This article examines the organization, personnel and selected operations of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in New York during and immediately after the First World War. Under the leadership of Sir William Wiseman, SIS agents successfully combated German intrigues as well as Irish and Indian nationalists. The greatest challenges, however, were managing the shifting relationship with American authorities and the encroachments of rival British agencies such as MI5. The roles of Guy Gaunt, Robert Nathan and Norman Thwaites are given particular attention.
In counter-revolutionary warfare strategy, political action forms the overwhelming part; however, also central as an off-shoot of the tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare is the elimination of insurgent structures - generally a euphemism for assassination. In reality, assassination is a subset of covert paramilitary action, implemented as a consequence of counter-intelligence or even counter-terrorism. South Africa's Security Branch presents one of the best recent examples of the use of counter-intelligence techniques for counter-revolutionary warfare. While politico-constitutional intelligence was gathered by the National Intelligence Service to support constitutional efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict and bring about a new political dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid government relied on the covert operational capabilities of the security forces (especially the Security Branch) to not only halt the 'Revolutionary Onslaught' of the liberation movements, but to eliminate them as a viable political and revolutionary force. In attempting to support an unwinnable political objective, the ultimate corruption of the intelligence process and the reliance of individuals overseeing it far and away on the covert operational intelligence capabilities of the state, the apartheid government brought about its own downfall. The Security Branch was at the heart of these efforts.
The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, anti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state-actors that may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage and transfer procedures, policy-makers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This article attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the article seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments.
Because of its clandestine character, the world of the undercover agent has remained murky. This article attempts to illuminate this shadowy feature of intelligence operations. It examines the activities of one double agent, the Czech-born Maximilian Wechsler, who in the early 1970s successfully infiltrated two socialist organizations. Wechsler was engaged by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. However, he was 'unreliable': he came in from the cold and went public. The article uses his exposés to recreate his undercover role. It seeks to throw some light on the recruitment methods of ASIO, on the techniques of infiltration, on the relationship between ASIO and the Liberal Party during a period of political volatility in Australia, and on the contradictory position of the Labor Government towards the security services.
Calls to evaluate ethically the practices of intelligence collection have been prompted by debate over the decision to go to war in Iraq and by consideration of how best to respond to terrorist threats. Recently, they have been bolstered by allegations of prisoner abuse that some have linked to intelligence organisations. Such demands for judgement are articulated with equal measures of urgency and apprehension: there is a perceived need to make clear statements about what constitutes morally prohibited and permissible conduct with regard to intelligence gathering, and yet the tools with which one might perform such a task are not readily apparent. This article begins with three basic assumptions. First, intelligence collection does not exist in an amoral realm of necessity, but, rather, is a human endeavour involving choice and deliberation and, therefore, is vulnerable to ethical scrutiny. Second, there is no consensus on the moral guidelines to be invoked to engage in such scrutiny. There are many distinct ethical perspectives from which intelligence collection might be evaluated - and from which one might provide disparate judgements of the same action. Finally, the practices involved in intelligence gathering are equally multifarious and it would be unhelpful to attempt to cover them with a blanket justification or condemnation (from any perspective). Following on from these assumptions, this article sets out a simple typology of 'realist', 'consequentialist' and 'deontological' ethical approaches to intelligence collection and explores how different practices might be variously evaluated from each. The aim is to provide an initial step towards thinking about ethics and intelligence collection.
One of the most notable messages in 'Venona' is No.1822, which the NKGB's Washington station sent to Moscow on 30 March 1945. As the message describes an agent of the GRU who circumstantially resembles Alger Hiss, it has strengthened the position of those scholars who have argued that Hiss was a Soviet spy. John Lowenthal, Hiss's lawyer, urges that an alternative reading of No.1822 exonerates his client. A review of the evidence shows that factual considerations exclude Lowenthal's reading of the cable. 'Venona' also contains another cable, hitherto unnoticed, that further strengthens the case against Hiss.
In 1943 the British Foreign Office created an obscure outfit called the Cultural Relations Department (CRD), to manage the growing organization of intellectual, cultural, social and artistic contacts designed to promote Allied goodwill. It became clear early on that the Soviet Union was already well-organized in this field, with many seemingly independent international organizations claiming to represent 'world opinion' yet operating as fronts for Moscow's foreign policy objectives. In the three years before 1948, when the more widely-known Information Research Department began its operations, CRD was the cutting edge of Britain's informational Cold War, focused very much upon the twin issues of culture and organized youth. This essay will examine this little-explored organization by focusing upon these twin issues and its neglected records in FO 924 in the Public Record Office, London.
Although a significant component of Cold War domestic security, counter-subversion has not received the same attention as counterespionage in recent historical writing. This article examines one aspect of the history of counter-subversion, specifically an internal attempt by the Canadian Security Service to reform itself in the face of the social change of the 1960s. 'Key Sectors' attempted to modernize the RCMP's pursuit of subversives by emphasizing qualitative factors and broader criteria for what constituted subversion beyond an association with communism. In the end, however, the program failed because it could not free itself from the anti-communism paradigm that the Canadian security state had been constructed on in the first place.
Because of its origins in a sort of anti-Elizabethan paranoia against centralised government, the United States is poorly set up institutionally to cope with the major danger to itself in the twenty-first century: the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. The Director of Central Intelligence is neither central nor fully directing. A large part of the intelligence community, especially in terms of budgets and supervision, is outside his direct control. There is a 'waters edge' separation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA. Essentially the CIA collects foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence overseas. The FBI, primarily a crime-oriented organisation, has had only a secondary function of domestic counter-intelligence. It is a case-oriented agency focused on establishing past facts in order to bring suspects to justice. It is psychologically ill-adapted to conceptualising threats that lie upstream, that is, in the future. In this context, September 11 can be most properly described as a failure of imagination. Remedies being proposed range from creating an internal security service à la Britain's MI5 to establishing a semi-autonomous domestic counter-intelligence agency within the FBI. In the field of covert action, intelligence in the twenty-first century likely will be characterised by what could be termed an offensive hunt strategy. Put in another way, intelligence operatives in the twenty-first century will become hunters, not gatherers. They will not simply sit back and gather information that comes in, analyse it, and then decide what to do about it. Rather they will have to go and hunt out intelligence that will enable them to track down or kill terrorists. This will involve sending operatives into countries with which we are not at war, indeed in some cases countries with which we have correct relations. In many circumstances, however, terrorist leaders will be hunted down with the help of host country elements. The likelihood is that this new strategy will be implemented primarily in terms of Special Forces operations aided by CIA elements. Modalities will have to be worked out between the Department of Defense and the CIA as to how such offensive hunt operations are to be carried out and how congressional oversight will be exercised.
Lost in the political fallout of the Iran National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007 was any discussion about historical parallels and what those might say about intersection between intelligence, policy, and politics. This article argues that the NIEs on the ballistic missile threat of the 1990s offer a useful analogy. In a short period of time, the NIE's assessment of the threat from so-called 'rogue states' went from modest to non-existent, provoking charges of politicization, eliciting investigations, and pausing the US missile defense program. A similar sequence of events followed the NIEs on Iran, whose tenor appeared to shift from alarmist in 2005 to dismissive in 2007. If the experience of the ballistic missile NIEs is any guide, then it is not clear that the 'cure'- investigations and commissions - are better than the disease. Both cases illustrate the need for the intelligence community to remain detached but not unaware of the policy environment into which these estimates are introduced. They also reaffirm that estimates are just estimates, probabilistic rather than deterministic judgments about future events.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 marked a clear turning point in the development of modern military intelligence. Intelligence played a major role in the conflict, as acknowledged by both sides and by many international observers at the time. Russian commentators attributed many of Russia's military and political reverses in the conflict both to their own military intelligence failures and to the sophistication (and broad-ranging scope) of Japanese intelligence activities. As a result, in the wake of the conflict, Russia set out to reorganize her whole intelligence structure via deep and broad-ranging reform, initiating developments that would ultimately culminate in the Soviet Union becoming one of the premier'panoptic' surveillance states of the twentieth century in terms of the measures it took to guard against both internal and external 'hidden forces'.
This article examines British intelligence efforts in Turkish Arabia at the turn of the twentieth century. It argues that intelligence collection was really three separate efforts, carried out by the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Government of India, and it reflected concerns about British decline, the problems experienced during the Boer War, as well as an effort to penetrate the ‘information order’ of India's sub-empire. Although intelligence efforts suffered from bureaucratic disharmony in Whitehall, and between London and the Government of India, valuable contributions were nevertheless made to Britain's knowledge of Turkish Arabia.
Britain's ability to discard its image of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) as an invincible enemy during the Burma campaign hinged upon two key factors. First, accurate assessments of the appropriate means to overcome the IJA not only hinged upon reliable intelligence, but of greater importance, the level of experience which the British-Indian army had in engaging its opponent. Second, the uncertainty was compounded by concerns arising from the IJAS ability to inflict considerable delays and casualties on its Allies counterparts, in spite of its shortage of modern weapons and lack of adequate training in
their use. Apprehensions could not be lifted until Allied forces had proven themselves capable of conducting operations against the Japanese without incurring excessive losses. The Fourteenth Army 's victories at Imphal and Kohima in June 1944 did not discredit the
IJA S ability to pose a difSicult challenge. The only reassurance which field commanders could draw was that their own forces had developed the skills necessary to undertake their quest to dislodge the IJA from its positions in Burma.
In 1958 a British serviceman, based near the Woomera rocket range in South Australia, passed secrets to the Soviet Union. They concerned the joint Anglo-Australian guided missile project. Recently-released archival files reveal the intense anxiety, bordering on panic, that this security breach provoked in Canberra and London. The article places this reaction against the background of a long-term quest by Britain and Australia to convince the United States to restore wartime co-operation in the field of atomic technology and lift its embargo on the transmission of classified information. By unraveling, for the first time, the story of the Woomera spy case, the article illuminates issues of security, defence preparations and Anglo-Australian relations.
The most important recent change within the realm of intelligence and security services has been the expansion of intelligence co-operation. The growing connectivity between both foreign intelligence services and also domestic security services means that we might speak - not just of growing international co-operation - but perhaps even of global co-operation. This essay considers the complex interplay of intelligence and globalization since 1989. It argues that there is an obvious tension between a developing global style of co-operative activity and the traditional mechanisms of oversight, which have tended to be national. Accordingly, it moves on to discuss the recent efforts by national, regional and international systems of inquiry to examine issues that involve intelligence co-operation. It suggests that while formal committee-type mechanisms have limited purchase, they are not the only options for oversight in a globalized context.
This article argues the importance of technical accountability (national government responsibility for plausible technical explanation of past design, acquisition or production decisions, engaging fully with focused international expert questioning) for the reliable verification of disarmament and arms control, traces its absence and underappreciated significance during the Iraq Compliance Crisis, makes the case for the systematic international cultivation and strengthening of a strong general Technical Accountability Obligation (TAO) in future treaty interpretation and enforcement, considers political objections and proposes modalities to overcome them.
This article assesses the British experience with intelligence accountability through an analysis of the principal mechanism that exists to provide for it - the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. It discusses the context within which oversight proposals emerged, the debate surrounding the nature of the new oversight body, and assesses the performance of the Committee over the first decade of its existence. It concludes that while the Committee has secured some important advances with regard to the accountability of the intelligence and security services, there are nevertheless significant limitations and weaknesses, many of which were evident in the Committee's 2003 investigation and report into pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In this context, the debate as to whether the oversight body should have select committee status, discussed at length in the article, remains highly relevant.
Intelligence is a critical component for all counter-proliferation activities. It allows us to assess and determine what makes up the current threat environment in terms of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. When informed with an accurate assessment of the situation, policy-makers are better suited to counter the proliferation threat. However, success and failure hinge upon how well information is managed during the intelligence process. The intelligence process as it relates to estimating nuclear capabilities or intentions is wrought with many challenges and complications. The denial and deception techniques employed by states running covert weapons programs and the dual-use nature of many weapons components create many difficulties for intelligence organizations. Additionally, illicit transnational networks obscure the situation further by serving as a source, for both nation states and non-state actors, for acquiring dual-use commodities and technologies. These challenges can lead to the miscalculation of a state's capabilities or intentions, as witnessed with the case of Iraq in 2003 when western intelligence services grossly overestimated the capabilities of Saddam's regime. This paper presents a comparative analysis of three cases of nuclear proliferation: India's 1998 nuclear tests, the exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and Iran's nuclear program. Drawing from the analysis, the authors examine the lessons learned and propose recommendations for future counter proliferation policy and strategy.
The US intelligence community prepares occasional psychological profiles of foreign political leaders. The origins of these practices lie in frantic and ad hoc attempts to understand the character of Adolf Hitler during the latter stages of the Second World War. The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) commissioned profiles of Hitler, contracting with a titan of personality theory in Professor Henry A. Murray and practicing psychoanalyst Walter C. Langer. Reconstructing the history of these profiles grounds the contemporary analysis of foreign leaders in the lessons of the pioneers. Useful insights on the challenges of profiling leaders, the relationship of academic theories – and academic personnel – to government, and the role of intelligence in policy abound.
Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the ‘intelligence-policy nexus’ are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a ‘failure of intelligence’ by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).
This article analyzes why institutional crises are bound to happen and how they impact on national intelligence systems’ development. Punctuated Equilibrium theory is reviewed and employed to explain one institutional crisis in each of Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India. In Brazil, the case study is the fall of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) director in 2008, following the Satiagraha operation conducted by the Federal Police Department (DPF). In Colombia, the 2009 wiretapping scandal known as chuzadas is examined. In South Africa, the investigation in Project Avani (2006–8) is reviewed. Finally, in India the case study is the intelligence crisis following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. We found that institutional crises are inevitable because there are tensions between security and democracy, both being co-evolutionary dimensions of successful contemporary state building. However, the impacts of such crises vary across the four cases pending on three variables: (1) degree of functional specialization inside the national intelligence system; (2) degree of external public control over the national intelligence system; (3) whether effectiveness, legitimacy or both were the main drivers of the crisis. Our analysis of the four case studies suggests that the amount of positive institutional change in the aftermath of an intelligence crisis is greater in countries with more functional specialization and stronger external control mechanisms.
Military engagement of insurgents risks destruction of religious monuments and historic structures, and political and economic instability that follows armed conflict enables looting of antiquities. In combination, threats to cultural structures and movable cultural patrimony compromise cultural security. This paper explores the potential of the art market for open-source intelligence assessments of cultural security. A comparison of the market value of artifacts of different ethnic origins provides a measure of the risk of looting of cultural patrimony by geographic region. Intelligence assessments of the relative desirability of cultural artifacts by region of origin can inform strategic planning to mitigate looting in conflict zones and to alert security services to emerging threats of trafficking in cultural patrimony.
This research puts forward a case for reviewing recently declassified CIA materials on the role played by various US intelligence agencies in preparations for the Nuremberg war crimes trials. It suggests that any such review will uncover major issues regarding tensions between the ostensible goal of re-asserting the rule of law following Nazi atrocities committed during the Second World War, and the institutional means deployed by the relevant intelligence agencies to gather evidence for the prosecution of suspected offenders. The study makes a case for learning lessons from an increasing range of declassified sources that remain relevant for contemporary war crimes trials. However, it also acknowledges that the nature of intelligence agencies’ involvement in the investigation of more recent genocidal activities is likely to be classified for many years.
Geopolitical dynamics associated with nuclear proliferation, the Arab Spring, the rapid rise of Chinese power, an oil-fueled Russian resurgence, and the post-Afghan and Iraq eras will demand significant changes in intelligence focus, processes, and resources. Nearly a decade after intelligence failures required a restructuring of the Intelligence Community with mandates for a scientific approach to intelligence analysis, current efforts continue to focus on overly deterministic individual analyst methods. We argue for a process-oriented approach to analysis resembling the collaborative scientific process successful in other professions that is built on shared theory and models. After demonstrating that events in the real world are path dependent and contingent on deterministic and random elements, we highlight the role of uncertainty in intelligence analysis with specific emphasis on intelligence failures. We then describe how human agency in an interconnected and interdependent system leads to a landscape of dancing strategies as agents dynamically modify their responses to events. Unfortunately, the consequences of the present deterministic intelligence mindset are significant time delays in adjusting to emerging adversaries leading to an increased susceptibility to intelligence failures. In contrast with the existing analyst-centric methods, we propose a risk management approach enhanced by outside collaboration on theory and models that embrace lessons from the twentieth-century science of uncertainty, human agency, and complexity.
During the Second World War there was an increasingly developed system for controlling the code-names used for operations where different Allied forces were involved. This paper follows the development of this system – based on the British Inter-Services Security Board – that spread to overseas theatres on the British side and to American forces world-wide. The selection of code-names was not without controversy; with Winston Churchill getting personally involved and his intervention is highlighted. A critique of the system is attempted, although the final judge is ultimately the success of the security of the activities disguised by the code-names.
This article aims to contribute to the understanding of the intelligence democratization process in new democracies comparing three South American countries: Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina. With a background of authoritarian legacies (‘political police’ style intelligence agencies controlled by the military) under particular political circumstances and changing strategic environments, these countries experienced disparate trajectories, prescriptions, and outcomes in their efforts to reform their intelligence communities. Drawing on new institutionalism, historical moments and relevant events shaping the dynamics of intelligence democratization are highlighted for each case, depicting failures and successes, and identifying drivers of change.
The emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft in the Intelligence Community's analytic production has fluctuated throughout its existence. The explanation for this intermittent emphasis on tradecraft may lie in changes in consumer preferences and collection means, the role played by individual tradecraft advocates, and the lack of an intelligence failure matching the severity of 9/11 and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both failures served as a forceful reminder that while strong analytic tradecraft does not guarantee ‘getting a judgment right’, it increases the likelihood that the assessments produced are transparent, relevant, and rigorous.
Using memoirs can be a vital way of supplementing archival evidence or indeed of overcoming a shortage of contemporaneous sources, and they offer insights into the attitudes and motivations of participants as well as how they recorded and remembered events. Memoirs retain an inherent value that must not be ignored, particularly in the study of intelligence liaison which addresses the kinds of personal and cultural aspects which are often especially well illuminated through autobiographical writing. This paper explores some of the theoretical and practical issues associated with the use of memoir material and examines them through the prism of selected autobiographical writings related to Anglo-French intelligence liaison from the Great War up to the Second World War.
In May 2003 Paul Bremer issued CPA Orders to exclude from the new Iraq government members of the Baath Party( CPA Order 1) and to disband the Iraqi Army (CPA Order 2). These two orders severely undermined the capacity of the occupying forces to maintain security and continue the ordinary functioning of the Iraq government. The decisions reversed previous National Security Council judgments and were made over the objections of high ranking military and intelligence officers. The article concludes that the most likely decision maker was the Vice President.
This article addresses the challenge of managing uncertainty when producing estimative intelligence. Much of the theory and practice of estimative intelligence aims to eliminate or reduce uncertainty, but this is often impossible or infeasible. This article instead argues that the goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess uncertainty. By drawing on a body of nearly 400 declassified National Intelligence Estimates as well as prominent texts on analytic tradecraft, this article argues that current tradecraft methods attempt to eliminate uncertainty in ways that can impede the accuracy, clarity, and utility of estimative intelligence. By contrast, a focus on assessing uncertainty suggests solutions to these problems and provides a promising analytic framework for thinking about estimative intelligence in general.
This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain. Yes Yes
This article discusses the reform of intelligence governance in two sub-regional groupings of former communist states: East Central Europe and the Balkans. These two sub-regions are delineated according to the pace and nature of transformations that they have undergone since the collapse of communist rule and their relations with respect to the European Union, the key political and economic organization in Europe. A number of lessons are drawn from comparing experiences in the two sub-regions relating to democratic reform of the security apparatus, and in particular the intelligence sector. Significant factors in the consolidation of democratic governance of intelligence include the nature of precursor communist-era regimes and the legacies they created, whether armed conflict has occurred during the transition, the extent and character of external (especially EU) assistance, and the strength of media and civil society. These factors appear to have influenced how transitional regimes have sought to introduce institutional reforms to constrain the powers of those services and their susceptibility to arbitrary use. They also have influenced measures taken to redress abuses by intelligence services under the preceding communist regime and the legitimation of the post-authoritarian state.
The arms race between the superpowers made spying on science and technology very important during the Cold War. However, whether Western secret services managed to recruit valuable sources in the research laboratories of the Soviet Union is a subject about which very little is known. This article shows that in the early 1960s the distinguished East German physicist Heinz Barwich did indeed spy for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, near Moscow. It also demonstrates that the Berlin Wall, built in 1961, had a considerable impact on Western espionage in East Germany.
This article examines the successful denuclearization of Iraq by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the early 1990s and the apparent failure of the US Intelligence Community (IC) to rethink its assessments of Saddam's desire for nuclear weapons despite Baghdad's co-operation with the IAEA inspectors, and clear evidence from the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification team that this was a highly successful process. US policy towards Iraq, from the Clinton administration onwards, was hyper-politicized; it relied on a default, unchanging view of Saddam Hussein as a rogue leader bent on WMD acquisition and regional domination in an area that was of vital importance to the United States. The article also considers the impact of the fractious UNSCOM inspections process and argues that this was severely compromised by political intrusion, which was also ignored by the US IC in its assessments of Saddam's intentions. Ultimately, US intelligence on Iraq was filtered for a decade through a hyper-politicized lens that tended to discount evidence from the IAEA that disproved pre-existing assumptions.
In most transition countries the main aim of ‘democratizing intelligence’ is to weaken the authoritarian governmental structures by introducing more transparency, legality and oversight. In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, the state-building efforts driven by international parties combined formal democratization processes such as independent oversight with the strengthening and operational capacity building of previously weak-to-non-existent intelligence structures. In parallel with the descent into war when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, the State Security Service (SDB) in the Republic of Bosnia had split into three ethnically-based outfits answering to the political and military leaders of war. ‘Democratization’ of intelligence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the establishment of a unified, state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) in 2004 has followed its own unique path reflecting the fragmented nature of politics in Bosnia and the leading role of international organizations in proposing and effectuating institutional reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of habits, operational methods and values many Bosnian intelligence officers went through similar adaptations and transitions as their colleagues in countries where institutions at the time of democratic transition were too strong and authoritarian rather than, as in the case of Bosnia, being deemed too weak and ineffectual.
Despite the emergence of Brazil as a global power, little is known about its security and intelligence services and the way they are seen by Brazilian society. This article analyzes the Brazilian perception of the role of its intelligence services and the relationship between the intelligence community (IC) and the decision makers. The historical background of intelligence in Brazil and a general overview of the Brazilian IC after the reestablishment of democracy are presented, as well as the general mechanisms of control and accountability of the secret services. Finally, there is consideration of some concerns on reforming the intelligence sector and its control and oversight apparatus.
This article uses original archive material to trace the connection between two processes of institutional development that was to result in the British intelligence Community becoming an integral part of government. The first process was the development in the latter part of the nineteenth century of a scheme of education and training for naval cadets at Dartmouth. The importance of this scheme is that it gives, through the Records of Progress and Conduct, a unique insight into the qualities that the first two heads of Britain's foreign intelligence service, and the first head of Britain's signals intelligence unit brought to their respective posts. This article argues that there are a number of timeless and vital competencies which cadets Smith, Sinclair and Hall displayed, albeit in embryonic form, that were critical, later on, in propelling their respective organizations to the centre of government. This is the second process of institutionalization. It is a position that they still occupy today.