John Ellis van Courtland Moon, for many years a Professor of History at Boston State College, is currently Professor of History at Fitchburg State College.
The following archivists were extremely helpful in identifying and locating material of importance: Mr. James Hastings, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; and Mr. William Cunliffe, Modern Military Branch of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Other archivists associated with the National Archives, the FDR Library, and the Public Record Office helped in innumerable ways. I am also greatly indebted to my colleagues who read this article in various stages and provided useful suggestions on content and style. Space precludes listing them all. Four readers were especially helpful: Professor Ernest R. May, Harvard University; Dr. William Emerson, Director of the FDR Library; my wife, Professor Joan van Courtland Moon, University of Massachusetts at Boston; Professor Ann R. Howe, Southeastern Massachusetts University.
1. This article is based primarily upon the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG [Record Group] 218, located in the National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C. Especially useful were the following files: CCS 385.2 and CCS 441.5.
Other documentary sources were useful in supplementing the record: a) RG 160: records of the Army Service Forces; b) RG 165: ABC Strategy Section Papers, OPD; c) RG 165: ABC 385.2 Germany; d) RG 165: OPD 385 CWP; 3) RG 165: OPD 385 TS; f) RG 175: records of the Chemical Warfare Service; g) RG 175: Chief Chemical Officer Army; h) RG 319: ACSI: Doc. Library Board, ID Files; i) RG 319: ACSI: Publications Files; j) RG 319: ABC 381: Strategy Section Papers, OPD; k) RG 331: Cossac 63Bx/Int: Gas Intelligence, Shaef Records; l) RG 331: 300.6.15 Chemical Warfare, Shaef Files; m) RG 331: 385.2 Chemical Warfare, Shaef Records; n) RG 370.47.6 Chemical Warfare, Shaef Records; o) RG 407: AG 381; p) RG 457: the records of the National Security Agency. (This last source contains the texts of intercepted Japanese cables—MAGIC—which record rumors and alerts regarding possible initiation of CW by either the Germans or the Allies.) In the Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, I found MR 302 Map Room Papers useful.
The debates on British policy and preparedness for CW can be followed in the Churchill papers, located at the Public Record Office: Premier 3/65; Premier 3/88/1-3; Premier 3/89.
I have also consulted a number of unpublished manuscript histories located in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C. The columns of The New York Times and the Congressional Record were used to trace the public debate over gas warfare during the interwar period.
Three useful studies dealing with CW preparedness in World War II are: Frederick Joseph Brown, United States Chemical Warfare Policy, 1979-1945: A Study of Restraints (Geneve: Imprimerie Offset Blanc, 1967) (hereafter U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy); The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the historical, technical, military, legal and political aspects of CBW and possible disarmament measures (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Almquist and Wiskell; New York: Humanities Press, 1971-1975), 6 vols. (hereafter SIPRI); Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). Only Harris and Paxman could work from declassified files. However, their work is largely centered on British sources. Highly colorful, it overdramatizes its thesis. The SIPRI volumes are useful in giving the researcher an overall view of the complexities of CW. Especially useful for my research were Volume 1: The Rise of CBW Weapons (1971); Volume 3: CBW and the Law of War (1973); Volume 4: CB Disarmament Negotiations: 1920-1970 (1971).
As some of the above citations show, the question of biological warfare was closely linked throughout the war with the question of chemical warfare. However, it remained a purely secondary issue. Implicitly covered by the same prohibition that ruled out the initiation of CW, BW preparations lagged even more seriously than CW preparations. Despite rumors and speculations, especially the alert that the Germans would use BW munitions...
This article argues that peaceful nuclear cooperation - the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes - helps explain why some countries pursue and acquire nuclear weapons while others do not. In particular, countries receiving peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate nuclear weapon programs and successfully develop the bomb - especially when they are also faced with security threats. To test this argument, this article uses a new dataset of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) signed between 1950 and 2000. A series of quantitative and qualitative tests provide strong empirical support. This article challenges the conventional wisdom by showing that supplier countries raise the risks of further nuclear proliferation when they assist others in developing civil nuclear programs. Further, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even ostensibly "innocuous" assistance such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors increases the likelihood that states will pursue nuclear weapons and ultimately acquire them. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers like the United States should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1998, regional scholars and diplomats have maintained that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents an evolving economic and security community. In addition, many contend that what is known as the ASEAN process not only has transformed Southeast Asia's international relations, but has started to build a shared East Asian regional identity. ASEAN's deeper integration into a security, economic, and political community, as well as its extension into the ASEAN Plus Three processes that were begun after the 1997 financial crisis, offers a test case of the dominant assumptions in both ASEAN scholarship and liberal and idealist accounts of international relations theory. Three case studies of ASEAN operating as an economic and security community demonstrate, however, that the norms and practices that ASEAN promotes, rather than creating an integrated community, can only sustain a pattern of limited intergovernmental and bureaucratically rigid interaction.
Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro caution that “[t]he decline of violence in Iraq in 2007 does not mean that the war was necessarily a success”. Their implication, however, is that the war was not necessarily a failure either. Biddle et al. write that the 2007 drop in violence from 2006 was a “remarkable reversal”. They ask, “What caused this turnaround?” Their answer is that the United States devised a strategy that stopped the violence in Iraq with a “synergistic” combination of the U.S. troop surge and the U.S. subsidized Sunni Awakening that “stood up” the Sons of Iraq (SOI). We argue first that the Biddle et al. synergy thesis and the evidence the authors present in its support overestimate the SOI role in violence reduction. Secondly, we argue that they underestimate the significance of the decision by Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr to limit the Mahdi Army's criminality by declaring a unilateral cease-fire. Furthermore, al-Sadr’s political calculations of the increasing costs to his Sadrist movement of the Mahdi Army’s spiraling violence in 2007 may have motivated this unanticipated cease-fire. Thus, our third argument is that the cease-fire played a major role alongside the surge in reducing the violence and increasing al-Sadr’s political influence in the governance of Iraq.
This dissertation assesses the international security implications of biological weapons and the strategic consequences of their proliferation. It examines the impact of biological weapons on four key areas of concern for international security: proliferation, deterrence, civil-military relations, and threat assessment. The dissertation draws upon a range of theories from the field of security studies and a wealth of newly available information regarding the biological weapons programs of Iraq, the former Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom, and South Africa. My analysis yields four major findings. First, it is extremely difficult to prevent the spread of biological warfare capabilities to actors that want them and these actors tend to be motivated by a desire to challenge the status quo. Contrary to conventional wisdom, biological weapons have utility across the spectrum of conflict and are well suited to supporting asymmetric strategies against stronger opponents. Second, biological weapons do not confer the deterrent benefits associated with nuclear weapons and will undermine reliance on deterrence as a security strategy. Biological weapons are not suitable as strategic deterrents due to the uncertainty regarding their effects, the availability of defenses and the reliance of these weapons on secrecy and surprise for their effectiveness. The accessibility of these weapons to a diverse range of actors, including terrorists, and the ease of clandestine attacks undermines the effectiveness of deterrence as a security strategy. Third, civilian oversight of biological warfare programs is hindered by the intense secrecy that shrouds these programs. This lack of supervision leads to abuse and corruption by
"In brief, our research showed that environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity. The violence will usually be sub-national, persistent, and diffuse. Poor societies will be particularly affected since they are less able to buffer themselves from environmental scarcities and the social crises they cause. These societies are, in fact, already suffering acute hardship from shortages of water, forests, and especially fertile land. "Social conflict is not always a bad thing: mass mobilization and civil strife can produce opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land and wealth and in processes of governance. But fast-moving, unpredictable, and complex environmental problems can overwhelm efforts at constructive social reform. Moreover, scarcity can sharply increase demands on key institutions, such as the state, while it simultaneously reduces their capacity to meet those demands. These pressures increase the chance that the state will either fragment or become more authoritarian. The negative effects of severe environmental scarcity are therefore likely to outweigh the positive."
Wireless sensor nodes are generally deployed in a hostile and unattended enviorment. Sensor nodes are cheep resource intensive devices. The major resource constraint is energy. Unattended nodes are expected to live years not weeks. Limited battery power force sensor nodes to inform neighboring nodes about their existence by broadcasting hello packets periodically. It is very easy for an adversory to budge-in or take over few sensor nodes and use the vulnerable/slave nodes to broadcast hello packet flood. Considering hardware constraints we proposed a defense mechanism in which probabilistically chosen random set of nodes will correspond with base station to validate the legitimacy of request.
The debate over credit for Libya's shift away from "rogue state" policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie terrorism case and abandoning its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, is lively politically and challenging analytically. It has important implications for theories of force and diplomacy, particularly coercive diplomacy, and policy debates including such cases as Iran and North Korea. U.S. coercive diplomacy against Libya can be divided into three phases: the Reagan strategy of unilateral sanctions and military force, which largely failed; the mixed results from the more multilateral strategy of the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations; and the substantial success achieved through the secret direct negotiations initiated along with Britain in the latter Clinton years and furthered under George W. Bush, which culminated in Libya closing down its WMD programs. These differences in success and failure are principally explained by (1) the extent of "balance" in the coercer state's strategy combining credible force and deft diplomacy consistent with three criteria--proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility--taking into account international and domestic constraints; and (2) target state vulnerability as shaped by its domestic politics and economy, particularly whether domestic elites play a "circuit breaker" or "transmission belt" role in blocking or carrying forward external coercive pressure.
The First World War is generally viewed by both advocates and critics of commercial liberal theory as the quintessential example of a failure of economic integration to maintain peace. Yet this consensus relies both on methodologically flawed inference and an incomplete accounting of the antecedents to the war. Crucially, the war began in a weakly integrated portion of Europe with which highly integrated powers were entangled through the alliance system. Crises among the highly interdependent European powers in the decades leading up to World War I were generally resolved without bloodshed. Among the less interdependent powers in Eastern Europe, however, crises regularly escalated to militarized violence. Moreover, the crises leading to the war created increased incentives for the integrated powers to strengthen commitments to their less-interdependent partners. In attempting to make these alliances more credible, western powers shifted foreign policy discretion to the very states that lacked strong economic disincentives to fight. Had globalization pervaded Eastern Europe, or the rest of Europe been less locked into events in the East, Europe might have avoided a “Great War.”
This article challenges "The Liberal Peace" described in work by Michael Doyle from three standpoints. First, it questions whether the statistical tests (which were performed and published by scholars other than Doyle) actually test any coherent theory of peace or conflict. Second, it questions whether the data sets used are valid proxies for the variables they are meant to represent. Third it questions the methods used and the results obtained. The article argues that there may a lower expectancy of conflict among Liberal republics, as Kant argued, modern literature focusing on statistics does not confirm it - it does not really test it. It also argues that there is probably a good reason we have observed a peace among Western democracies since WWII, and this reason may be found in shared values that led them to join the NATO alliance. The simple implementation of a democratic form of government does not prevent nations from making war on one another.
Dr. Jack Ruina is Professor of Electrical Engineering at MIT and Director of the Defense and Arms Control Program at MIT's Center for International Studies. He has served as Director of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency and on many government advisory committees, including the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1973.
1. For a complete discussion of the ICBM vulnerability problem, see Albert Carnesale and Charles L. Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse Than the Disease," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982).
International Security 29.3 (2004) 170-190
Nine days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, the U.S. Army commander in Hawaii at the time, was relieved of duty. Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the decimated Pacific Fleet, was relieved of command the next day. President Franklin D. Roosevelt then established by executive order a commission to investigate the attack, which was chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. The Roberts commission issued its report on January 23, 1942, less than two months after the attack. The commission found both Short and Kimmel guilty of dereliction of duty. The two officers were forced to retire with reduced rank, disgraced. Most subsequent official inquiries and scholarship have concluded that Short and Kimmel were scapegoats, the victims of an unfair rush to judgment, and that the real cause of America's surprise on December 7, 1941, was the absence of an effective national intelligence structure.
Unlike Pearl Harbor, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, produced no Husband Kimmel, no Walter Short. No one has taken the fall for the failure to prevent attacks that killed 2,819 innocent people. These attacks were the work of men, not fate. They could have been prevented but were not. The government failed in this responsibility, but who within the federal government is to blame for this failure? This open-ended question does not sit well with many segments of American society, especially those most skeptical of representations made by President George W. Bush and his principal officers.
The Bush administration had little enthusiasm for an independent investigation into the events leading up to 9/11, seeing such an inquiry as a distraction from more pressing business at hand. The 9/11 attacks triggered extraordinary and simultaneous actions by the federal government on multiple fronts. It was understood that al-Qaida had a sanctuary in Afghanistan, so the United States assembled and led an international military coalition to invade the country, rout the terrorists, and depose the Taliban regime. It was understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was insular and reactive, so President Bush ordered its newly installed director, Robert Mueller, to fundamentally reform his organization. It was understood that the nineteen hijackers had easily penetrated airport security checkpoints and the cockpits of the four aircraft used in the attacks, so Congress passed and the president signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and created a vast new federal agency, the Transportation Security Administration, with broad new regulatory powers. It was understood that the FBI and intelligence agencies did not share information particularly well, so Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act, and Attorney General John Ashcroft revised the guidelines that govern federal law enforcement investigations and information sharing. It was understood that all of the hijackers were foreigners who had acquired visas to enter the country legally, so the State Department tightened its visa requirements, and Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. All this and much more was done in a few months after the attacks—in most cases, without the benefit of a precise understanding of the details of the problems that had been exposed by the 9/11 attacks. Preoccupied with the need for action in the weeks after 9/11, the federal government agencies devoted little effort to studying or reflecting on the events leading up to the attacks.
Yet pressure for an official public inquiry into the terrorist attacks grew quickly, much of it emanating from the families of 9/11 victims. On February 14, 2004, Senator Bob Graham and Congressman Porter Goss, the chairmen of the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees, announced that their committees would conduct a joint inquiry into the events leading to the attacks. The inquiry was to be conducted by thirty-eight politicians—twenty Republicans and eighteen Democrats—in the lead-up to the November 2002 midterm elections. In December 2002 the committees released a rambling 858-page report, which included eight "additional views...
What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conoict breaks out, the weak actor would be capable of rendering its opponent’s strategic capabilities tactical and its own tactical capabilities strategic. The deterrence relationship that has evolved between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in the decade since—and as a result of—the 2006 Lebanon War (a.k.a. the Second Lebanon War or the July War) conarms this observation. A comparison of these two actors’ deterrence behavior in the years preceding the war and in its aftermath shows that one of the leading explanations for the ongoing stability along the Israeli- Lebanese border is that Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply deterrence in a manner that meets the prerequisites of rational deterrence theory.
Across the globe, states have attempted to contain COVID-19 by restricting movement, closing schools and businesses, and banning large gatherings. Such measures have expanded the degree of sanctioned state intervention into civilians' lives. But existing theories of preventive and responsive repression cannot explain why some countries experienced surges in repression after states in Africa initiated COVID-19-related lockdowns. While responsive repression occurs when states quell protests or riots, “opportunistic repression” arises when states use crises to suppress the political opposition. An examination of the relationship between COVID-19 shutdown policies and state violence against civilians in Africa tests this theory of opportunistic repression. Findings reveal a large and statistically significant relationship between shutdowns and repression, which holds after conditioning for the spread and lethality of the disease within-country and over time. A subnational case study of repression in Uganda provides evidence that the increase in repression appears to be concentrated in opposition areas that showed less support for Yoweri Museveni in the 2016 elections. Opportunistic repression provides a better explanation than theories of preventive or responsive repression for why Uganda experienced a surge in repression in 2020 and in what areas. The results have implications for theories of repression, authoritarian survival, the politics of emergency, and security.
One reason why Europe went to war in 1914 is that all of the continental great powers judged it a favorable moment for them to fight, and all were more pessimistic about postponing the fight until later. Not only is this historical paradox an interesting puzzle in its own right, but it sheds light on what is arguably the reigning theory of the causes of wars in general: James Fearon's rational bargaining theory. None of Fearon's three main mechanisms private information, commitment problems, or indivisibility of stakes can explain the paradox of the universal, simultaneous view of 1914 as a favorable year for war. Two mechanisms that play a marginal role in his analysis, however-bounded rationality in multidimensional power assessments and attempts to mitigate power shifts through coercive diplomacy help to explain how Europe's powers became trapped in a choice between war now and war later. These mechanisms were set in motion by background strategic assumptions rooted in the culture of militarism and nationalism that perversely structured the options facing Europe's political leaders in 1914. Whereas Fearon's theory assumes that states are paying equal attention to all relevant information, in 1914 each power's strategic calculations produced disproportionate levels of self-absorption in its own domestic concerns and alliance anxieties.
International Security 29.3 (2004) 136-169
In 1933 Adolph Hitler became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country's international agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and seizing Austria. Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused to respond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a piece of Czech territory called the Sudetenland. Once again, the British and French acquiesced to German demands; at the infamous Munich conference, they agreed to pressure Czechoslovakia into surrendering the Sudetenland to Germany. Finally, in 1939, as Germany was preparing to invade Poland, Britain and France took a firm stand. They warned Hitler that if he attacked Poland, they would declare war on Germany. By this time, however, Hitler no longer believed their threats. As the German leader told a group of assembled generals, "Our enemies are worms. I saw them in Munich."
The lessons of Munich have been enshrined in international relations theory and in U.S. foreign policy. For deterrence theorists, the history of the 1930s shows that countries must keep their commitments or they will lose credibility. U.S. leaders have internalized this lesson; the most costly and dangerous moves undertaken by the United States during the Cold War were motivated by a desire to preserve credibility. Concerns about credibility led the United States to fight both in Korea and in Vietnam ; during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy risked nuclear war rather than back down and risk damaging U.S. credibility. And even after the end of the Cold War, the fear of breaking commitments continues to be a powerful force in U.S. foreign policy.
The notion that a country's credibility depends on its history of keeping its commitments is widely accepted, but is it true? Does credibility depend on a history of resoluteness? More broadly, what causes credibility in international politics? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of credibility. The first, which I call the "past actions" theory, holds that credibility depends on one's record for keeping or breaking commitments. I test this theory against the "current calculus" theory, which argues that decisionmakers evaluate the credibility of an adversary's threats by assessing (1) the balance of power and (2) the interests at stake in a given crisis. If an adversary issues a threat that it has the power to carry out, and an interest in doing so, the threat will be believed, even if that country has bluffed in the past. But if it makes a threat that it lacks the power to carry out, or has no interest in doing so, the credibility of that threat will be viewed with great skepticism.
To test the past actions and current calculus theories, this article uses evidence from German decisionmaking during three crises from the 1930s: the Austrian crisis, the Sudetenland crisis, and the crisis over Poland. These cases offer easy tests for the past actions theory. Nevertheless the current calculus theory performs significantly better. Although the British and French backed down repeatedly in the 1930s, there is little evidence to support the argument that their concessions reduced their credibility in German eyes. The credibility of Britain and France did fluctuate from one crisis to the next, but these fluctuations are better explained by the current calculus theory. Furthermore, German discussions about the credibility of their adversaries emphasized the balance of power, not their history of keeping or breaking commitments.
The past actions theory is intuitively appealing because it accurately describes how people assess credibility in their everyday interactions with friends, colleagues, and family. Parents know that if they do not keep their promises and carry out their threats, their children will learn to disregard their rules. Moreover, people quickly discover which friends are reliable and which ones frequently break their promises. But people reason differently in their daily lives than they do in high-stakes international crises. In their daily lives, people quickly estimate the odds of friends showing up on time, and...
Ideas shape human behavior in many circumstances, including those involving political violence. Yet they have usually been underplayed in studies of the causes of armed mobilization. Likewise, emotions have been overlooked in most analyses of intrastate conflict. A mixed-methods analysis of Italian resistance during the Fascist regime and the Nazi occupation (1943�45) provides the opportunity to theorize and analyze empirical evidence on the role of indignation and radical ideologies in the process of armed mobilization. These nonmaterial factors play a crucial role in the chain that leads to armed collective action. Indignation is a push factor that moves individuals away from accepting the status quo. Radical ideologies act as pull factors that provide a new set of strategies against the incumbent. More specifically, detachment caused by an emotional event disconnects the individual from acceptance of the current state of social relations, and individuals move away from the status quo. Ideologies communicated by political entrepreneurs help to rationalize the emotional shift and elaborate alternative worldviews (disenchantment), as well as possibilities for action. Finally, a radical ideological framework emphasizes normative values and the conduct of action through the �anchoring� mechanism, which can be understood as a pull factor attracting individuals to a new status.
International Security 26.2 (2001) 103-131
The collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane with a Chinese military fighter on April 1, 2001, focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives. The effort to deter U.S. intelligence flights over China's exclusive economic zone brought Chinese jets within dangerous proximity of U.S. aircraft. This raised the first tension in the Taiwan Strait since China's missile tests in 1995-96. That had occasioned the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups toward the vicinity of Taiwan. More recently, China undertook a steady buildup of missiles across from Taiwan. This, together with greater emphasis on East Asian security by George W. Bush and his administration, justifies reexamination of the circumstances under which China used military force for deterrence or coercion from 1950 to 1996. What patterns, if any, emerged during this period? To what extent are they likely to continue or change with respect to Taiwan in the coming years? How will the advent of high-technology weapons affect China's decision to use force in the future, particularly against Taiwan?
My study, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam, addressed some of these questions but was largely inferentially based on intelligence materials. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly opened archives in Moscow provided authoritative documents on Sino-Soviet relations, and the Korean War in particular. Recent Chinese collections of primary materials, supplemented by historical accounts, autobiographies, and personal interviews, have enabled American and Chinese scholars to reconstruct decisions made by the Chinese leadership and their implementation during Mao Zedong's reign. These new sources refine and strengthen my earlier work. In addition, China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and its 1995-96 Taiwan Strait exercises provide more case studies for comparison. As a final consideration, my earlier optimistic forecast concerning the unlikelihood of conflict over Taiwan is now tempered with recent Chinese military writings that emphasize the implications of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 conflict in Kosovo for bringing Taiwan into negotiation with the mainland.
My focus is on eight case studies wherein Chinese military actions involved the United States and the Soviet Union or indirect challenges to them via proxy allies: (1) major combat with the United States in Korea, 1950-53; (2) offshore islands operations against Taiwan, 1954-55 and 1958; (3) deterrence deployment opposite Taiwan, 1962; (4) limited combat with India, 1962; (5) support for Vietnam against U.S. intervention, 1965-68; (6) border clashes with the Soviet Union, 1969; (7) limited combat with Vietnam, 1979; and (8) missile firings and joint exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, 1995-96. China's primary motivations included preemption of perceived attack (Korea), deterrence (the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union along the Sino-Soviet border), coercion (India, Vietnam), and coercive diplomacy (Taiwan). I first examine military doctrine manifest in historical writings and those of Mao Zedong that emphasize seizing the initiative. I then review verbal warnings and patterns of deployment by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in each case as indicators of intent to support deterrence and coercive diplomacy. On the basis of limited evidence, I assess the level of deliberate risk taking and risk management. The logic of Chinese threat perception is examined together with the calculation or miscalculation of consequences. The weight given political goals determining PLA action against a militarily superior enemy deserves special attention with respect to Taiwan, where the relevance of past patterns to future action are addressed.
Students of Chinese military affairs find that seizing the initiative is embedded in doctrine as a preferred course of action. An academic analogue to doctrine is the concept of strategic culture variously defined. For my purposes it is composed of formulated military practice reflected as a tendency in combat operations and tactics. This does not posit a rigid operational code automatically adhered to under all circumstances. Planning is necessarily contingency defined, and practice is inevitably contingency determined. Nevertheless, it is standard for military doctrine to be declared and codified, albeit modified in warfare. Over time this evolves...
Standard explanations for the demise of U.S.-Soviet détente during the 1970s emphasize the Soviet Union's inability to put aside its communist ideology for the sake of a more cooperative relationship with the United States. Soviet resistance to reaching a stable accommodation during this period, many analysts maintain, was especially evident in the Middle East, where Moscow is said to have embraced the “radical Arab program” vis-à-vis Israel. Such accounts do not fare well, however, in light of the historical evidence. Instead, that evidence indicates that the Soviet Union was eager to cooperate with the United States to achieve an Arab-Israeli agreement. The Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations, however, were not interested in working with the Soviets in the Middle East, and instead sought to expel them from the region. These findings have important implications for scholarly debates about whether great power rivals can cooperate on issues where their strategic interests are overlapping, as well as for contemporary debates over U.S. policy toward countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
Why has the People's Republic of China (PRC) courted international opprobrium, alarmed its neighbors, and risked military conflict in pursuit of its claims over vast areas of the South China Sea? Answering this question depends on recognizing long-term patterns of continuity and change in the PRC's policy. A new typology of “assertive” state behaviors in maritime and territorial disputes, and original time-series events data covering the period from 1970 to 2015, shows that the key policy change—China's rapid administrative buildup and introduction of regular coercive behaviors—occurred in 2007, between two and five years earlier than most analysis has supposed. This finding disconfirms three common explanations for Beijing's assertive turn in maritime Asia: the Global Financial Crisis, domestic legitimacy issues, and the ascendancy of Xi Jinping. Focused qualitative case studies of four breakpoints identified in the data indicate that PRC policy shifts in 1973, 1987, and 1992 were largely opportunistic responses to favorable geopolitical circumstances. In contrast, the policy change observed from 2007 was a lagged effect of decisions taken in the 1990s to build specific capabilities designed to realize strategic objectives that emerged in the 1970s.
Warner R. Schilling is the James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. An earlier, undocumented version of this article is in Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner (eds.), New Directions in Strategic Thinking (Sydney and London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).
1. A general treatment of these three decisions and the issues associated with them can be found in Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975) and John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). The deployment dates for American and Soviet MIRVed missiles are from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1979-1980 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 86-87.
2. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1972), pp. 9, 297; and The SALT II Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1979) [hereafter cited as SCFR, SALT II Hearings,] Part I, pp. 5, 77, 439. The 1972 Soviet total (2,358) was an American estimate and assumed the Soviets had 313 heavy ICBM launchers built or building. In contrast, the total number of missile launchers declared by the Soviet Union in 1979 was 2,348, which included only 308 heavy ICBM launchers (SS-9s and SS-18s).
3. For these figures and dates, see Harold Brown, Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington D.C.: January 29, 1980), pp. 37, 77; Melvin Laird, Fiscal Year 1971, Defense Program and Budget (Washington D.C.: February 20, 1970), p. 35; James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975 (Washington D.C.: March 4, 1974), p. 50; and Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T (Washington D.C.: February 5, 1975), II-19. If launchers on Soviet diesel-powered submarines are counted, the Soviets overtook the United States in SLBMs in 1974 and in the total number of delivery vehicles in 1972. See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1976-1977 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 75.
The U.S. total cited (2,058) excludes 66 FB-111s, which are not counted under the 1979 SALT Treaty, and 226 mothballed bombers, which are counted as part of the U.S. SALT total. The Soviet total (2,504) does not include the Backfire bomber, which is not SALT-counted. See Brown, Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 77, and SCFR, SALT II Hearings, I: pp. 77-78.
4. Assuming a 1964 American force of 834 ICBMs, 416 SLBMs, and 630 bombers (The Military Balance 1976-1977, p. 75) and 4 warheads per bomber, the United States would have had 3,370 warheads in 1964, as compared to 9,200 in 1980 (Brown, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, p. 77). There are no realistic assumptions regarding Soviet offensive capabilities and U.S. reliabilities and alert rates for the two years involved under which the number of U.S. warheads that would have survived a first strike in 1980 would not have been at least double the number that would have survived in 1964. On the other hand, given the larger yield of the warheads carried by the bomber force in 1964, the U.S. second-strike force, measured in one-megaton equivalents, would have been much larger in 1964 than in 1980.
5. These figures are most arbitrary and are at best only suggestive of the change that has taken place. The 30 million figure is from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played," Foreign Affairs (October 1972), p. 192, and reflects an estimate he was given about the fatalities that would have resulted from a nuclear exchange in 1962. The 100-140 million range is taken from Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington D.C., May 1979...
How influential are domestic politics on U.S. foreign affairs? With regard to Middle East policy, how important a role do ethnic lobbies, Congress, and public opinion play in influencing U.S. strategy? Answering these questions requires the use of archival records and other primary documents, which provide an undistorted view of U.S. policymakers' motivations. The Ford administration's 1975 reassessment of its approach to Arab-Israeli statecraft offers an excellent case for the examination of these issues in light of this type of historical evidence. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided, in large part because of the looming 1976 presidential election, to avoid a confrontation with Israel in the spring and summer of 1975 by choosing to negotiate a second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel rather than a comprehensive settlement. Nevertheless, domestic constraints on the White House's freedom of action were not insurmountable and, had they had no other option, Ford and Kissinger would have been willing to engage in a showdown with Israel over the Middle East conflict's most fundamental aspects. The administration's concern that a major clash with Israel might stoke an outbreak of anti-Semitism in the United States likely contributed to its decision to back down.
After a decade and a half of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers want to change their approach to COIN by providing aid and advice to local governments rather than directly intervening with U.S. forces. Both this strategy and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in general, however, do not acknowledge the difficulty of convincing clients to follow U.S. COIN prescriptions. The historical record suggests that, despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the United States and its local partners have had significantly different goals, priorities, and interests with respect to the conduct of their counterinsurgency campaigns. Consequently, a key focus of attention in any future counterinsurgency assistance effort should be on shaping the client state's strategy and behavior. Although it is tempting to think that providing significant amounts of aid will generate the leverage necessary to affect a client's behavior and policies, the U.S. experience in assisting the government of El Salvador in that country's twelve-year civil war demonstrates that influence is more likely to flow from tight conditions on aid than from boundless generosity.
James Woolsey is with the Washington law firm of Shea and Gardner. He served as Under Secretary of the Navy during the Carter Administration, and is presently a member of the Townes Commission studying the MX.
The Russian government has claimed that the Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise. Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied that this was the case; but other scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made in 1990. So who is right? The question still has political importance: how it is answered has bearing on how we should feel about NATO expansion and, indeed, about the United States' post–Cold War policy more generally. So it makes sense to stand back and try to see where the truth lies. An examination of the debate in light of the evidence—especially evidence that the participants themselves have presented—leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.
Devin T. Hagerty is a Postdoctoral Research Associate with the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security and a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania in August 1995. This article was written while the author was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Additional research support was provided in 1993-94 by the United States Institute of Peace and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies.
The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on earlier manifestations of this article: Stephen P. Cohen, Daniel Deudney, Avery Goldstein, Herbert G. Hagerty, and Wendy Patriquin. Thanks also to participants in the Olin Institute's 1994-95 National Security Seminar; a colloquium series on "South Asian Security Issues After the Cold War" at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Spring 1995; and a conference on "New Frontiers in Arms Control," at the Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, March 30-31, 1995.
1. Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73. The quotations are on pp. 56-57.
2. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 506.
3. Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 83, 99.
4. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," pp. 64-66.
5. Major works addressing this debate have included: Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Praeger, 1962); Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968); George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Joseph I. Coffey, ed., "Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals," special issue, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 430 (March 1977); Albert Wohlstetter et al., Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); George H. Quester, ed., "Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain," special issue, International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1981); Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Benjamin Frankel, ed., "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications," special issue, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990); Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: IISS, 1991); Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)," special issue, Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993).
6. For a comprehensive descriptive statement of this "logic," see Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, pp. 69-94. Sagan's "Perils of Proliferation" is a recent, more theoretical treatment. See also Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; and Steven E. Miller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 67-80.
7. The classic statement of this position is Waltz, More May Be Better. For other works in this vein, see John J. Weltman, "Nuclear Devolution and World Order," World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1980), pp. 169-193; John J. Weltman, "Managing Nuclear Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 182-194; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.
8. This term was first introduced by Benjamin Frankel in...
Colin H. Kahl is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. In 1997-98 he was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
I would like to thank Richard Betts, Nazli Choucri, Tim Crawford, David Downie, Peter Gleick, Jack Goldstone, Tad Homer-Dixon, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Marc Levy, Rhoda Margesson, Aaron Seeskin, Jack Snyder, Leslie Vinjamuri, Jon Western, Marcia Wright, and all the participants in the Olin Institute's National Security Seminar for helpful comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank the United States Institute of Peace and the Olin Institute for their generous financial support.
1. Steven Greenhouse, "The Greening of U.S. Diplomacy," New York Times, October 9, 1995, p. A6.
2. Mohammed Ayoob, "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 37; see also Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
3. Thomas W. Merrick, "Population Dynamics in Developing Countries," in Robert Cassen and contributors, Population and Development: Old Debates and New Conclusions (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1994); and World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 2.
4. See, for example, George D. Moffett, "The Population Question Revisited," Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 54-79.
5. This hypothesis is grounded in the theoretical work of James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February 1962), pp. 5-19; and Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a discussion, see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 104-105, 109-111.
6. See Norman Meyers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 22; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 166, 168; and Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 178-179.
7. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," in Clifford T. Paynton and Robert Blackey, eds., Why Revolution? (Rochester, Vt.: Schenkman Books, 1971), pp. 128-129.
8. A public good is defined by its nonexcludable and nonrival nature. It is nonexcludable in the sense that the benefits of the good, once provided, are available to all. It is nonrival to the extent that a portion of the good can be consumed by an individual without preventing others from consuming that same portion. Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 5-6.
9. See Jeffry Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 649-651, 655; Mark I. Lichbach, "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 3 (April 1994), pp. 383-418; and Edward N. Muller and Karl-Deiter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (June 1986); pp. 471-473. This line of reasoning builds on the classic work of Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
10. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
11. See Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Jack A. Goldstone, "Population Growth and Revolutionary Crises," in John Foran, ed., Theorizing Revolutions (London: Routledge, 1997); Homer-Dixon "On the Threshold"; and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 4-40. A similar but much...
Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
Brian Bond is a Professor at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London.
1. Martin Van Creveld, Command In War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 180.
2. Ibid., p. 190.
3. Basil Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, pp. 128, 177.
Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued seemingly incongruous courses of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and international intervention in Afghanistan at the same time as it has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban's political leadership and many of its military commanders to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of indiscriminate and costly violence directed against Islamabad by Pakistani groups affiliated with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's policy is the result not only of its enduring rivalry with India but also of historically rooted domestic imbalances and antagonistic relations with successive governments in Afghanistan. Three critical features of the Pakistani political systemthe militarized nature of foreign policy making, ties between military institutions and Islamist networks, and the more recent rise of grassroots violencehave contributed to Pakistan's accommodation of the Afghan Taliban. Additionally, mutual suspicion surrounding the contentious Afghanistan-Pakistan border and Islamabad's long record of interference in Afghan politics have continued to divide Kabul and Islamabad, diminishing the prospect of cooperation between the two capitals. These determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior reveal the prospects of and obstacles to resolving the numerous issues of contention that characterize the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship today.
John Lewis Gaddis is Professor of History at Ohio University. He is the author of The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.
Paul Nitze is now associated with System Planning Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, and Director of Policy Studies, Committee on the Present Danger. From 1950-1953, he was Director of the Policy Planning Staff, U.S. State Department.
1. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: 1967), p. 408. Kennan's statement was made with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, but it conveys his attitude toward NSC 68 as well.
2. For an attempt to reconstruct Kennan's thinking, see John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," Foreign Affairs, LV(July, 1977), 873-887.
3. Nitze memorandum, "Recent Soviet Moves," February 8, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950 (Washington: 1977), I, 145; NSC-68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, Ibid., pp. 263-264.
4. Minutes, Policy Review Group meeting, March 16, 1950, Ibid., p. 199.
5. NSC 68, April 14, 1950, Ibid., pp. 243-244.
6. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: 1969), p. 374.
7. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington: 1979).
Samuel F. Wells, Jr. is secretary of the International Security Studies Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution. He has served as a consultant on Soviet-American Relations to the Department of Defense, and he is now working on a study of the impact of the Korean War on U.S. strategic programs.
He would like to express thanks to John D. Watson, Jr. for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. NSC 68, April 7, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, I, pp. 287-288.
2. For a review of these events, see Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 321, 355, 362; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 237 n.; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, "A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission," vol. II (Washington: U.S. AEC, 1972), pp. 362-369; Nitze, "Recent Soviet Moves," February 8, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, I, p. 145.
3. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 373-394, Senator McMahon's statement appears on p. 394.
4. Ibid., pp. 394-405; Paul Nitze, memorandum of December 19, 1949, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, R.G. 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
5. Report by the Special Committee of the NSC to the President, January 31, 1950, President to the Secretary of State, January 31, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, I, pp. 513-517, 141-142.
6. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 371-380; Gen. Omar Bradley, "This Way Lies Peace," Saturday Evening Post, 222 (October 15, 1949), pp. 168-196.
7. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 378-386. Oppenheimer's letter to Conant, October 21, 1949, is quoted on p. 379; italics appear in the original. For evidence on the U.S. Navy's opposition to the atomic strategy and the activity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in urging rapid development of the H-bomb, see David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," Journal of American History, 66 (June 1979), pp. 62-87.
8. From October 1 until December 31, 1949 he served as both Counselor and Director of Policy Planning Staff. Paul Nitze assumed the latter post on January 1, 1950. Discouraged over recent trends in American diplomacy, Kennan had asked on September 29, 1949 to be relieved of his duties as Director of the Policy Planning Staff as soon as possible and to retire from the Foreign Service the following June. He summarized in his diary two months later why he had made this decision:
"The heart of the difficulty lies in the fact that my concept of the manner in which our diplomatic effort should be conducted is not shared by any of the other senior officials of the department; and that the Secretary is actually dependent on these officials, for better or for worse, for the execution of any foreign policy at all. Even if he shared my views, he would not be able to find others who did. . . ." George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 468.
9. Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Foreign Relations, 1950, I, pp. 22-29; italics appear in the original.
10. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
11. Ibid., pp. 37-40.
12. Ibid., pp. 40-44; italics appear in the original. In his Memoirs, Kennan says that this personal memorandum was "in its implications one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government." He recounts from memory his main points, and it is interesting to note where his recall fails. He contends that he argued against basing American strategy totally on nuclear weapons and made a plea against development of a thermonuclear bomb. Within the actual paper, however, he argued against the first use of atomic weapons, called for an agreement on international control, pointed out the insidious effects of retaining any nuclear weapons, but made no mention of thermonuclear development. See Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 471-476.
13. In his Memoirs, Kennan...