This article presents a unique framework for analyzing the politics of immigration control in developed countries and reviews related political theories. The author describes distinctive patterns of immigration in selected OECD countries and standard explanations. The author argues that the costs and benefits of immigration are spatially unevenly distributed and explains how spatial concentrations affect costs and benefits, as well as how local conditions, population, and the business community create support for and opposition to immigration. Evidence from Great Britain is used to support the framework. Control of immigration is due to the power of local constituencies in creating and maintaining a national political coalition. Local constituency preferences are a systematic, but not exclusive, feature that underpin the politics of immigration control. Other factors may have periodic impacts. The case of Great Britain, during 1955-81, illustrates the importance of disaggregated analysis. Cross national analyses will reveal the variation in level of impact. Japan and Germany, with similar economic and political histories, indicate substantial differences in net demand for immigration. Conditions, such as high, rapidly increasing immigration proportions, access to social services, and higher unemployment, may lead to hostility and less community support for immigration. The theory is based on native-immigrant competition over scarce resources, variable business support depending upon the flexibility of local markets and potential for capital mobility, and the dynamics of party competition as influenced by underlying structural conditions.
An examination is made of the political and potentially conflicting implications of the current global predicament with regard to population growth, finite resources, and the negative environmental influence of technological development. The problem is borken down and discussed in the following manner: 1) the international implications of population dynamics, resource constraints and distribution, and technological developments; 2) the interdependencies and reverberating effects associated with efforts to cope with any one dimension singly; and 3) the ways by which the conduct of research in the academic community can address itself more clearly to environmental problems. A prime objective is to highlight the implications for the developed as well as the less developed world. Thus, the empirical analysis centers around Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.
On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon announced a new foreign economic policy for the United States. In response to the first trade deficit since 1893 and accelerating attacks on the dollar, the president imposed a surcharge on American imports, suspended the convertibility of the dollar, and took other remedial actions. During the following eighteen months the dollar was devalued twice (December, 1971, and February, 1973), the world moved toward a system of flexible exchange rates, and intense negotiations were initiated to create a new international monetary and trading system.
Nationalization of the Zairian and Zambian copper industries failed to deliver the hoped for benefits and pushed some still further beyond reach. It did so because nationalization entailed the loss of insulation, that is, the wide range of unperceived risk management and custodial functions fulfilled by the multinational mining corporations. Without this insulation these two governments, their copper industries, and their citizens' welfare all suffered. Looking beyond Zaire and Zambia, it appears that the loss of insulation has negative effects in all cases of mining industry nationalization. The size of the costs are mitigated by the strength of the nationalizer's political system.
This article investigates the politics of sovereign borrowing in Europe over the very long run. I consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the sources of borrower credibility. According to the first, European states with constitutional checks on executive authority found it easier to obtain credit at low interest rates than did states that lacked such constraints. My second hypothesis focuses on state type (city-state versus territorial state) and the way in which this may have influenced the balance of political power between owners of land and owners of capital in a society. This hypothesis suggests that after controlling for other factors, one should observe that city-states in Europe found it easier to borrow than did larger territorial states, and that these city-states paid lower interest rates on their debt. Finally, my third hypothesis suggests that borrower credibility depended on the simultaneous presence of both constitutional checks and balances and a city-state. When one considers a broad sample of cases over a long time span there is strong support for the proposition involving city-states and merchant power, but less support for the argument that constitutional checks influenced credibility regardless of state type (city-state or territorial state). There is, however, some empirical evidence of an interaction effect whereby constitutional constraints on rulers made city-states particularly credible as borrowers. My results are robust to a number of controls for alternative determinants, for sample selection bias, and for the endogeneity of city-state development.I would like to thank Robert Fannion, Jeff Frieden, Peter Gourevitch, Lisa Martin, Adam Przeworski, Ronald Rogowski, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Ken Scheve, Mike Tomz, Nikki Velasco, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Stanford and UCLA for comments on a previous draft. This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK).
Debates and events during the year since the publication of the last report to the General Assembly have brought to the fore different concepts of the United Nations, the character of the Organization, its authority and its structure.
A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.
How do rising levels of international interconnectedness affect social, economic, and political conditions for women? Research on gender and international relations frequently offers clear propositions but seldom submits them to broad, quantitative testing. This article begins to fill that gap. We advance the hypothesis that, on balance and over time, increasing cross-national exchange and communication lead to improvements in women s status and equality. Economic aspects of globalization can bring new opportunities and resources to women. But equally important, globalization promotes the diffusion of ideas and norms of equality for women. In an analysis of 180 countries from 1975 to 2000, employing cross-sectional time-series regression techniques, we examine the impact of several measures of globalization on women s levels of life expectancy, literacy, and participation in the economy and parliamentary office. International trade, foreign direct investment, membership in the United Nations (UN) and World Bank, and ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), are associated with improved conditions for women.A grant from the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine, supported this research. The authors are grateful for constructive comments from participants in the faculty research colloquium of the Department of Political Science at Brigham Young University. The authors also received helpful suggestions from their fellow panelists at the 2004 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association and from the editor of IO, Lisa Martin, and two anonymous reviewers.
Constructivists have argued that interest-based explanations cannot fully account for important international phenomena and that analysis of the social construction of state identity may explain the genesis of state interests. This argument can be applied to the early development of neutral rights policy in the United States, when a weak and divided state clung to a policy that was opposed and consistently challenged by far stronger powers. My explanation poses a principled conception of identity: if leaders adopt a principle that constitutes a specific international role for the state and commands domestic legitimacy, then diverse interests will converge on that principle, generating foreign policy continuity While neorealist and liberal institutionalist theories each provide fragments of an explanation, a constructivist hypothesis comprehensively explains the relative continuity of the policy over time.
In any field of scholarly inquiry it is recognized that we must describe before we can hope to explain. That is, we cannot account for the incidence of a certain class of events or conditions until we have identified and described those particular phenomena. If we agree that the current state of theory in the field of international organization leaves much to be desired, this fact may be partly due to our violation of this principle. Whether we deal with all international organizations over a lengthy period of time or a smaller subset based on such inclusion criteria as function or time period and whether we treat such organizations as the dependent, intervening, or independent variable, it is essential that we first acquire the data by which such organizations can be described. The major purpose of this article is to report the results of a first systematic effort to generate this data, so that we may move on in a cumulative fashion toward the empirical testing of propositions, models, or theories in which international organization is a major variable.
In the three centuries or so since the modern international system began flo take on its present shape, its component members have come together in a wide variety of organizations, for a wide variety of purposes. Those who act on behalf of the nations have turned to international organizations to oversee peace settlements, to strengthen their collective defense capacity, to mediate conflicts between themselves, to discourage interference from the outside, to harmonize their trade relations, to supervise international waterways, to accelerate the production of food, to codify diplomatic practice, and to formalize legal proceedings. Some organizations are established primarily for the neutral purpose of making coexistence possible, others for the more affirmative purposes of positive cooperation. Some have been directed toward the modification of the system, others toward the preservation of its status quo.
One challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order. Earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulations by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries. This article explores a different face of hegemony. Specifically, we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power, hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners. We examine this argument in the case of the American Walker Tariff of 1846. American tariff liberalization was intimately related to Britain's repeal of its Corn Laws. In the antebellum United States, Northern protectionist and Southern free trade proclivities were fixed; Western grain growers held the balance of power. By allowing access to its lucrative grain market, Britain altered the economic and political incentives of Western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the Walker Tariff.
What accounts for the spread of political protest and contention across countries? Analyzing the wildfire of attempted revolutions in 1848, the present article assesses four causal mechanisms for explaining diffusion, namely external pressure from a great power (such as revolutionary France after 1789); the promotion of new norms and values by more advanced countries; rational learning from successful contention in other nations; or boundedly rational, potentially distorted inferences from select foreign experiences. The patterns in which revolutionary contention spread and eyewitness reports from all sides of the ensuing conflicts suggest that bounded rationality played a crucial role: cognitive heuristics that deviate from fully rational procedures drew attention to some experiences but not others and induced both challengers and defenders of the established order to draw rash conclusions from these experiences, particularly the French monarchy's fall in February 1848. My study also shows, however, that other factors made important contributions, for instance by preparing the ground for the wave of regime contention.
World society is not organized around a single state, and the separate national states took up environmental concerns only very belatedly. During the past century, the spread of a scientific culture and thr creation of an international associational system-most prominently around the United Nations-helped structure a world environmental regime by other means. The development of this world-level regime took a course different from the one that would be predicted by state-based theories. International nongovernmental associations, rooted in expanding scientific discourse, grew earliest, followed by a spate of environmental treaties among governments. Then, after 1945, the United Nations system facilitated a dramatic expansion in the number and scope of intergovernmental environmental organizations. Only late in the process did environmental concerns become structured as major components of national state organizations. We provide qualitative and quantitative descriptions, and report results of longitudinal analyses, elucidating the processes involved. The larger point is that different sectors of world society become structured through more variable processes than are usually considered.
The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributional considerations between rival domestic interests and decided by politically dominant coalitions. The domestic institutional structure in each country determined the composition of the politically dominant coalition. Decentralized structures allowed potential losers to curb public policies favorable to capital market internationalization, whereas centralized structures allowed expected winners to promote such policies. As a result, economies with centralized states ended up being the most dependent on the international capital market, whereas economies with decentralized states took a less active part in the globalization of finance. Copyright 1998 by MIT Press.
The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributional considerations between rival domestic interests and decided by politically dominant coalitions. The domestic institutional structure in each country determined the composition of the politically dominant coalition. Decentralized structures allowed potential losers to curb public policies favorable to capital market internationalization, whereas centralized structures allowed expected winners to promote such policies. As a result, economies with centralized states ended up being the most dependent on the international capital market, whereas economies with decentralized states took a less active part in the globalization of finance.
International institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility. Neorealists draw on the post respectively the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) clause and the informal conventional tariff system (CTS) regime it underpinned hegemonic Britain via the 1846 Corn Laws Repeal. The regime was instead a private good that was collectively provisioned by all its constituent member states via the unprecedented interstate practices institutionalized in the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and then autonomously maintained by a negarchical and self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism. Finally, the informal CTS regime's enforcement mechanism autonomously altered the interests and behaviors of states in directions incongruent with executive preferences solely through the brute force of rational calculations imposed by decentralized international institutional constraints. Both the French and British executives in the 1870s believed the regime was normatively inappropriate and unsuccessfully attempted to exit amid eight system-threatening crises. Nonetheless, the MFN-based regime's self-enforcing sanctioning mechanism autonomously induced compliance: conceptualized as unitary states' behavior deviating from executives' first-order preference. The extraordinarily turbulent 1870s therefore provide an unexplored historical vantage point to make strong institutionalist claims in an era, issue area, and under conditions that they are least likely to be validated.
Whereas historical accounts of U.S. tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties, previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects. We explore this paradox by employing time series techniques and conclude that political parties did have a significant impact on the tariff during this period. In particular, we construct a model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters' preferences from which we derive the empirical equations to be tested. We then find that even after controlling for interest group demands, partisan control of government did have a significant effect on the tariff. Finally, we show that during this period political parties enacted significantly different tariff policies from one another that benefited certain producer groups at the expense of others. We conclude that political institutions indeed do play a significant role in shaping interests that influence U.S. foreign economic policy. Copyright 1996 by MIT Press.
Over the past century, Germany has repeatedly attempted to use trade as a tool of foreign policy vis-à-vis Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Against the background of continual German economic superiority, this article analyzes Germany's ability to apply trade leverage in terms of four other factors: the nature of the prevailing international trade regime, government views of trade leverage as a tool of statecraft, the degree of German state autonomy in setting trade policies, and the availability of an effective bureaucratic mechanism for controlling German imports and exports. The historical record demonstrates that beyond economic superiority, the application of trade leverage requires a permissive international trade regime, state acceptance of trade-based economic statecraft, an autonomous domestic regime, and a rigorous trade control bureaucracy. Surprisingly, this conjunction of factors, as they applied to Eastern Europe, occurred during both the Nazi period and the early years of the Federal Republic. The article closes by pointing out how two important factors—the politicized nature of the East-West trade regime and the Federal Republic's high degree of state autonomy in setting Eastern trade policy–are being eroded by political and economic change in Eastern Europe.
This article analyzes Germany's ability to apply trade leverage in Eastern Europe in terms of four factors: the nature of the prevailing international trade regime, government views of trade leverage as a tool of statecraft, the degree of German state autonomy in setting trade policies, and the availability of an effective bureaucratic mechanism for controlling German imports and exports. The application of trade leverage requires a permissive international trade regime, state acceptance of trade-based economic statecraft, a sufficiently autonomous domestic regime, and a rigorous trade control bureaucracy. This conjunction of factors occurred during both the Nazi period and the early years of the Federal Republic. Yet currently the politicized nature of the East-West trade regime and the Federal Republic's high degree of state autonomy in setting Eastern trade policy are being eroded by political and economic change in Eastern Europe. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.
During the split second of time represented by the last few years, humanity has been bereft of five of its great leaders who were still in the midst of carrying awesome responsibilities including the promotion of peace—Jawaharlal Nehru, Pope John XXIII, John F. Kennedy, Dag Hammarskjöld, and Adlai E. Stevenson. How great the void that the passing of each of them produced! How strong our conviction that a world gripped with grave problems—old and new—needed their special gifts, their clear minds, their strong hands, their sense of devotion for a longer span of time! Yet the destiny that shapes our ends is in this sense beyond our control.
The period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history, and in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. World War I catapulted the United States into international economic and political leadership, yet in the aftermath of the war, despite grandiose Wilsonian plans, the United States quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad: it did not join the League of Nations, disavowed responsibility for European reconstruction, would not participate openly in many international economic conferences, and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy, did the United States move to center stage of world politics and economics: it built the United Nations and a string of regional alliances, underwrote the rebuilding of Western Europe, almost single-handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system, and led the world in commercial liberalization.
This research note develops a new explanation of postwar peace duration: periods of peace following wars last longer when the war ends in foreign-imposed regime change. This study tests this hypothesis on a new data set (an expansion of Fortna's (2004) data) of all periods of peace following interstate war cease-fires, over the period 1914 2001. It also tests for other possible factors affecting postwar peace duration, including international institutions, the revelation of information during war, third-party intervention during war, postwar changes in the balance of power, regime type, past conflict history, and others. The article finds strong support for the central hypothesis that peace lasts longer following wars that end in foreign-imposed regime change. This pacifying effect diminishes over time when a puppet is imposed, but not when a democracy is imposed. There are other results, including that the strength of a cease-fire agreement has almost no impact on peace duration.
A remarkable document in the history of international organization is a detailed constitution for a league of nations which was given limited distribution in March 1915 under the title “Proposals for the Avoidance of War”. Prepared by British liberal and socialist critics of prewar British diplomacy headed by Lord Bryce, the historian, jurist, and retired ambassador to the United States, it undoubtedly was the single most influential scheme for a league of nations produced during the First World War. Although the “Proposals” recommended neither international social or economic cooperation nor measures of international administration, it was known to the authors of the major league schemes prepared in the United Kingdom and the United States during the First World War and to officials in both countries. Indeed, the document was the source of key concepts and language embodied in 1919 in the Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and of its successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yet discussion of the “Proposals” in the literature on the origins of the League of Nations is both cursory and imprecise. Even such writers as Henry R. Winkler and Alfred Zimmern who recognize its importance seem not to understand how the “Proposals” evolved and how early and pervasive an influence it had.
The decision of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 to place the German colonies and Turkish territories under the supervision of the League of Nations raised serious political and legal questions to which no one had satisfactory answers. But, by contrast with the numerous recent studies of World War I and the Peace Conference that deal at least in passing with the origins and establishment of the mandates system, there are very few satisfactory scholarly essays that analyzer the aftermath of the Peace Conference's deliberations on international colonial affairs. The opening of the archives of the government of the United Kingdom after 1919 provides a good opportunity to review the subject and to examine what the unpublished records reveal about international supervision in colonial areas.
Under the same systemic shock, the collapse of the international economy in 1929, different countries formulated different policy responses. Britain, Germany, the United States, France, and Sweden all began by attempting the orthodoxy of deflation. Soon after, they abandoned deflation, devalued their currencies, erected tariff barriers, and set up corporatistic production and marketing arrangements. A few countries went further, and began experimenting with demand-stimulus fiscal policy. The most successful was Nazi Germany; the Swedish and U.S. efforts were much more limited and less effective, the French attempt crumbled in less than a year, and Britain never tried demand stimulus. Why this divergence in policy? The politics of policy response, the societal basis of different policy coalitions and the way in which they were expressed through different political formulations, suggests an answer. In all countries, labor, agriculture, and certain elements of business became available for revolts against policy orthodoxy. What differed across countries was the specific balance of forces among these interest groups, and the political factors that shaped their combinations. The effect of political leadership, institutions, and other variables on outcomes depended critically on the way specific social forces in each society used and worked through them.
Ever since Adolph Hitler's invasion of Poland, American and European interwar diplomacy has, with good reason, been judged a failure. Analyzing what went wrong, American historians have been quick to note their own nation's withdrawal from European affairs following the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Consequently, they have focused great attention on the Senate's rejection of United Statesmembership in the League of Nations, an act which has been seen as both cause and effect of the ensuing years of isolation. Indeed, nonmembership in the Geneva-based international organization came to have—for contemporaries and historians alike—deep symbolic and emotional overtones as well as diplomatic significance, appearing as the quintessence of isolationism itself.
In recent research on the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), there has been no examination of the reaction of private actors to the RTAA. Did producer groups and investors in 1934 believe the Democratic RTAA was the solution to Republican protectionism, as institutional analyses of the RTAA claim, or did they realize the RTAA was no magic bullet against a return of protectionism, as skeptics argue? Archival data suggests that many producer groups believed the RTAA would result in durable liberalization, but that fewer understood the likely effects of its specific features. An event study of investor reaction to the RTAA reveals that export-dependent firms experienced a significant, positive stock return increase on news of the RTAA, while heavily tariff-protected firms experienced a significant stock decline, albeit several months later.Many thanks to George Kanatas, David Mowery, Barbara Ostdiek, Joanne Oxley, Dennis Quinn, Duane Windsor, Bernard Yeung, two anonymous reviewers, and Peter Gourevitch and David Lake for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Scott Baggett for statistical assistance and to Katie Schwenker, Helen El-Mallakh, and Clara Montz for patient research assistance.
In 1930, Congress approved the highly restrictive Smoot–Hawley tariff, the textbook case of pressure group politics run amok. Four years later, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), surrendering much of its tariff-making authority to a policy process in which internationalists had increasing influence. While the United States had used reciprocity to expand exports before, the stick of discriminatory treatment took precedence over the carrot of liberalizing concessions. With the transfer of tariff-making authority to the executive, the United States could make credible commitments and thus exploit its market power to liberalize international trade. Despite later modifications, the RTAA set the fundamental institutional framework for trade politics.
The imposition of limited sanctions against Italy was given fair prospect of success by members of the League. Sanctions were to have a twofold purpose. One was to uphold the Covenant and encourage collective security. The other was to end the war by putting pressure on the Italian government so as to make it amenable to a negotiated settlement. It was expected that economic and financial measures (as opposed to military means) would be sufficient, over a period of time, to achieve this. The timetable was upset by unexpected political events and by the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Policies are explained, events discussed, and to illuminate some dilemmas a distinction (not then well perceived) is made between politically important “consumatory” assumptions and diplomatically operative “instrumentalist” and reconciliationist practices.
This article presents an interpretation of the conflicts between universalism and nationalism as they affected United States policy toward the creation of the United Nations. Drawing on heretofore unavailable sources, the author stresses the rising influence of nationalism in the evolution of decisions on the veto power, trusteeships, and regionalism. His focus is on the decision-making process during Roosevelt’s last year and the initial months of the Truman administration. He contends that Cordell Hull’s universalist UN blueprint, which Roosevelt supported, was inexorably eroded by critics within the American government, especially military spokesmen. These leaders took advantage of the apprehension about the Soviet Union’s future policy to further their own ambitions for a strong post-war military posture. Truman was sympathetic to the voices of nationalism, and when he became president the shift away from a strong UN became more pronounced.
The demand by Third World countries for a “new international economic order” also has its political dimension. Do the threats of commodity cartels, debt defaults, and investment expropriation reflect a fundamental shift in the balance of power between North and South? This paper argues, to the contrary, that the power of the South is quite limited. An analysis of trade, financing, and investment relations between North and South reveals the latter's clearly subordinate position, which is all the more weakened by the fragile political-administrative structures of many Third World regimes. Nevertheless, the demands being made should in some form be accommodated since they serve Northern interests in two important respects: they potentially allow the North new means of leverage in relations with the South; and they offer the North the opportunity to coordinate its various policies and interests in regard to the Third World. Had the South not called for a new international economic order, the North should have pressed for one.
In recent years considerable concern has been expressed in the United States over the changing composition of the United Nations membership and the failure of the one-state, one-vote formula in the General Assembly to reflect the actual power and significance of the different United Nations Members. “Malapportionment” as such is frequently not the issue here, for whether one looks at population, wealth, or budget assessments the United Nations General Assembly has always been “malapportioned.” And, at least in terms of population, the United Nations is no more malapportioned now than it was in 1945. Rather than a concern with a new situation, the growing emphasis on this issue is often a reflection of the fear that malapportionment will now operate to the disadvantage of the United States; that is, the ”overrepresented” states of today may not be as closely associated with the United States as the ”overrepresented” states of the past.
This article updates earlier work by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye on conflict management by international organizations. In addition, it seeks to answer the question of whether one can fruitfully interpret conflict management as a case of regime growth and regime decay. For this purpose I develop indicators of regime coherence and regime effectiveness, and illustrate them by subjecting the management of disputes to time-series analysis. The discussion identifies when and under what global conditions the regime began to decay. Finally, I explain that decay in terms of four mutually supportive hypotheses. In this article I thus offer a statistical history of the conflict management functions of the United Nations and the major regional organizations, and use it to probe the limits of the utility of the regime literature.
Cultural expansion has been a major component of postwar French foreign policy. The creation and operation of UNESCO afforded opportunities for pursuit of French cultural relations. French authorities determined to secure the location of UNESCO in Paris, the privileged use of the French language, and to direct the organization towards activities with appeal to an international intellectual clientele. France also endeavored to divert UNESCO from paths detrimental to French cultural policy. These dangers included the creation of international norms and mandatory reports on bilateral cultural relations, adherence by UNESCO to a philosophy inimical to French cultural policy, and penetration by multilateral organs into areas of French cultural predominance. At the same time, France availed itself of UNESCO to supplement its independent actions, to infiltrate a French presence into new areas, to facilitate the operational conduct of cultural relations, and to diversify the conventional instruments of cultural action. Additionally, the French National Commission for UNESCO emerged as an agent for the conduct of French cultural diplomacy.
A functioning balance-of-power system, comparable to the one which existed throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, limits the ability of Small Powers to achieve their own goals. However, in compensation it provides more real security for them—in terms of the maintenance of independence—than other historical systems, all of which offered the Small Power some elements of maneuverability but to the detriment of long-range security. At first glance the contemporary political system appears to contradict this generalization: Surely, one would presume, the new status of Small Powers reflects a system in which the weaker units of international politics have finally achieved both security and influence. Nevertheless, a closer examination of actual patterns of interaction substantially qualifies this presumption: The original generalization, that is, remains basically sound.
This article presents a cross-national analysis of the relationship between domestic political regime changes and voting realignments of Third World nations in the United Nations (UN). It seeks to move beyond existing research that has assumed that foreign policy is rooted in political and economic structures and changes only when a political revolution occurs. It argues that a wider variety of regime changes can also provoke major realignments. Using a new data set on Third World regimes, the article examines the impact of regime changes for eighty-seven nations on their UN voting patterns during the period from 1946 to 1984. Although the findings indicate that revolutions are most likely to provoke major voting realignments, they also show that the more frequent, nonrevolutionary types of regime change are associated with many voting realignments. A major implication of these findings is that foreign policy changes reflect a complex set of domestic regime factors, including leadership belief systems and internal political constraints, as well as aspects of political structure.
The Charter of the United Nations does not define the “veto”, and many questions have been raised as to what constitutes a veto. For the purpose of this repertoire it has been established that the veto has been applied if a substantive motion which has received a majority of seven votes has failed of adoption through the negative vote of one or more of the permanent members. Thus only the application of the extraordinary right of a permanent member to overcome a majority (seven) has been considered. Negative votes of permanent members on resolutions which have failed to receive the necessary seven votes have not been listed.
This article is devoted to a consideration of the role (during the period 1946–54) of the International Court of Justice within the general context of international institutions existing to facilitate the pacific settlement of international disputes. For the development of international judicial techniques, this period is dominated by a novel, and unwelcome, phenomenon, that of the non-implementation of several of the Court's decisions. In this respect the position of the Court, as a principal organ of the United Nations, is not unique, for, in all its work, the United Nations has had to face the problem of the non-implementation of the resolutions of the principal organs. In making the following observations, the possibility that a decision will be taken in 1955 to convene a General Review Conference, in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 3, of the Charter and Article 69 of the Statute is kept in mind. However, it is not our intention to put forward any specific suggestions for amending either Chapter XIV of the Charter or the Statute. Until a careful and comprehensive review has been made of the working of the provisions of the Charter relating to the Court, and of the Statute, it would be premature to do so.
Eight generalizations are extracted from two partially competing perspectives (Johan Galtung's and Jorge Dominguez's ) on center-periphery interaction patterns. Seven of these generalizations are tested by examining head of state, governmental and ministerial visits to and from the Arab world between 1946 and 1975. Neither perspective is fully supported or disconfirmed by the data. Dominguez's emphases on limited resources and local problems, however, which lead in turn to relatively high intra-subsystemic interaction between peripheral actors and changing center-periphery patterns, appear to provide a more accurate analytical base than does the static model, with its emphasis on high levels of asymmetry and concentration, advanced by Galtung. Further tests of the two perspectives will be necessary in order to assess fully the geographical scope and the type of interaction patterns covered by these diachronic findings.
Financial contributions are one among several ways that states provide support for the United Nations. Different levels of contributions may serve as one measure of support, but differences in the size and wealth of states make comparisons of absolute amounts contributed misleading. In this study, member contributions from 1946 through 1969 are examined from a number of perspectives, including a state's relative capacity-to-pay. The results indicate that the United States has not been a particularly generous supporter of the UN even though its support levels have been higher than those of the Soviet Union. In general, smaller and poorer states have tended to assume heavier burdens in UN financing than larger and richer states; the trend over time has been toward increasing burdens for those least able to pay. If these tentative results and other studies of contributions are combined with investigations of other forms of support for the UN, we should be able to develop a fuller understanding of the evolution of commitments toward global organization.
An analysis of UN coverage in sample years between 1948 and 1975 by five representative black U.S. newspapers as compared with the New York Times and, to a lesser extent, the Chicago Tribune shows that UN coverage by the black press since 1961 has declined, as it has for the white press, but that the decline in black press coverage is not only less sharp but has also been somewhat reversed in recent years. Patterns of coverage differ: greater priority is accorded in the black press to Africa and Asia and more emphasis is placed on personalities, especially on black Americans at the United Nations. Comparisons of black press coverage with UN and with the differentials of support for the UN that have been manifested over the years in both black and white public opinion reveal no clear correlations.
It has been suggested that the United Nations may perform any of three general functions in its field operations: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peaceservicing. The first two functions are more widely recognized than the third, and it is to the third that this article is directed with specific application to the Middle East. Peacekeeping, the termination or containment of violence, has been extensively discussed; in the Middle East such agencies as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and the Mixed Armistice Commissions are regarded as peacekeeping units of the parent organization. Increasingly a separate functional category for analysis termed peacemaking has been employed referring to efforts to remove or mollify the substantive issues causing violence. In the Middle East missions such as the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP), its special representatives, and the representatives of the secretary-general such as Gunnar Jarring are generally labeled peacemakers rather than peacekeepers.
Much of the discussion and study in the field of international organization has long been beset by a sterile encounter between the “uncritical lovers” and the “unloving critics” of formal intergovernmental organizations, of which the UN family is the preeminent example. The former have seen in those institutions and their procedures precursors of a regime of international law, if not of a world government, characterized by greater rationality, order, and cooperation and by less conflict in interstate relations; they have often been mentally fixed on a dominant image of international order, an image whose flaws and other characteristics were well analyzed by John Ruggie several years ago. The latter have seen them largely as shadow plays, at best reflecting and at worst having nothing to do with the power relations among states, which are the real determinants of state behavior in an anarchic system. The split between the two corresponds roughly, if not identically, to another fundamental divide among theorists of international relations, namely, that between idealists and realists.