The Westphalian idea of sovereignty in international relations has undergone recent transformation. "Shared sovereignty" through multilevel governance describes the responsibility of the European Union (EU) and its Member States in tobacco control policy. We examine how this has occurred on the EU level through directives and recommendations, accession rules for new members, tobacco control campaigns, and financial support for antitobacco nongovernmental organizations. In particular, the negotiation and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the participation in the FCTC Conference of the Parties illustrates shared sovereignty. The EU Commission was the lead negotiator for Member States on issues over which it had jurisdiction, while individual Member States, through the EU presidency, could negotiate on issues on which authority was divided or remained with them. Shared sovereignty through multilevel governance has become the norm in the tobacco control policy area for EU members, including having one international organization negotiate within the context of another.
The place of agriculture in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prior to 1986 is usually described in terms of either exclusion or exemption from general trading rules. This paper reevaluates the ‘exemption’ argument and its corollary that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) represented a punctuated equilibrium in the governance of agriculture. Instead it traces the dynamics of institutional change through the history of the GATT/WTO, distinguishing between multilateral trading rounds and the framework of trade rules as separate but linked contexts for addressing agricultural trade matters; and further disaggregating the latter into broad principles and specific rules. It is argued that the broad principles lacked detail but, paradoxically, initially this facilitated an approach to dispute settlement based on conciliation. Subsequent trade tensions exposed an inability to make definitive legal decisions on the compatibility of specific national rules with broad GATT principles. The AoA is rooted in these institutional antecedents, but claims of the legalization of the trade regime are belied by a continued reliance on political flexibility and bargaining.
Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.
Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to undermine political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards the robustness of these findings. In this paper we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas and officials’ rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials’ attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organisational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time; spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.
The "new politics of the welfare state", the term coined by Pierson (1996) to differentiate between the popular politics of welfare expansion and the unpopular politics of retrenchment, emphasizes a number of factors that distinguish countries in their capacity to pursue contentious measures and avoid electoral blame. Policy structures, vested interests, and insitutions play a prominant role in accounting for cross-national differences in leaders ability to diffuse responsability for divisive initiatives. This paper contends that parties are relevant to "new politics" and that, under specified insitutional conditions, their impact is counterintuitive.
This article examines how senior permanent officials in the European Commission (directorgenerals and directors) conceive of the role of nationality in their organization. Do they support a weberian ideal–typical bureaucratic organization, where merit shapes personnel selection and task organization, or do they prefer a consociational form, in which nationalities are represented in organization and policymaking? I explain variation in weberian and consociational orientations, using 105 mail questionnaires collected between July 1995 and May 1997. In explaining variation, I contrast socialization factors and factors related to the professional utility function of officials. I find that utility packs far more power than socialization. Support for consociational principles is highest among officials who belong to nationalities that are organized in strong multifunctional networks in Brussels. In an administration where nationality is a powerful principle of personnel organization, officials with the “right citizenship” have compelling incentives to reinforce its role. Professional utility is also a function of one’s position in the work environment: officials in positions of weak regulatory autonomy or dealing with quality of life issues are more likely to be consociational. Socialization is weak, though prior experience as a national civil servant reduces consociationalism and prior Commission cabinet experience increases it.
There has been considerable discussion of the decline of the nation-state. It is important, however, to set claims that the nation-state is in decline in historical context and to distinguish processes of state adaptation to crises from changes in the power of the state. The popularity of anti-state rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s led many to confuse changes in the modes of state activity, of which there is much evidence, with a decline in the significance of the state, for which there is much less evidence.
This study examines political, institutional and economic influences on monetary policy in the long run. A monetary policy reaction function is estimated, which focuses principally on the influence of the administration, Congress and the Federal Reserve on outcomes; these influences are estimated together with a variety of economic and political controls. The findings show that partisan control of the White House is particularly important in explaining variations in the growth of the quantity of money over time. Republican control of the White House is associated with tighter money, and Democratic control with looser money, but there are exceptions. Finally, the indirect influence of partisanship on the economic variables in the reaction function suggest that the total effects are stronger than the direct effects alone.
On average, two-thirds of the Jews in German-controlled territory during World War II did not survive. However, the degree of victimization varied considerably, depending on the area examined. In Poland, the Baltic States, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Greece, the territories of Yugoslavia and the Netherlands, more than 70 percent of Jews were killed. In Hungary and the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, the number of Jews killed was close to the average. In Belgium, Norway, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Denmark, a majority of the Jews survived. At the same time, the structure of Nazi rule over Europe before and during World War II was characterized by a wide variety of administrative regimes. So far, research has not systematically linked different degrees of Jewish victimization to different kinds of administrative regimes. Did different forms of administrative regimes result in differing degrees of Jewish victimization during the Holocaust? The present paper presents both evidence and an operationalization for a related general hypothesis.
Why does the federal government provide aid for small business? This article contends that American core values are one of the sources of small business aid. Rather than taking the values/policy congruence approach of the national values school, it demonstrates a mechanism through which core values have influenced small business aid and through which core values likely influence other policies. The focus is on the processes of policy problem definition. While a role for core values in problem definition processes has been noted previously, core values have neither been a center of attention, nor have the various paths of values influence been linked. Analysis of the problems defined in the legislative histories of 39 systemically selected small business aid enactments, 1953–1993, shows avenues of values influence that have been under-appreciated or not appreciated at all.
This article tests the hypothesis that leftist governments concede higher wage increases to their public sector employees than right-wing governments. Leftist governments are expected to be more generous toward public sector employees because of their commitment to public sector intervention, and because of the heavy representation of the public sector among leftist party elite and clientele. The study examines all major wage settlements signed between 1967 and 1984 in the Canadian provincial public sector and finds that, everything else being equal, wage increases are 10% higher under leftist governments. The standard economic variables (labor demand, expected inflation and spillover from previous contracts) that have been shown to affect wage increases in the private sector also emerge as significant. Finally, the data indicate that the greater the public debt the more constrained governments feel to negotiate minimal wage increases. These findings establish that a proper understanding of public sector labor relations requires a consideration of political as well as economic variables.
This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a “negative” approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.
Overall, within the broad descriptive framework of the comparative-elites study, the special impact of New Public Management (NPM) on the German federal government is considered, but judged marginal. The mandarin status of the administrative elite prevails, despite a long-term decrease in the share of jurists and more open career patterns, both due to a first managerialist turn in the 1970s. It is argued that new administrative policies are carried out like any other substantive policy. On the polity dimension, the bureaucracy's function as the center of expertise is reflected in terms of both formal education and subjective role understanding. On the policy dimension, the 1970 reformist agenda of the Brandt government resulted in higher programmatic commitment than at the point of replication of the base line study in 1987, when the Kohl government was consolidating public finances. Under conditions such as those prevailing after national unification in 1990 and since about 1995, though, top administrators can turn quite managerial. The most significant change is observed on the politics dimension: growing party politicization of the administrative elite, in particular after fundamental government changes (1969, 1982, 1998) examined here. Functional as it may be for streamlining the ministries, the extent of party patronage may, in the long run, undermine the still-high trust in executive institutions in Germany.
The concept of a “policy community” is useful in understanding the joint efforts of national governments and domestic business interests to secure industrial competitiveness in world markets. The definitional debate accompanying the increased use of the term in political studies, on the other hand, is of marginal value in appreciating the substance of government-industry collaboration. An analytic account of the actions of two national governments grappling with the needs of industries subject to similar circumstance, as in a sectoral crisis, provides the opportunity to apply the term in a practical manner. Policy communities are no more than the institutionalized expressions of long-established relationships between private and public interests, subject to national idiosyncracies and accumulated experience. They are not the product of a deliberate and coherent design for the attainment of specific industrial goals. This point can be illustrated by reconstructing the actions of two national policy communities in crisis, that is in situations where established relationships come under greater strain than found under “normal” circumstances and, indeed, might be expected to break down entirely. A comparison of government intervention in the automobile industries of West Germany and France, 1971–1985, demonstrates the resilience of industrial policy communities. The maintenance of established relationships is shown to be part and parcel of the emerging industrial solution. Institutions and organizations involved in crisis resolution in the French and German motor industries are revealed to have dissimilar, overarching political objectives beyond the specific and immediate needs they seek to address. The imposition of such political factors onto industrial problems is not necessarily a disservice to an industry's long-term vitality.
During the 1980s the Thatcher Government implemented numerous changes to the British employment system. Most of these changes had the effect of linking the receipt of welfare benefits to an individual's willingness to participate actively within a government sponsored employment or training scheme. These changes culminated in the Social Security Act (1989) which linked the receipt of welfare payments to an individual's active job search and willingness to accept any officially offered job after a maximum grace period of 13 weeks. While these changes are important in their own right, more interestingly, most trace their origins back to the American welfare-to-work system initiated by the Reagan administration during the early 1980s. This article will demonstrate why the Thatcher government turned to the United States in the development of their employment policy. Once an explanation for this has been provided the article will highlight the key policies transferred by the Thatcher Government in the development of the British welfare-to-work system. This entire analysis will be placed within a policy transfer framework in order to illustrate its usefulness in the analysis of policy development.
This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London.
In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non‐local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non‐local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state.
Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before.
Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site.
In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans.
The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs.
Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long‐term, non‐issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.
Political-administrative relations became an issue once politicians and administrators came to be considered as distinct actors in the public realm. This happened in the late eighteenth century, and several authors since then explored the nature of this relationship in normative and/or juridical terms. But it took almost two centuries before it became an object of systematic empirical study in a comparative perspective: Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (APR 1981). The APR study was the first to use survey methods and to advance empirically based theory. In this article we discuss the intellectual attention for this topic since the early nineteenth century, APR's findings and impact and—given APR's influence upon methods—some intriguing problems with the framework that they developed. Finally we list some potential new avenues of research.
During the mid-1980s and early 1990s the New Zealand economy moved from being one of the most regulated outside the former communist bloc to among the most liberal in the OECD. Largely unheralded and begun by an ostensibly social democratic Labour government, changes included the floating of the exchange rate; extensive liberalization of financial, capital and other markets; lowering of trade protection; fiscal restraint and monetary disinflation; changes to the machinery of government; corporatization and then sale of state assets; and changes to industrial relations frameworks (Castles, Gerritsen and Vowles 1996). Known as Rogernomics after Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, these economic policies were heavily derivative of neoclassical economic theories, such as the New Classical and Chicago schools, public choice and new institutional economics (Boston et al. 1996, ch. 2; Goldfinch 1997). This article explains how such radical economic restructuring occurred through the influence of a select group of strategically located institutional elites.
In this article the changes that have been implemented in the Dutch social security system are analyzed. The extensive changes are characterized as a form of “managed liberalization.” This characterization points to the paradoxical nature of these changes. On the one hand a certain liberalization can be observed (an increase of social insurance and the administration of social security via the market) while on the other hand the control of the system by the state is also increasing. This process of managed liberalization, however, takes place under an umbrella of lasting universal social protection: entitlements are still determined by law and remain collective. In this article the changes in the Dutch social security are described extensively, interpreted theoretically and analyzed in their consequences for the level of social protection. By following the process of institutional change the system of social security has undergone, the authors also try to find out what the causes of the changes are and what determines the direction the process has taken.