European Journal of Social Psychology

Research showed that, in the workplace, women have to meet more requirements than men, a phenomenon that has been labelled ‘perfection bias’. In the current research, we developed and validated a tool to capture individuals’ perceptions of such a phenomenon and its association with women's well‐being. In Study 1 ( N = 150 women), we identified a one‐factor structure of the scale. Study 2 ( N = 360 women) replicated the structure of the scale, while Study 3 extended this evidence in a sample of men ( N = 471). Study 4 ( N = 335 women and men employees) showed that women's higher awareness of being targets of a perfection bias at work was negatively related to their well‐being. Overall, the measure developed provides a new tool to examine a specific facet of gender discrimination. Findings might provide useful insights for stakeholders and policymakers to raise awareness concerning gendered expectations and enhance workplace equality.

The saying-is-believing (SIB) effect suggests that communicators’ messages align with the audience's attitude, leading to memory bias in subsequent recall. This meta-analysis examines how variations in the audience's social identity and communication topics influence the strength and occurrence of the SIB effect. The meta-analysis included 27 studies from 13 articles (1990–2021), yielding 55 effect sizes for message tuning and 59 for memory bias (Cohen's d). The random-effects meta-analysis and subgroup comparisons revealed a robust effect of audience attitude on message tuning. However, its impact on memory bias diminished when communicators interacted with an outgroup audience or discussed topics that threatened social identity. Heterogeneity ranged from low to very high (I2 = 21.23%–88.47%). Despite indications of publication bias, the findings remained robust. This study clarifies how social factors in communication contribute to the creation of a shared reality.

Altruistic punishment involves punishers incurring costs to penalize norm violators for the benefit of the group or others. Through five studies, this article explored how and when perceptions of economic fairness affect altruistic punishment. Study 1 found a positive relationship between perceptions of economic fairness and two forms of altruistic punishment: Reporting Social Problems and Protesting Misbehaviour of Boss. Study 2 extended these findings to the real‐world, indicating that perceptions of economic fairness are positively associated with direct punishment but not indirect punishment. Studies 3 and 4 provide causal evidence for the above findings by manipulating perceptions of economic fairness in two different ways. Study 5 manipulated perceptions of economic fairness and outcome efficacy, indicating that the above effects only manifest under high outcome efficacy. These findings advance theoretical research on altruistic punishment, offering insights into economic and social governance.

Progressive taxation is an effective way of redistributing wealth and reducing economic inequality, as such its promotion through efficient communication strategies is a key goal. Drawing on construal level theory, we test in five studies whether attitudes towards progressive taxation are improved by high (vs. low) construal communication focusing on generic (vs. specific) taxes that are temporally distant (vs. close). In two experiments (Studies 1 and 2, N total = 522), we orthogonally manipulated the specificity and temporal distance of a tax proposal to disentangle the two sources of construal. Generic tax proposals obtained more consensus than specific ones, while no effect of the temporal distance was found. In Studies 3 ( N = 373) and 4 ( N = 353), the effect of generic tax proposals was mediated by their enhanced perceived importance. Moreover, we found that specific descriptions of taxes were also functional in promoting support, but only when containing multiple (vs. single) taxes. Study 5 ( N = 499, pre‐registered) provides compelling results for the central role of perceived importance, which proved as a consistent mediator, resistant to counter‐argumentation. Together, our studies suggest that progressive taxation is supported when a radical change in the system is envisioned: A single progressive tax is not enough. Practical implications for tax communication are discussed.

Humans are hardwired to seek out social connections, as well as monitor for warning signs that their belonging may be at risk. Social identities provide a mechanism through which to monitor belonging, shaping how people understand and see themselves, as well as how they are perceived by others. This large qualitative study ( n = 203) presents a dual‐pathway model of masculinity threats for self‐identified gay and straight men, integrating theoretical models of the psychological need to belong, role congruity theory and social identity theory. Using reflexive thematic analysis to code descriptions of masculinity‐threatening experiences, we identified two contexts in which threats were experienced: (1) through private and public experiences of role incongruity and (2) through public experiences with social rejection. Furthermore, the content of threats experienced spanned six themes: (a) perceived femininity; (b) deviation from heteronormativity; (c) competency; (d) physical prototypicality; (e) social prototypicality and (f) sociometer. Notably, the few men who felt they had never experienced a masculinity threat before were more likely to believe this was due to the positive regard and self‐esteem they derive from their connections with others. The findings complement and extend the existing research on masculinity threats in meaningful ways: First, they show that gender‐role incongruity can lead to masculinity threats for both straight and gay men. Second, they highlight that social inclusion also plays a significant role in both gay and straight men's experiences with masculinity. Furthermore, the findings have important implications for understanding when, and for whom, masculinity threats may lead to antisocial behaviours.

Virtual communication on digital‐meeting platforms is increasingly common in work, educational and other settings. One contentious issue concerns camera use. Some suggest keeping the camera off to mitigate ‘Zoom fatigue’, whereas others argue that keeping the camera on is a sign of dedication and engagement. Here, we conducted an experiment to examine the effects of camera use from two perspectives: the perspective of actors and observers. Participants were randomly assigned to have their camera on or off while working in small groups over Zoom; we further varied whether everyone in the group had the camera on or off or whether the camera use was mixed. Following the virtual interactions, participants reported their experiences of the interaction and their perceptions of others in a round‐robin design. Turning the camera off (vs. on) resulted in being perceived as less engaged, less moral and less suitable for a leadership role by other group members, but had minimal impact on the actors' experiences (self‐reported engagement, fatigue or well‐being). One exception was higher self‐reported fatigue levels in participants who had a natural preference to be off camera but were assigned to switch the camera on. A comparison of self and observer reports showed that people underestimated the engagement of off‐camera targets. Our findings inform the social psychological research on the differences in self and other perceptions and the research on digital communication and well‐being.

The present work integrates cultural practices, perceptual psychology and social cognition to explore the psychological effects of blindfolding in state‐sanctioned punishment. Across four studies, we demonstrate how the use of blindfolds—a seemingly minor aspect of punishment rituals—attenuates configural face processing, a change we argue alters social behaviour. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that blindfolds are associated with a tolerance for harsher punishments. Studies 3 and 4 explore the legitimacy of punitive action; findings from these studies suggest that blindfolding rituals hold the largest effect when the punishment would not be seen as legitimate. These results suggest that historically ingrained punitive rituals may subtly exploit psychological biases to shape public attitudes, offering insights into the psychological underpinnings of institutional legitimacy and societal compliance.

Psychological well‐being is remarkably stable over time. However, people may still believe that the future will deviate from the past. Across four experiments in Norway and the United States ( N = 1,827), participants were randomly assigned to report their well‐being in the past or predict their future well‐being. In line with a “bright‐future hypothesis”, people predicted higher levels of happiness and meaning in the future than in their historical baseline. We observed the same optimistic pattern for a 1‐year as a 5‐year time horizon. Rather than reflecting a past‐neglecting cognitive mechanism, the evidence mostly favored a motivational explanation. First, the effect emerged both between‐subjects and within‐subjects: Even when people had just reported their past well‐being, they still predicted future improvement. Second, predicted well‐being improvement generalized to social judgments of a friend but not to an enemy, mediated by judgments of deservingness. In conclusion, people predict a bright future when they want to see one.

How do people imagine targets of ostracism? We conducted a multi‐method investigation using both open‐ended questions and quantitative experiments. Eleven preregistered studies (five main and six supplementary studies with participants from the United States, the United Kingdom and France) showed that people imagine ostracized individuals as socially, psychologically and physically different from the average person. This was shown to have significant consequences—the same act directed at prototypical (vs. counterprototypical and control) targets is more likely to be classified as ostracism, even when people try to ignore target features and focus on the behaviour alone. Prototypical targets are seen as less deserving of being excluded, more hurt and are sympathized with more. Further, people judge alleged ostracizers more negatively and express less interest in affiliating with them when the target fits the prototype. We discuss theoretical implications for the understanding of prototypes and ostracism and practical implications for the detection and curbing of ostracism in everyday life.

Social class profoundly affects people in a wide range of ways, leaving its mark on individuals’ behaviour, cognition, experiences and outcomes. Social class also plays a role in social perception, and, in this review, I provide a snapshot of the current body of knowledge related to the social perception of social class. Specifically, I review research examining accuracy and bias in social‐class perceptions from nonverbal cues, in addition to the consequences of these perceptions. Altogether, perceivers show some accuracy in judging individuals’ social class from various nonverbal cues, indicating that nonverbal behaviour provides signal to individuals’ social class and that perceivers can detect this. A large body of evidence simultaneously highlights substantial bias in social‐class perceptions, with social‐class stereotypes meaningfully affecting impressions. Finally, research illustrates the broad range of consequences of social‐class perceptions, perhaps most importantly in the domain of competence and hiring judgments, which can serve to perpetuate inequality.

The special issue focuses on the social–psychological mechanisms behind corruption, emphasizing the role of social norms, power dynamics, cultural perspectives and gender in shaping corrupt behaviours. The special issue highlights the importance of understanding how shared expectations, cultural influences and organizational structures sustain or mitigate unethical conduct. By integrating interdisciplinary approaches, the collection presents new insights into corruption that go beyond traditional explanations. Studies in the special issue explore interventions targeting social norms to reduce bribery, examine moral judgements of corruption across different cultural contexts, investigate how power asymmetries within organizations perpetuate corruption and show how gendered dynamics, particularly in cases of sextortion, shape responses to corruption. The special issue underscores the significance of using diverse methodologies, including qualitative research, to better understand corruption and inform more effective anti‐corruption policies.

Individuals form impressions of others’ social‐class standing from nonverbal information, including facial appearance. Whether the facial cues relating to (perceptions of) social class generalize across different contexts and class measures (e.g., income and subjective status) remains unknown. We tested which facial cues relate to actual and perceived social class using multiple social‐class measures in two contexts: Canada (using contemporary lab‐based photos) and Iceland (using mid‐20th‐century yearbook photos). Results show that facial appearance reveals and predicts impressions of social class broadly (vs. only for specific measures). Greater facial Attractiveness (attractiveness/competence/health) and Positivity (affect/warmth) related to higher social‐class standing in both contexts, suggesting that social class influences facial appearance similarly in different environments. Attractiveness also primarily explained social‐class perceptions. Validity and utilization of other cues, however, differed between contexts, and we observed perception accuracy only for Canadian targets. These findings provide a more complete understanding of accuracy and bias in perceiving social class.

We investigated the content, consistency and accuracy (i.e., convergence with self‐assessment) of stereotypes about recreational users of common psychoactive substances. In Study 1 ( N = 470), participants rated a typical occasional user of one of seven substances (cannabis, MDMA, heroin, LSD, cocaine, amphetamine and alcohol) on personality traits, values and other attributes. Results revealed distinct and highly consistent stereotypes across substances. Study 2 ( N = 1163) assessed stereotype accuracy by comparing them to self‐reports from an international sample of substance users. Accuracy (based on overall and distinctive similarity) was generally low, with cocaine user stereotypes revealing the highest accuracy. Modest accuracy was also found for MDMA, amphetamine and heroin. These findings highlight the prevalence of consistent yet largely inaccurate stereotypes about recreational substance users in society. The discrepancy between stereotype agreement and accuracy is discussed in the context of the origins of these stereotypes.

This study explored why highly altruistic individuals are regarded as less moral from a third‐party perspective and investigated the boundary conditions of this phenomenon. In Study 1 ( N = 199), participants evaluated those who distributed all (vs. half) of their resources to others as being less predictable and having a lower moral character. Study 2 ( N = 238) examined the boundary condition of the mediation effect and found that honesty‐humility moderated the relationship between altruism type and predictability. Low honesty‐humility exacerbated the perception that highly altruistic individuals were less predictable, while high honesty‐humility buffered this lower predictability, which further influenced people's judgements of the moral character of highly altruistic individuals. Study 3 ( N = 213) optimized the experimental design to further test the role of predictability and honesty‐humility to validate the robustness of the hypothesized model. Implications of the negative relationship between high altruism and moral character judgement are discussed.

To better understand what facilitates reconciliation after violent conflict, we examined the relevance of intergroup contact, conflict appraisals and emotions for reconciliation in post‐conflict Colombia. The first study with Colombian students ( N 1 = 260) was run shortly after the peace treaty with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), one of the biggest rebel groups in Colombia, was signed. The second study with members of the Colombian community ( N 2 = 346) was conducted 4 years after the peace treaty. We assessed the frequency of positive and negative direct and indirect contact experiences, conflict appraisals, intergroup emotions and reconciliation attitudes with a mixed‐method approach combining open and closed questions. Conflict appraisals and emotions did not mediate the association between intergroup contact and attitudes towards reconciliation. Instead, intergroup contact and conflict appraisals represented different sources of reconciliation, which can be targeted by interventions.

Research warns of a tokenistic combination of two colonial ideologies that recognises Indigenous culture as part of the nation's identity (low symbolic exclusion) yet denies the relevance of colonisation to contemporary inequities (high historical negation). Because symbolic exclusion and historical negation respectively reinforce symbolic and material inequalities, this Moral Credentialer profile may mask intolerance with superficial support for equality. Using latent profile analysis, we investigate the presence of this asymmetric response pattern among a nationwide random sample of Pākehā (New Zealand Europeans; N = 13,877) and Māori (N = 2004). As expected, we identify heterogeneity among both ethnic groups, yet find a Moral Credentialer profile (high historical negation and low symbolic exclusion) among only Pākehā. Sociopolitical attitudes predicted profile membership, which, in turn, predicted bicultural political attitudes. Results thus corroborate a tokenistic subgroup of settler colonisers who endorse less costly forms of symbolic equality whilst upholding material inequities.

This research, comprising three experiments with a total of 1718 population‐representative participants, investigates the strategies Muslim organizations can utilize to sustain trust and positive perceptions in the direct aftermath of terrorist attacks. It evaluates the effectiveness of different crisis communication strategies as outlined by the Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Additionally, it examines the effects of a positive pre‐crisis reputation, statement framing and the publishing source on attitudes towards Muslim organizations, Muslims in general and Islam. Three experiments with several reference groups were conducted. Multivariate analyses underscore the critical importance of active crisis communication in cultivating positive attitudes and trust in Muslim organizations. Across experiments, the findings indicate that the act of issuing a statement itself holds more substantial influence than the specific crisis response strategy employed. In addition, the source of publication played a notable role in shaping perceptions; statements released through personal channels resulted in more positive reactions compared to statements released by a public source.

Various theories on intergroup bias predict that stereotypes about minorities are more negative than those about majorities. Although there is clear evidence that specific minorities are often subject to negative stereotypes, a systematic test of the relationship between group size and stereotype valence across various social groups is lacking. We conducted a multinational study across seven Western European countries to examine this relationship. We retrieved objective data on group sizes for 196 political, social, religious, ethnic, and sexual orientation groups and assessed people’s stereotypes about these groups. With 19,958 stereotype ratings from 1,397 individuals (~200 per country), our findings reveal that stereotypes about minorities are indeed more negative. This pattern persisted when controlling for respondents' group membership and several robustness checks (e.g., which country is studied). Our study provides a systematic test of a central claim in stereotype research within WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries.

In this article, we discuss how social identity theory (SIT) and self‐categorization theory (SCT) may apply to mechanisms of social identification and self‐categorization among individuals with multiple identities within a single social domain. We focus on individuals with mixed racial–ethnic backgrounds, which provide unique flexibility for their racial–ethnic identities. In line with SCT, we suggest that their racial–ethnic self‐categorization is guided by perceptions of similarity with multiple racial–ethnic categories and that these are influenced by contextual factors, such as the frame of reference. Drawing on SIT, optimal distinctiveness theory and uncertainty reduction theory, we suggest that situationally significant motives may determine Mixed individuals’ levels of identification with different racial–ethnic groups. By integrating predictions from these theories with empirical evidence on Mixed individuals’ experiences, we provide a first step to building a comprehensive theoretical framework and outlining a future research program for understanding the dynamic social identification processes of these individuals.

A significant amount of punishment that happens in society is state punishment, that is, third‐party punishment carried out by an organized political community in response to a rule violation. We argue that a complete psychology of punishment must consider state punishment as a distinct form. State punishment is a unique type of punishment because it is a special case of third‐party punishment, pre‐specified to occur after the violation of official rules and policies, carried out by people acting on behalf of a nation or government. State punishment, especially as compared to interpersonal punishment, is regarded as a legitimate form of violence, which communicates not just disapproval but information about procedures and power. Moreover, state punishment is made possible by state rules, which, unlike norms, are formalized, can be fully articulated and are perfectly transmissible across generations. We end the paper with implications for the psychology of punishment more broadly and future directions for better understanding the unique psychology of state punishment.

Public sentiment on collateral civilian killings during wartime may crucially impact critical governmental decisions and the trajectory of the conflict itself. Across six studies in Israel and the United States, we examined (1) left-right ideological differences in acceptance of collateral civilian killings across diverse war scenarios and (2) the role of moral values and ideological ingroup norms in underlying them. Conservatives/rightists consistently showed higher acceptance of collateral civilian killings than liberals/leftists, regardless of whether the civilians killed are members of a current rival group or a strategic partner, whether the war involves real-life or fictitious groups, or whether participants are members of the group conducting the killings or mere observers. These ideological differences were mediated by conservatives'/rightists' lower endorsement of individualizing moral foundations but not by their higher endorsement of binding moral foundations. Finally, results suggest that ideological ingroup norms may play an indirect role in shaping these ideological differences.

The monological belief system model suggests that—for at least a subset of people—developing a belief in one conspiracy theory will cause them to be more likely to believe in others. This model has been influential in the literature, but its core causal hypothesis has never been credibly tested. We therefore tested it in two longitudinal studies. Study 1 used a sample from New Zealand and Australia ( N = 498), with 7 monthly waves. Study 2 (preregistered) used a sample from New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom ( N = 978), with 13 monthly waves. We applied random intercept cross‐lagged panel models, permitting a credible causal identification strategy, albeit we cannot rule out time‐varying confounds. We find that increased belief in a conspiracy theory at one wave did (on average) predict increased belief in other conspiracies at the next wave, although the estimated coefficients were small.

Perceiving income disparities has a limited impact on attitudes towards reducing economic inequality. In this research, we proposed a novel and alternative strategy by focusing on other aspects intrinsically related to economic inequality, such as unequal access to health and education resources. We investigated whether recognizing inequality in health and education, beyond income disparities, could motivate people to reduce economic inequality. In four preregistered studies ( N Study1 = 513, N Study2 = 1536, N Study3 = 443, N Study4 = 400), we showed that perceived economic inequality in health and education, over and above perceived income disparities, leads to greater intolerance towards inequality and increased support for redistributive policies and collective actions. Our findings suggest that heightened awareness of economic inequality in aspects meaningful for individuals’ lives, such as health or education, may foster support for redistributive policies and engagement in collective actions to mitigate such disparities.

Inequalities and discrimination against Indigenous minorities are pervasive in post‐colonial societies. Collective action is critical for Indigenous minorities to redress these injustices. Integrating research on collective action, macro‐level norms and multiculturalism, we argue that macro‐level climates characterized by non‐Indigenous endorsement of Indigenous multiculturalism policies are likely associated with Indigenous minorities’ collective action. Two multilevel studies in Chile (non‐Indigenous majorities N = 1132; Indigenous minorities N = 1160; 26 communities) and New Zealand (NZ) (non‐Indigenous majorities N = 12,136; Indigenous minorities N = 3484; 108 communities) reveal that non‐Indigenous macro‐level (i.e., aggregated) endorsement of resource‐based policies was related to increased Indigenous minorities’ reaction to injustices and collective action. Non‐Indigenous macro‐level endorsement of symbolic policies showed similar (albeit weaker) results in NZ, but not in Chile. Thus, macro‐level climates that endorse concrete measures to address power asymmetries are particularly effective at fostering Indigenous minorities’ collective action. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.