This is a critical reassessment of the effects of the institution of labor migration on the sending countries. It is argued that the present system of migrating labor from the less developed countries of the European periphery to the highly advanced industrial societies of Western and Northern Europe has failed to address systematically any of the conditions which give rise to pressures for emigration in the first place. Thus, labor emigration, operating in a virtual policy void, has merely functioned as a palliative—rather than as a reforming agent—of the labor supplying countries' structural deficiencies. This article outlines a set of policy initiatives aimed at the improvement of the situation—such as measures for redressing some of the structural causes of emigration, the development of a coherent manpower and development strategy which would utilize the skills and experiences of target returning emigrants, and policies designed to utilize repatriated capital in an intelligent manner.
While there has been much recent empirical investigation of the relationship between economic development, dependence, and income inequality, the issue of gender inequality has received less systematic attention. This exploratory study is a cross-sectional investigation of the effects of industrialization and investment, debt, and export dependency on levels of female education, and on rates of female economic participation, both absolutely and relative to male rates in 60 less developed countries. Although some of the macroeconomic indicators emerge as significant predictors of gender inequality in several of the regression equations, the most important explanatory variable is cultural region. These findings fail to lend strong empirical support to either the modernization or the dependency/world system theoretical perspective. The concluding discussion speculates on the interpretation of the research findings, offers some observations on the conceptual distinctions between class and gender stratification, and suggestions some directions for future research.
Aid potentially can contribute to democratization in several ways: (1) through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, and the promotion of civil society organizations, including a free press; (2) through conditionality; and (3) by improving education and increasing per capita incomes, which research shows are conducive to democratization. This study provides a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975-2000 period. Using two different democracy indexes and two different measures of aid intensity, no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy. This result is robust to alternative model specifications and estimation techniques, including the use of exogenous instruments for aid. Results are similar if the analysis is confined to the post-Cold War period (1990-2000), despite the reduced dependence of the U.S. and other donors on pro-Western authoritarian regimes among aid recipient nations.
Alliances play a central role in international relations theory. However, aside from applications of traditional cooperative game theory which ignore the issue of enforcement in anarchic systems, or interpretations of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the attempt to understand the source of cooperation in such systems, we have little theory on which to base predictions about alliance formation. This article, then, builds on an n-country, noncooperative, game-theoretic model of conflict in anarchic systems in order to furnish a theoretical basis for such predictions. Defining an alliance as a collection of countries that jointly abide by “collective security strategies” with respect to each other but not with respect to members outside of the alliance, we establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for an alliance system to be stable. In addition, we show that not all winning or minimal winning coalitions can form alliances, that alliances among smaller states can be stable, that bipolar alliance structures do not exhaust the set of stable structures, and that only specific countries can play the role of balancer.
We introduce a new hybrid approach to joint estimation of Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) for high quantiles of return distributions. We investigate the relative performance of VaR and ES models using daily returns for sixteen stock market indices (eight from developed and eight from emerging markets) prior to and during the 2008 financial crisis. In addition to widely used VaR and ES models, we also study the behavior of conditional and unconditional extreme value (EV) models to generate 99 percent confidence level estimates as well as developing a new loss function that relates tail losses to ES forecasts. Backtesting results show that only our proposed new hybrid and Extreme Value (EV)-based VaR models provide adequate protection in both developed and emerging markets, but that the hybrid approach does this at a significantly lower cost in capital reserves. In ES estimation the hybrid model yields the smallest error statistics surpassing even the EV models, especially in the developed markets.
The political economy of trade policy has largely neglected popular election. When legislatures determine protection, politicians supply tariffs that are demanded by their constituents. A model of this political market is specified and tested with data related to the McKinley Tariff of 1890. An index of the extent to which tariff protection accrued to individual congressional districts is applied, along with demand and supply variables, to three questions: Did representatives supply tariffs to their districts as the model predicts? Did they vote in accordance with the district tariff interest in the roll-call vote on the McKinley Tariff? Did electors reward representatives for the district tariff protection in a manner consistent with a political market model? Empirical estimations based on the model provide answers that are generally affirmative and appear to be inconsistent with the traditional view that the Republic defeat in 1890 was a result of the McKinley Tariff. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.
The connection between nation and state is far from settled, and though naturalized in ordinary political discourse, it is often regarded with circumspection by many social scientists. Can Charles Tilly’s application of Nettl’s idea of stateness to European state formation illuminate the nation/state relationship and if so, what does this reveal about the tension between national majorities and national minorities that produces civil strife, conflict, and even violence within states? This article explores the implications of the interplay between the international normative framework produced by European state formation that inevitably creates minorities in states on the one hand, and Tilly’s notion of stateness, on the other. How does the existence of minorities and the de facto privileging of national majorities within the state affect its ability to develop and sustain politically stable authoritative institutions?
A game-theoretic model of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars,” is developed based on a deterrence model founded on the game of Chicken. In this model, two players can choose any level of preemption, and threaten any level of retaliation against preemption, whereas in the Star Wars Game they are constrained in these choices by the defensive capabilities of an opponent. Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are derived in this game and illustrated for three different scenarios involving various postulated relationships between the first-strike and second-strike defenses of the players. Unlike the deterrence model, mutual preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wars Game, underscoring the problem—particularly if defensive capabilities are unbalanced—that deterrence may be subverted by the development of Star Wars. Ramifications of this model for avoiding preemption and preserving crisis stability, especially in superpower relations, are discussed.
This paper presents a formal model that characterizes the two faces of development - persistent poverty, as well as industrialization and rising incomes - and establishes that the interaction between politics and economics determines which path a nation travels. We demonstrate that political factors affect fertility decisions so that a one-time disturbance compounds across generations, impacting a country's entire development trajectory. Modeling strategic multi-objective policy-setting by the government, we derive a new concept of political capacity and prove that a sufficient amount of political capacity is necessary to escape a poverty trap and develop the economy. Empirical tests for a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 provide strong support for the predictions of the formal model. In particular, we show that both political stability and political capacity significantly influence birth rates. We conclude that politics can be either a stimulant or barrier to economic development.
This paper uses a model developed by Brams and Doherty (1993) to examine negotiations among a country of origin, a country of asylum, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in a refugee crisis. A unique feature of the paper is its treatment of the country of asylum as a separate player in the negotiations, which makes the choice to permit or deny settlement in the asylum country endogenous.
The model is applied to two groups of Rwandese refugees: Tutsis living in exile in Burundi for three decades and Hutus in Zaire during the 1990s. The contrasting circumstances surrounding these two refugee crises provide an opportunity to study asylum countries that were sympathetic and unsympathetic, and to model changing attitudes in the country of origin and the international community toward the refugees. For both crises, the predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the unfolding of the negotiation process and the opportunities that eventually became available to the refugees.
The analysis of 2 × 2 ordinal games, in which both players can sequentially move and countermove after an initial outcome is chosen, is extended to repeated play of these games in which one player has ‘threat power’. This power enables this player to threaten the other player with a mutually disadvantageous outcome in order to deter certain moves in the future play of the game. Except for no-conflict games with a mutually best outcome, there are relatively few games in which neither player can threaten the other. Of the games in which one or both players has a threat strategy, those in which one player does enables him to implement an outcome at least as high-ranking for himself as for the other player. In the bulk of games in which both players have threat strategies, threat power is effective—it is always better for a player to have it than for the other player to have it. Where ‘deterrent’ and ‘compellent’ threat power outcomes conflict, deterrent threat power induces a better outcome; conditions for the existence of both kinds of threats in 2 × 2 games, and for the threatener to implement his best outcome in general two-person games, are given. To illustrate the threat-power model, it is applied to the Polish strategic situation in 1980–81. Finally, threat power is compared with other kinds of power that have been proposed in nonrepeated play, and, ominously, ‘Chicken’ is the one game in which threat power is uniquely effective in undermining a nonmyopically stable ‘cooperative’ outcome.
This paper focuses on the relationship between International Relations theory and ethics. It poses the question of the complicity of the discipline in the events of September 11, 2001. The paper begins with a discussion of Weber's notion of science as a vocation, and links this to the commitment in the discipline to a value-free conception of social science, one that sharply separates facts from values. The paper then examines the role of ten core assumptions in International Relations theory in helping to construct a discipline that has a culturally and historically very specific notion of violence, one resting on distinctions between economics and politics, between the outside and the inside of states, and between the public and the private realms. Using the United Nations Human Development report, the paper summarizes a number of forms of violence in world politics, and questions why the discipline of International Relations only focuses on a small subset of these. The paper then refers to the art of Magritte, and specifically Velazquez's painting Las Meninas, to argue for a notion of representation relevant to the social world that stresses negotiation, perspective, and understanding rather than notions of an underlying Archimedean foundation to truth claims. In concluding, the paper asserts that the discipline helped to sing into existence the world of September 11 by reflecting the interests of the dominant in what were presented as being neutral, and universal theories.
This article applies an autoregressive intervention model for the 1968–2003 period to identify either income based or geographical transference of transnational terrorist events in reaction to the rise of fundamentalist terrorism, the end to the Cold War, and 9/11. Our time-series study investigates the changing pattern of transnational terrorism for all incidents and only those involving U.S. people and property. Contrary to expectation, there is no evidence of an income-based post-9/11 transfer of attacks to low-income countries except for attacks with U.S. casualties, but there is a significant transference to the Middle East and Asia where U.S. interests are, at times, attacked. We also find that the rise of fundamentalist terrorism has most impacted those regions—the Middle East and Asia—with the largest Islamic population. The end to the Cold War brought a “terrorism peace dividend” that varies by income and geography among countries. Based on the empirical findings, we draw policy recommendations regarding defensive counterterrorism measures.
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was adopted in 2000 with the aim of ensuring all efforts toward peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the conduct of armed conflict itself, would entail sensitivity toward gendered violence and gendered inequalities. In this article, I contrast two accounts of the writing of UNSCR 1325 that issue from the two institutions that claim authority over the document: the United Nations Security Council and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. I make a broader theoretical argument about the importance of paying analytical attention to the discursive terrain of international institutions when analyzing the formulation and implementation of security policy, concluding that contemporary theorizing of international institutions is product/productive of a particular configuration of political authority and legitimacy that can, and should, be challenged.
Competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) creates opportunities for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to diffuse corporate management practices from their countries-of-origin (home countries) to countries hosting their foreign operations. We examine conditions under which MNEs transfer corporate environmental practices from home countries to host countries. Our focus is on ISO 14001, the most widely adopted voluntary environmental program in the world. We examine inward FDI stocks and ISO 14001 adoption levels for a panel of 98 countries, and a subset of 74 developing countries, for the period 1996–2002. We find support for the country-of-origin argument in that inward FDI stocks are associated with higher levels of ISO 14001 adoption in host countries only when FDI originates from home countries that themselves have high levels of ISO 14001 adoption. Countries’ ISO adoption levels are associated not with how much FDI host countries receive overall but from whom they receive it. Three implications emerge from this study: (1) FDI can become an instrument to perpetuate divergence in corporate practices across the world; (2) economic integration via FDI can create incentives for firms to ratchet up their environmental practices beyond the legal requirements of their host countries; (3) instead of racing down to match the less stringent corporate practices prevalent in developing countries, developed countries can employ FDI outflows to ratchet up corporate practices abroad given that developing countries are net recipients of developed countries’ FDI outflows.
The empirical literature has found that interstate alliances are, with the exception of the nineteenth century after 1815, usually followed by war rather than by peace. This analysis tries to identify theoretically the characteristics of alliances that distinguish those that are followed by war from those that are followed by peace. It is argued that alliances that embody settlements of territorial disputes are most peaceful. Alliances consisting exclusively of major states or of states that have been successful in their last war are predicted to be war prone, while those that have the opposite characteristics are predicted to be followed by peace. An empirical analysis of the data shows that all of the above expectations are confirmed. The analysis concludes by using these characteristics to reexamine the classic Levy, 1981, study.
This study explores the connections between the Long Wave and the Leadership Cycle by examining their possible effect on long-term patterns in major power war and colonial expansion. Building directly upon the Leadership Cycle work of Modelski and Thompson, Goldstein's Long Wave analysis, and the Modern World System School, a new analytical framework is developed. This framework treats the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave as separate, though interconnected processes, and permits derivation of empirically testable hypotheses concerning the effects of the Leadership Cycle and Long Wave on armed conflict in the system, and on the timing of colonial expansion by major powers into the periphery. This “phase-pair” framework also allows assessment of the effect of each systemic process while controlling for the effect of the other. The results of our analysis suggest that the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle not only are associated with the most severe or systemic wars, but may affect conflict more broadly within the system. We also find strong identifiable effects of these processes on colonization. Finally, all results taken together indicate the Long Wave and Leadership Cycle should be treated as distinct, though interrelated processes.
This study investigates the question of why democracies are more likely to win wars than non-democracies. I argue that due to the transparency of the polities, and the stability of their preferences, once determined, democracies are better able to cooperate with their partners in the conduct of wars, and thereby are more likely to win wars. In support of my argument, the main findings in this study show that, other things being equal, the larger the number of democratic partners a state has, the more likely it is to win; moreover, democratic states are more likely to have democratic partners during wars. These results are in contrast with those in current literature about the high likelihood of prevailing by democracies in wars, which emphasize, on the one hand, the superior capacity of democratic states to strengthen military capabilities and, on the other hand, to select wars in which they have a high chance of winning.
Students of world politics disagree about the approaching outlook for war. Are we in the midst of an era of peace with a declining prospect of war, or are we facing a future characterized by increasing “ethnic” conflicts? This puzzle has led scholars to call for a more comprehensive examination of the phenomenon of war. A discussion concerning this need for a new look at war had also arisen within the Correlates of War Project. For more than three decades the Correlates of War Project's database has served the research needs of most of the quantitative world politics community, especially in identifying and trying to account for several classes of war (inter-state, extra-systemic, and civil) throughout the international system since 1816. However, a number of the disagreements in the literature concerning the prospects of war derive from the tendency of many researchers to rely on only one of our data sets (e.g., inter-state war). Here we wish to stimulate a broader view of war by examining the interplay among the three major types of war.
This study identifies an important thematic change among international technology organizations (ITOs). Within the general expansion of the ITO population, the social development model has risen rapidly over time in comparison with the industrial and professional models. Rationalistic political theories, which tend to treat international organizations as negotiated arrangements among nation-states or interest groups, locate organizational changes in the power capabilities and interest calculation of such actors. These theories do not explain this historical change among ITOs. Building upon the constructivist approach and sociology's institutionalism, this study emphasizes ITOs as constructed by world cultural norms. I propose that the rise of a liberal and rationalized world regime of development in the post–World War II era affected the popularity of different ITO models by supplying a new norm for technology. Data were collected for the population of ITOs established between 1856 and 1993, and the impact of the main forces on the rise of the social development model was formally tested with event-history methods. The study demonstrates the importance of world cultural norms in shaping the evolving field of ITOs.
Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have im-portant pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.
In this article, we seek to advance the theoretic and empirical literature on the diversionary use of force. We argue that state leaders are more likely to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior when opposition groups from within the winning coalition press for policy changes, but the government rejects those policy demands. Only when domestic unrest threatens a loss of political support from groups that are politically important to the leadership do we expect leaders to try and rally their support through heightened international conflict. We test this argument in an analysis of Japanese foreign policy behavior from 1890 to 1941 regarding (i) the initiation of military threats, (ii) concessions in negotiations, and (iii) the escalation of military confrontations. Drawing upon new data sets collected on Japanese domestic politics and foreign relations, we find strong support for our argument in a series of statistical tests.
In 1903–1906, 1917–1923, and 1930–1932 British decision makers debated whether to adopt a system of imperial preferences. Preferences were rejected in 1906 and 1923, but adopted in 1932 at the Ottawa Conference. The existing political economy literature focuses primarily on the hegemon's position in the international system, state or society centered arguments, and the role of ideas and beliefs to explain changes in a hegemon's foreign commercial policy. Using a second image reversed argument, I contend that changes in the commercial composition of the emerging contenders from a mix of liberal and nonliberal contenders in the first and second periods (1903–1906; 1917–1923) to nonliberal contenders in the third period (1930–1932) strengthened economic nationalists over free traders, contributing to Britain's adoption of imperial preferences. Although greatly diminished in strength, free traders were able to moderate theprotectionist policies through the Ottawa Agreements and the Sterling Area.
Military strategy is centrally important to understanding the causes, conduct, and outcomes of war. Several foreign policy theories make predictions as to what military strategies a state will choose. This article presents the first quantitative, empirical tests of hypotheses of strategy choice. Analysis was conducted on a random sample of country-years taken from the population of all countries from the years 1903 to 1994. Military strategy is classified as being either maneuver, attrition, or punishment. Empirical findings reveal that democracies and industrialized states are more likely to choose maneuver strategies, and that a state's own experiences affect the likelihood of it choosing maneuver. Factors found not to affect strategy choice include terrain, the level of external threat, troop quality, whether a state is democratizing, whether a state is a mixed regime, whether a state is a military regime, and vicarious experiences.
This article develops a new unified territorial explanation of conflict that accounts for the possibility of certain factors affecting the rise of a militarized dispute, as well as the probability that a dispute will escalate to war. In the past, research linking territorial disputes to a relatively high probability of war outbreak has been criticized for underestimating the potential problem of sampling bias in the militarized interstate dispute (MID) data. This study utilizes newly available data on territorial claims going back to 1919 to determine, using a two-stage estimation procedure, whether the presence of territorial claims in the dispute onset phase affects the relationship between territorial militarized disputes and war in the second stage. It is found that territorial claims increase the probability of a militarized dispute occurring and that territorial MIDs increase the probability of war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset. The effect of territory across the two stages is consistent with the new territorial explanation of conflict and war and shows no sampling bias with regard to territory in the MID data.
A democratic leader, anticipating a “rally ‘round the flag effect,” may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant's prescription for “perpetual peace.” We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921–2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant's hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced.
This paper compares the explanatory power of two models of UN intervention behavior: (i) an “organizational mission model” built around the proposition that variations in the amount of resources that the UN devotes to different conflicts primarily reflect the degree to which a conflict poses a challenge to the UN’s organizational mandate of promoting international peace and stability and (ii) a “parochial interest model” that revolves around the purely private interests of the five veto-holding members of the UN Security Council (the so-called P-5), i.e., interests that are either unrelated to or at odds with the UN’s organizational mandate. Examining data on UN conflict management efforts in more than 270 international crises between 1945 and 2002, we find that measures of the severity and escalatory potential of a conflict are significantly better predictors of the extent of UN involvement in international crises than variables that measure P-5 interests that do not align with the UN’s organizational mission of acting as a global peacemaker. This suggests that the UN adheres more closely to the humanitarian and security mission laid out in its Charter than critics of the organization often suggest.
This paper provides the most comprehensive and extensive analysis to date of the possibility of a “rally ‘round the flag” effect—an increase in support for the government caused by involvement in international conflict—in Britain, for the years 1948–2001. We use a fractionally integrated time series model with an array of political and economic controls. Our primary dependent variable is intention to vote for the ruling party. The results confirm earlier studies that the Falklands War generated a rally effect, but they provide a more sophisticated understanding of the Gulf War rally. New results also include the findings that participation in international crises which stopped short of war did not engender rallies, and that there were no rallies for the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo Wars. The findings indicate that when they do occur rallies are heterogeneous in nature, that rallies are most likely when there is intense and direct threat to the national interest, that the relationship between multilateralism and rallies in the British case is tenuous, and that rallies for the ruling party are sometimes expressed through satisfaction with the prime minister.
A growing body of empirical research addresses the influence of domestic political and economic circumstances on the use of force. Most models explain the use of force as a function of various domestic and international demands for military force. This article uses data on U.S. uses of force between 1949 and 1994 to test a model that also considers the influence of these conditions on the supply of this policy instrument. Conditions that have complementary demand and supply effects—making military force both more useful and less costly to employ—are associated with frequent U.S. uses of force in the postwar era. These conditions include high unemployment, strong investor confidence, wartime presidential election years, and the absence of ongoing wars. Some of these same conditions contribute to a motivated bias in international threat perception, leading U.S. decision makers to perceive more opportunities for the use of force when it is most convenient for them to employ it.
It is argued that ethnic competition, triggers for ethnic mobilization, and political institutions together affect changes in government-imposed political and economic restrictions on ethnic groups worldwide. Due to the fact that the only existing comparative data set on ethnic discrimination, produced by the Minorities at Risk project, uses discrimination as a criterion for including ethnic groups, a new data set of 620 additional groups has been created to predict the selection process through a full-information, maximum-likelihood Heckman probit model, but selection bias is found not to affect the results. Discrimination is modeled as a dynamic Markov process, and central and regional government institutions, economic conditions, and minority group characteristics are found to influence the initiation and continuation of discriminatory policies.
Trends in energy production, trade, and consumption during 1950–1992 are analyzed, using nine world regions to highlight both North–South energy trade and the regions’ differing patterns of industrialization. Following price shocks in 1973 and 1979, and the price drop of the mid–1980s, the industrialized West adjusted its patterns of energy consumption and imports, and the Middle East changed its level of exports. These relationships suggest a cobweb–type model with an equilibrium price for Mideast oil around $30/barrel. This equilibrium could result in zero growth in energy consumption in the industrialized West but continued growth of GDP as energy efficiency increases. Energy prices that are“too high”reduce GDP growth in the short term—to the detriment of both energy importers and exporters—while prices that are“too low”lead in the long term to high dependency on Middle East oil exports, which, in turn, depends on an elusive and costly political stability in that region. The analysis highlights the central role of North–South energy trade in the world economy, and the close but changing relationship of energy with overall GDP growth.
The liberals believed that economic interdependence, as well as democracy, would reduce the incidence of interstate conflict. In this article, we test both their economic and their political prescriptions for peace, using pooled-regression analyses of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era. We find that the pacific benefits of trade, both total and dyadic, have not been sufficiently appreciated. We also offer clear evidence that democracies are relatively unlikely to become involved in militarized disputes with other democracies, while autocracies and democracies are prone to conflict with each other. Since democratic dyads are more peaceful than autocratic dyads, it follows that democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states generally, ceteris paribus. Previous research at the national level of analysis, which led most to conclude that democracies have been no more peaceful than other states, did not consider that the incidence of conflict depends importantly upon the number of contiguous states, the character of their political regimes, and other factors. In addition, we find no evidence that states that have recently undergone regime changes, whether in the democratic or autocratic direction, are particularly conflict prone. Our results suggest the basis for a broader formulation of expected–utility theories of interstate conflict.
There has not been much formal or empirical research on the impact of ColdWar–era arms transfers on regional subsystems, and the work that has been undertaken is inconclusive: arms transfers appear, in some cases, to promote stability, but in other situations they are shown to be destabilizing. This study confronts the issue directly by developing and testing both stability and instability models of Superpower (U.S. and USSR) and third-country arms transfers. The models examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers—India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia—during the 1950–1991 period. Tests of the models with recently released arms trade data reveal that the weapons shipments of the U.S. and USSR were profoundly destabilizing, while those of third parties generally had little impact on subsystem political and military relationships. An intriguing exception to these patterns is the weaponstransfers of the PRC, specifically to Pakistan: these are found to have lessened the military imbalance between Pakistan and India, suggesting that the PRC's reputation as an irresponsible exporter deserves further review.
A common public perception in OECD countries suggests that refugees are mostly “economic migrants” in search of a better standard of living. Does the empirical record belie this belief? The authors explore that question within a rationalist approach using aggregate-level data that allow them to explore a variety of other covariates of the choice to seek refuge in one country relative to another. In addition to wages, they consider fear of persecution, culture, and the costs of relocation. The results are at odds with the “bogus refugees” image: the effect of average wages is mediated by proximity such that higher average wages are associated with fewer refugees, except among bordering countries. In addition, refugees seek asylum in neighboring countries, especially those at war with their own country or those experiencing a civil war. Those who seek refuge in countries other than their neighbors follow colonial ties.
Using alternative time-series methods, this paper investigates the patterns of transnational terrorist incidents that involve one or more deaths. Initially, an updated analysis of these fatal events for 1970–1999 is presented using a standard linear model with prespecified interventions that represent significant policy and political impacts. Next, a (regime-switching) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model is applied to this fatality time series. TAR estimates indicate that increases above the mean are not sustainable during high-activity eras, but are sustainable during low-activity eras. The TAR model provides a better fit than previously tried methods for the fatality time series. By applying a Fourier approximation to the nonlinear estimates, we get improved results. The findings in this study and those in our earlier studies are then applied to suggest some policy implications in light of the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
Addressing the long-standing debate over the social impact of military power and recent discussions of military-induced famine, we conduct a panel analysis of aggregate food supply and child hunger rates in 75–79 less-developed countries (LDCs). Distinguishing between militarization, as the growth of military resources, and militarism, as the use of military force to handle political conflicts, we show that militarization is both beneficial and detrimental to food security, whereas militarism is consistently detrimental. Arms imports and associated increased military spending plus praetorianism and military repression reduce food security, whereas increased military participation and arms production boost food security. Increased food supply reduces child hunger and is largely confined to the more developed of the LDCs. These military power effects show net economic growth, which “trickles down” to improve food supply and reduce child hunger among the more developed LDCs, reflecting the growth of global economic inequality. Contrary to views that see militarization as a single unified process, use of armed force is not strongly rooted in either praetorianism or militarization.
This study examines situation versus personality effects on foreign policy decision making. It proposes that while both factors are important in explaining decision outcomes, the relative importance of each in a given circumstance is a function of the structural constraints imposed by the policy decision environment. Following Maoz (1990) and Maoz and Astorino (1992b), a decision-game theoretic framework is used to “reconstruct” policy decision problems in order to study individual and environment effects concurrently. The substantive focus is the ten decisions that comprised the major events of the 1970 Civil War in Jordan. The decision reconstructions are used to rate these decision tasks according to the presence and degree of structural constraint. Although it represents a preliminary test, the decision analysis indicates that in structurally constrained decision settings, policymakers tended to respond in accordance with environmental clues, while response variability and evidence of simplifying decision heuristics was greater in more fluid decision settings.
We broaden the analysis of aid flows by investigating the effects of domestic and transnational electoral politics on Japanese overseas development assistance(ODA). We also consider measures of external financial balance and Japan's importance in the international trading system. We present a method for assessing shifts in Japanese ODA policy. We find that Liberal Democratic Party popularity affects the size of the Japanese ODA budget and the way that ODA is allocated. There is also limited evidence that ODA allocations are sensitive to the timing of U.S. elections. By contrast, Japan's changing importance in the international trading system and its current account and exchange rate positions account for little of the inter-temporal variation in Japanese ODA policy.
The research presented in this article examines one aspect of state socialization, the extent to which transnational military-to-military interactions have served as an effective mechanism of the democratic political socialization of states. Military organizations are very interesting when we consider avenues by which state socialization might occur because military organizations are an influential part of governments, and members share common beliefs and values as soldiers and officers that transcend borders. Thus, it would seem that a state's military structure is one likely channel whereby politically relevant individuals might learn new ideas and have the capability to reform existing institutional structures. The socialization process described in this study is three level: (1) individuals acquire new ideas; (2) coercion, incentives, and persuasion aid in institutionalizing these ideas in the underlying political structure of the state; and (3) once institutionalized, these new ideas/identity of the state influence the material and ideational structure of international society. Using Cox Proportional Hazard models and an original data set encompassing over 160 states during the years 1972–2000, the analyses find U.S. military-to-military contacts to be positively and systematically associated with liberalizing trends. This finding provides evidence that constructivist mechanisms do have observable effects, and that ideationally based processes play an important role in U.S. national security.
This paper seeks to understand the relationship between state building, interstate and intrastate rivalry. Previous studies of state building have focused primarily on the European experience, with selective application to cases in the developing world. Prior studies of interstate rivalry have focused primarily on their effects on interstate relations. This paper seeks to expand the domain of both literatures. First, the paper investigates the applicability of the predatory theory of the state, derived from the European experience, in the context of the postcolonial developing world. Second, the paper expands interstate rivalry research to an examination of the effects of both interstate and intrastate rivals on domestic politics. In particular, the literature derived from the European experience considers decisions about fiscal policy as central to the process of state building and survival. Therefore, this paper examines the effects of internal and external rivals on extractive capacity in the context of state development in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia from 1975 to 2000. A series of pooled, cross-sectional time-series analyses suggest that external and internal rivals increase the extractive capacity of the state in a manner similar to the experience of early modern Europe.
While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability.
Here we seek to build on our earlier research (Poe and Tate, 1994) by re-testing similar models on a data set covering a much longer time span; the period from 1976 to 1993. Several of our findings differ from those of our earlier work. Here we find statistical evidence that military regimes lead to somewhat greater human rights abuse, defined in terms of violations of personal integrity, once democracy and a host of other factors are controlled. Further, we find that countries that have experienced British colonial influence tend to have relatively fewer abuses of personal integrity rights than others. Finally, our results suggest that leftist countries are actually less repressive of these basic human rights than non-leftist countries. Consistent with the Poe and Tate (1994) study, however, we find that past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic development, and international and civil wars exercise statistically significant and substantively important impacts on personal integrity abuse.
Recent research suggests that a crucial factor in understanding the outcomes of military conflicts is the extent to which militaries are mechanized—that is, their relative dependence on tanks and armored vehicles compared to manpower. Since World War II, militaries have become increasingly mechanized both among the great powers and in unexpected quarters of the developing world. Yet the extent of military mechanization varies widely across states. Why have some states adopted highly mechanized force structures, while others have not? This paper tests several hypotheses about the determinants of military mechanization. One perspective suggests that strategic factors—including the force structures of adversaries and neighbors, recent combat lessons, and internal insurgency threats—shape a military’s mix of manpower and vehicles. A second set of hypotheses points instead to domestic institutions such as democracy and civilian control of the military. Still other theories emphasize economic forces and international norms. To test these and other hypotheses, we construct a new data set containing mechanization rates for more than 150 militaries from 1979 to 2001. Broadly, we find significant support for the strategic perspective and little support for domestic institutional explanations. In addition, the results suggest systematic and predictable differences in the ways states structure their militaries in response to security pressures.
Culturalists claim that political outcomes, such as respect for human rights, are deeply rooted in culture. Some have singled out Islam as particularly problematic. We assess whether Muslim societies suffer higher levels of political terror compared with others. Our results show that countries containing larger shares of Catholics, and those dominated by Catholics, fare the worst. The share of the population Muslim and Membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference predicts lower levels of political terror. Claims about the uniqueness of Islam for accounting for political repression seem to be exaggerated. Consistent with the findings on religion and democracy, our results indicate that it is the Arab region, not religion that matters, but Latin America shows the largest impact. Substantively, political and economic factors matter a whole lot more than do the variables on religion. This is good news for policy that seeks to end the scourge of political repression.
In this article I seek to explain why European Community members subsidized a substantial portion of their economies in the period 1981–1986. I test three competing explanations: socioeconomic, party control, and world markets. Parties have an impact on overall state subsidies and loans, but trade deficits are most influential in the disbursement of direct budget outlays and tax incentives. Unemployment has no effect on subsidies. The differential responsiveness to trade and parties is likely to frustrate efforts toward greater European integration.
Does the implementation of a World Bank structural adjustment agreement (SAA) increase or decrease government respect for human rights? Neoliberal theory suggests that SAAs improve economic performance, generating better human rights practices. Critics contend that the implementation of structural adjustment conditions causes hardships and higher levels of domestic conflict, increasing the likelihood that regimes will use repression. Bivariate probit models are used to account for World Bank loan selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. Using a global, comparative analysis for the 1981–2000 period, we examine the effects of structural adjustment on government respect for citizens' rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances. The findings show that World Bank SAAs worsen government respect for physical integrity rights.
What shapes the transnational activist agenda? Do non-governmental organizations with a global mandate focus on the world's most pressing problems, or is their reporting also affected by additional considerations? To address these questions, we study the determinants of country reporting by an exemplary transnational actor, Amnesty International, during 1986–2000. We find that while human rights conditions are associated with the volume of their country reporting, other factors also matter, including previous reporting efforts, state power, U.S. military assistance, and a country's media profile. Drawing on interviews with Amnesty and Human Rights Watch staff, we interpret our findings as evidence of Amnesty International's social movement-style “information politics.” The group produces more written work on some countries than others to maximize advocacy opportunities, shape international standards, promote greater awareness, and raise its profile. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses, which we consider after extending our analysis to other transnational sectors.
The debate on whether class-based or industry-based coalitions are politically salient in American trade politics has illuminated domestic sources of international trade policy but remains unresolved. In particular, the literature offers contradictory evidence on the dominance in recent years of class-based or industry-based trade politics. This contradiction is mainly due to selective use of congressional votes. This article contributes to this debate by applying a multilevel item-response-theory model to the entire universe of trade-related votes since 1987. This study finds that class-based coalitions are politically salient in current U.S. trade politics. Furthermore, while this study confirms the significance of party influence on trade voting, it finds little support for the view that political parties have dyadic relationships with particular groups of constituents.
As democratization has advanced in the developing world, developed countries such as the United States have implemented explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations through a variety of channels. This analysis examines the relationship between democracy support by the US Agency for International Development and democratization in the developing world between 1988 and 2001. In a model that examines the simultaneous processes linking democratization and democracy aid, we argue that carefully targeted democracy assistance has greater impact on democratization than more generic economic aid packages. We test the relationship in a simultaneous equation model, supplemented by several time-series cross-sectional regressions. Our data reveal a positive relationship between specific democracy aid packages and progress toward democracy. We conclude by weighing the implications of these findings for democratization and democracy promotion policies.
This article develops a general theory of bargaining between a minority, its host state, and outside lobby actor to explain why minorities shift their demands from affirmative action to cultural autonomy to secessionism and back, often in the absence of clear economic or security incentives. This paper uses a simple game tree model to show that if a minority believes that it enjoys significant support from a powerful national homeland or other external actor, it radicalized its demands against the host state, even if the center has credibly committed to protect minority rights. Conversely, if a minority believes that it enjoys no external support, then it will accommodate the host state, even in the presence of significant majority repression. As a general theory of claim-making, this model challenges structural theories of demands that rely on static economic differences or historical grievances to explain claim-making. It also challenges security dilemma arguments that hold that minority radicalization is mainly a function of ethnic fears. The model's hypotheses are tested using longitudinal analysis of Hungarians in Vojvodina during the 1990s, as the Yugoslav dog that “barked but did not bite.” Careful examination of claim-making in this case demonstrates the superior explanatory power of the ethnic bargaining model as compared with dominant theories of minority mobilization in the literature.