Emotion

Although multiple neuroimaging studies suggest that affect labeling (i.e., putting feelings into words) can dampen affect-related responses in the amygdala, the consequences of affect labeling have not been examined in other channels of emotional responding. We conducted four studies examining the effect of affect labeling on self-reported emotional experience. In study one, self-reported distress was lower during affect labeling, compared to passive watching, of negative emotional pictures. Studies two and three added reappraisal and distraction conditions, respectively. Affect labeling showed similar effects on self-reported distress as both of these intentional emotion regulation strategies. In each of the first three studies, however, participant predictions about the effects of affect labeling suggest that unlike reappraisal and distraction, people do not believe affect labeling to be an effective emotion regulation strategy. Even after having the experience of affect labels leading to lower distress, participants still predicted that affect labeling would increase distress in the future. Thus, affect labeling is best described as an incidental emotion regulation process. Finally, study four employed positive emotional pictures and here, affect labeling was associated with diminished self-reported pleasure, relative to passive watching. This suggests that affect labeling tends to dampen affective responses in general, rather than specifically alleviating negative affect.

Reports an error in "It's a bittersweet symphony: Simultaneously mixed emotional responses to music with conflicting cues" by Jeff T. Larsen and Bradley J. Stastny (Emotion, 2011, np). In the first paragraph on page 5, the word "inches" was omitted from the sentence, "As noted by Sir Arthur Eddington (1939; see Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), scientists who cast nets with 2 mesh into the sea may catch many fish, but none of them will be smaller than 2." The corrected sentence is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-12883-001.) Some evidence indicates that emotional reactions to music can be organized along a bipolar valence dimension ranging from pleasant states (e.g., happiness) to unpleasant states (e.g., sadness), but songs can contain some cues that elicit happiness (e.g., fast tempos) and others that elicit sadness (e.g., minor modes). Some models of emotion contend that valence is a basic building block of emotional experience, which implies that songs with conflicting cues cannot make people feel happy and sad at the same time. Other models contend that positivity and negativity are separable in experience, which implies that music with conflicting cues might elicit simultaneously mixed emotions of happiness and sadness. Hunter, Schellenberg, and Schimmack (2008) tested these possibilities by having subjects report their happiness and sadness after listening to music with conflicting cues (e.g., fast songs in minor modes) and consistent cues (e.g., fast songs in major modes). Results indicated that music with conflicting cues elicited mixed emotions, but it remains unclear whether subjects simultaneously felt happy and sad or merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. To examine these possibilities, we had subjects press one button whenever they felt happy and another button whenever they felt sad as they listened to songs with conflicting and consistent cues. Results revealed that subjects spent more time simultaneously pressing both buttons during songs with conflicting, as opposed to consistent, cues. These findings indicate that songs with conflicting cues can simultaneously elicit happiness and sadness and that positivity and negativity are separable in experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Assessing the way people look to judge their intentions" by J. Bruno Debruille, Mathieu B. Brodeur and Ursula Hess ( Emotion , 2011[Jun], Vol 11[3], 533-543). Figure 1 should have been printed in color. The online version has been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-11794-006 .) Faces of unknown persons are processed to infer the intentions of these persons not only when they depict full-blown emotions, but also at rest, or when these faces do not signal any strong feelings. We explored the brain processes involved in these inferences to test whether they are similar to those found when judging full-blown emotions. We recorded the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by faces of unknown persons who, when they were photographed, were not asked to adopt any particular expression. During the ERP recording, participants had to decide whether each face appeared to be that of a positively, negatively, ambiguously, or neutrally intentioned person. The early posterior negativity, the EPN, was found smaller for neutrally categorized faces than for the other faces, suggesting that the automatic processes it indexes are similar to those evoked by full-blown expressions and thus that these processes might be involved in the decoding of intentions. In contrast, in the same 200–400 ms time window, ERPs were not more negative at anterior sites for neutrally intentioned faces. Second, the peaks of the late positive potentials (LPPs) maximal at parietal sites around 700 ms postonset were not significantly smaller for neutrally intentioned faces. Third, the slow positive waves that followed the LPP were larger for faces that took more time to categorize, that is, for ambiguously intentioned faces. These three series of unexpected results may indicate processes similar to those triggered by full-blown emotions studies, but they question the characteristics of these processes.

Does trauma exposure have a long-term impact on the brain and behavior of healthy individuals? The authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess the impact of proximity to the disaster of September 11, 2001, on amygdala function in 22 healthy adults. More than three years after the terrorist attacks, bilateral amygdala activity in response to viewing fearful faces compared to calm ones was higher in people who were within 1.5 miles of the World Trade Center on 9/11, relative to those who were living more than 200 miles away (all were living in the New York metropolitan area at time of scan). This activity mediated the relationship between group status and current symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. In turn, the effect of group status on both amygdala activation (fearful vs. calm faces) and current symptoms was statistically explained by time since worst trauma in lifetime and intensity of worst trauma, as indicated by reported symptoms at time of the trauma. These data are consistent with a model of heightened amygdala reactivity following high-intensity trauma exposure, with relatively slow recovery.

In this article, we present FACSGen 2.0, new animation software for creating static and dynamic three-dimensional facial expressions on the basis of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). FACSGen permits total control over the action units (AUs), which can be animated at all levels of intensity and applied alone or in combination to an infinite number of faces. In two studies, we tested the validity of the software for the AU appearance defined in the FACS manual and the conveyed emotionality of FACSGen expressions. In Experiment 1, four FACS-certified coders evaluated the complete set of 35 single AUs and 54 AU combinations for AU presence or absence, appearance quality, intensity, and asymmetry. In Experiment 2, lay participants performed a recognition task on emotional expressions created with FACSGen software and rated the similarity of expressions displayed by human and FACSGen faces. Results showed good to excellent classification levels for all AUs by the four FACS coders, suggesting that the AUs are valid exemplars of FACS specifications. Lay participants' recognition rates for nine emotions were high, and comparisons of human and FACSGen expressions were very similar. The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the software in producing reliable and emotionally valid expressions, and suggest its application in numerous scientific areas, including perception, emotion, and clinical and neuroscience research.

There is now sufficient work in the literature on emotional intelligence to suggest that this construct or series of constructs deserves serious attention, but several questions remain as to adequate construct validation as well as to the emergence and development of these constructs. There is a need to conduct convergent and divergent validity studies on a midlife sample that is likely to show the optimal level of differentiation of the new constructs. The reference domain of cognitive intelligence should be constructed in a multiple-construct manner, and the validation procedure should use confirmatory factor analysis and P. S. Dwyer's (1937) extension method. Once properly validated, there is a need to study the emergence, age differences, and age changes in the level and structure of emotional intelligence. A paradigm that investigates the invariance of factor structure across age and uses the model of differentiation-dedifferentiation would be useful for this purpose.

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen (2003) contend that confusion is an emotion because it is valenced, it has a distinct facial expression, and it has a distinct internal state. On the basis of these criteria, they call for further study of this unstudied stateand challenge emotion researchers to consider "confusion" to be an emotion. The author agrees with Rozin and Cohen (2003) that confusion is an affective state, is valenced, has an (internal) object, may be expressed facially, and that laypersons may, under certain circumstances, consider it an emotion. However, its expression is likely to be an expressive component of emotions for which goal obstruction is central. Further, confusion may also not be as commonly considered an emotion by laypersons, as Rozin and Cohen contend. Finally, confusion is not unstudied, only most of the time it is not emotion researchers who do the researching.

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) method of sending students out to observe each other in familiar circumstances undoubtedly exaggerated the apparent prevalence of confusion, concentration, and worry. The expressions they observed probably ranged from regulatory feedback and communicative signals to expressions of the "intellectual emotions" described by C. Darwin (1872/1965). Appraisal theories can easily accommodate these affective states; there is no need to postulate new "basic emotions" unless one adheres to a rigid categorical view of emotion. Finally, Rozin and Cohen have made a valuable contribution by reminding us of the importance of emotions related to interest.

This investigation uncovered several substantial errors in the confirmatory factor analysis results reported by J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, D. R. Caruso, and G. Sitarenios (see record 2003-02341-015). Specifically, the values associated with the close-fit indices (normed fit index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and root-mean-square error of approximation) are inaccurate. A reanalysis of the Mayer et al. subscale intercorrelation matrix provided accurate values of the close-fit indices, which resulted in different evaluations of the models tested by J. D. Mayer et al. Contrary to J. D. Mayer et al., the 1-factor model and the 2-factor model did not provide good fit. Although the 4-factor model was still considered good fitting, the non-constrained 4-factor model yielded a non-positive definite matrix, which was interpreted to be due to the fact that two of the branch-level factors (Perceiving and Facilitating) were collinear, suggesting that a model with 4 factors was implausible.

In this article, the authors elaborate on 3 ideas advanced in P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) innovative study of facial expression. Taking a cue from their discovery of new expressive behaviors (e.g., the narrowed eyebrows), the authors review recent studies showing that emotions are conveyed in more channels than usually studied, including posture, gaze patterns, voice, and touch. Building on their claim that confusion has a distinct display, the authors review evidence showing distinct displays for 3 self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, shame, and pride), 5 positive emotions (amusement, desire, happiness, love, interest), and sympathy and compassion. Finally, the authors offer a functional definition of emotion to integrate these findings on "new" displays and emotions.

An automatic vigilance hypothesis states that humans preferentially attend to negative stimuli, and this attention to negative valence disrupts the processing of other stimulus properties. Thus, negative words typically elicit slower color naming, word naming, and lexical decisions than neutral or positive words. Larsen, Mercer, and Balota analyzed the stimuli from 32 published studies, and they found that word valence was confounded with several lexical factors known to affect word recognition. Indeed, with these lexical factors covaried out, Larsen et al. found no evidence of automatic vigilance. The authors report a more sensitive analysis of 1011 words. Results revealed a small but reliable valence effect, such that negative words (e.g., "shark") elicit slower lexical decisions and naming than positive words (e.g., "beach"). Moreover, the relation between valence and recognition was categorical rather than linear; the extremity of a word's valence did not affect its recognition. This valence effect was not attributable to word length, frequency, orthographic neighborhood size, contextual diversity, first phoneme, or arousal. Thus, the present analysis provides the most powerful demonstration of automatic vigilance to date.

Reports an error in "Affect dynamics, affective forecasting, and aging" by Lisbeth Nielsen, Brian Knutson and Laura L. Carstensen (Emotion, 2008[Jun], Vol 8[3], 318-330). The first author of the article was listed as being affiliated with both the National Institute on Aging and the Department of Psychology, Stanford University. Dr. Nielsen would like to clarify that the research for this article was conducted while she was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University. The copyright notice should also have been listed as "In the Public Domain." (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-06717-002.) Affective forecasting, experienced affect, and recalled affect were compared in younger and older adults during a task in which participants worked to win and avoid losing small monetary sums. Dynamic changes in affect were measured along valence and arousal dimensions, with probes during both anticipatory and consummatory task phases. Older and younger adults displayed distinct patterns of affect dynamics. Younger adults reported increased negative arousal during loss anticipation and positive arousal during gain anticipation. In contrast, older adults reported increased positive arousal during gain anticipation but showed no increase in negative arousal on trials involving loss anticipation. Additionally, younger adults reported large increases in valence after avoiding an anticipated loss, but older adults did not. Younger, but not older, adults exhibited forecasting errors on the arousal dimension, underestimating increases in arousal during anticipation of gains and losses and overestimating increases in arousal in response to gain outcomes. Overall, the findings are consistent with a growing literature suggesting that older people experience less negative emotion than their younger counterparts and further suggest that they may better predict dynamic changes in affect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Neural mechanisms of anger regulation as a function of genetic risk for violence" by Nelly Alia-Klein, Rita Z. Goldstein, Dardo Tomasi, Patricia A. Woicik, Scott J. Moeller, Benjamin Williams, Ian W. Craig, Frank Telang, Anat Biegon, Gene-Jack Wang, Joanna S. Fowler and Nora D. Volkow (Emotion, 2009[Jun], Vol 9[3], 385-396). This article contained an incorrect DOI for the supplemental materials. The correct DOI is as follows: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015904.supp. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-07991-010.) Genetic risk may predispose individuals to compromised anger regulation, potentially through modulation of brain responses to emotionally evocative stimuli. Emphatically expressed, the emotional word No can prohibit behavior through conditioning. In a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging study, the authors showed that healthy males attribute negative valence to No while showing a lateral orbitofrontal response that correlated with their self-reported anger control. Here, the authors examined the influence of the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene (low vs. high transcription variants) on brain response to No and in relationship to trait anger reactivity and control. The orbitofrontal response did not differ as a function of the genotype. Instead, carriers of the low-MAOA genotype had reduced left middle frontal gyrus activation to No compared with the high variant. Furthermore, only for carriers of theup low-MAOA genotype, left amygdala and posterior thalamic activation to No increased with anger reactivity. Thus, vulnerability to aggression in carriers of the low-MAOA genotype is supported by decreased middle frontal response to No and the unique amygdala/thalamus association pattern in this group with anger reactivity but not anger control. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Dejection at in-group defeat and schadenfreude toward second- and third-party out-groups" by Colin Wayne Leach and Russell Spears (Emotion, 2009[Oct], Vol 9[5], 659-665). In the article "Dejection at In-Group Defeat and Schadenfreude Toward Second- and Third-Party Out-Groups" by Colin Wayne Leach and Russell Spears (Emotion, 2009, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 659-665), the authors affiliations were incorrectly listed. Colin Wayne Leach was affiliated with his current institution, the Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, and Russell Spears was affiliated with his current institution, the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Wales, U.K. at the time of writing. The research was conducted while Russell Spears was at the University of Amsterdam and Collin Wayne Leach was a visiting scholar at the University of Amsterdam and supported by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-17981-007.) It has been argued that the emotional pain of being outshone by a second party leads to the malicious pleasure of schadenfreude when this second party subsequently suffers a misfortune. However, direct tests of this idea are rare, especially at the intergroup level. Thus, the authors presented participants with their country's defeat in international competition by a second party and then presented this second party as failing. Participants' dejection at their in-group's defeat led to schadenfreude toward the second party. Consistent with the notion that it affirms the self, schadenfreude toward the second party was associated with positive evaluation of the in-group. Dejection at defeat by a second party also led to schadenfreude toward a third party who had not defeated the in-group. Schadenfreude toward the third party was associated with negative evaluation of the third party rather than positive evaluation of the in-group. As such schadenfreude toward the third party was more malicious. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Brain dynamics in spider-phobic individuals exposed to phobia-relevant and other emotional stimuli" by Jaroslaw M. Michalowski, Christiane A. Melzig, Almut I. Weike, Jessica Stockburger, Harald T. Schupp and Alfons O. Hamm (Emotion, 2009[Jun], Vol 9[3], 306-315). This article contained an incorrect DOI for the supplemental materials. The correct DOI is as follows: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015550.supp. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-07991-002.) Dense sensor event-related brain potentials were measured in participants with spider phobia and nonfearful controls during viewing of phobia-relevant spider and standard emotional (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral) pictures. Irrespective of the picture content, spider phobia participants responded with larger P1 amplitudes than controls, suggesting increased vigilance in this group. Furthermore, spider phobia participants showed a significantly enlarged early posterior negativity (EPN) and late positive potential (LPP) during the encoding of phobia-relevant pictures compared to nonfearful controls. No group differences were observed for standard emotional materials indicating that these effects were specific to phobia-relevant material. Within group comparisons of the spider phobia group, though, revealed comparable EPN and LPP evoked by spider pictures and emotional (unpleasant and pleasant) picture contents. These results demonstrate a temporal unfolding in perceptual processing from unspecific vigilance (P1) to preferential responding (EPN and LPP) to phobia-relevant materials in the spider phobia group. However, at the level of early stimulus processing, these effects of increased attention seem to be related to emotional relevance of the stimulus cues rather than reflecting a fear-specific response. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Structural resemblance to emotional expressions predicts evaluation of emotionally neutral faces" by Christopher P. Said, Nicu Sebe and Alexander Todorov (Emotion, 2009[Apr], Vol 9[2], 260-264). In this article a symbol was incorrectly omitted from Figure 1, part C. To see the complete article with the corrected figure, please go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014681. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-04472-011.) People make trait inferences based on facial appearance despite little evidence that these inferences accurately reflect personality. The authors tested the hypothesis that these inferences are driven in part by structural resemblance to emotional expressions. The authors first had participants judge emotionally neutral faces on a set of trait dimensions. The authors then submitted the face images to a Bayesian network classifier trained to detect emotional expressions. By using a classifier, the authors can show that neutral faces perceived to possess various personality traits contain objective resemblance to emotional expression. In general, neutral faces that are perceived to have positive valence resemble happiness, faces that are perceived to have negative valence resemble disgust and fear, and faces that are perceived to be threatening resemble anger. These results support the idea that trait inferences are in part the result of an overgeneralization of emotion recognition systems. Under this hypothesis, emotion recognition systems, which typically extract accurate information about a person's emotional state, are engaged during the perception of neutral faces that bear subtle resemblance to emotional expressions. These emotions could then be misattributed as traits. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Minding one's emotions: Mindfulness training alters the neural expression of sadness" by Norman A. S. Farb, Adam K. Anderson, Helen Mayberg, Jim Bean, Deborah McKeon and Zindel V. Segal (Emotion, 2010[Feb], Vol 10[1], 25-33). The DOI printed in the article was incorrect. The correct DOI is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-01983-008.) Recovery from emotional challenge and increased tolerance of negative affect are both hallmarks of mental health. Mindfulness training (MT) has been shown to facilitate these outcomes, yet little is known about its mechanisms of action. The present study employed functional MRI (fMRI) to compare neural reactivity to sadness provocation in participants completing 8 weeks of MT and wait-listed controls. Sadness resulted in widespread recruitment of regions associated with self-referential processes along the cortical midline. Despite equivalent self-reported sadness, MT participants demonstrated a distinct neural response, with greater right-lateralized recruitment, including visceral and somatosensory areas associated with body sensation. The greater somatic recruitment observed in the MT group during evoked sadness was associated with decreased depression scores. Restoring balance between affective and sensory neural networks-supporting conceptual and body based representations of emotion-could be one path through which mindfulness reduces vulnerability to dysphoric reactivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Affect bursts: Dynamic patterns of facial expression" by Eva G. Krumhuber and Klaus R. Scherer (Emotion, 2011, np). There were several errors in Table 1, and in Table 4 spaces were omitted from the rows between data for anger, fear, sadness, joy, and relief. All versions of this article have been corrected, and the corrections to Table 1 are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-12872-001.) Affect bursts consist of spontaneous and short emotional expressions in which facial, vocal, and gestural components are highly synchronized. Although the vocal characteristics have been examined in several recent studies, the facial modality remains largely unexplored. This study investigated the facial correlates of affect bursts that expressed five different emotions: anger, fear, sadness, joy, and relief. Detailed analysis of 59 facial actions with the Facial Action Coding System revealed a reasonable degree of emotion differentiation for individual action units (AUs). However, less convergence was shown for specific AU combinations for a limited number of prototypes. Moreover, expression of facial actions peaked in a cumulative-sequential fashion with significant differences in their sequential appearance between emotions. When testing for the classification of facial expressions within a dimensional approach, facial actions differed significantly as a function of the valence and arousal level of the five emotions, thereby allowing further distinction between joy and relief. The findings cast doubt on the existence of fixed patterns of facial responses for each emotion, resulting in unique facial prototypes. Rather, the results suggest that each emotion can be portrayed by several different expressions that share multiple facial actions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Positive and negative affect produce opposing task-irrelevant stimulus preexposure effects" by Josef Lazar, Oren Kaplan, Terri Sternberg and R. E. Lubow (Emotion, Advanced Online Publication, Aug 22, 2011, np). In the article, there was an error in the following text on pp. 4-5. The correct text should read: The test phase, consisting of 96 trials, was divided into two blocks of 48 trials each. Between-trial sequencing and temporal conditions for stimulus presentations were the same as in the preexposure phase. Now, however, a $ sign appeared on the screen 40 times. The $ was preceded by the PE stimulus on 16 occasions (8 in each block), by the NPE stimulus 16 times (8 in each block), and by the other preexposed shapes (square, ellipse, diamond and rectangle) eight times. The pairings of the PE and the NPE shapes with $ were randomly interspersed within the 56 presentations of the other geometric forms (14 each for squares, ellipses, diamonds, and rectangles, 7 in each block). These changes do not affect the results or their interpretation. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-18174-001.) In three experiments, groups were exposed to either positive or negative affect video clips, after which they were presented with a series of task-irrelevant stimuli. In the subsequent test task, subjects were required to learn an association between the previously irrelevant stimulus and a consequence, and between a new stimulus and a consequence. Induced positive affect produced a latent inhibition effect (poorer evidence of learning with the previously irrelevant stimulus than with the novel stimulus). In opposition to this, induced negative affect resulted in better evidence of learning with a previously irrelevant stimulus than with a novel stimulus. In general, the opposing effects also were present in participants scoring high on self-report questionnaires of depression (Experiments 2 and 3). These unique findings were predicted and accounted for on the basis of two principles: (a) positive affect broadens the attentional field and negative affect contracts it; and (b) task-irrelevant stimuli are processed in two successive stages, the first encodes stimulus properties, and the second encodes stimulus relationships. The opposing influences of negative and positive mood on the processing of irrelevant stimuli have implications for the role of emotion in general theories of cognition, and possibly for resolving some of the inconsistent findings in research with schizophrenia patients. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Frequent and successful use of cognitive reappraisal, an emotion regulation strategy that involves rethinking the meaning of an emotional event in order to change one's emotional response, has been linked in everyday life to positive outcomes such as higher well-being. Whether we should expect this association to be maintained in a strong, temporally and spatially close emotional context is an unexplored question that might have important implications for our understanding of emotion regulation and its relations to psychological functioning. In this study of members of the U. S. Embassy Tokyo community in the months following the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis in Japan, self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal was not related to psychological functioning, but demonstrated success using cognitive reappraisal to decrease feelings of unpleasantness in response to disaster-related pictures on a performance-based task was associated with fewer symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress. Moreover, emotional reactivity to these pictures was associated with greater symptomatology. These results suggest that situational intensity may be an important moderator of reappraisal and psychological functioning relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Can seeking happiness make people happy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness" by Iris B. Mauss, Maya Tamir, Craig L. Anderson and Nicole S. Savino (Emotion, 2011, np). There was an error in the title. The title of the article should read, "Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness." All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-08397-001.) Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).

Bargh and Shalev (2012) hypothesized that people use warm showers and baths to compensate for a lack of social warmth. As support for this idea, they reported results from two studies that found an association between trait loneliness and bathing habits. Given the potential practical and theoretical importance of this association, we conducted nine additional studies on this topic. Using our own bathing or showering measures and the most current version of the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996), we found no evidence for an association between trait loneliness and a composite index of showering or bathing habits in a combined sample of 1,153 participants from four studies. Likewise, the aggregated effect size estimate was not statistically significant using the same measures as the original studies in a combined sample of 1,920 participants from five studies. A local meta-analysis including the original studies yielded an effect size estimate for the composite that included zero in the 95% confidence interval. The current results therefore cast doubt on the idea of a strong connection between trait loneliness and personal bathing habits related to warmth. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Heartwarming Memories: Nostalgia Maintains Physiological Comfort" by Xinyue Zhou, Tim Wildschut, Constantine Sedikides, Xiaoxi Chen and Ad J. J. M. Vingerhoets (Emotion, Advanced Online Publication, Mar 5, 2012, np). In the article, the last sentence was incorrect. The corrected sentence is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2012-05385-001.) Nostalgia, a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past, is a predominantly positive and social emotion. Recent evidence suggests that nostalgia maintains psychological comfort. Here, we propose, and document in five methodologically diverse studies, a broader homeostatic function for nostalgia that also encompasses the maintenance of physiological comfort. We show that nostalgia-an emotion with a strong connotation of warmth-is triggered by coldness. Participants reported stronger nostalgia on colder (vs. warmer) days and in a cold (vs. neutral or warm) room. Nostalgia, in turn, modulates the interoceptive feeling of temperature. Higher levels of music-evoked nostalgia predicted increased physical warmth, and participants who recalled a nostalgic (vs. ordinary autobiographical) event perceived ambient temperature as higher. Finally, and consistent with the close central nervous system integration of temperature and pain sensations, participants who recalled a nostalgic (vs. ordinary autobiographical) event evinced greater tolerance to noxious cold. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Reports an error in "Cross-cultural generality and specificity in self-regulation: Avoidance personal goals and multiple aspects of well-being in the United States and Japan" by Andrew J. Elliot, Constantine Sedikides, Kou Murayama, Ayumi Tanaka, Todd M. Thrash and Rachel R. Mapes (Emotion, 2012[Oct], Vol 12[5], 1031-1040). The authors intended, but neglected to include the following, at the end of the Study 2 Measures paragraph: The data for the personal goals and intrapersonal well-being variables in the U.S. sample were also used in the context of other, separate studies (Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 2006, Study 2; Elliot, Thrash, & Murayama, 2011, Study 1). A small portion of these data, specifically the relation between avoidance personal goals and intrapersonal well-being, was also reported in Elliot et al., 2011, Study 1 (albeit in composite form and for non-Asians and Asians combined). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2012-10011-001.) The authors examined avoidance personal goals as concurrent (Study 1) and longitudinal (Study 2) predictors of multiple aspects of well-being in the United States and Japan. In both studies, participants adopted more avoidance personal goals in Japan relative to the United States. Both studies also demonstrated that avoidance personal goals were significant negative predictors of the most relevant aspects of well-being in each culture. Specifically, avoidance personal goals were negative predictors of intrapersonal and eudaimonic well-being in the United States and were negative predictors of interpersonal and eudaimonic well-being in Japan. The findings clarify and extend puzzling findings from prior empirical work in this area, and raise provocative possibilities about the nature of avoidance goal pursuit. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).

Shalev and Bargh (2014) replied to our work and summarized results from 3 new studies concerning the associations between trait loneliness and showering/bathing habits. We clarify a few issues and provide a foundation for future work by conducting a meta-analysis of the relevant studies. The inclusion of new data does little to change our basic conclusions. There are no indications of strong connections between trait loneliness and showering/bathing habits. Additional studies are needed to test moderators of these associations, and to evaluate possible cross-cultural differences in the connection between loneliness and physical warmth extraction from baths and showers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).