Ideas y Valores

Lévinas is one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century and is perhaps the philosopher who most seriously has taken the intent to think the difference, meeting the limits of language itself and the difficulties found in it for thinking the other, the difference, outside of the concept which closes the universe of sense in a totality. Lévinas centers his ethical ideas in the figure of the other and is extremely cautious, and maybe the (permanently open) totality of his work is no more than the intent to give that twirl to overcome the impossibility he faces, in affirming the place of that other not like the other of me, but the other as other. The outline of this essay pursues the comprehension of that radical other preserving its outside, its “beyond”, without enclosing it in the totalizing frontiers of the concept.

En el pasaje 179c-183b, Platón rechaza la explicación heraclítea extrema de la percepción mostrando que ella no puede cumplir con la condición (I): si es el caso que, al percibir x, x se mueve, pero no se altera, será posible describir a x como algo cualificado. Intentaré mostrar en este trabajo que, para Platón, cumplir con la premisa (I) requiere elaborar una explicación de la percepción en la que el proceso de percepción lo lleve a cabo un único agente, el cual, asimismo, es el encargado de otros procesos cognitivos distintos de la percepción �como juzgar� pero, además, de un proceso mediante el cual, para todo objeto sensible x, es posible tener conocimiento de x.

In the passage 179c-183b, Plato rejects the extreme Heraclitean explanation of perception by showing that it cannot comply with condition (I): if while perceiving x, x moves, but does not change, it will be possible to describe x as something qualified. This paper intends to show that, for Plato, in order to comply with (I), there must be an explanation of perception in which the perception process is performed by an agent who undertakes other cognitive processes different from perception, such as judging. This is a process through which, for every sensible object x, it is possible to have knowledge of x.

Pedro Abelardo desarrolla un pensamiento ético, poco cercano a la filosofía moral posterior, que se estructura con base en varios conceptos, entre ellos la razón y la subjetividad moral. El primero como poder discursivo sobre la vida moral y como razonamiento moral. Al respecto de la subjetividad moral, enfatiza la psicología del acto moral y desarrolla su comprensión que no parte del pecado, sino de su constitución. El estudio le sigue el rastro a ambos conceptos en las dos obras morales mayores que el autor escribió, la Ética y el Diálogo entre un filósofo, un judío y un cristiano. Asimismo, el estudio estudia la moralidad según P. Abelardo en relación con la metafísica por él defendida. Peter Abelard�s ethical thought, which is quite different from later moral philosophy, is based on some core concepts such as reason and moral subjectivity, understood both as discursive power over moral life and as moral reasoning, and moral subjectivity. With respect to moral subjectivity, Abelard underlines the psychology of the moral act, understanding it not on the basis of sin, but rather of its constitution. The paper traces the development of these two concepts in Abelard�s two major ethical works: Ethics and Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian, and analyzes the relation between Abelard�s morality and his metaphysics.

Peter Abelard develops an ethical thought, which is quite different from later moral philosophy, structured over some concepts such as reason and moral subjectivity. The first, is understood as discursive power over moral life and as moral reasoning. About moral subjectivity, emphasizes the moral act’s psychology, and develop his understanding not on the basis of sin, but its constitution. The paper traces the development of these two concepts in Abelard’s two major ethical works: Ethics and Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian. And also studies the relation between Abelard’s morality and the metaphysics held by him.

Se busca examinar, en los textos de Hegel anteriores a la Fenomenología del Espíritu , la forma como la lucha por el reconocimiento se relaciona con la configuración de la eticidad absoluta, es decir, con el estado en el cual el individuo es reconocido, tanto por otro singular, como por la comunidad a la cual pertenece. Para ello se analizan las diferencias que existen entre los diversos textos, así como sus continuidades, con el fin de comprender mejor el concepto de lo ético que subyace a todos ellos The aim of this paper is to examine, in those texts written by Hegel prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit , the way in which the struggle for recognition relates to the configuration of absolute ethical life, that is, the state in which the individual is recognized by another individual as well as by the community to which he/she belongs. With this in mind, some of the differences and continuities among the texts will be analyzed, in order to clarify and provide a better understanding of the concept of ethics underlying them

Una de las más frecuentes críticas dirigidas contra Hegel es que su sistema crea una totalidad finalizante que determina lo que es como absolutamente necesario. La Ciencia de la Lógica, siendo el edificio conceptual de dicho sistema, es el lugar más apropiado para determinar el significado específico de los conceptos utilizados por Hegel. A continuación se ofrece un análisis detallado del capítulo sobre realidad (Wirklichkeit), para mostrar cómo el concepto de necesidad absoluta no sólo incluye dentro de sí, sino que además contiene como elemento estructural, el concepto de contingencia. Con ello se pretende generar una interpretación deflacionista, en la cual el carácter absolutamente necesario de la realidad no deberá entenderse como fundado en un fin pre-existente que determina de manera inexorable la realidad, sino como un movimiento interpretativo, en rememoración, de su proceso.

The aim of this paper is to examine, in those texts written by Hegel prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the way in which the struggle for recognition relates to the configuration of absolute ethical life, that is, the state in which the individual is recognized by another individual as well as by the community to which he/she belongs. With this in mind, some of the differences and continuities among the texts will be analyzed, in order to clarify and provide a better understanding of the concept of ethics underlying them.

Resumen: En este ensayo pongo en contraposición dos doctrinas conspicuamenteleibnicianas: la doctrina del tiempo relacional e ideal, y la doctrina de la armonía preestablecida. Argumentaré que si todas las substancias están necesariamentecoordinadas, entonces no tiene sentido negar el carácter absoluto y real del tiempo. En la primera sección describiré la concepción newtoniana y clarkeana del tiempo absoluto; en la segunda discutiré la crítica leibniciana a dicha concepción, crítica sobre la que se erige su doctrina relacional e ideal del tiempo; en la tercera sección daré un vistazo a la metafísica monádica madura de Leibniz, haciendo especial énfasis en la doctrina de la armonía preestablecida; finalmente, en la última sección sugeriré la existencia de una tensión irreconciliable entre estas dos doctrinas.Abstract: In this paper I bring together two characteristically Leibnizean doctrines:the doctrine of relational and ideal time, and the doctrine of preestablished harmony. I will argue that, if every substance is necessarily connected with another, then it makes no sense to deny absolute and real time. In the first section, I will describe Newton’s and Clarke’s conception of absolute time; then, in the second section, I will consider Leibniz’s critique of that conception, on which he bases his ideal and relational doctrine of time. In the third section I will look briefly at Leibniz’s mature monadic metaphysics, taking special account of his doctrine of preestablished harmony. In the last section, I will suggest that there is an irreconcilable tension between these two doctrines.

En este ensayo pongo en contraposición dos doctrinas conspicuamente leibnicianas: la doctrina del tiempo relacional e ideal, y la doctrina de la armonía preestablecida. Argumentaré que si todas las substancias están necesariamente coordinadas, entonces no tiene sentido negar el carácter absoluto y real del tiempo. En la primera sección describiré la concepción newtoniana y clarkeana del tiempo absoluto; en la segunda discutiré la crítica leibniciana a dicha concepción, crítica sobre la que se erige su doctrina relacional e ideal del tiempo; en la tercera sección daré un vistazo a la metafísica monádica madura de Leibniz, haciendo especial énfasis en la doctrina de la armonía preestablecida; finalmente, en la última sección sugeriré la existencia de una tensión irreconciliable entre estas dos doctrinas.

This paper develops some of Austin�s ideas on excuses, stressing their �dimensional� character and relating it to Searle�s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson�s, while Austin�s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice�s critique of Davidson�s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical in its conclusions concerning the justificatory aspect of reasons and the rational features of action. En este trabajo se desarrollan algunas ideas de Austin sobre las excusas. Se señala su carácter �dimensional� conectándolo con la idea de Searle de intención en la acción e intención previa. Se muestra que la distinción entre debilidad de la voluntad y debilidad moral se puede mantener en una semántica como la de Davidson, pero no todas las posibles dimensiones de evaluación de la acción. Finalmente, se muestra cómo la crítica de Grice a Davidson sobre acracia es más fiel a Austin y más radical en sus conclusiones con respecto al carácter justificativo de las razones y a los aspectos racionales de la acción.

Speech given by Markus Gabriel within the international meeting �Presente del idealismo alemán� organized by the Philosophy Department of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. This conference was held on October 9, 2009. Palabras pronunciadas por Markus Gabriel en el marco del encuentro internacional �Presente del idealismo alemán� organizado por el Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Conferencia que tuvo lugar el 9 de octubre de 2009.

En nuestros días es un hecho que las especializaciones han ocasionado la disgregación del conocimiento humano. La universidad actual es la representación más concreta de esta disgregación, y el carácter de su quehacer se ha convertido en una inquietud relevante en todas las culturas por la multiplicidad de versiones que se tienen acerca de sus funciones sustantivas, dada la complejidad de su dinámica académica. En contraste con esta desarmonía contemporánea, la presente revisión muestra la evolución de la universidad medieval y coloca un especial énfasis en su sistema organizativo, el cual dio origen a las funciones sustantivas de docencia, investigación y servicio a la comunidad, en un ambiente de internacionalización y autonomía universitaria, apuntalándola como la institución de estudios superiores por excelencia.

This article explores the question of the political meaning of the term “revolution” and the relation that has been established and should continue to be established between revolution and freedom. To this effect, the article examines some of the main proposals set forth in this respect by three contemporary thinkers, Hannah Arendt, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, with occasional references to Michel Foucault and Antonio Negri. The proposal argued for here is that Arendt’s notion of revolution and the notions of event and act put forth in the radical political theories of Badiou and Žižek intersect and necessarily supplement one another.

This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical in its conclusions concerning the justificatory aspect of reasons and the rational features of action.

La intención de este artículo es analizar el concepto zubiriano de phylum. Para eso se muestra el significado del phylum según Zubiri y el significado del phylum biológico, y se expone la actualidad del primero con respecto al segundo. Además, se muestran las consecuencias que dicho concepto tiene para la teoría de la evolución.

The aim of this article is to analyze the zubirian concept of phylum . For this purpose, the meanings of biological phylum and phylum according to Zubiri are presented, as well as the validity of the first regarding the second. Finally, the consequences that this concept has for evolutionary theory are shown.

Resumen: El presente trabajo contribuye al debate sobre la actualidad estética, abordando diferentes enfoques del polémico concepto de deconstrucción, introducido por Jacques Derrida. Esta categoría es de referencia casi obligatoriacuando se habla sobre teoría estética contemporánea, forma parte de su nuevo aparato conceptual y expresa bien la nueva realidad que no tiene análogos históricos en lo que antes llamaban arte, estética y cultura. La elaboracióndel concepto de deconstrucción, el análisis de cómo funciona esa nueva forma del pensamiento crítico, y el método creativo de la interpretación y de la producción del texto artístico, nos permite entrar en el código de muchas obras artísticas actuales donde el espacio entre arte y teoría del arte es cada vez más incierto, especialmente en las diversas formas de arte conceptual o “performance art”.Abstract: Tackling polemic concept of deconstruction, introduced by Jacqes Derrida, from different approaches this article contributes to the debate on aesthetic current issues. This category is of almost obligatory reference when discussing about contemporary aesthetic theory. Deconstruction belongs to its new conceptual apparatus, and expresses well new reality that does not have historical analogy with what before was called art, aesthetics and culture. The elaboration of the concept of deconstruction, and the analysis of how this new form of strategical “procedure” of interpretation and production of the text (as textual reading) is functioning allow us to enter the code of many current art works where the space between art and theory of the art is more and more uncertain, specially in the diverse forms of conceptual art or “performance art“.

Nietzsche's reflection on art extends throughout his philosophical work. From the early claim of an “artist's metaphysics” to the late considerations that see in art the privileged form of the Will to Power, Nietzsche makes his attempt to overcome western metaphysics to depend on a particular ontological conception of the artistic fact. This ontological aestheticism, of enormous influence in current philosophical trends, has been the subject of various comments and criticisms. Less interest has raised instead the analysis of the implications that this long nietzschean meditation concerning art can have in the interior of the aesthetic field itself: what is the specificity of art compared with other fields of human action? What results for the individual and for culture from the encounter with the phenomenon of art? This article constitutes a first attempt to answer these questions. Its analysis focuses in The Birth of Tragedy and, to a lesser extent, in the physiology of art found in the Twilight of the Idols . The article's central thesis defends that, according to Nietzsche, the aesthetical experience is essentially an experience of knowledge, a type of knowledge that gives access to truth.

This paper introduces Hegel’s theory of poetry as a linguistic construction in which man’s essence and existence in the world converge. This convergence finds its objective expression in the epic, its subjective expression in the lyric, and the union of freedom and objectivity in drama. The dramatic encounter of the subject’s freedom and the world’s objectivity achieves its highest transparency in the tragic conflict, which has assumed two main historical forms: the Classical Greek tragedy and the Romantic Modern Drama. Focusing on the specificity of these two forms of the tragic conflict, the essay carries out a reflection on tragedy in general as the artistic form that reveals the precarious greatness of men in the world. On the basis of this reflection, the paper outlines a critique of Hegel’s conception of the surpassing of poetry by philosophy, by claiming for the language of the latter the effort of making essence and existence converge by assuming the contingency and finitude, which tragic poetry, especially in its modern form, shows to be constitutive of our historical being in the world.

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar el problema triple (trilema) de Agripa que cuestiona la posibilidad de alcanzar una justificación epistemológica del conocimiento empírico. Una posible reconstrucción del problema es la que se apoya en el problema del regreso al infinito -uno de los modos de Agripa. En el presente texto se presentará una reconstrucción del mencionado problema mediante un argumento de reducción al absurdo. Los intentos de solucionar el absurdo conducen a los restantes dos modos que constituyen el problema triple de Agripa.

Agrippa’s Problem: The purpose of this paper is to present the triple problem (trilemma) of Agrippa that questions the possibility of reaching an epistemological justification of empirical knowledge. A possible reconstruction of such problem is one that is based on the problem of the regresum ad infinitum –one of Agripa’s modes. In this paper, a reconstruction of this problem will be presented by means of a reduction ad absurdum argument. The attempts of solving the absurd lead to the remaining two modes of Agrippa’s triple problem.

The paper addresses two questions regarding the interpretation of akrasia among the Stoics, offered by Marcelo Boeri in his book Appearance and Reality in Greek Thought: On the one hand, can Chrysippus’s monistic adaptation of the Platonic model of the divided soul set forth in Book iv of the Republic provide a philosophically satisfactory explanation of the classical phenomenon of akrasia? On the other hand, is this phenomenon the true explanandum of this adaptation? The paper shows that the answer to both these questions could be negative and thus different from the answer provided by Boeri in his book. The argument is based on the analysis of Plutarch vm 446f-447b and on the analysis of the classical problem of akrasia.