European Journal of Political Research

Published by Springer Verlag
Online ISSN: 1475-6765
Print ISSN: 0304-4130
Levels of class voting (measured by log-odds ratios) and linear trends in 20 countries, 1945-1990
Zero-order correlations between explanatory variables and the levels of class voting per country, 1945-1990
Analyzing data obtained from the literature and our own calculations, significant differences were found among countries in their levels of class voting. The Scandinavian countries had the highest and Canada and the USA the lowest levels of class voting. Since the 1950s, there was a decline in almost all countries in the level of class voting. In this article, several hypotheses were deduced from a limited number of individual assumptions, each purporting to explain the differences among and declining trends within countries. Testing these hypotheses with multilevel techniques revealed that differences among countries can best be explained by their population's religious-ethnic-linguistic diversity, and by the union density within countries. The decline in most countries can best be explained by the rise in their standard of living. Furthermore, a rise in the percentage of union members, especially among the nonmanual classes, accelerated the decline in the level of class voting in some countries.
We propose a measure of voter ideology which combines party manifesto data compiled by Budge, Robertson, Heari, Klingemann, and Volkens (1992) and updated by Volkens (1995), with election return data. Assuming the comparability and relevance of left- right ideology, we estimate the median voter position in 15 Western democracies throughout most of the postwar period. The plausibility of our assumptions, and therefore the validity of our measure, is supported by the results of several validity tests. With this new measure we are able to make cross-national comparisons of voter ideology among these countries as well as cross- time comparisons within individual countries. We discuss the potential application of our measure to various debates in political science.
In this article, a study is presented of the ideological shift to the right that took place in the Swedish elite-dominated public debate between 1969 and 1989. The first aim of the article is to present the results of a number of analyses of the shift. Two questions guided the analyses: first, what was the ideological content of this swing to the right? Second, how comprehensive was it? The results indicate that the shift could best be described as a neo-liberalization of the debate, and that conservative ideas were still virtually absent from the arenas of public debate in the late 1980s. The comprehensiveness of the shift was studied (a) as the proportion of neo-liberal ideas put forward as explicit statements in the debate arenas, and (b) as influence on the normative and descriptive use of political terms such as the Swedish words for democracy, justice and equality. The results showed a neo-liberalization of the usage of some of the terms. The second aim of the article is to suggest, by example, certain methods for the analysis of ideological change and to evaluate those methods.
There are two clearly differentiated parts to thiswork. The first consists of areview of the theoretical arguments that underliethe so-called `resourcesof power hypothesis'. That theory has beenused to explain the growth anddevelopment of the Welfare State in severalEuropean countries. The findingsof a number of empirical works backing up thattheory have also been includedin this review. The intention of the second partis to check the theory against theSpanish case between 1975 and 1995. The conclusionof this work is that if, besidesconsidering the ideological persuasion of theparty controlling the government, wetake into account the other relevant factorsencompassed by the theory, then the`resources of power hypothesis' is validin explaining and interpreting themake-up and scope of the Spanish Welfare State.
The country tables of the data collection Political Data 1945–1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies (European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (July 1993), pp. 1–119) are updated and corrected to the end of 1995. Errors and omissions on the level of separate Ministers and/or Ministries have been corrected as well. These are listed as changes/corrections in the corresponding tables in the original data collection.
In this article we set out to improve our knowledge onvoting for extreme right-wing parties, i.e. the Republikaner, by taking into account social,political and contextual characteristics. We test fourtheories that provide explanations as to why certainsocial categories are more likely to vote for the Republikaner. The hypotheses are tested withmultilevel analyses, with data from a national sample(N = 4688). Multinomial analyses provide additionalinformation on how theoretically derived politicalattitudes effect voting behaviour.
Previous research has indicated that the success of the directional model of issue voting depends on levels of political sophistication and how party position is measured. Using 1991and 1995 Belgian Election Surveys, the predictive power of proximity and directional measures are compared controlling for both variables. It is shown that when one uses overall mean placements, instead of mean placements by level of political sophistication, the proximity effect declines most among the highly sophisticated voters. The article also compares the performance of the proximity and directional measures across party systems. Contrary to theoretical expectations, party-system differences between Flanders and Wallonia do not affect the explanatory power of either of these measures. It is only in the cases of the liberal, socialist and extreme right parties that the directional measure is clearly superior. A closer analysis of this result indicates that the relative success of the directional measure is due to the limited number of issues from which those parties draw support.
This paper deals with the 1994 Italian elections to both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. It discusses: the new electoral system introduced for these elections; the realignment of the Italian party system since the previous election; patterns in the election results and the implications of these for the future. The paper argues that crucial differences in electoral law explain differences in the pattern of Senate and Chamber results. Considering regional patterns of voting, only the southern part of the country showed signs of close competition between the main party cartels. Comparing plurality and PR voting at constituency level, the paper highlights the inability of candidates of the left to mobilise supporters of other parties in their cartel in plurality elections, a factor that does not augur well for the left in future elections.
One of the most effective mechanisms for obtaining an overview of the general direction of political science in a particular country is an examination of the output of its journal literature. This article lists the contents of the 1996 issues of selected European political science journals from a range of European countries (normally, those published by national political science associations) and comments on their content. Recent developments in three types of publishing on the world wide web are also reviewed and the relevant addresses are supplied. First, print journals increasingly maintain a minimal presence on the web, but in certain cases this extends a good deal further, to include abstracts or even the full texts of selected articles and links to related resources. Second, European governments are now all represented on the web in one form or another, though they vary greatly in terms of the range of governmental institutions covered and in the volume of documentation available. Third, the huge increase in political coverage on the web makes the indexing of this material all the more important, and we offer a listing of the major guides to national political science resources.
This article continues the annual review of developments in European political science periodical literature. The review covers not just traditional print media but also electronic publishing, and therefore begins with an overview of a pilot project in integrated electronic publishing, the SuperJournal project, which links a range of British-published political science journals in an electronic cluster that facilitates ease of access by individual users. We continue with a summary of developments in political science journal publishing in central and eastern Europe in the aftermath of the political upheavals after 1989. The article concludes with a listing of the contents of the 1997 issues of selected European political science journals from a range of European countries (normally, those published by national political science associations) and comments on their content.
In this lecture I discuss the development of the social divisions in Western Europe and their translation into politics. I successively take up the three aspects embraced by the notion of cleavages – their structural base, the political values of the groups involved, and their political articulation. My main argument is that the decline of traditional cleavages does not necessarily signify the end of structuration of politics by social divisions. There is ample empirical evidence for the existence of a new social division between two segments of the new middle class, which has important consequences for politics. This new social division is shown to be closely linked to the new value cleavage although it is not able to fully account for the enormous political implications which contrasting value-orientations have today. Finally, I suggest that the political articulation of both the transformed class structure and the new configuration of values is strongly shaped by the political legacy of traditional cleavages.
Most conventional accounts of voting behaviour fit single models to the entire electorate, implicitly assuming that all voters respond to the same sets of influences, and do so in similar ways. However, a growing body of research suggests that this approach may be misleading, and that distinct groups of voters approach politics, and the electoral decision, from different perspectives. The paper takes a disaggregated look at voting in the 1997 British General Election, dividing voters into different groups according totheir formal educational qualifications. Results suggest that different groups of voters respond to different stimuli, depending on their education, and on the party they are voting for.
This article addresses the issue of whether a model of deep European integration might be envisaged in a continent-wide process that might accompany eastern enlargement of the European Union. The paper argues that deep integration in Western Europe has been built on three dimensions: the functional; the territorial; and affiliational. The articulation of these three dimensions has evolved through not only the EU, but also a dense pattern of other transnational linkages, including those between immediate neighbours. Moreover, different west European countries have been linked into this process through varied patterns for domesticating Europe. Efforts to develop an EU polity require the interplay of all three dimensions of integration, a tough goal for post-cold-war Europe in the western part of the continent, let alone in pan-Europe.
Issues in National Politics in 1999 The Kosovo crisis and the elections to the European Parliament were the two topics that affected politics in most of the 29 countries treated in this issue of the Political Data Yearbook. The military actions of NATO countries against Serbia were mostly approved of, except in Greece, where the general public supported the Serbs, placing the Greek government in a rather difficult position. Political parties in Italy, a country deeply involved in the military operations, were divided on the issue. And Central European countries learned the consequences of their recent membership of NATO, in that they were asked to support Western military action against a country in Eastern Europe. The elections to the European Parliament aroused far less public attention. Voting turnout was very low in many countries, but it was not limited to European elections only. Also on other occasions indifference towards the electoral process in democracies seems to be growing, as the low turnout at general elections in New Zealand, in Finland or at local and provincial elections in Norway may indicate. Another phenomenon that also touched politics in many countries was political scandal. Most political scandals were related to the financing of political parties and/or candidates, but not all of them, as the Lewinsky-affair in the United States shows. The most prominent financial scandal was the Kohl affair in Germany, that was to reach its peak in 2000. In a sense it was a specific type of financial scandal, in that it was not so much about corruption or fraud, but rather about the fact that former chancellor Kohl had refused to publish the names of donors, which is illegal in Germany. Corruption, fraud or tax evasion were reported in other countries (Belgium, France, Hungary, Ireland, New Zealand), indicating that the ‘spiral of scandals’, mentioned in the Political Data Yearbook 1994 has not been broken as yet. Sometimes resulting from financial scandals, new legislation was introduced on the financing of parties and/or elections (United Kingdom, the Netherlands).
The ongoing use of the concept of corporatism in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different lists of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long-term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic integration which is clearly linear and which has no problem cases. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non-integrated (or pluralist) economies.
Modern democracy requires delegation. Oneproblem with delegation is that principals andagents often have conflicting interests. A secondproblem is that principals lack informationabout their agents. Many scholars conclude that theseproblems cause delegation to become abdication. Wereject this conclusion and introduce a theory ofdelegation that supports a different conclusion. Thetheory clarifies when interest conflicts andinformation problems do (and do not) turn delegationinto abdication. We conclude by arguing that remediesfor common delegation problems can be embedded in thedesign of electoral, legislative, and bureaucraticinstitutions. The culmination of our efforts is asimple, but general, statement about when citizens andlegislators can (and cannot) control their agents.
This paper begins by identifying a framework in which we can study democratic representation and accountability, namely the neo-institutional rational choice literature on delegation and agency. I suggest why I believe that the enforcement of accountability is becoming a more and more central democratic issue. I then go on to share some data from Norwegian election surveys that indicate that voters, at least in this country, are increasingly available to play the part that democratic accountability requires. Finally, I present evidence that political leaders in coalition bargaining anticipate and are constrained by this electoral accountability, sometimes with surprising results. There is even a silver lining to this part of my story, in the sense that coalition outcomes that may at first sight seem deviant or even pathological, may in fact play a perfectly normal part in the democratic process.
Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced bypoliticians and especially by the scholarly communitybut remains less widely understood. In this essay, Iidentify the institutional features that defineparliamentary democracy and suggest how they can beunderstood as delegation relationships. I proposetwo definitions: one minimal and one maximal (orideal-typical). In the latter sense, parliamentarydemocracy is a particular regime of delegation andaccountability that can be understood with the help ofagency theory, which allows us to identify theconditions under which democratic agency problems mayoccur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, andrelies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism hascertain advantages, such as decisional efficiency andthe inducements it creates toward effort. On theother hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantagessuch as ineffective accountability and a lack oftransparency, which may cause informationalinefficiencies. And whereas parliamentarism may beparticularly suitable for problems of adverseselection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard.In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism isfacing the challenges of decaying screening devicesand diverted accountabilities
In modern democracies politicalparties exist because (1) they reduce transactioncosts in the electoral, parliamentary and governmentalarenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collectiveaction. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutionalchain of political delegation and accountability workin practice. Party representatives in public officeare ultimately the agents of the extra-parliamentaryparty organization. In order to contain agency lossparties rely on party-internal mechanisms and theinstitutionalisation of party rights in public rulesand, in contrast to US parties, they apply the fullrange of ex ante and ex post mechanisms.Generally, the role of party is weaker the furtherdown the chain of delegation.
In the actor-centered institutionalist approach of Fritz Scharpf (1997), `actor constellations' constitute the crucial link between substantive policy analysis and interaction-oriented policy research. This paper presents an attempt to conceptualize the `actor constellation' in a given policy domain and to analyze it empirically with network analysis. The empirical context is provided by the Swiss energy policy elite in the late 1990s – an example of a policy domain in transition between two policy equilibria. Based on interviewswith 240 of the core actors in this policy elite, the results show a characteristic antagonism between a pro-ecology and a pro-growth coalition. On the national level, the two coalitions are of comparable size and power, which explains the current impasse in the policy domain in question. Moreover, in a federalist state like Switzerland, the energy policy elite is not concentrated at the center, but the basic antagonism is reproduced in each region nationwide. Confirming the consensus character of Swiss politics, the different components of the two antagonist coalitions not only cooperate within, but also acrosscoalitions. These cooperative ties and the presence of honest brokers, policy enterpreneurs, and heterogeneous interests within each coalition provide opportunities for new alliances, which may lead out of the current impasse in the more or less near future.
Most decisions by the European Parliament are taken by an absolute majority of its members. Some decisions however – such as the approval of the budget of the European Union – require a two-thirds majority. The paper analyzes the a priori voting strength of the member states when their representatives vote coherently. It is shown that the increase in votes for Germany in the 1994 reallocation enhanced its position. A less favourable effect, however, can be seen for the other large members (France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain). However, since votes in the EP tend to be cast according to partisan rather than national affiliation, the relative voting power of the political groups with respect to the two quotas is also analyzed. The tool to measure this is the (normalized) Banzhaf power index, partially extended to account for connected coalitions. The paper demonstrates that the distribution of votes between the present EU member states as allocated in proportion to their population size indeed roughly corresponds to their a priori voting power. However, the relative influence of the largest political groups, the European Socialists and the European People's Party, tends to be overestimated by their share of seats in the framework of the simple majority rule, but it is considerable if the quota is two-thirds. Finally, under the two-thirds majority rule, the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party as well as the small groups appear to be almost powerless. The more the EP gains political leverage – a further increase in its institutional powers is to be expected in the framework of the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference – the more the distribution of voting power between the member states and between the political groups will be a crucial factor in the shaping of EU policies.
Comparison of Court and Council Positions 
Institutional plans from the Treaty of Rome to the Single European Act
The purpose of this article is twofold. Our first goal is to make explicit an institutionalist theory of European integration. This theory is based on the concept of conditional agenda setting, which we argue has played an important role in European integration. According to this theory, the fact that Commission proposals are more easily accepted than modified by the Council has accelerated the pace of integration. This finding brings us to the second goal of this article which is to investigate, by studying the history of EU institutions, whether or not these institutions were the result of conscious planning. We demonstrate that while some of the founding fathers (Hallstein, Spaak) and opponents of the EU (de Gaulle) had an accurate understanding of the institutional structures created in Rome, later participants in the integration process did not. In particular, the arguments surrounding the Single European Act indicate a lack of understanding of the full implications of the institutions selected.
Delegation from cabinet to ministers iscomplicated because the cabinet consists of the sameministers that are supposed to act as its agents. Inthe extreme case ministers are completely autonomouswithin their portfolio. This paper argues that theresulting potential for agency loss is limited, butnot negated, by both hierarchy and collectivedecision-making in cabinet, or by establishing directdelegation relationships between legislativecommittees or political parties and ministers,bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerialoffice are the prevailing exception to ministerialautonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferencesare not stable and exogenous, screening beforeappointments is an ineffective control, andministerial identification with departmental interestsis the most probable source of agency loss.
In a comparative study of five countries: Australia, Canada, the Republic of Ireland, the UK, and the USA, this article examines the degree of convergence of agricultural credit policy content, policy instruments, and policy outcomes on a market liberal model. It shows that all five countries have moved toward market liberal policy arrangements over the past quarter century of globalizing and domestic fiscal pressures, but important differences in policy remain. The Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom move further toward a market liberal model than do Australia, Canada, and the USA. The distinct national paths taken to market liberalism give rise to policy feedback that hastens or retards the adoption of a fully market liberal system. Historical choices of policy instruments and path dependence help account for continuing policy divergence.
This article examines the classification of regime types. It shows that most writers classify regime types with reference to both their dispositional properties (whether there is a president and/or a prime minister, whether or not they are popularly elected and whether or not they serve for a fixed term) and their relational properties (the actual patterns of executive politics in the political system). It is argued that this juxtaposition of dispositional and relational properties creates a conceptual ambiguity. As a result, it is concluded that classifications of regime types should be made on the basis of either dispositional or relational properties but not both together. It then shows that writers who classify regime types with reference to relational properties are likely to make highly contestable assumptions about how power is actually exercised. This is because the question of where executive power lies in a particular country is often subject to not just one incontestable interpretation but to a number of contestable and mutually exclusive interpretations. This point is illustrated by examining the case of the Fifth French Republic. Therefore, it is concluded that the classification of regime types should be made with reference to dispositional properties alone.
The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it. The ambition of this study is to reassess the behavioural autonomy of the European Commission (Commission), as well as organisational conditions thereof. To accomplish this, this paper utilizes one under-researched laboratory of the Commission: temporary officials (SNEs). It is argued that SNEs may serve as a crucial test-bed of Commission autonomy due to SNEs’ ambiguous affiliation towards the Commission. Whereas past studies claims that SNEs have a predominant intergovernmental behavioural pattern, this study demonstrates that the SNEs foremost blend departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby safeguarding their behavioural autonomy. It is also argued that to understand Commission autonomy, the organisational anatomy of the Commission organisation has to be carefully considered. The organisational anatomy is measured by considering the following four independent variables: (i) the organisational composition of the Commission services, (ii) organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance, (iii) recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called “submarine” approach, and (iv) socialisation dynamics inside the Commission. The study demonstrates that the autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject to what Lipsky (1980:19) calls actors’ conspicuous desire for autonomy. One implication of our findings is that Commission autonomy is sensitive to reforms of the Commission apparatus.
The paper applies a structural perspective to the analysis of political preferences. Examining two British surveys, the 1987 cross-section of the electorate and a panel survey that covers the 1983 and 1987 elections, the research explores the bases of persistent voting for the same party, location on left-right scales, and the probability of holding the same policy views on a host of different issues over time. A set of structural variables rests at the heart of the paper';s theory: discussion networks, patterns of interactions with members of political parties, social class networks, and location in the social structure. Several hypotheses guide the analysis: The effects of the structural variables on the probability of casting a ballot for the same political party in any one election and in adjacent elections will remain, even after controlling for party identification; political party socialization; location on left-right scales; positions taken on any and all political issues; age, and past levels of electoral stability. The effects of structural variables on left-right position will remain, even after controlling for locations on alternative left-right scales. Finally, reinforcing attitudinal context provides the only consistent determinant of stable policy positions, after controlling for a host of alternative explanations including level of education; age; interest in politics, and a general propensity to offer stable answers to political questions.
Regressions of full models for the explanation of part support in eight countries
Interactions with radical right parties
In this article we address the question whether or not the votes for anti-immigrant parties can be considered as protest votes. We define protest votes by the motives underlying electoral choices, building on earlier research done by Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). That research showed that ideological proximity and party size are the best predictors of party preference. On this basis we designed a typology of motives for party choice and how these motives would manifest themselves empirically. Analyzing the 1994 elections for the European Parliament for seven political systems we show that anti-immigrant parties attract no more protest votes than other parties do, with only one exception: the Dutch Centrumdemocraten. Voting for anti-immigrant parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties. In addition, (negative) attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties. Social cleavages and attitudes towards European unification are of minor importance as determinants of preferences for anti-immigrant parties. The overall conclusion is that a rational choice model of electoral behavior has strong explanatory power for party preferences in general, but also for the support for anti-immigrant parties in particular.
Peak-level organization of business interests in Italy
Peak-level organization of business interests in Greece
The article explores changes in the politics of business associability in Italy and Greece, focusing in particular on a set of comparable domestic and European developments that have played the roles of stimuli for the slow but unmistakable transformation of interest politics. Against a background of intense politicization, changes that are taking place since the 1980s suggest that organized interests become disentangled from the linkages which sustained party colonization and state dominance. Changes in interest politics were facilitated by the transition to a majoritarian system (in Italy) and party alternation (in Greece). The disentanglement we refer to would be difficult under conditions of sharing-out government; conversely, alternating governments facilitate changes in the relationships between interests, parties and policy-making. Apart from the domestic sources of change, the article argues that shifts in interest politics are the combined outcome of wider challenges and of the impact of Europeanization. On the basis of this analysis, we speculate that the disentanglement of interest politics may be conducive to national policy adjustment in two possible scenarios. Either by enabling intersectoral agreements over policy issues or by freeing national policy-making from the burden of oligopolisticcoalitions – a social democratic and a neoliberal scenario respectively.
Claims have been made that national institutions influence public preferences, as well as structuring patterns of social division. This article analyses attitudes to redistribution and financial cheating in Norway and the USA. On the aggregate level the results show that there are striking differences between the two countries regarding attitudes to redistribution and confidence in the state, while similar attitude patterns are found regarding cheating with taxes and benefits. Results endorse arguments emphasising that the design and scope of welfare state policies shape and determine their own legitimacy. There is less support for political trust arguments, which emphasise that the efficacy of political decision-making institutions promotes beliefs about trust in the state and views on government responsibilities. Similarly, arguments proposing that advanced welfare statism has undesirable effects on civic morality, such as cheating on taxes and benefits, are not supported empirically. Finally, while conflicts over redistribution are similarly structured in the USA and Norway, divisions over financial cheating are less clear-cut and vary cross-nationally.
This essay provides a critical assessment of an important contribution to the debate on institutional efficiency and inefficiency in European policy-making: the thesis on the joint- decision trap. This trap was identified by Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy-making in the European Union. The essay argues that joint-decision traps may be a much more prevalent phenomenon than envisaged by Scharpf. However, the essay demonstrates that joint-decision traps are not inherent to joint- decision systems. The basic argument of the essay is that the effects of joint-decision systems on public policy is contingent upon the central government's ability to threaten intergovernmental actors with exit. If this is possible, joint-decision systems turn into an asset. This argument is made on the basis of an analysis of intergovernmental relations in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and a comparison of the Scandinavian systems with those of France and Germany.
This paper explores the emergence of direct linkages between the international economy and the state government of Baden-Wrttemberg, Germany. In the early 1990s Baden-Wrttemberg embarked on a plan in which the laender government took the lead in organizing a large-scale, high technology project for the development of interactive television. Creating a `network' between itself and major economic actors the laender government sought to enhance the economic development of the region. However, as the economic actors involved in the project questioned the economic viability of interactive television, they began to withdraw from the project. The project's failure demonstrates the incompatibility of political objectives with the economic goals of actors in a globalized economy. We conclude that as attractive as the network approach may be for regional and national governments, it is likely to be successful only where both sets of actors see the outcome as enhancing their respective priorities (political legitimacy and economic gains).
This article reviews a selected range of comparativepolitical research on women's movements, a subfield ofpolitical science whose recent proliferation nowpositions it at the leading edge of women and politicsscholarship. Recognizing that ``women'' as a categoryof research is of necessity heterogeneous and informedby differences of race, class, ethnicity, nationality,generation, and religion, the article argues that thiscomplex intersectionality need not mean that women'smovements are beyond the scope of comparativepolitical research. Rather, as the research focus ofwomen and politics scholars has become increasinglycarefully specified, general patterns are evident inthe research that should serve to advance thecomparative study of women's movements and comparativepolitical research more generally. The articlefocuses on definitional challenges and the limitationsof conflating ``women's movements'', ``feministmovements'', and ``women in social movements'', anddiscusses four major research arenas within whichcross-national commonalities among women's movementsare evidenced. These include the relationship betweenwomen's movements and political parties; ``doublemilitancy'' as a potentially distinctive collectiveidentity problem for women's movement activists; theextent to which political opportunities for women'smovements are (or can be) gendered; and therelationship between women's movements and the state.The article concludes with suggestions for futureresearch in the subfields of comparative women'smovements and comparative politics.
Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo-liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for `regulatory business' from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an `efficiency' regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo-liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
The development of political science was closely connected to the democratic changes and the restoration of statehood at the end of the 1980s in Lithuania. This paper examines the historical and contemporary social and academic roots of political science in the country. The other issue investigated in detail is the institutionalisation of political studies, which required the development of new academic curricula. Major vehicles for the institutionalization of political science were the decentralisation of academic activities and the establishment of new institutions, such as the Institute of Political Science and International Relations (University of Vilnius) and the Lithuanian Political Science Association, and intensive cooperation with Western universities and funding organizations. Nonetheless, the growth and efficiency of political studies and research depend very much on their successful integration into the environment of the existing universities. The research output of Lithuanian political science is characterised by a widening of research interests and the further introduction of statistical and computer methods of investigation, with problems of Lithuania's foreign and security policy and issues of democratisation as topics of continuing popularity.
In this paper we analyse the literature on a particular aspect of immigrant integration in Western European welfare states: the extent to which this can be explained by conditions set by institutions, social rights and rights of residence. Our focus is on health care, old age insurance, housing and vocational training, and on the circumstances under which migrants have access to benefits from the general systems of social security. In particular, the assignment of a legal position by the rights of residence plays an essential role. The various legal groups have access to social benefits depending on their status of residence. The institutional framework of each welfare states is also relevant to the access that people have to social benefits. In the countries analysed, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the individual security systems are organized oaccording to different political concepts, each of them allowing immigrants access to their benefits to a different degree. On the whole, the degree and kind of governmental regulations seem to be crucially important for the integration of immigrants into the welfare state.
In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, onprofessional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain betweenelite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations,and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based onthe objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood ofelections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economyand on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form ofelection-related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirroredby election-related cycles in personal and general expectations formed bythe mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from eliteexpectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed,our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectationsand voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of eliteforecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implicationsof our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of masselectorates.
After the radical political changes of 1989, new possibilities for the development of political science appeared in Bulgaria. The discipline went through its own transitional periods. The first was the legitimisation of political science and its institutionalisation in the major academic institutions. The second, which remains at an early stage, is the establishment of a community of scholars and university staff with the necessary theoretical knowledge and resources for assuring its development. Of the major challenges which political science is facing today, one is the need to ensure the expansion of the community of scholars who are sufficiently familiar with recent developments in the discipline. Another is the need to overcome the politicisation of the discipline which was typical of many social scientists (and especially political scientists) at the beginning of the period of change. To an increasing extent, political science is not merely a product of democracy but also one of the major scientific resources for achieving its consolidation.
The article examines the role of governments in thetransition in cable policy in the three largest mediacountries of Europe (Britain, France and Germany). Intheoretical terms it is argued that the involvement ofgovernments in determining the course of developmentof cable systems has comprised three main stages. Inthe first stage, governments tried to ignore cable andprevent the establishment of cable infrastructure. Inthe second stage, governments regulated the technologyin order to promote a national cable policy andencourage the overall development of the broadcastingmedia. In the third stage, although at differentspeeds and perceptions, governments deregulated cableby giving permission to market forces to dominatecable's development and abandoning the social goals ofcable policy.
The argument presented is that political culture and institutional structures independently shape government performance. This is consistent with Putnam et al's (1983) initial argument that endogenous and exogenous factors are independently at work in shaping institutional performance. It is hypothesized that: (I) social capital within a community positively contributes to government performance, and (2) governmental institutional forms that minimize the number of veto players in the decision making process generate performance superior to those where the number of veto players is large. An analysis of cross-sectional data (mainly drawn from surveys of citizens and elites) on 30 small- to medium-size municipalities in East and West Germany from the year 1995 is undertaken to evaluate these hypotheses. The results from this analysis lead to the following conclusions. Higher social capital within the elite political culture of a community leads to greater citizen satisfaction with local government performance. Local government structures where power is centralized (and thus the number of veto players minimized) generate greater citizen satisfaction with government performance than do those where the distribution of power is more diffuse.
This paper critiques what can be interpreted as an application of the literature on state failure in current political economy and political science to the changing role of political parties in advanced post-industrial democracies, Katz and Mair's theory of cartel parties. It develops an alternative set of hypotheses about the dynamics of parties and party systems with the objective to clarify empirical terms according to which rival propositions can be tested. Specifically, the paper rejects three propositions in the theory of cartel parties and advances the following alternatives. First, party leaders are not divorced from their members and voting constituencies, but become ever more sensitive to their preferences. Second, inter-party cooperation generates a prisoner's dilemma in the competitive arena that ultimately prevents the emergence of cartels. Ideological convergence of rival parties has causes external to the competitive arena, not internal to it. Third, conventional parties cannot marginalize or coopt new challengers, but must adjust to their demands and electoral appeals. The age of cartel parties, if it ever existed, is not at its beginning, but its end.
The tentative evidence which has emerged from multi-organisational implementation processing has had little impact on explanatory theoretical frameworks. The literature uses top-down and bottom-up models as if they were totally discrete ways of examining the institutionalisation of an implementation process. However, actual processes tend to fall somewhere between these two extremes. In this paper, I consider why this might be the case and suggest that there are ways of solving the theoretical dilemmas which prevent a comprehensive analysis of implementation processing. Using evidence from a recently completed case study of the implementation of environmental health-care in Finland, I suggest that the evidence of an interplay between the mandated implementors and others, be they public or private agents, may be an indication of an effective method of coping with these issues.
The proportional arena has been designed as a buffer and corrective for the hard verdicts of the new Italian plurality system. However, the political impact of this arena is much deeper than its purely electoral role. It measures the loadings of single parties within coalitions and, subsequently, influences their interactions and bargaining tactics. The elections of April 1996 clearly show the effects of institutional learning by the different actors involved: voters, coalitions, candidates, etc. The analysis of electoral data shows the following main findings: (a) the remarkable equilibrium between left-wing and right-wing coalitions; (b) the gains made by the left thanks to its better ability to manage alliances with the centre and extreme left; (c) surprisingly little change in voter behaviour between 1994 and 1996, and most of what change there is deriving from vote nationalization. The main features of Italian electoral geography are also confirmed.
Top-cited authors
Hermann Schmitt
  • The University of Manchester
Hanspeter Kriesi
  • European University Institute
André Blais
  • Université de Montréal
Frans Van Waarden
  • Utrecht University
Thomas Poguntke
  • Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf