This paper examines wealth accumulation among couple-headed households and investigates changes in within-household inequality over time and across couple statuses. Going beyond previous research that mostly studies wealth accumulation within marriages by comparing married with unmarried individuals, we consider the legal statuses of couples (cohabitation, civil union, and marriage) and property regimes (community and separate property). We apply multivariate regression analysis to high-quality longitudinal data from the French wealth survey (2015–2018) and find no differences in net worth accumulation between couples’ legal statuses when property regimes are not accounted for. However, couples with a separate property regime accumulate more wealth than couples with a community property regime, and married couples with a separate property regime drive this association. Our results show that the gender wealth gap is larger for couples with a separate property regime, but it is partially compensated by accumulated wealth. Our results highlight the importance of legal statuses and property regimes in explaining the dynamics of between- and within-household inequality in France, specifically within a context of increasingly diversified marital trajectories.
Previous studies documented the existence of a ‘cohabitation–marriage gap’ in resource pooling among opposite-sex partners, with cohabiters being more likely to separate income and wealth than married individuals. Surprisingly, despite many non-marital cohabitations transform into marriages, we know little about income and wealth pooling of ‘spousal cohabiters’, i.e. spouses who transition to marriage after experiencing a period of non-marital cohabitation. The comparison between ‘spousal cohabiters’ and directly married spouses is particularly interesting because it offers a litmus test of theories of marriage in relation to how and why economic resources are differently distributed within married vs. cohabiting couples. This paper compares directly married couples and ‘spousal cohabiters’ in Italy, focusing on one aspect of resource pooling: the marital property regime, i.e. the choice made at the time of marriage between joint or separate ownership of wealth accumulated during marriage. Competing hypotheses are developed on the basis of the arguments that marriage yields legal protection, that selection mechanisms drive both the choice of community vs. separation of property and direct marriage vs. premarital cohabitation, and that, by inertia, ‘spousal cohabiters’ continue to separate resources upon transition to marriage. Results based on the 2016 Italian ‘Family and social subjects’ survey show that ‘spousal cohabiters’ are significantly more likely to choose separation of property compared to directly married spouses. Such differences, however, are drastically reduced once relevant confounders are controlled for, hence suggesting that existing differences between directly married and previously cohabiting couples and, more generally, differences between married and cohabiting couples are driven, above all, by selection mechanisms.
We propose a new summary measure of population health (SMPH), the well-being-adjusted health expectancy (WAHE). WAHE belongs to a subgroup of health-adjusted life expectancy indicators and gives the number of life years equivalent to full health. WAHE combines health and mortality information into a single indicator with weights that quantify the reduction in well-being associated with decreased health. WAHE's advantage over other SMPHs lies in its ability to differentiate between the consequences of health limitations at various levels of severity and its transparent, simple valuation function. Following the guidelines of a Committee on Summary Measures of Population Health, we discuss WAHE's validity, universality, feasibility sensitivity and ensure its reproducibility. We evaluate WAHE's performance compared to life expectancy, the most commonly used indicators of health expectancy (HE) and disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) in an empirical application for 29 European countries. Data on health and well-being are taken from the 2018 EU-SILC, and the life tables are from Eurostat. DALE is taken from the database of the Global Burden of Disease Programme. WAHE's sensitivity to univariate and multivariate state specifications is studied using the three Minimum European Health Module health dimensions: chronic morbidity, limitations in activities of daily living, and self-rated health. The empirical tests of the indicators’ correspondence reveal that WAHE has the strongest correlation with the other SMPHs. Moreover, WAHE estimates are in agreement with all other SMPHs. Additionally, WAHE and all other SMPHs form a group of reliable indicators for studying population health in European countries. Finally, WAHE estimates are robust, regardless of whether health is defined across one or multiple simultaneous dimensions of health. We conclude that WAHE is a useful and reliable indicator of population health and performs at least as well as other commonly used SMPHs.
Existing literature shows that on average and across countries, men have higher levels of wealth than women. However, very little is known about the gender-specific wealth gap within couples. This paper studies this phenomenon for the first time in Austria. The particular focus of the paper is on the relationship between the socio-demographic characteristics of the couple and the couple’s gender wealth gap. We focus on how age, education, marital status, fertility, migratory background, and the gender of the respondent are related to the wealth gap within a couple. In both bivariate and multivariate analyses, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that bargaining power plays an important role in the intra-couple gender wealth gap in Austria. Immigrant women living in a couple with native men, and, among natives, couples in which the man is much older on average, have larger gender wealth gaps. Furthermore, couples in which the woman is the “financially most knowledgeable person” in the household have consistently lower gender wealth gaps.
In France, as in other European countries, the age at first cohabiting union has risen over the past decades, as a result of longer school enrolment, structural economic changes, and new family norms. While the median age at first co-resident couple was 23.8 for men born in France in the beginning of the 1950s, it was 26.0 among the generation born in the beginning of the 1970s. This tendency is often referred to as a postponement of couple formation and as a part of a broader delay in the transition to adulthood. This article argues, on the contrary, that couple formation has not been postponed but prolonged. In fact, age at first couple formation has remained stable across generations born since the mid-twentieth century in France. Starting from there, we take on a biographical approach to examine the nature, duration, and articulation of the successive stages that make up young people’s conjugal trajectories in France. What are the different pathways into couple life, and how have these changed over time? In order to answer these questions, we use optimal matching methods to identify ideal typical trajectories and then logistic regressions in order to see how these relate to generational differences as well as sociodemographic characteristics. We observe three traditional, three timeless and five new paths to couple life. The main historical change is the increasingly gradual nature of union formation, a trend that reflects a dual pattern. First, unions are progressively institutionalized: the time laps between different relationship stages, such as “going out,” “settling in,” and eventually marrying, have expanded. Second, young people increasingly experience several relationships during youth: the different steps of couple formation are taken with different partners. We conclude that couple formation is not delayed per se; it is rather the material and institutional formalization of unions that is put off for the future. We discuss the scientific and methodological implications of this finding.
Refugees coming to Norway are assigned to a municipality where they start their integration process. These municipalities offer very different contexts for refugees’ access to employment. Using rich register data, we study how the employment of a refugee varies by both the centrality and population size of the municipality to which he/she is assigned, conditional on existing local labor market conditions and the share of non-Western immigrants. Results show that refugees assigned to the least central municipalities are most likely to be employed the first years after arrival. However, one municipality type does not fit all: Population size matters more for men than it does for women, and there is persistent disadvantage for low-educated men assigned to large municipalities. For women, a high share of non-Western immigrants correlates with lower long-term employment. Municipality context seems to matter the least for highly educated refugees of both genders.
Union dissolution is a critical event for women’s living standards. Previous work has found that women in high-income unions lose more from union dissolution than women in low-income unions. This study proposes two mechanisms to explain this “convergence” in living standards. The compensation mechanism concerns the ability to compensate the loss of partner earnings with alternative sources of income, whereas the partner independence mechanism concerns how much women stand to lose from dissolution in the first place. To test these mechanisms, the author drew on a unique administrative dataset from the Netherlands, covering women who experienced dissolution within ten years after union formation ( N = 57,960). A decomposition analysis showed that convergence was not driven by compensation: women from all income groups decreased their household size and re-partnered, women from low-income unions increased transfer income, and women from high-income unions increased personal earnings and decreased tax payments. Instead, convergence was driven by partner independence: women from lower-income unions depended relatively less on their partners because they relied more on transfer income prior to dissolution. These results demonstrate how partners’ interdependence moderates the consequences of life events. The welfare state plays a crucial role in this process.
Most social phenomena are inherently complex and hard to measure, often due to under-reporting, stigma, social desirability bias, and rapidly changing external circumstances. This is for instance the case of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), a highly-prevalent social phenomenon which has drastically risen in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper explores whether big data-an increasingly common tool to track, nowcast, and forecast social phenomena in close-to-real time-might help track and understand IPV dynamics. We leverage online data from Google Trends to explore whether online searches might help reach "hard-to-reach" populations such as victims of IPV using Italy as a case-study. We ask the following questions: Can digital traces help predict instances of IPV-both potential threat and actual violent cases-in Italy? Is their predictive power weaker or stronger in the aftermath of crises such as COVID-19? Our results suggest that online searches using selected keywords measuring different facets of IPV are a powerful tool to track potential threats of IPV before and during global-level crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, with stronger predictive power post outbreaks. Conversely, online searches help predict actual violence only in post-outbreak scenarios. Our findings, validated by a Facebook survey, also highlight the important role that socioeconomic status (SES) plays in shaping online search behavior, thus shedding new light on the role played by third-level digital divides in determining the predictive power of digital traces. More specifically, they suggest that forecasting might be more reliable among high-SES population strata.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-022-09619-2.
In this paper, we introduce cohort succession in the study of marriage behaviour among the children of immigrants. Research among majority populations in developed countries has shown an overall increase in age at first marriage. Yet whether a similar change is occurring across successive cohorts of children of immigrants is unknown but relevant given the growing shares of children of immigrants in developed countries. Using full population register data from the Netherlands, we test the theoretical assumptions of cohort succession with event history models for the timing of first marriage across entire Turkish and Moroccan second-generation birth cohorts. In line with the expectations based on diffusion theories, we find clear evidence that younger birth cohorts postpone marriage. Moreover, the marriage timing of especially the Turkish second generation and Dutch majority population converges across birth cohorts. Our findings call for a more differentiated study of the children of immigrants acknowledging diffusion of new demographic behaviour among these groups.
Economic precariousness has taken on a central role in explanations of the postponement of childbearing in developed societies. However, most studies conceptualize and operationalize precariousness as being static and one-dimensional, which provides only a partial perspective on the links between precariousness and fertility. In this paper, we study precariousness as a dynamic and multidimensional concept, distinguishing between past and current precariousness as well as between precariousness relating to income and to employment. Analyses are based on Dutch full-population register data. We select all inhabitants of the Netherlands who left education in 2006 and follow them until 2018. Event history analyses show that current and past income and employment precariousness all have independent negative effects on the first birth rate for men. Current and past employment precariousness and past income precariousness also reduce the first birth rate for women, but current income precariousness increases women’s probability of first conception. When precariousness is both persistent and multidimensional, it is associated with a threefold decrease in the monthly probability of conceiving a first child for men and almost a halving of the probability for women. Our analyses show the need for going beyond static and one-dimensional analyses in order to understand how economic precariousness may affect fertility behaviour.
In the last decades, conventional patterns of assortative mating have been challenged by changes in the gender-gap in education. In many countries, educationally hypogamous unions (i.e. the woman is more educated than the man) now outnumber hypergamous unions (i.e. the man is more educated than the woman). The extent to which such structural changes have also been accompanied by gender egalitarian attitudes has not yet been investigated. This paper fills the gap by focusing on both age and educational assortative mating, using data from wave 1 and 2 of the Generations and Gender Surveys for 6 European countries. I investigate the role of gender-role attitudes of single men and women, measured in the first wave, on their age and educational assortative mating outcomes observed in the second wave. To this aim, I applied multinomial logistic regressions, and used as reference outcome category remaining single in the second wave. Compared to non-egalitarian men, I found that men holding gender-egalitarian views are more likely to form hypogamous unions instead of remaining single, in terms of both age and educational assortative mating. Egalitarian women are more likely than non-egalitarian women to form age-hypogamous unions instead of remaining single, but they are less likely to form educationally hypogamous unions. I discuss the implications of these results in relation to the convergence of mating preferences between men and women.
As baby boomers enter retirement, an increasing portion of the population in Europe will rely on wealth as a source of financial security. We address two research questions: what is the association between family size, i.e. the number of children, and wealth for adults who are preparing for or have entered retirement and does the generosity of family transfers moderate that association? Data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are used to estimate the relationship between family size and the total household net worth of men and women between ages 50–65, born 1939–1967 from 14 European countries. We use logistic and linear regression modelling to investigate the probability of zero or negative wealth and net worth percentile rank. We find that adults with four or more children are more likely to be in debt and have less wealth than childless adults. In contrast, adults with two and three children have more wealth. We provide evidence that the generosity of family transfers ameliorates the negative association between larger family sizes and wealth, but may exacerbate wealth inequality by benefiting two and three child families most.
Previous research shows that parentally bereaved children in north-western Europe in the past left home earlier than children who lived together with both biological parents. This article analyses the mechanisms behind this phenomenon with a special focus on the routes out of the parental household and the entry of step-parents and step-siblings. The Historical Sample of the Netherlands is exploited which contains detailed information about household composition and life courses of more than 22,000 female and male adolescent and young adult children born between 1850 and 1922. Event-history analysis is applied, and two exclusive routes out of the parental household, for marital and non-marital reasons, are studied in a competing risk design. The results show that parental loss does not increase the risk of early marriage before age 23, but strongly enhances the chances for leaving home for non-marital reasons, which are mainly work-related. This is especially true in case of maternal loss. No support is found for the hypothesis that the entry of a step-parent and step-siblings increases the risk of leaving home compared to living with a single widowed parent. Tensions with step-parents therefore do not suffice to explain why parentally bereaved children left earlier for non-marital reasons. Instead, we argue that children’s exit was in the interest of both the single widowed parent and the bereaved child.
This study examines the prevalence of marital contracts across marriage cohorts (1990–2019) in Germany. We further investigate the characteristics of spouses who signed a marital contract. Using cross-sectional data from the German Family Panel (pairfam, 2018/19), we employ complementary log–log and multinomial logistic regression models to predict the prevalence and the type of marital contracts. The results show that 5% of all married couples opt out of the default matrimonial property regime by signing a contract in Germany. Differentiating between contract types, most couples either specify a separation of property (40%) or modify the default community of accrued gains (31%). We find an increase in the prevalence of marital contracts across marriage cohorts. The decision to opt out of the default is strongly positively associated with self-employment that often requires the customisation of asset ownership structures within marriage. Married individuals with prior divorce experiences are more likely to opt for the separation of property, indicating that the awareness of the economic consequences of divorce promotes the individualisation of marriage. Our results are in line with the cross-national trend towards customised marriages, although the trend in Germany is less pronounced than in other countries.
In high-income countries, women increasingly remain permanently childless. Little is known about the relationship between childlessness and socioeconomic development in non-Western societies and particularly sub-Saharan Africa. At lower levels of development, poverty-driven (i.e., involuntary) childlessness may decrease with increases in levels of development, while at higher levels of development opportunity-driven (i.e., voluntary and circumstantial) childlessness may rise with development. Thus, we expect a U-shaped relationship between childlessness and development overall. We examine this idea for sub-Saharan Africa. We further contribute by differentiating between female and male childlessness; and between involuntary, voluntary and circumstantial childlessness. Moreover, we construct new indicators of subnational historical development to assess both inter- and intra-country variation, and distinguish between three components (health, education and income) to investigate the drivers behind the hypothesized U-shaped relationship. Using 291 Demographic and Health Surveys between 1986 and 2018 from 38 countries and 384 regions, we find a U-shaped relationship between female childlessness and development, and a linear relationship for men. The U-shape for women results from negative associations of female involuntary childlessness with health and educational advancements, combined with positive correlations of voluntary and circumstantial childlessness with education and income improvements. While these positive associations are stronger among men than women, the negative relationships of involuntary childlessness with health and education observed for women are absent for men, resulting in an overall positive and linear relationship between development and childlessness among men. Our findings have implications for how we might expect childlessness rates to evolve with future levels of development.
This study analyses the influence of family policies on women’s first and second births in 20 countries over the period 1995 to 2007. Welfare states have shifted towards social investment policies, yet family policy–fertility research has not explicitly considered this development. We distinguish between social investment-oriented and passive support that families may receive upon the birth of a child and consider changes in policies over time. These indicators are merged with fertility histories provided by harmonized individual-level data, and we use time-conditioned, fixed effects linear probability models. We find higher social investment-oriented support to be correlated with increased first birth probabilities, in contrast to passive family support. First birth probabilities particularly declined with higher passive family support for women over age 30, which points to a potential increase in childlessness. Social investment-oriented support is positively related to first and second births particularly for lower-educated women and has no relationship to childbirth for highly educated women, countering the Matthew-effect assumptions about social investment policies. Passive support is negatively related to second births for post-secondary educated women and those who are studying. Family policies that support women’s employment and labour market attachment are positively linked to family expansion and these policies minimize educational differences in childbearing.
Medically assisted reproduction (MAR) plays an increasingly important role in the realization of fertility intentions in advanced societies, yet the evidence regarding MAR-conceived children’s longer-term well-being remains inconclusive. Using register data on all Finnish children born in 1995–2000, we compared a range of social and mental health outcomes among MAR- and naturally conceived adolescents in population-averaged estimates, and within families who have conceived both through MAR and naturally. In baseline models, MAR-conceived adolescents had better school performance and the likelihood of school dropout, not being in education or employment, and early home-leaving were lower than among naturally conceived adolescents. No major differences were found in mental health and high-risk health behaviours. Adjustment for family sociodemographic characteristics attenuated MAR adolescents’ advantage in social outcomes, while increasing the risk of mental disorders. The higher probability of mental disorders persisted when comparing MAR adolescents to their naturally conceived siblings. On average, MAR adolescents had similar or better outcomes than naturally conceived adolescents, largely due to their more advantaged family backgrounds, which underscores the importance of integrating a sociodemographic perspective in studies of MAR and its consequences.
Though child shared physical custody arrangements after divorce are much more frequent and parents who use it more diverse in many European countries, little is known about their economic consequences for parents. By relaxing family time constraints, does shared custody help divorced mothers return to or stay on work more easily? Since lone mothers are one of the least-employed groups, and they face high unemployment rates, the type of child custody arrangement adopted after divorce is of particular interest for their employability. This article analyses to what extent the type of child custody arrangement affects mothers’ labour market patterns after divorce.
Using a large sample of divorcees from an exhaustive French administrative income tax database, and taking advantage of the huge territorial discrepancies observed in the proportion of shared custody, we correct for the possible endogeneity of shared custody. Results show that not repartnered mothers with shared custody arrangements are 24 percentage points more likely to work one year after divorce compared to those having sole custody, while no significant effect is found for repartnered mothers. Among lone mothers, we also highlight huge heterogeneous effects: larger positive effects are observed for previously inactive women, for those belonging to the lowest income quintiles before divorce, for those with a young child, and for those who have three or more children. Thus, shared physical custody arrangements may reduce work–family conflict by diminishing childcare expenses and enlarge the possibilities to find a suitable job because of more relaxed time constraints for lone mothers.
While existing research has documented complexities in biographies of childless women, few studies to date have systematically examined the life-course pathways of the childless from a comparative, cross-country perspective. In this paper, we analyse biographies of childless women in four countries—Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United States—in order to investigate whether pathways into childlessness are country-specific or commonly shared across institutional, cultural, and geographical settings. Partnership, education, and employment histories are examined using sequence analysis with dynamic Hamming distance and cluster analysis. Discrepancy analysis indicates a country-effect in women’s biographies although life-course patterns identified in each country share similarities. Overall, seven life-course trajectories have been identified, with the most numerous cluster comprising single, working women who completed their education at a relatively young age. The results highlight a marked variation in the life-courses of childless women. Put together, these findings provide descriptive evidence for both country-specificity and cross-country similarity in the pathways to childlessness.
In this paper, we explore the patterns of assortative mating among college-educated women who graduated from typically female, typically male, or mixed disciplines. Using a set of cross-sectional observations of a single cohort of female graduates (2010) from European Union Labour Force Survey data and applying multilevel multinomial logit models, we estimated the relative risk of living with a college-educated partner (homogamy), living with less educated partner (hypogamy), or being single. Focusing on the first five years after graduation, the analysis demonstrated that field of study is a significant predictor of mating behaviour. Women with degrees in male-dominated fields are less likely to partner down with less educated men. The mating advantage of women from male-dominated fields is stronger in countries with a higher female employment rate. Furthermore, more liberal gender roles seem to increase the level of singlehood among women from male-dominated fields. Finally, women from female-dominated and mixed disciplines are more likely to partner down if the man graduated from a male-typical discipline. However, among women from male-dominated disciplines, such a trade-off was not observed.
Natural population growth is an intrinsic property of demographic systems that depends on (spatially) non-stationary processes of fertility and mortality. Assuming distinctive demographic dynamics as a characteristic attribute of urban, suburban and rural systems, analysis of spatial variability in natural population growth delineates nonlinear stages of metropolitan expansion, possibly reflecting divergent responses to socioeconomic stimuli. The present study investigates endogenous population growth (1956–2019) and the relationship with demographic density as basic attributes of individual stages of the city life cycle in Athens (Greece), a mono-centric metropolitan region in Southern Europe. A spatially explicit analysis of natural balance rates at local scale identified two stages of growth, namely compact urbanization (mid-1950s to late 1970s)—with agglomeration strengthening the polarization in demographically dynamic and shrinking districts—and spatially decentralized suburbanization (early 1980s to late 2010s)—with a less defined role of agglomeration economies and more heterogeneous demographic processes. However, the impact of population density on endogenous growth was stronger in recent decades, suggesting how demographic dynamics may still respond to agglomeration stimuli, at least during recessions. At the same time, the spatial structure of natural balance rates became more mixed, likely reflecting the importance of heterogeneous demographic behaviors at the individual level.
After three decades since reunification male life expectancy in East Germany still lags behind that of West Germany. Unlike most of the prior studies focusing on the role of socioeconomic factors, this study aims at assessing the contribution of the population with severe disabilities to the persistent East-West male mortality gap. Our analysis is mainly based on the German Pension Fund data. It is restricted to men aged 30-59 receiving disability pension (DP). We estimate mortality indicators and compare trends among populations with or without DP. We use decomposition method to quantify the effects of changes in mortality and compositional changed in the prevalence of receiving DP on the East-West mortality difference. The analysis covers the period 1995-2013. The German Socioeconomic Panel data and Cox proportional hazard models are used to evaluate the regional differences in the risk of receiving DP. Our results suggest that both the higher prevalence of receiving DP in the East and the higher mortality level among men not receiving DP in the East explain the East-West gap. The mortality difference among those receiving DP is negligible and does not contribute much to it. The observed higher prevalence in receiving DP in the East is very likely to reflect the reality as we found no regional differences in the risk of transitioning to receiving DP. The disadvantageous position of the East can be explained by the post-reunification crisis which particularly hit young men in the 1990s, selective migration from East to West after reunification, and the higher proportion of the healthier foreign population living in the West.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-022-09609-4.
Late-life depression is a condition that affects an ever-growing share of the population in ageing societies. While depression prevalence varies across countries for a myriad of reasons, generational factors, expressed in the shared experience of birth cohorts, may also play a part in such differentials. This paper describes the presence of age, period, and cohort (APC) effects in late-life depression prevalence trends (for adults aged 50 and above) for selected countries in Europe, using the Survey of Health and Ageing and Retirement of Europe (SHARE). We analysed six countries during the 2004–2016 period: Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, with a lower baseline prevalence, and Italy, Spain, and France, with a higher baseline prevalence. By applying a set of APC statistical models to visualise linear and nonlinear effects, we found that all countries followed a J-shaped curve when describing the transversal and longitudinal age trajectories of late-life depression. We also found a combination of nonlinear effects present in Germany, France and Sweden in males, indicating that younger male cohorts had a higher relative risk of depression. In females, we found nonlinear cohort effects, indicating that younger and older cohorts presented a higher risk of depression in Sweden and Germany and a lower risk in Spain. The presence of an increased risk for younger male cohorts may be indicative of a new trend in some countries, which may reduce the sex gap in prevalence. Future analysis should focus on the causes and mechanisms that lead to differential risks across cohorts.
We investigate how previous generations of migrants and their children integrated into Austrian society, as measured by their wealth ownership. Using individual-level data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), we document (1) a positive average migrant wealth gap between migrants and natives—that is, migrants owning less wealth than natives, especially in the upper half of the distribution, (2) substantial within-group inequality for migrants, and (3) evidence for catch-up, since second-generation migrants are much more similar to natives in terms of wealth and socio-economic characteristics than first-generation migrants. Using a RIF regression, we confirm an economically significant migrant wealth gap for first-generation migrants after controlling for socio-economic characteristics especially for the upper middle of the distribution, where housing wealth is a particularly relevant asset category. Second-generation migrants’ wealth gap is fully explained by our covariates in the middle of the distribution, whereas at the top where business wealth is more salient, their characteristics predict them to have higher wealth than natives. Decomposing the partial effects of covariates suggests that inheritances have the highest explanatory power for the migrant wealth gap of both first- and second-generation migrants, further buttressing the case for progressive integration in terms of wealth, while the composition of the migrant population, and in particular migrants’ heritage may continue to play a role in their wealth ownership.
In the 2010s, fertility has declined in the Nordic countries, most strikingly in Finland, and first births drive the decline. It remains unclear whether this decline results from decreased fertility within unions, changing union dynamics, or both. Thus, we investigated changes in the union-first birth dynamics from 2000 through 2018 in Finland using full-coverage population register data and an incidence-based multistate model. To do so, we calculated the yearly age-specific transition probabilities across states of single, cohabitation, marriage, and first births among 15- to 45-year-old childless men and women. We found lower fertility rates in unions after 2010, increasing dissolution rates amongst cohabiting couples, and long-term declines in the transition to marriage. Counterfactual simulations showed that, for the decline in first births since 2010, fertility within unions matters more (three-quarters) than union dynamics (one-quarter): that is, lower fertility in cohabitating and married individuals explained 42% and 13% of the decline, respectively, and decreasing fertility rates among couples entering cohabitation explained a further 17%. Decreasing marriage (19%) and cohabitation rates (2-4%) as well as higher union dissolution rates (6%) explained a smaller share of the first birth decline. The decline in first births was somewhat sharper among the lower social strata, but across strata the decreasing first birth transitions in unions explained most of the decline. To conclude, while changing union dynamics provide a partial explanation, postponing or foregoing fertility within unions represents the primary reason for the fertility decline.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-022-09605-8.
Many studies in different settings have suggested that migrants from countries with skewed sex ratios at birth tend to adjust the sex of their offspring to ensure the birth of at least one male child. Enlarging the scope of existing research, the present study explores the phenomenon by studying the sex ratio at birth and sex selection at birth among migrants in Italy, focussing on birth order and the sex of the previous child. We perform a descriptive analysis of SRB by birth order (first, second and third), sex of the previous children, inter-birth interval and citizenship of the child. We analyse data from the Longitudinal register on reproductive histories from 1999 to 2017 (ISTAT). Results show significantly higher values of SRB for third births among Indian and Chinese communities when the first and second births are girls. A skewed SRB is also present among Indian babies born after a female firstborn. A more detailed analysis of SRBs for immigrants from China and India, by the sex of the previous children and inter-birth interval between second and third birth, did not indicate significant changes in SRB when the inter-birth interval is longer. Our study provides evidence for policymaking. However, further research is needed to address the causes of sex selection among immigrant communities. Efforts to alter gender norms and reduce son preference within communities are required to tackle gender discrimination against second-generation girls.
In recent years, fertility rates have declined in most wealthy countries. This phenomenon has largely been explained by focusing on the rise of economic uncertainty. We contribute to this debate by arguing that, under uncertain conditions, narratives of the future —i.e., socially conveyed imagined futures—impact individuals’ decision-making about childbearing. To assess this impact, we conducted (for the first time in fertility intention research) a controlled laboratory experiment in two contrasting settings: Florence (Italy, N = 800) and Oslo (Norway, N = 874). Individuals were randomly exposed to a specific positive or negative future economic scenario (treatments) and were compared with individuals who were not exposed to any scenario (control group). Participants were then asked whether they intended to have a child in the next three years. The results showed a clear causal impact of narratives of the future on fertility intentions among the participants. Moreover, when the actual economic condition at the macro- (country context) or micro-level (labor-market status and characteristics) was more favorable, negative narratives of the future played a more crucial role. Conversely, when the actual economic conditions were less favorable, positive narratives of the future proved especially important. We conclude that, in the era of global uncertainty, individuals respond to more than their actual situation and constraints; narratives of the future create a distance experience from the daily routine that plays a potent role by inhibiting or facilitating fertility decision-making.
Considering soaring wealth inequalities in older age, this research addresses the relationship between family life courses and widening wealth differences between individuals as they age. We holistically examine how childbearing and marital histories are associated with personal wealth at ages 50-59 for Western Germans born between 1943 and 1967. We propose that deviations from culturally and institutionally-supported family patterns, or the stratified access to them, associate with differential wealth accumulation over time and can explain wealth inequalities at older ages. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP, v34, waves 2002-2017), we first identified typical family trajectory patterns between ages 16 and 50 with multichannel sequence analysis and cluster analysis. We then modelled personal wealth ranks at ages 50-59 as a function of family patterns. Results showed that deviations from the standard family pattern (i.e. stable marriage with, on average, two children) were mostly associated with lower wealth ranks at older age, controlling for childhood characteristics that partly predict selection into family patterns and baseline wealth. We found higher wealth penalties for greater deviation and lower penalties for moderate deviation from the standard family pattern. Addressing entire family trajectories, our research extended and nuanced our knowledge of the role of earlier family behaviour for later economic wellbeing. By using personal-level rather than household-level wealth data, we were able to identify substantial gender differences in the study associations. Our research also recognised the importance of combining marital and childbearing histories to assess wealth inequalities.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09601-4.
While cohabitation and non-marital childbearing have been increasing in Russia since 1990, the share of marital first births that are conceived prior to marriage has changed very little since the Soviet era. The prior findings on the stability of trends in premarital conceptions in Russia have been contradictory and inconclusive. This study aims to extend the existing empirical evidence on premarital conceptions in Russia and to contribute to the discussion on the persistence of marriage as the preferred partnership context for parenthood. We focus on births that occurred within the first two years of marriage, and compare the childbearing patterns of Russian women who married in different historical periods. For our investigation of fertility among marital cohorts who married during the Soviet era (1960-1991), we use individual-level data from the 1994 microcensus. For our examination of fertility among more recent marital cohorts (2000, 2011, and 2016), we draw on data from birth records in civil registers. We also use relevant complementary data sources. Our findings show that there has been a marked shift in the relationship between conception and marriage in Russia. Increasingly, conceptions have been occurring before marriage, and in the most recent marital cohorts, the level of premarital first conceptions has even surpassed the level of marital first conceptions. The average interval between conception and entry into marriage has also been lengthening. We describe this unique pattern of childbearing and discuss some potential explanations for the ongoing association between marriage and childbearing in Russia.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09600-5.
Using unique longitudinal data from the Dutch population registers, this study investigates the patterns and drivers of emigration of the Turkish second generation born in the Netherlands between 1983 and 1992. Around 13% of the Turkish second generation in the research population emigrated during early adulthood, as compared to 6% of their peers without immigrant parents. Half of the Turkish second-generation emigrants who reported their destination country moved to Turkey, while the other half moved to other destinations, especially the Dutch neighbouring countries. Among the Turkish second generation, unemployment over the previous year was found to increase the likelihood of emigration for individuals with low or middle levels of education, whereas no support was found that higher educated individuals (either employed or unemployed) are more likely to emigrate. However, if high-skilled unemployed individuals of the Turkish second generation emigrated, they appeared more likely to select Turkey as their destination as compared to other (or unknown) destinations. International migration experiences during childhood, living at the parental home, and residing in neighbourhoods with a high share of co-ethnics were also associated with a higher chance of emigration to Turkey, whereas living in the Dutch border regions was associated with a higher chance of emigration to other destinations. Together, the findings indicate that the Turkish second generation has a higher chance to emigrate than their peers without immigrant parents, and that mechanisms specific to the second generation apply to the migration behaviour of this group.
The lengthening of the amount of time adult children depend on their parents’ support and rising longevity have pushed scholars to devote increasing attention to the phenomenon of older sandwich family generations. This brief report develops a descriptive portrait of the prevalence of being demographically and socially sandwiched in the population aged 50 or more years, in Europe. It is shown that the prevalence of social sandwiching is highly sensitive to the types of support utilized to operationalize the concept; also, differences between welfare and transfer regimes are significantly affected by different operationalizations. Next, the analyses highlight the dynamic nature of social sandwiching over the adult life cycle, and show that demographic events and the changing needs of older parents are the main drivers of moving in/out the status of socially sandwiched. Support to adult children is ubiquitous in all European societies. Among the pivot generation family solidarity prevails over competition, but children enjoy a strategic advantage when older parents are in good health.
Despite pervasive evidence of more educated women having lower fertility, it remains unclear whether education reduces women’s fertility. This study presents new evidence of the causal effect of women’s education on fertility from China, where fertility has remained below the replacement level since the early 1990s. To account for endogeneity, the study exploits the timing and varying intensity of China’s higher education expansion as exogenous sources of increase in women’s education. Using data from China General Social Survey (2010–2012), findings show that each year of women’s education induced by the higher education expansion increases the number of children ever born by 10%. According to the average marginal effects, each additional year of women’s education increases the number of children ever born by 0.14, decreases the probability of having no children by 3 percentage points, and increases the probability of having two or more children by 4 percentage points. Two mechanisms drive the positive effect of education: first, education does not cause an increase in the mean age at first marriage; second, among ever-married women, education increases their demand for children. Findings from this study have important implications for China and other low-fertility developing countries.
A trend towards a reversal of the negative educational gradient in fertility has been detected in some advanced societies, although the end of this inverse relationship is far from being generalized across developed countries. Previous analyses have shown that, for most of the twentieth century, Spain exhibited the steady negative educational gradients in fertility that characterize the low-fertility demographic regimes in Southern Europe. This report presents data collected on the period fertility of Spanish women between 2007 and 2017 and tests for the persistence of educational gradients in their recent reproductive behavior. Using data taken from Spanish administrative registers and standard period indicators of fertility, evidence is offered that proves that a negative educational gradient in fertility continues to exist in the country in accordance with the historical experience of cohorts born during the first decades of the twentieth century. This negative gradient implies significant differences in fertility between educational categories and affects both quantum and tempo. Moreover, the educational differentials in fertility not only persisted during the observed years but probably widened.
Many studies show that females' age at first childbirth affects important outcomes of these females and their offspring such as health- and socioeconomic-related variables. This paper analyzes whether there is a causal relationship between working mothers' school entry age and the timing at which they give birth by exploiting Korea's elementary school entry cutoff regulation. Using administrative employment insurance data that record the fertility history of female working mothers together with regression discontinuity design, we find that a year's delay in age at school starting increases age at first and second childbirth by approximately 3 and 4 months, respectively. We also find that one of the mechanisms that affects the relationship between these two variables is age at first employment. The estimated effects of SSA are likely to be salient in a country where educational sequence that a student experience is rigid.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09597-x.
Separated fathers are generally assumed to be less involved with their children than partnered fathers. Yet, extant research on separated fathers has mainly focused on nonresident fathers without taking into consideration the existing diversity in post-separation residence arrangements. In fact, separated resident and shared residence fathers may possibly be more involved than partnered fathers, because the former likely bear primary childcare responsibilities, while the latter often act as secondary caregivers. This study extends previous research by investigating father involvement via regular care and leisure activities across a full range of separated fathers, and how it compares to that of partnered fathers, as well as whether patterns differ by father's education. Data from the New Families in the Netherlands survey (N = 1592) reveal that as compared to partnered fathers, shared residence fathers and especially resident fathers are more actively involved in the regular care of their child, whereas nonresident fathers are less involved. Results are similar for leisure, except that partnered fathers are similarly involved as shared residence fathers in this activity. Education also matters: involvement of fathers across different post-separation residence arrangements is more similar to that of partnered fathers when being highly educated. These findings suggest that including resident and shared residence fathers in the picture offers a more optimistic view of fathers' post-separation parenting role, because these separated fathers are actually more actively involved in childrearing than partnered fathers.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09593-1.
This paper uses linked Swiss administrative and survey data to examine the relationship between educational mismatch in the labour market and emigration decisions, carrying out the analysis for both Swiss native and previous immigrant workers. In turn, migrants’ decisions separate returning home from onward migration to a third country. We find that undereducation is positively associated with the probability of emigration and return to the country of origin. In contrast, the reverse relationship is found between overeducation and emigration, especially among non-European immigrant workers. According to the predictions of the traditional model of migration, based on self-selection, migrants returning home are positively selected relative to migrants emigrating to other countries. We also find that immigrants from a country outside the EU27/EFTA have little incentive to return home and generally accept jobs for which they are mismatched in Switzerland. These results highlight the relevance to understand emigration behaviours in relation to the type of migrant that is most integrated, and productive, in the Swiss market, hence enabling better migration and domestic labour market policy design.
Although European integration can be expected to result in mortality convergence (reduced mortality differences), a life expectancy divide persists in the European Union (EU) between the old Member States (OMS) in the west and the new Member States (NMS) in the east. Studies investigating the impact of European integration on mortality convergence are rare and did not consider regional differences. We examine the short-term effects of the 2004 enlargement on mortality convergence at the supranational, national, and subnational levels. Using sex-specific life expectancies for 23 Member States (1990-2017) and the NUTS 2 regions in Czechia, Hungary, and Poland for 1992-2016, we examined the trend in sigma and beta mortality convergence measures at the country and regional levels using joinpoint regression. We found no compelling evidence that EU accession influenced the process of mortality convergence between OMS and NMS, or within the three NMS, over the short term. While there was overall beta and sigma convergence at the national level during 1990-2017, no regional convergence showed, and the trends in convergence did not significantly change at the time of EU accession or soon after (2004-2007). The accession in 2004 did not visibly impact the overall process of mortality convergence over the short term, likely because of the greater influence of country and region-specific policies and characteristics. The interaction of Member State and regional contexts with the mechanisms of European integration requires further study. Future enlargement procedures should emphasise tailored support to ensure more equitable gains from European integration.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09596-y.
Recent research suggests that the increasing complexity of family life could be a factor in declines in internal migration (long-distance moves within countries). As many separated parents continue to share childcare responsibilities or have visiting arrangements, their mobility is naturally constrained. However, the relationship between family complexity and individual migration behaviour has never been studied explicitly. We compare separated parents with parents in two-parent families in their likelihood of migrating within the Netherlands. We use detailed records of parents’ partnership status and children’s residential situation. An event-history analysis was performed using register-based population data (N = 442,412). We find that separated, single parents are more likely to migrate than those in two-parent families. The same is true for repartnered mothers, while repartnered fathers are about as likely to migrate as fathers in two-parent families. Separated parents’ migration behaviour depends on where their children live. Having non-resident children who live some distance away is associated with a much higher likelihood of migrating than having resident children or non-resident children who live nearby. Having both resident and non-resident children who live nearby—shared residence (i.e. joint physical custody) is likely common in this situation—is associated with a considerably lower likelihood of migrating than having resident children only. Based on our findings, one would expect family complexities stemming from parental separation to be associated with higher rather than lower levels of migration. However, potential future increases in the number of parents who share physical custody after separation might lead to lower migration levels.
The paper investigates the relationship between structural partner market constraints and the timing and educational sorting of unions in Germany (1985–2018). We integrate the literature on the effect of the reversed gender gap in education on educational assortative mating, with a focus on mating dynamics and the measurement of the partner market over the life course. We concentrate on two particular educational groups, low-educated men and highly educated women, those with worsening mating prospects and more subject to experience hypogamous unions. Our results show that the local education-specific mating squeeze influences union formation, its timing, and educational sorting. Indeed, for the two groups, the increasing supply of highly educated women in the partner market increases the likelihood of remaining single or establishing an hypogamous union, where she is higher educated than he. In line with search theory, we find the effects of the mating squeeze to become particularly visible after people turn 30 years of age. This is true for the risk of remaining single and forming an hypogamous union. We underline the necessity to study assortative mating and union formation from a dynamic perspective, taking into account changing structural conditions during the partner search process.
The study focuses on understanding the association between parental socio-economic status (SES) and the likelihood of women experiencing a first birth while single, and identifying societal factors that influence this association in 18 North American and European societies. Previous research has shown that single motherhood occurs disproportionately among those from with lower a lower parental SES. The study assesses whether this is caused by parental SES differences in the risk of single women experiencing a first conception leading to a live birth or by parental SES differences in how likely women are to enter a union during pregnancy. Additionally, an assessment is made of whether cross-national differences in these associations can be explained by a country's access to family planning, norms regarding family formation, and economic inequality. Across countries, a negative gradient of parental SES was found on the likelihood of single women to experience a first pregnancy. The negative gradient was stronger in countries with better access to family planning. In some countries, the negative gradient of parental SES was aggravated during pregnancy because women from lower parental SES were less likely to enter a union. This was mostly found in societies with less conservative norms regarding marriage. The results suggest that certain developments in Western societies may increase socio-economic differentials in family demography.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09591-3.
This study focused on individuals' re-partnering behavior following a divorce and asked whether divorcees influence each other's new union formation. By exploiting the System of Social statistical Datasets (SSD) of Statistics Netherlands, I identified divorced dyads and examined interdependencies in their re-partnering behavior. Discrete-time event history models accounting for shared characteristics of divorcees that are likely to influence their divorce and re-partnering behavior simultaneously were estimated. Findings showed that the probability of re-partnering increased within the first two years following a former spouse's new union formation. Further analyses focusing on formerly cohabiting couples rather than divorcees also revealed significant associations in re-partnering behavior. Following a former romantic partner's new union formation, women were exposed to risk longer than men, due to men's quicker re-partnering. These results were robust to the falsification tests. Overall, findings indicate that the consequences of a divorce or breakup are not limited to the incidence itself and former romantic partners remain important in each other's life courses even after a breakup. With the increasing number of divorcees and changing family structures, it is important to consider former spouses as active network partners that may influence individual life courses.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09589-x.
This study analyzed whether there are different patterns of mortality decline among low-mortality countries by identifying the role played by all the mortality components. We implemented a cluster analysis using a functional data analysis (FDA) approach, which allowed us to consider age-specific mortality rather than summary measures, as it analyses curves rather than scalar data. Combined with a functional principal component analysis, it can identify what part of the curves is responsible for assigning one country to a specific cluster. FDA clustering was applied to the data from 32 countries in the Human Mortality Database from 1960 to 2018 to provide a comprehensive understanding of their patterns of mortality. The results show that the evolution of developed countries followed the same pattern of stages (with different timings): (1) a reduction of infant mortality, (2) an increase of premature mortality and (3) a shift and compression of deaths. Some countries were following this scheme and recovering the gap with precursors; others did not show signs of recovery. Eastern European countries were still at Stage (2), and it was not clear if and when they will enter Stage 3. All the country differences related to the different timings with which countries underwent the stages, as identified by the clusters.
What role does population play in thinking about the problem of climate change and some of its solutions? In a survey conducted between February and April 2020, we asked European demographers to state their views on the relationship between climate change and population developments, and asked them to rate their concern about climate change and other socio-demographic issues. We found that climate change is at the top of the list of demographers’ concerns, but that their sense of urgency with respect to taking action to redress global warming is not matched by their belief that population policy can make a crucial difference in reducing CO2 emissions: demographers are highly divided on the question whether the global population size should be reduced to lower CO2 emissions, as well as on the question whether family planning is an effective policy instrument.
In Norway, as in many other rich countries, childlessness is more common among men than women and has also increased more among men. Over the last 15 years, the gap in childlessness between 45-year-old women and men has widened from 5.8 to 10.2 percentage points, according to national register data. In the Norwegian-born subgroup, the gap has increased by 2.4 percentage points, from 5.8 to 8.2. The goal of the study was to identify the demographic drivers of this development, using a quite simple, but original, decomposition approach. The components reflect changes in relative cohort sizes, whether the child has one native and one immigrant parent, whether the father was older than 45, and whether one of the parents already had a child, no longer lived in Norway at age 45, or was unidentified. It was found that the modestly increasing sex gap in childlessness among the Norwegian-born is largely linked to changes in cohort sizes, i.e. fertility trends. Changes in re-partnership have actually contributed weakly in the opposite direction: It has become more common especially among men to have the first child with a partner who already had a child, and thus not contribute to bringing also that person out of childlessness. The importance of the various components is different for immigrants, among whom the sex gap in childlessness has increased particularly much. This development may also reflect that especially male immigrants perhaps have children in the home country who are not included in the Norwegian register.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10680-021-09590-4.
The realisation rates of short-term childbearing intentions are known to be consistently lower in post-socialist countries than in the rest of Europe. However, the East–West differences in the outcomes of intentions to postpone or forego (further) childbearing have not been previously examined. We employ two panel waves of the Generations and Gender Survey in six countries (three from Eastern and three from Western Europe), and, based on the short- and long-term fertility intentions expressed by respondents at the first survey wave, we classify the births occurring between two waves as intended, sooner-than-intended, or unintended. We find that in our study population of non-teenage respondents who had the same partner at both survey waves and a child between the two survey waves, between around 10% (Western European countries) and 30% (Eastern European countries) experienced an unintended or a sooner-than-intended birth. The East–West divide is largely driven by the share of unintended parents which is clearly higher in the post-socialist countries. However, the geographical pattern fades away once we control for the anticipated costs of having a child. Our study gives insight into East–West differences in attitudes to childbearing and into how they affect reproductive behaviour. It also offers methodological improvements of cross-national panel surveys designed to examine childbearing intentions that would allow for a more accurate assessment of childbearing intendedness.
The aim of this paper is to examine differences in life expectancy (LE) between self-employed (SE) and paid employee (PE) workers when they become retirement pensioners, looking at levels of pension income using administrative data from Spanish social security records. We draw on the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (CSWL) to quantify changes in total life expectancy at age 65 (LE65) among retired men over the longest possible period covered by this data source: 2005–2018. These changes are broken down by pension regime and initial pension income level for three periods. The literature presents mixed evidence, even for the same country–for Japan and Italy, for example–with some studies pointing to higher life expectancy for SE than for PE retirement pensioners while others argue the opposite. In Spain, LE65 is slightly higher for the SE than for PE workers when retirement pensioners. For 2005–2010, a gap in life expectancy of 0.23 years between SE and PE retirement pensioners is observed. This widens to 0.55 years for 2014–2018. A similar trend can be seen if pension income groups are considered. For 2005–2010, the gap in LE65 between pensioners in the lowest and highest income groups is 1.20 years. This widens over time and reaches 1.51 years for 2014–2018. Although these differences are relatively small, they are statistically significant. According to our research, the implications for policy on social security are evident: differences in life expectancy by socioeconomic status and pension regime should be taken into account for a variety of issues involving social security schemes. These include establishing the age of eligibility for retirement pensions and early access to benefits, computing the annuity factors used to determine initial retirement benefits and valuing the liabilities taken on for retirement pensioners.
Previous research has shown that seemingly irrelevant events such as unexpected outcomes in sporting events can affect mood and have relevant consequences for episodes of crime and violence, investing behavior and political preferences. In this article, we test whether mood shocks associated with unexpected results in soccer matches in Spain affect fertility. We use data on betting odds and actual scores to define mood shocks and link them to births by month and province in Spain, between 2001 and 2015. We find that unexpected losses of local teams lead to a small decrease in the number of births nine months thereafter. The effect is larger for more unexpected losses, in those provinces with the largest amount of support for the local team and robust to a number of placebo tests. We argue that these results are consistent with the gain–loss asymmetry predicted by prospect theory.
Informed by the life course perspective, this paper investigates whether and how employment and family trajectories are jointly associated with subjective, relational and financial wellbeing later in life. We draw on data from the Swiss Household Panel which combines biographical retrospective information on work, partnership and childbearing trajectories with 19 annual waves containing a number of wellbeing indicators as well as detailed socio-demographic and social origin information. We use sequence analysis to identify the main family and work trajectories for men and women aged 20–50 years old. We use OLS regression models to assess the association between those trajectories and their interdependency with wellbeing. Results reveal a joint association between work and family trajectories and wellbeing at older age, even net of social origin and pre-trajectory resources. For women, but not for men, the association is also not fully explained by proximate (current family and work status) determinants of wellbeing. Women’s stable full-time employment combined with traditional family trajectories yields a subjective wellbeing premium, whereas childlessness and absence of a stable partnership over the life course is associated with lower levels of financial and subjective wellbeing after 50 especially in combination with a trajectory of weak labour market involvement. Relational wellbeing is not associated with employment trajectories, and only weakly linked to family trajectories among men.