Many decisions involve a degree of personal control over event outcomes, which is exerted through one's knowledge or skill. In three experiments we investigated differences in decision making between prospects based on a) the outcome of random events and b) the outcome of events characterized by control. In Experiment 1, participants estimated certainty equivalents (CEs) for bets based on either random events or the correctness of their answers to U.S. state population questions across the probability spectrum. In Experiment 2, participants estimated CEs for bets based on random events, answers to U.S. state population questions, or answers to questions about 2007 NCAA football game results. Experiment 3 extended the same procedure as Experiment 1 using a within-subjects design. We modeled data from all experiments in a prospect theory framework to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. Participants weighted the probabilities associated with bets characterized by control so as to reflect greater risk attractiveness relative to bets based on random events, as evidenced by more elevated weighting functions under conditions of control. This research elucidates possible cognitive mechanisms behind increased risk taking for decisions characterized by control, and implications for various literatures are discussed.
Despite evidence that individual differences in numeracy affect judgment and decision making, the precise mechanisms underlying how such differences produce biases and fallacies remain unclear. Numeracy scales have been developed without sufficient theoretical grounding, and their relation to other cognitive tasks that assess numerical reasoning, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), has been debated. In studies conducted in Brazil and in the USA, we administered an objective Numeracy Scale (NS), Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS), and the CRT to assess whether they measured similar constructs. The Rational-Experiential Inventory, inhibition (go/no-go task), and intelligence were also investigated. By examining factor solutions along with frequent errors for questions that loaded on each factor, we characterized different types of processing captured by different items on these scales. We also tested the predictive power of these factors to account for biases and fallacies in probability judgments. In the first study, 259 Brazilian undergraduates were tested on the conjunction and disjunction fallacies. In the second study, 190 American undergraduates responded to a ratio-bias task. Across the different samples, the results were remarkably similar. The results indicated that the CRT is not just another numeracy scale, that objective and subjective numeracy scales do not measure an identical construct, and that different aspects of numeracy predict different biases and fallacies. Dimensions of numeracy included computational skills such as multiplying, proportional reasoning, mindless or verbatim matching, metacognitive monitoring, and understanding the gist of relative magnitude, consistent with dual-process theories such as fuzzy-trace theory.
Performance on complex decision-making tasks may depend on a multitude of processes. Two such tasks, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART), are of particular interest because they are associated with real world risky behavior, including illegal drug use. We used cognitive models to disentangle underlying processes in both tasks. Whereas behavioral measures from the IGT and BART were uncorrelated, cognitive models revealed two reliable cross-task associations. Results suggest that the tasks similarly measure loss aversion and decision-consistency processes, but not necessarily the same learning process. Additionally, substance-using individuals (and especially stimulant users) performed worse on the IGT than healthy controls did, and this pattern could be explained by reduced decision consistency.
Financial decisions about investing and saving for retirement are increasingly complex, requiring financial knowledge and confidence in that knowledge. Few studies have examined whether direct assessments of individuals' confidence are related to the outcomes of their financial decisions. Here, we analyzed data from a national sample recruited through RAND's American Life Panel (ALP), an internet panel of U.S. adults aged 18 to 88. We examined the relationship of confidence with self-reported and actual financial decisions, using four different tasks, each performed by overlapping samples of ALP participants. The four tasks were designed by different researchers for different purposes, using different methods to assess confidence. Yet, measures of confidence were correlated across tasks, and results were consistent across methodologies. Confidence and knowledge showed only modest positive correlations. However, even after controlling for actual knowledge, individuals with greater confidence were more likely to report financial planning for retirement and to successfully minimize fees on a hypothetical investment task. Implications for the role of confidence (even if it is unjustified) in investment behavior is discussed.
Delayed rewards are less valuable than immediate rewards. This well-established finding has focused almost entirely on individual outcomes. However, are delayed rewards similarly discounted if they are shared by a group? The current article reports on three experiments exploring the effect of group context on delay discounting. Results indicate that discount rates of individual and group rewards were highly correlated, but that respondents were more willing to wait (decreased discounting) for shared outcomes than for individual outcomes. An explanatory model is proposed suggesting that decreased discount rates in group contexts may be due to the way the effects of both delay and social discounting are combined. That is, in a group context, a person values both a future reward (discounted by delay) and a present reward to another person (discounted by the social distance between them). The results are explained by a combined discount function containing a delay factor and a factor representing the social distance between the decision maker and group members. Practical implications of the fact that shared consequences can increase individual self-control are also discussed.
We explored the potential for a sunk-cost effect in the realm of time. Questionnaire studies (Experiments 1-4) obtained a sunk-time effect that was robust to manipulations of prospective value, individual versus group consequences, and the effort or enjoyment inherent in the time. Behavioral experiments (Experiments 5-7) also suggested a sunk-time effect and found support for a personal responsibility by sunk cost interaction on choice behavior. We discuss theoretical implications and a potential connection to animal sunk cost phenomena.
We tested the effectiveness of prepayment for advice and aligned incentives as mechanisms for enhancing trust in unfamiliar advisers in decision-making under uncertainty. Participants were low-income Zimbabweans who played two rounds of the Monty Hall three-door game. In round 1, participants who purchased advice were significantly more likely to follow advice for how to win the game than were participants who received free advice. In round 2, the apparent effectiveness of advisers’ suggestions in round 1 moderated participants’ propensity to follow advice. If the round 1 advice appeared wrong, the credibility enhancing benefits of prepayment diminished. If the advice appeared right, the benefits of prepayment maintained. Hypotheses with regard to the benefits of aligned incentives received only weak support.
Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
When deciding for whom to vote, voters should select the candidate they expect to best handle issues, all other things equal. A simple heuristic predicted that the candidate who is rated more favorably on a larger number of issues would win the popular vote. This was correct for nine out of ten U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 2008. We then used simple linear regression to relate the incumbent's relative issue ratings to the actual two-party popular vote shares. The resulting model yielded out-of-sample forecasts that were competitive with those from the Iowa Electronic Markets and established quantitative models. The issue-index model has implications for political decision makers, as it can help to track campaigns and to decide which issues to focus on.
Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) have shown that choices based on similarity judgments will account for the vast majority of observed violations of expected and discounted utility. In this paper, I show that such judgments also explain which equilibria will be selected in single-shot games with multiple equilibria, predict circumstances in which non-equilibria outcomes may predominate in such games, and predict circumstances in which specific pure strategy outcomes will predominate in games with no pure strategy equilibria.
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think ought to be done (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s own choice. However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think should be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for those who design institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior.
Research on historical cases of policy decisions thought to involve groupthink nearly always has been qualitative, rather than quantitative. We propose that observable antecedents and consequences can be used to code incidents in a group's decision process, thereby providing the basis for more rigorous, quantitative analyses. As a first step toward such a quantitative case analysis, we coded statements from the investigative report on the space shuttle Challenger accident as positive or negative instances of the observable antecedents and consequences of groupthink. Positive instances of groupthink were twice as frequent as negative instances. More importantly, during the 24 hours prior to launch the ratio of positive to negative instances increased, then remained high. These results are consistent with the notion that the decision to launch the Challenger involved groupthink and provide a first step toward more rigorous quantitative analysis of historical or current decision processes.
Recently, the ‘heuristics and biases’ approach to the study of decision making has been criticized, with a call for better integrated theory. Three experiments stemming from fuzzy-trace theory addressed information seeking on probability problems, and the cognitive representation of hit-rates, base-rates, and the contrapositive. As predicted by the fuzzy-trace principle of ‘denominator neglect’, many subjects exhibited ‘conversion errors’, confusing the hit-rate, P(A|B), with the answer, P(B|A). These subjects sought base-rates less often than other subjects. On causal problems, more subjects correctly represented base-rates, sought base-rates more often, and produced more accurate estimates than on non-causal problems. Subjects tutored on the meaning of the hit-rate sought the base-rate more often, and were more accurate than control subjects. Results are explained by fuzzy-trace theory principles of gist extraction, fuzzy processing preference, denominator neglect, and output interference.
This study assesses the impact of accountability, the status quo, and anticipated costs and benefits on judgement of the acceptability of a drug in the US pharmaceuticals market. Several effects are documented: (1) subjects were more accepting of a drug, the lower the anticipated risks of side effects and the greater the anticipated benefits; (2) subjects were especially unwilling to accept risk when the drug was not yet on the market and when they felt accountable for their decisions; (3) accountable subjects confronted by an off-the-market drug that posed moderate or high risk were also especially likely to procrastinate, to buckpass, and to think in integratively complex ways about the problem, notwithstanding the fact that many more lives would be saved than lost. We explain these results by positing that perceptual-cognitive processes (loss aversion) and political processes (blame avoidance) mutually reinforce each other when decision makers are accountable for choices that raise the possibility of changing the status quo in ways that impose losses on identifiable constituencies. We conclude by commenting on the complex normative issues that arise in labelling response tendencies as biases. Choices that look irrational within one ethical or political framework sometimes appear quite reasonable with another.
When a judgment task evokes unbiased estimates (i.e. the errors in individual judgments are distributed randomly around the true value), mathematical aggregation of individual estimates, even by a simple arithmetic mean, often will outperform all group members. However, when a task evokes biased estimates, mathematical aggregation does not perform so well. In this study, simulated data were accumulated to specify the expected' accuracy of mathematical aggregation relative to the accuracy of observed judgment of individual group members under varying conditions of task bias. Three types of judgment tasks were employed: (1) single-estimate, holistic tasks, (2) multiple-estimate, ranking tasks, and (3) multi-cue, decomposed tasks. Findings indicated across all task types that a large percentage of judgment-making group estimates formed strictly by computing the arithmetic mean of individual estimates performed better than their most capable members when a judgment task evoked little or no bias, a result particularly pronounced for ranking tasks. When the task was more greatly bias-evoking, a large percentage of parallel groups performed more poorly than average (or median) members, again a pattern more starkly evident for ranking tasks. These results suggest that the extent to which a judgment task evokes bias in a population of prospective group members is an important explanatory variable deserving much greater attention in the study of group performance. For example, an assertion about the efficacy of a particular group intervention based on a reliable demonstration of group performance as accurate as the most capable members may be unfounded when a task evokes no bias, since the baseline standard under such conditions should be much higher. By selecting tasks and populations that jointly produced highly biased estimates, researchers can lower the performance floor enough to detect (with reasonably small samples of groups) experimental effects should they occur.
This paper examines the impact of accuracy feedback, effort feedback, and emphasis on either a goal of maximizing accuracy relative to effort or minimizing effort relative to accuracy on decision processes. Feedback on the accuracy of decisions leads to more normative-like processing of information and improved performance only in the most difficult problems, i.e., decisions with low dispersion in attribute weights. Explicit effort feedback has almost no impact on processing or performance. The impact of the goal manipulation on decision processes was found to be consistent with the shift in strategies predicted by an effort/accuracy model of strategy selection. In particular, a goal of emphasizing accuracy led to more normative-like processing, while emphasis on effort led to less extensive, more selective, and more attribute-based processing and poorer performance. These results provide perhaps the clearest evidence to date of the effect of goals on processing differences. Complex interactive relationships between types of feedback and goal structures suggest the need for additional study of feedback and goals on adaptive decision behavior.
In this study we compare the probability judgment accuracy of subjects from the United States and Turkey. Three different response modes were employed — numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. The questions employed in the study were restricted to two-alternative, general-knowledge items. The observed pattern of differences in the components of probability judgment accuracy paralleled those of studies that have compared Western and Asian subjects. In particular, Turkish subjects exhibited better discrimination but worse calibration than their US counterparts. This result persisted across all three response modes. These findings lend support to previous assertions that observed cross-national differences arise from socioeconomic rather than Asian versus Western cultural differences. However, the consistency of the observed differences across response modes refutes a previous assertion that observed cultural differences are merely the result of response bias.
Intuitions relating to outcomes extended over time are examined. Utility integration is proposed as a normative rule for the evaluation of extended episodes. In Experiment 1, subjects explicitly compared aversive experiences of varying durations. By several measures, disutility was a marginally decreasing function of episode duration, even for experiences that were thought to become increasingly aversive. This pattern is a qualitative violation of the integration rule. In Experiment 2, subjects made global evaluations of a hypothetical person's aversive experiences, on the basis of a series of subjective ratings of discomfort made at periodic intervals. The results showed an extreme sensitivity to improving or deteriorating trend and a striking neglect of duration. The final moments of an extended episode appear to exert a strong influence on the overall judgment. This leads to violations of monotonicity when adding some moments of moderate pain reduces judgments of global aversiveness.
It has been asserted that (I) tests of expectancy-value models require within-persons analyses and that (2) within-persons analyses yield better predictions of behavioral tendencies than do across-persons analyses. The first assertion is correct; the second is not. Justification for within-persons tests of expectancy-value models must be made on theoretical rather than empirical grounds.