb and event memories stabilizes after a year. The results are discussed in terms of community memory practices.

Five experiments traced the causes of the discrepancy in research that showed both local and global precedence in selective attention tasks. The effects of the relative discriminabilities of the local and global levels of the stimuli and the differences between Stroop-type interference (attributable to incongruity on the irrelevant dimension) and Garner-type interference (attributable to variability on the irrelevant dimension) were explored. The experiments also examined whether the precedence effects previously examined in form perception generalize to motion perception. 45 Ss, most of whom were college students, participated. Ss viewed stimuli on an oscilloscope under 9 conditions. Results show that (a) some cases of global precedence were due solely to the greater perceptual discriminability of the global level; (b) instances of both local and global precedence could be demonstrated for certain types of stimuli, even when the discriminabilities of their local and global levels had been equated; and (c) the Stroop and Garner measures of selective attention were not equivalent but instead measured different types of interference. It is concluded that cases of both local and global precedence have been amply documented but that no general theory can account for why or when these effects will appear until a better understanding is gained of both the nature of part-whole relationships and the perceptual processes that are tapped by different measures of selective attention. (31 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

Certain reliable findings from research on directed forgetting seem difficult to accommodate in terms of the theoretical processes, such as selective rehearsal or storage differentiation, that have been put forward to account for directed-forgetting phenomena. Some kind of "missing mechanism" appears to be involved. In order to circumvent the methodological constraints that have limited the conclusions investigators could draw from past experiments, a new paradigm is introduced herein that includes a mixture of intentional and incidental learning. With this paradigm, a midlist instruction to forget the first half of a list was found to reduce later recall of the items learned incidentally as well as those learned intentionally. This result suggests that a cue to forget can lead to a disruption of retrieval processes as well as to the alteration of encoding processes postulated in prior theories. The results also provide a link between intentional forgetting and the literature on posthypnotic amnesia, in which disrupted retrieval has been implicated. With each of these procedures, the information that can be remembered is typically recalled out of order and often with limited recollection for when the information had been presented. It therefore was concluded here that retrieval inhibition plays a significant role in nonhypnotic as well as in hypnotic instances of directed forgetting. The usefulness of retrieval inhibition as a mechanism for memory updating was also discussed.

Conducted 4 studies to show that the basic level differs qualitatively from other levels in taxonomies of objects and of living things. The 4 studies show that (1) parts prevail at the basic level, (2) basic level categories differ by parts, (3) subordinate level categories share parts, and (4) parts vary in perceived goodness. It was found that part terms proliferated in Ss' listings of attributes characterizing category members at the basic level, but were rarely listed at a general level. At a more specific level, fewer parts were listed, although more were judged to be true. Perceptual salience and functional significance both contributed to perceived part goodness. It is proposed that part configuration underlies the various empirical operations of perception, behavior, and communication that converge at the basic level. Part configuration underlies the perceptual measures because it determines the shapes of objects to a large degree. Parts underlie the behavioral tasks because most behavior is directed toward parts of objects. Labeling appears to follow the natural breaks of perception and behavior; consequently, part configuration also underlies communication measures. Because elements of more abstract taxonomies, such as scenes and events, can also be decomposed into parts, this analysis provides a bridge to organization in other domains of knowledge. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

Because of the biasing nature of retrieval tests, evidence that the introduction of misleading postevent information will impair the memory for an original event has recently been in dispute. In two experiments, a retrieval test sensitive to both biasing effects of misinformation (misinformation acceptance) and influences of the misinformation on memory (misinformation interference) was used. Both experiments demonstrated misinformation acceptance, and one of the experiments suggested that misinformation interferes with the ability to remember the original event. Two misinformation interference hypotheses are evaluated; they suggest that the misinformation may have either impaired memory or led to confusion regarding what had occurred during the event.

Fifty-six heroin addicts and 60 age-matched controls were offered choices between monetary rewards ($11-$80) available immediately and larger rewards ($25-$85) available after delays ranging from 1 week to 6 months. Participants had a 1-in-6 chance of winning a reward that they chose on one randomly selected trial. Delay-discounting rates were estimated from the pattern of participants' choices. The discounting model of impulsiveness (Ainslie, 1975) implies that delay-discounting rates are positively correlated with impulsiveness. On average, heroin addicts' discount rates were twice those of controls (p = .004), and discount rates were positively correlated with impulsivity as measured by self-report questionnaires (p < .05). The results lend external validity to the delay-discounting rate as a measure of impulsiveness, a characteristic associated with substance abuse.

A study was conducted in which 133 participants performed 11 memory tasks (some thought to reflect working memory and some thought to reflect short-term memory), 2 tests of general fluid intelligence, and the Verbal and Quantitative Scholastic Aptitude Tests. Structural equation modeling suggested that short-term and working memories reflect separate but highly related constructs and that many of the tasks used in the literature as working memory tasks reflect a common construct. Working memory shows a strong connection to fluid intelligence, but short-term memory does not. A theory of working memory capacity and general fluid intelligence is proposed: The authors argue that working memory capacity and fluid intelligence reflect the ability to keep a representation active, particularly in the face of interference and distraction. The authors also discuss the relationship of this capability to controlled attention, and the functions of the prefrontal cortex.

It has become fashionable to equate constructs of working memory (WM) and general intelligence (g). Few investigations have provided direct evidence that WM and g measures yield similar ordering of individuals. Correlational investigations have yielded mixed results. The authors assess the construct space for WM and g and demonstrate that WM shares substantial variance with perceptual speed (PS) constructs. Thirty-six ability tests representing verbal, numerical, spatial, and PS abilities; the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices; and 7 WM tests were administered to 135 adults. A nomological representation for WM is provided through a series of cognitive and PS ability models. Construct overlap between PS and WM is further investigated with attention to complexity, processing differences, and practice effects.

Though E. C. Cherry (1953) examined the recall of information from an irrelevant spoken channel in selective listening, the relationship between attention and subsequent recall still has not been examined adequately. It was examined here in 4 experiments, 3 of which were designed to identify conditions under which some participants, but not others, would notice a change from forward to backward speech. Only participants who shifted attention toward the irrelevant channel during the backward speech later recalled hearing it. In those whose attention shifted, shadowing errors peaked dramatically about 15 s after the change. There was no evidence of direct or indirect memory for phrases presented in the irrelevant channel. The results contradict models of attention stating that listeners process task-irrelevant information extensively without diverting resources used in shadowing.

In influential research, R. N. Shepard, C. I. Hovland, and H. M. Jenkins (1961) surveyed humans' categorization abilities using tasks based in rules, exclusive-or (XOR) relations, and exemplar memorization. Humans' performance was poorly predicted by cue-conditioning or stimulus-generalization theories, causing Shepard et al. to describe it in terms of hypothesis selection and rule application that were possibly supported by verbal mediation. The authors of the current article surveyed monkeys' categorization abilities similarly. Monkeys, like humans, found category tasks with a single relevant dimension the easiest and perceptually chaotic tasks requiring exemplar memorization the most difficult. Monkeys, unlike humans, found tasks based in XOR relations very difficult. The authors discuss the character and basis of the species difference in categorization and consider whether monkeys are the generalization-based cognitive system that humans are not.

Ceci and Liker (1986b) presented data that they contended shows two things: (a) Handicapping harness races is a cognitively complex undertaking that can be captured by a multiple regression model, and (b) neither overall skill at handicapping nor the complexity of the mental model used is related to standard measures of intelligence. The first contention is not at issue. But the second contention, that handicapping performance is unrelated to IQ, is not supported by the data presented; in fact, the opposite conclusion seems more likely. The purpose of this comment is to point out errors frequently made in individual-differences research concerning population definition, sample selection, dependent and independent variable reliability and validity and interpretation of results.

Ceci and Liker (1986) reported statistical independence of IQ and cognitive complexity as evidenced by horse-race handicapping. However, they dismissed too easily a potentially important finding contrary to their hypothesis: a negative correlation between IQ and years of horse-race experience among horse-race experts. Furthermore, F values for the relation between level of handicapping expertise and either level of education or occupational prestige (each of which correlates highly with IQ) are statistically too small and therefore suggest selectional biases.

In their article, "Relativity in the Perception of Emotion in Facial Expressions," Russell and Fehr (1987) argued that context is the principal determinant in interpreting facial expressions of emotion. They questioned the biological bases for emotion suggested by Darwin and supported by many cross-cultural studies. We suggest that their results occurred because the target faces they used were emotionally neutral or ambiguous. We also argue that their findings can be interpreted as supporting the communicative importance of the face.

Previously we (Bruno & Cutting, 1988) explored the perception of spatial relations among objects laid out in a computer-generated environment. In his commentary on our article, Massaro (1988) raised several issues. The most important is from his reanalysis, which indicated that--because of a subadditive trend in the results--additive and multiplicative strategies fit our data in Experiment 1 about equally well. In reply, we performed a different analysis. Results corroborate subadditivity--and hence multiplicative information combination--in Experiment 1 but provide no evidence for it in Experiments 2 and 3. On the whole, then, the results still support additivity more strongly than any other combination rule and thus support our notion of minimodularity.

Balota and Chumbley's studies led them to conclude that category verification, lexical decision, and pronunciation tasks involve combinations of processes that cause them to produce differing estimates of the relation between word frequency and ease of lexical identification. Monsell, Doyle, and Haggard challenged Balota and Chumbley's empirical evidence and conclusions, provided empirical evidence to support their challenge, and presented an alternative theoretical position. We show that Monsell et al.'s experiments, analyses, and theoretical perspective do not result in conclusions about the role of word frequency in category verification, lexical decision, and pronunciation that differ from those of Balota and Chumbley.

Lindsay (1991), in his comment CHARMed, but not Convinced: Comment on Metcalfe (1990), acknowledged that distributed models of human memory using the construct of a composite memory trace, such as the Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model (CHARM), are able to account for most of the findings within the eyewitness-testimony paradigm. Despite this success, Lindsay found CHARM to be of limited usefulness as a model of eyewitness suggestibility. The reasons stated for this peculiar conclusion are discussed in this rebuttal.

Cerella (1991) has argued that the performance of older adults in the Fisk and Rogers (1991) study is a linear function of the performance of younger adults that is independent of task-specific cognitive requirements. We demonstrate that this is not the case. First, we show that the scatter plot analyses used by Cerella can hide the very task-specific age-related slowing they were designed to reveal. Second, we demonstrate that the percentage of variance explained by such analyses can be misleading. Third, we show that there are reliable differences across tasks in the parameters relating younger and older adults' performance. Finally, we argue that the general, task-independent proportionate slowing that Cerella suggested explains so much of the variance in age-related performance is actually an average slowing that is a function of a relatively small task-independent and a relatively large task-dependent factor.

With respect to the influence of postevent information, Schooler and Tanaka (1991) made a useful distinction between composite recollections--in which subjects retrieve "items from both the original and the postevent sources" (p.97)--and compromise recollections--in which subjects retrieve" at least one feature that cannot be exclusively associated with either the original or the postevent sources, but which reflects some compromise between [the] two" (p.97). Schooler and Tanaka argued that only the latter constitutes good evidence for blend-memory representations of the CHARM-type. As it turns out, Schooler and Tanaka's intuitions (and Metcalfe & Bjork's, initially) are faulty. Compromise recall--defined as a preference for an intervening alternative over either of the actually presented alternatives--is not normally a prediction of CHARM and may not be a prediction of composite-trace models in general. Only under specialized conditions--a systematic displacement of the test alternatives or a systematic shift attributable to assimilation to prior semantic knowledge--will computer simulations of CHARM produce unimodal compromise recollection. Equally surprising is the fact that separate-trace models, under a different set of conditions, can predict compromise recollection.

A series of analyses of variance on target search times allowed Fisk and Rogers (1991) to reject the null hypothesis that age had a uniform, additive effect across search conditions. It does not, however, follow that age affected some conditions in an exceptional way, as Fisk and Rogers concluded. Age may have had a uniform but nonadditive effect across conditions. In this article, it is shown that age had a uniform linear, or perhaps slightly curvilinear, effect on search times. This "null hypothesis" adequately accounted for the age effects in all 27 search conditions. Indeed, it accounted for the age effects in 107 conditions abstracted from other visual search studied and for the age effects in 154 conditions abstracted from a miscellaneous collection of nonsearch processing-time studies. The only variation in age outcomes across studies was consistent with sampling error, given the known variance in response times. It is concluded that age is experienced as a generalized slowing of the central nervous system uniformly affecting all information processes.

Ashby and Lee (1991) tested various models derived from the general recognition theory (GRT; Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986) on their ability to predict and interrelate similarity, categorization, and identification performance. This commentary (a) argues that contrary to Ashby and Lee's suggestion, the likelihood-based GRT cannot generally predict categorization from identification without incorporating selective attention, (b) argues that the categorization rule in the likelihood-based GRT is extremely close in spirit to Nosofsky's (1986) exemplar-based similarity model, (c) reports new model-based analyses that call into question Ashby and Lee's interpretation of their identification-confusion data, (d) raises questions about the identification and similarity models tested by Ashby and Lee, and (e) criticizes Ashby and Lee's methods of fitting and evaluating the various models.

One of S. Siegel, L. G. Allen, and T. Eissenberg's (1992) recent arguments in support of associative-learning explanations of colored aftereffects (CAEs) is that the contingencies underlying these effects are not constrained by simple stimulus dimensions, such as contour orientation. Specifically, the authors claim to have generated CAEs contingent on sets of spatiotopic relationships between orientation components of a pattern (as opposed to orientation components per se). The present article illustrates how Siegel et al.'s claims are compromised by their failure to adequately address the role of fixation and eye movements during CAE induction.

S. P. Vecera and M. J. Farah (1994) have addressed the issue of whether visual attention selects objects or locations. They obtained data that they interpreted as evidence for attentional selection of objects from an internal spatially invariant representation. A. F. Kramer, T. A. Weber, and S. E. Watson question this interpretation on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, the authors suggest that there are other interpretations of the Vecera and Farah data that are consistent with location-mediated selection of objects. Second, they provide data, using the displays employed by Vecera and Farah in conjunction with a postdisplay probe technique, that suggests that attention is directed to the locations of the target objects. The implications of the results for space and object-based attentional selection are discussed.

The authors have found the data presented in the C. Schooler, E. Neumann, L. J. Caplan, and B. R. Roberts (1997) article to be interesting and of potential value in constraining the further development of detailed theoretical models of Stroop performance. However, the authors have found that the relative speed of processing account of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) effects given by Schooler et al. in Experiment 1 fails to address several important and vexing issues faced by such accounts, which have been highlighted by existing formal models. The authors also have expressed concerns about Schooler et al.'s, interpretation of the reduction in Stroop interference observed among individuals with schizophrenia in Experiment 2. Whereas the authors have acknowledged that it is plausible to relate this to a dysfunction of prefrontal cortex, they have pointed to equally plausible alternative explanations, which are not addressed by the experiment or in the discussion in the Schooler et al. article.

A. G. Greenwald, M. R. Klinger, and E. S. Schuh (1995) have proposed a regression method for detecting unconscious cognition in experiments that obtain measures of indirect and direct effects of stimuli with suspected unconscious effects. Their indirect-on-direct-measure regression approach can produce misleading evidence for indirect effects in the absence of direct effects when the direct-effect measure has typical measurement error. This article describes an errors-in-variables variant of the regression method that corrects for error in the direct-effect measure. Applied to the uses of the regression method by S. C. Draine and A. G. Greenwald (1998) in this issue, the errors-in-variables method affirms substantial evidence for indirect effects in the absence of direct effects.

S. C. Draine and A. G. Greenwald (1998) demonstrated replicable unconscious semantic priming by combining a response window procedure, which increases priming effects by requiring rapid responding, and a regression analysis in which the regression intercept is a marker for unconscious cognition. The commentaries by B. A. Dosher (1998) and by P. M. Merikle and E. M. Reingold (1998) raise two questions about conclusions based on these methods: (a) Did Draine and Greenwald (1998) demonstrate an indirect effect (subliminal priming) in the absence of a direct effect (i.e., visibility of the subliminal priming words)? and (b) Did Draine and Greenwald (1998) demonstrate dissociation of conscious from unconscious cognition? The first question has reassuring responses that are reviewed here. The second question is answered by pointing out that although Draine and Greenwald (1998) did not claim to have established such dissociation, they provided data that advance the plausibility of that conclusion.

S. C. Draine and A. G. Greenwald (1998) have described a methodology based on regression analysis for demonstrating unconscious perception. They have suggested that their methodology represents a major improvement over existing methodologies. An analysis of their methodology reveals that it is closely related to the classic dissociation paradigm. As such, interpretation of their results is compromised by the same issues concerning the measurement of awareness that have plagued all previous attempts to use the dissociation paradigm to demonstrate unconscious perception in the complete absence of conscious perception.

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (1999) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought--Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings.

M. R. Lamb, E. W. Yund, and H. M. Pond (1999) question L. C. Robertson's (1996) earlier arguments that attention can be guided by spatial frequencies when searching for a target in complex visual patterns. The 2 major findings they report to argue against Robertson's conclusions are discussed and found inadequate for the purposes of abandoning this hypothesis. Instead, findings reported in the accompanying article in combination with previous findings reported by 2 of the same authors (M. R. Lamb & E. W. Yund, 1996) provide converging evidence to support spatial frequency as a medium for guiding attention.

The RCCL model (M. C. Lovett & C. D. Schunn, 1999) produces predictions that are non-novel or that do not truly spring from its principles. However, it offers the valuable insight that learning processes may affect the selection of both representations and strategies within those representations, and points the way to possible theoretical progress on implicit and explicit control. The authors' account of base-rate neglect under direct experience is compared with RCCL, and it is concluded that learning-based models allow for tests that are not fostered by representation-based models.

E. Fantino (2000) argued that R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's (2000) experiments fail to elucidate the relationship between stimulus value and temporal context. His reasoning is that predictions for R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's probe tests based on delay-reduction theory (DRT) and the contextual choice model (CCM) are indistinguishable. However, his method of applying DRT to the probes ensures that temporal context will have no effect on which stimulus is preferred, contrary to the core principle of that theory. The only basis for differential responding in the probes is baseline training, and R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's data clearly show that the terminal-link schedules, independent of temporal context, control choice in the probes, as predicted by CCM.

Recent research has demonstrated that people care about the temporal relationships within a sequence of experiences. There is considerable evidence that people pay particular attention to the way experiences improve or deteriorate over time and to their maximum (peak) and final values. D. Kahneman and coauthors suggested in earlier articles that people ignore or severely underweight duration (which they referred to as duration neglect). In the preceding article, D. Ariely and G. Loewenstein (2000) challenged the generalizability of these findings and their normative implications. In the current commentary, D. Ariely, D. Kahneman, and G. Loewenstein jointly examine the issue to provide a better understanding of what they feel they have learned from this literature and to discuss the remaining open questions.

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) make two main||| criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (1999) RCCL||| model. (RCCL is pronounced "ReCyCLe"; it stands for Represent the task,||| Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies||| according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors||| believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between||| broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this||| article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new||| empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular,||| RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental||| representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address||| several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that||| qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their||| original data--a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous||| accounts.

The deliberate application of a strategy can have unintended discriminative effects. It is argued that these effects or influences on discriminative responding are the source of automatic influences and can be dissociated from controlled influences under appropriate circumstances. Such automatic influences are often latent in the interaction between the memory structures and the strategies that participants bring to bear in many implicit learning tasks.

V. Di Lolo, J. T. Enns, and R. A. Rensink (2000) reported properties of masking that they claimed were inconsistent with all current models. The current authors show, through computer simulation, that many current models can account for V. Di Lollo et al.'s (2000) data. Although V. Di Lollo et al. (2000) argued that their data could be accounted for only with models that incorporate reentrant processing, the current authors show that reentrant processing is not necessary.

P. A. Higham, J. R. Vokey, and J. L. Pritchard (2000) claimed to provide evidence for separable controlled and automatic processes in artificial grammar learning. It is argued that their results are compatible with a single controlled influence: Participants might mistakenly identify more grammatical items than nongrammatical items as belonging to the other grammar, because the grammars are very similar to each other, and the nongrammatical items are relatively highly dissimilar. Participants' knowledge may be ambiguous, rather than automatic. It is further argued that even if Higham et al.'s data do support automatic effects, opposition logic, in this case, cannot be said to have succeeded where dissociation logic has failed, because it is used to address the issue of whether participants have conscious control over the knowledge they acquire, rather than whether they possess conscious awareness of that knowledge.

R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano (2000) have devised a procedure to determine whether the effectiveness of a stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer depends on the temporal context of reinforcement. Although they interpret their results in terms of the contextual choice model, which maintains that value is independent of context, the results also support delay-reduction theory, which maintains that value depends on temporal context. It is argued that the delay-reduction view of the role of temporal context is also intuitively more plausible and more consistent with the way choice responds to changes in conditions.

A. Lleras and J. T. Enns demonstrated a negative influence of a masked arrow that is attributable to the perceptual interaction between the arrow and the mask when these have properties in common (in this case diagonal lines). Although the present analysis is in agreement that this type of perceptual interaction can occur, it also demonstrates that this is not the only way a masked arrow can produce a negative influence. The most critical finding is that a negative influence occurred even when the arrow and mask did not share the common properties that would be needed for this type of perceptual interaction. This illustrates the version of the negative compatibility effect that was studied by S. T. Klapp and L. B. Hinkley (2002) and others.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) requires responding to category contrasts such as young versus old, male versus female, and pleasant versus unpleasant. In introducing the IAT, A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, and J. L. K. Schwartz (1998) proposed that IAT measures reflect mental structures involving the nominal features of the IAT's categories (e.g., age, gender, or valence features). In contrast, K. Rothermund and D. Wentura proposed that IAT performance is dominated by salience asymmetries of the IAT's pairs of contrasted categories. To assess relative contributions of nominal feature contrasts versus salience asymmetries, the authors (a) briefly summarize the extensive evidence now available to support construct validity of the IAT as a measure based on nominal category features and (b) present 2 new experiments that yielded results problematic for the salience asymmetry interpretation.

M. Peña, L. L. Bonatti, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler argued that humans compute nonadjacent statistical relations among syllables in a continuous artificial speech stream to extract words, but they use other computations to determine the structural properties of words. Instead, when participants are familiarized with a segmented stream, structural generalizations about words are quickly established. P. Perruchet, M. D. Tyler, N. Galland, and R. Peereman criticized M. Peña et al.'s work and dismissed their results. In this article, the authors show that P. Perruchet et al.'s criticisms are groundless.

Verleger, Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, and Groen and Lleras and Enns have argued that negative compatibility effects (NCEs) obtained with masked primes do not reflect self-inhibition processes in motor control. Instead, NCEs are assumed to reflect activation of the response opposite to the prime, triggered by the presence of prime/targetlike features in the mask. Thus, no NCEs should be elicited when masks do not contain such task-relevant features. In Experiments 1 and 3, the authors demonstrate that NCEs can be obtained when masks contain only irrelevant features. Experiment 2 demonstrates that positive compatibility effects (PCEs) will occur with such masks when masked primes are presented peripherally. These results are inconsistent with the mask-induced activation accounts but are in line with the self-inhibition hypothesis of the NCE. Although perceptual interactions and mask-induced motor activations may contribute to NCEs under certain conditions, they cannot provide a full explanation for these effects.

V. M. Sloutsky and A. V. Fisher reported 5 experiments documenting relations among categorization, induction, recognition, and similarity in children as well as adults and proposed a new model of induction, SINC (similarity, induction, categorization). Those authors concluded that induction depends on perceptual similarity rather than conceptual knowledge. Despite the useful contributions of this work, there are some important limitations. The experimental designs examined a limited range of phenomena that are not the most revealing about the use of nonperceptual information. The main results involved a simple triad task, for which the SINC model's predictions are equivalent to the predictions of previous models of inductive reasoning. It is also unclear whether the SINC model can account for the observed relations between similarity and recognition. Implications for future work on induction and related cognitive activities are discussed.

D. Algom, E. Chajut, and S. Lev presented a series of definitional, conceptual, and empirical arguments in support of their conclusion that the classic and emotional Stroop effects are, in their words, "unrelated phenomena" (p. 336), such that the term emotional Stroop effect is a misnomer in reference to the relatively greater interference in ink color naming of emotional versus neutral words. These are strong claims. In this comment, the author critically examines each component of Algom et al.'s case and argues that, in fact, none of these components represents compelling evidence in support of their eventual conclusions.

The authors make 3 points in response to F. Schlaghecken and M. Eimer's proposal of self-inhibition as an explanatory factor in the negative compatibility effect: (a) The self-inhibition hypothesis lacks empirical support for its main tenets; (b) considering the roles of geometric, spatial, and temporal similarity of primes and masks makes self-inhibition unnecessary; and (c) the negative compatibility effect occurs even when the main tenets of self-inhibition are violated. The authors propose that understanding what is "relevant" in a masked-priming task applies not only to geometric features that are shared with the target but to spatial and temporal ones as well. Briefly, target-mask similarity determines how motor preparation is accumulated during the prime-mask sequence.

Reports a retraction of "Hierarchical encoding of behavior: Translating perception into action" by Bridgette Martin Hard, Sandra C. Lozano and Barbara Tversky (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2006[Nov], Vol 135[4], 588-608). All authors retract this article. Co-author Tversky and co-author Hard believe that the research results cannot be relied upon; Sandra C. Lozano takes full responsibility for the need to retract this article. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2006-20327-007.) People encode goal-directed behaviors, such as assembling an object, by segmenting them into discrete actions, organized as goal-subgoal hierarchies. Does hierarchical encoding contribute to observational learning? Participants in 3 experiments segmented an object assembly task into coarse and fine units of action and later performed it themselves. Hierarchical encoding, measured by segmentation patterns, correlated with more accurate and more hierarchically structured performance of the later assembly task. Furthermore, hierarchical encoding increased when participants (a) segmented coarse units first, (b) explicitly looked for hierarchical structure, and (c) described actions while segmenting them. Improving hierarchical encoding always led to improvements in learning, as well as a surprising shift toward encoding and executing actions from the actor's spatial perspective instead of the participants' own. Hierarchical encoding facilitates observational learning by organizing perceived actions into a representation that can serve as an action plan. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

R. Kliegl, A. Nuthmann, and R. Engbert reported an impressive set of data analyses dealing with the influence of the prior, present, and next word on the duration of the current eye fixation during reading. They argued that outcomes of their regression analyses indicate that lexical processing is distributed across a number of words during reading. The authors of this comment question their conclusions and address 4 different issues: (a) whether there is evidence for distributed lexical processing, (b) whether so-called parafoveal-on-foveal effects are widespread, (c) the role of correlational analyses in reading research, and (d) problems in their analyses because they use only cases in which words are fixated exactly once.

Francis (2013) tested for and found evidence of publication bias in 1 of the 3 focal relations examined in Elliot et al. (2010), that between red and attractiveness. He then called into question the research as a whole and the field of experimental psychology more generally. Our reply has 3 foci. First, we attend to the bottom line regarding the red-attractiveness effect; it has already been replicated and extended by several independent laboratories. Second, we note that the test applied to our research is an exploratory test meant to be used cautiously and highlight ways in which the application to our research seems incautious. Third, we place the critique in the broader context of the prevailing norms and practices of the field and suggest that the preferred approach to reevaluating and revising the system currently in place is the frank, creative exchange of ideas already underway. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Goal neglect and Spearman's g: Competing parts of a complex task" by John Duncan, Alice Parr, Alexandra Woolgar, Russell Thompson, Peter Bright, Sally Cox, Sonia Bishop and Ian Nimmo-Smith (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2008[Feb], Vol 137[1], 131-148). The DOI for the supplemental materials was printed incorrectly. The correct DOI is as follows: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.137.1.131.supp (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-01081-009.) In goal neglect, a person ignores some task requirement though being able to describe it. Goal neglect is closely related to general intelligence or C. Spearman's (1904) g (J. Duncan, H. Emslie, P. Williams, R. Johnson, & C. Freer, 1996). The authors tested the role of task complexity in neglect and the hypothesis that different task components in some sense compete for attention. In contrast to many kinds of attentional limits, increasing the real-time demands of one task component does not promote neglect of another. Neither does neglect depend on preparation for different possible events in a block of trials. Instead, the key factor is complexity in the whole body of knowledge specified in task instructions. The authors suggest that as novel activity is constructed, relevant facts, rules, and requirements must be organized into a "task model." As this model increases in complexity, different task components compete for representation, and vulnerable components may be lost. Construction of effective task models is closely linked to g. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).

Four studies investigated whether political allegiance and salience of outgroup membership contribute to the phenomenon of acceptance of false, stigmatizing information (smears) about political candidates. Studies 1-3 were conducted in the month prior to the 2008 U.S. Presidential election and together demonstrated that pre-standing opposition to John McCain or Barack Obama, as well as the situational salience of differentiating social categories (i.e., for Obama, race; for McCain, age), contributed to the implicit activation and explicit endorsement of smearing labels (i.e., Obama is Muslim; McCain is senile). The influence of salient differentiating categories on smear acceptance was particularly pronounced among politically undecided individuals. Study 4 clarified that social category differences heighten smear acceptance, even if the salient category is semantically unrelated to the smearing label, showing that, approximately 1 year after the election, the salience of race amplified belief that Obama is a socialist among undecided people and McCain supporters. Taken together, these findings suggest that, at both implicit and explicit cognitive levels, social category differences and political allegiance contribute to acceptance of smears against political candidates.