In light of the opening of the borders within the EC, scheduled for January 1993, this article "discusses the prospects in Europe concerning immigration from third [world] countries in relation to the internal market, the border control issue and the general policies towards non-EC nationals living within the community. The paper will concentrate on immigration from the 'South', discussing the preconditions for various forms of influx from poor countries in the Third World to the European Community. Attention will also be paid to the conception of the problem in the West, and to the prevailing policy proposals at national and European level. It is contended that development aid will not be a sufficient medicine to curb the immigration pressure in the future."
Based on a communicative perspective this article works out the theoretical possibility of a twofold change in European security (in the referent object of security; and in the understanding and practice of the best means to achieve security). The approach suggested should be considered supplementary to rational choice perspectives, and at the same time as a contribution to a strengthening of the "widening" literature on security. It is argued that the concepts of communicative rationality and deliberation can contribute to this in particular in two ways: First, by contributing to establish alternative and more precise micro-foundations to those provided in the rational choice perspective. Second, by providing a critical standard that enables us to avoid the normative ambiguity in security studies.
Processes of globalization are occurring in a world marked by processes of regional integration that are comparable though different. Integration processes in both Asia and Europe are open to global forces and marked by multiple centres of influence. In Asia, integration processes occur in informal and inclusive network structures. This contrasts with the more formal and exclusive pattern that characterizes the integration process among continental European states. Our analysis of international politics could be enriched if it took more account of these emerging structures in different world regions.
Much of the existing literature on the European Union (EU), conflict transformation and border dynamics has been premised on the assumption that the nature of the border determines EU intervention and the consequences that flow from this in terms of EU impact. The article aims to transcend this literature through assessing how domestic interpretations influence EU border transformation in conflict situations, taking Cyprus as a case study. Moreover, the objective is to fuse the literature on EU bordering impact and perceptions of the EU’s normative projection in conflict resolution. Pursuing this line of inquiry is an attempt to depart from the notion of borders being constructed solely by unidirectional EU logics of engagement or bordering practices to a conceptualization of the border as co-constituted space, where the interpretations of the EU’s normative projections by conflict parties, and the strategies that they pursue, can determine the relative openness of the EU border.
This article offers a critical re-examination of the concept of world order. Taking our cue from Georg Sørensen's recent article in this journal entitled `What Kind of World Order?' we begin by unpacking the concept of order itself. We distinguish two principal meanings of the term: one analytical and descriptive (order as non-randomness) and one value-laden and normative (order as stability and the absence of violent conflict). In debates about world order, these two meanings are often blurred. Drawing on William Connolly's critique of the descriptive-normative distinction, we suggest that this blurring occurs in part because world order is an `essentially contested concept'. Practices of ordering typically involve the production of specific spatializations, yet questions of space and spatiality are largely absent from discussions of world order. In the second part of the article, therefore, we address this absence through a discussion of geo-politics, focusing on US hegemony and neo-liberalism, military geographies and the spaces of marginalization and resistance. The article concludes with some reflections on the political implications of a spatialized account of world order.
This article examines causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among conflictual dyads. Based on the International Crisis Behavior dataset, it presents a new sub-dataset of 12 cases of interstate crises between Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan. While crisis behavior in Greece-Turkey is connected to two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian-Pakistani crises are subject to the presence of nuclear weapons. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. The result demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation ‘usually’ (probability 0.65) although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error than the former. Moreover, the data demonstrate that Greek-Turkish crises escalated to relatively low levels of danger (threat of war and the show of force) while Indian-Pakistani crises escalated to higher levels (use of force). In these cases, nuclear weapons and regional organizations shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The latter mitigated crises although they often unintentionally encouraged low intensity conflicts while nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic politics exacerbated crises particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare.
The paper explores the question of how the EC and several European governments almost simultaneously launched research and technological development programmes during the 1980s. It is argued that the RTD policy processes within EC and individual states were linked to each other in a European policy process, and that the convergence of such policies was a function of policy diffusion. An analytical approach of policy diffusion is outlined in order to study the linkages between national and EU policy processes. A policy diffusion perspective, which entails how policies are formed in a communication between various national political-administrative systems, can be seen as an important contribution to the study of the dynamics behind the European integration process. It is suggested that the OECD with its informal and non-hierarchical cooperation structure is an institutional condition for policy diffusion, and that this type of cooperation also can be found within the EU. The EU, which can be characterized as a type of multilevel governance, enhances communication between national political-administrative systems and thus the processes of policy diffusion.
This article considers the future of 'globalization', conceived here as processes promoting international interconnectedness. Three questions are examined. First, is contemporary globalization unusual compared to past episodes such as 1850-1914? Then there was rapid growth in trade, capital flows and migration comparable to or greater than today. There was also a policy backlash and the widespread adoption of protectionist policies. Second, are contemporary globalization processes undermining national economies and thus hollowing out states? On the contrary, the major states are reinforced in their role of international actors. However, both the global economy and national governments will face crucial challenges during this century, the chief of which is climate change. Such changes will tend to foster conflict and thus reinforce the role of the state, but in a context where governance at every level will be harder to achieve. Third, is economic globalization likely to increase or decrease? Evidence about the effects of borders and the limits to trade expansion are presented, which indicate that we could be close to the limits of feasible globalization.
In this article I argue that the systemic shift to unipolarity has created an incentive to invest in security regionalization, both on the part of the American hegemon and on the part of the regional states. After defining what I mean by 'security regionalization', I examine the hegemonic incentives for encouraging the building of regional security institutions. Such institutions, I suggest, can advance its three main goals: To maintain regional stability, to maintain its unipolar position and to achieve system-maintenance at low cost. At the same time, regional states have increased incentives to invest in building regional security arrangements. Such arrangements, I suggest, are necessary should the hegemon choose to abandon them. They can also help prevent such abandonment by offering meaningful burden-sharing. They can serve as a 'pact of restraint' to restrain the hegemon, and finally they can be an avenue to a new division of labor. I apply this framework to the changes in security regionalization in Europe after the end of the Cold War (11/9 - beginning of the fall of the Berlin wall) and after the events of 9/11.1 conclude by highlighting some of the tensions and paradoxes built into this security regionalization thesis.
The EU has been making strong inroads into the realm of security over the last few years. This is a remarkable development, since security matters used to be the preserve of states. The articles presented in this special issue all testify to the breadth of the EU security agenda, as they all try to capture some aspects of the EU’s fast-changing security policies following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. In parallel with a broadening of the EU’s security agenda, an increase in supranational security governance in the EU can also be observed. The transition to supranational governance is reached in two ways. First, cross-border security threats generate demand for EU laws, which supranational organisations then supply. Reasons for changes in the EU polity are exogenous shocks, the fact that rule innovations are endogenous to politics, the diffusion of organisational behaviour and models of action, and policy entrepreneurship, whereby institutional entrepreneurs construct and revise ‘policy frames’, which engage other actors and define new relationships between them and chart courses of action. As the articles in this special issue demonstrate, 11 September 2001 provided such a major exogenous shock required for a change in the EU polity, which EU institutions exploited by providing increasing EU legislation, and even, as a by-product, stabilising a European legal order.
‘Othering’ – the view or treatment of another person or group as intrinsically different from and alien to oneself – is a central concept in the International Relations literature on identity construction. It is often portrayed as a fairly singular and predominantly negative form of self/Other differentiation. During the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden at first glance emerged as exactly such a negative Other. This article problematises such a view of Othering. Departing from a narrative analysis of news reporting on Sweden’s management of COVID-19 in the United States, Germany and the Nordic states, the article proposes an ideal type model with four forms of Othering – emotional, strategic, analytic and nuanced – not recognised in previous research. These types differ in their treatment of the Other as more or less significant and in involving a more or less self-reflexive construction of the self. Although narratives in all these settings drew on previously established narratives on Sweden, they followed different logics. This has implications for our understanding of Sweden as an Other in the time of COVID-19, as well as of self/Other relations in International Relations more broadly.
How and why do some foreign policy crises end successfully and efficiently, but others do not? Do democracies deal better than non-democracies with foreign policy crises? Focusing on both the outcome and the duration of foreign policy crises, this article employs event history (survival) analysis to model and test three models of foreign policy crisis derived from realist, liberal, and constructivist theories and the level-of-analysis framework. The dataset in this article is drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918-2007. The analysis indicates that democracies are more likely to solve a foreign policy crisis successfully and efficiently than non-democracies. While the involvement of international organization during a crisis has a negative effect on a state's goal of 'winning' a crisis more quickly, the increasing power of a rival also hinders and prolongs the achievement of success in a crisis. Finally, the more violence a state uses during a crisis, the more difficult it is for this state to solve the crisis in a timely manner.
This article scrutinizes the assumption that friends support each other in times of war. Picking up the notion that solidarity, or ‘other-help’, is a key feature of friendship between states, the article explores how states behave when a friend is attacked by an overwhelming enemy. It directs attention to the trade-off between solidarity and self-help that governments face in such a situation and makes the novel argument that the decision about whether and how to support the friend is significantly influenced by assessments of the distribution of material capabilities and the relationship the state has with the aggressor. This proposition is supported empirically in an examination of Sweden’s response to its Nordic friends’ need for help during the Second World War – to Finland during the 1939–1940 ‘Winter War’ with the Soviet Union, and to Norway following the invasion of Germany from 1940 to 1945.
This paper examines the degrees of cooperation and conflict between the Socialist countries from January 1962 until the end of August 1968. The study is an experiment in the analysis of international interaction events. The sources of data are rather exceptional news media: the relevant editorials of five Finnish newspapers and the Chronology of Current History. However, the method is not a content analysis but an event analysis. The concept of actional distance is used to measure and combine (both explicitly and implicitly) cooperation and conflict. Actional distance between A and B includes both direct interaction between them and the behavior of A and B toward some object X. The distances among the Socialist countries are described in regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict. The bloc is found to be divided into two subgroups with the exception of five countries which do not belong to either of them. The theory tested is the Simmel/Coser cohesion hypothesis, which is strongly supported by the results. The results are compared with two content analysis studies and one transaction flow study; the comparison confirms the validity of the results of this paper. The validity problem is also discussed.
The author traces the development of Finland's security policy through the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's.
Finland's foreign policy activity has inreased beginning with membership in the United Nations Security Council. The preparations for the European Security Conference have given Finland the opportunity of working positively for European security. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union was renewed in 1970 for a further twenty years.
Trade policy has created certain problems for Finland. A free trade agreement with the EEC has been initialled but not yet signed. The Parliamentary Defence Committee presented its conclusions in 1971, and defence policy has become the subject of greater interest for all political parties.
For Finland, the last decade has been one of implementation in foreign policy and doctrine formation and material expansion in defence policy. After tracing the fundamentals of Finland's security conception, the article notes that the basic argument and strategy for an active foreign policy line, promoting peace and security, and based on acceptability of the line in the East and West, was established as early as the mid-1960s. Finland's Nordic security policy for confirming the ‘disengaged’ position of the area has been tenacious, whereas in European and global fora Finland's activity has been more dependent on the East–West climate. The three parliamentary defence committees formulated a defence doctrine legitimating the national defence system and ensuing armaments programmes dimensioned to respond to a limited conventional attack. The internal debate resulted in a consensus doctrine on how much Finnish–Soviet military cooperation to include in the defence doctrine that corresponds with the basic philosophy of Finland's foreign policy to trust in political regulation as the best security guarantee even in conflict situations. The military provisions of the Finnish–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance are to be used actively and reliably to maintain the preventive effect of the defence arrangement. With the onset of the 1980s the debate on the increased danger of limited nuclear war is testing the credibility of the defence doctrine based on a restrictive threat conception and questioning the concept of security policy traditionally used.
The present study describes the events in the Norwegian west-coast Sognefjord in November 1972. The possible presence of an unidentified submarine presented an inexperienced government with a complicated set of strategic assessments. The choices made appear to have been based on an inadequate understanding of the chances of success as the latter were seriously circumscribed by the physical characteristics of the waters involved. Even if Norway had possessed the means of detecting and identifying the mystical submarine, serious doubts are raised about the wisdom of pursuing the maximalist objectives which the government announced. The decision-making in the crisis reflects little deliberate calculation of costs and risks, and did not focus on how losses could be cut when it became clear that the submarine would escape. The information policy added to the perception of loss and tended to feed unrealistic expectations about what could be achieved.
In the face of escalating conflicts or atrocities, international organizations (IOs), alongside non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often vocalize public condemnation. Researchers have examined NGO shaming, but no extant literature has comparatively explored if, how and why IOs shame. This article fills this gap. We conceptualize IO shaming as condemnatory speech acts and distinguish between the agent, targets and actions of shaming. We theorize how compliance and socialization are motives that lead IOs to shame. Empirically, we use new data on more than 3000 instances of IO shaming, covering 27 organizations between 1980 and 2015 to examine empirical patterns across the three dimensions of agents, targets and actions. We find that the majority of IOs do employ shaming but to varying degrees. Global, general-purpose IOs shame the most and regional, task-specific IOs the least. IOs mainly shame states, but there is a rise in the targeting of non-state and unnamed actors. While many condemned acts relate to human rights and security issues, IOs shame actions across the policy spectrum. These findings indicate that IO shaming is driven by compliance and socialization motives and that it is a wider phenomenon than previously recognized, suggesting possible avenues for further inquiry.
The key strategic position of Norway in Northern Europe is elaborated in the first part of this article. Norwegian alignment in NATO is based on the proposition that Norwegian (or Scandinavian) means are inadequate to defend the country from attack from a major power. It has become an objective of Norwegian defence policy to block as effectively as possible any option of limited war against North Norway by raising the force requirements for the adversary to a level at which the risks of escalation would appear forbidding. The Norwegian security calculus is predicated on the notion that South Norway has forward defence in the Baltic, Northern Germany and Denmark. Therefore, the defence effort has been concentrated in the north. Public support for Norway's policy of alignment has been rather stable over the last decade. The issue of reinforcement is dealt with in detail, as are the re-emerging nuclear weapons issues. Finally, the evolution of the Norwegian defence effort is analysed. It is concluded that those aspects of alliance policy which relate to nuclear weapons are likely to cause discussion and dissension in the years ahead. The Norwegian Government is likely to support changes in the posture and doctrine of NATO which reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and, particularly, the pressures for early use. The unilateral constraints with respect to the stationing of foreign troops will be maintained.
Change in China's policy towards the USA, the USSR and the Third World is analysed in terms of its immediate causes, and by means of a framework categorizing types of sources, processes of change and reappraisals, as well as stabilizers affecting all of these. It is shown that there has been a descriptive reappraisal since Afghanistan, based on perceived changes in conditions of policy towards important power groupings, changes that imply global multipolarity. Domestic politics, in particular the drive towards economic modernization and its ideological ramifications, has resulted in a normative reappraisal of policy. It is found that purges and professionalization have affected composition of the foreign policy-making system, while conflicts between representatives of technocratic and bureaucratic constituencies have affected the balance of power within the system. The article describes the resulting policy, which is marked by independence and equidistance towards the superpowers.
In this article, we aim to contribute to two contemporary debates within the English School. The debate about how to observe primary institutions and the debate concerning hierarchy between primary institutions. Specifically, we analyse references to primary institutions in United Nations General Assembly disarmament resolutions in the decade 1989–1998 and their distribution using descriptive statistics. In this way, the article offers a novel approach to identifying primary institutions empirically, and provides some insight into the hierarchy-question in the sense of documenting the relative numerical presence of references to different primary institutions in a specific issue area and temporal context. With respect to the latter, the key finding is that great power management, diplomacy and international law are by far the most prominent primary institutions in the analysed material. This is an intriguing finding, not least given the importance attached to them by Hedley Bull in his classic work The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. The main contribution of the article is thus to spell out a new approach to how the aforementioned debates might proceed empirically.
This study analyses to what extent a change of government in times of unchanged international structure affects the ideology of foreign policy. The main contribution is to investigate the role of political culture, as reflected through institutional design, as an intervening variable. Effects of changes of government in the United Kingdom in 1997 and 2010 and in Sweden in 1994 and 2006 is studied by analysing speeches in the General Debates of the UN General Assembly. The analysis is based on four ideal types. The results indicate that institutional design is an influencing intervening variable of foreign policy ideology. In the UK, a country dominated by majoritarian institutional design, foreign policy ideology changes more extensively in times of government change than in Sweden, a country dominated by consensual institutional design.
Contemporary Arctic transformations and their global causes and consequences have put international cooperation in the Arctic Council, the region’s most important forum for addressing Arctic affairs, at the forefront of research in Northern governance. With interest in Arctic regional affairs in world politics being at a historical high, the actual participation and contribution by interested actors to regional governance arrangements, such as the Arctic Council, has remained very much a blind spot. This article introduces and analyses a novel dataset on stakeholder participation in the Arctic Council (STAPAC) for all member states, Permanent Participants and observers in Ministerial, Senior Arctic Officials’ and subsidiary body meetings between 1998 and 2015. The article finds that participation in the Arctic Council varies significantly across meeting levels and type of actors, and that new admissions to the Council, a source of major contestation in recent debates, do not necessarily result in more actors attending. The article further discusses these findings in light of three prevalent debates in Arctic governance research, and shows the empirical relevance of the STAPAC dataset for the study of Arctic cooperation and conflict, observer involvement in the Arctic Council system and political representation of indigenous Permanent Participants.
In the international debate, it is often argued that Denmark, in its major foreign policy priorities, has sided with the United States (US) since the Cold War rather than with the European Union (EU) or its European partners. I examine whether this is correct, and if it is, why this is so, since 2001. I also ask whether a different theoretical approach, namely discourse analysis, would lead to findings different from those of the dominant approaches. I first present various ways of explaining why a country chooses the balance that it does between the EU and the US. One particular approach, post-structuralist discourse analysis, is applied. The balance between the EU and the US in the dominant Danish discourse is analysed. I outline the policy level and attempt to map where Danish policies are conducted with the EU and the US, respectively. I show that the EU is the most important partner across foreign policy areas since 2001, despite ad hoc foreign policy cooperation with the US, and that this is due to a dominant discourse articulating the EU as 'our most important alliance'. However, the US is the most important partner on military security issues based on a discourse articulating cooperation with the US as a central part of Danish foreign policy identity and an 'offensive foreign policy'.
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah operatives crossed into Israel and attacked a military patrol, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two more. In retaliation to this incident Israel launched a military operation that resulted in 34 days of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. The Israeli retaliation has been deemed to be severe and surprising. Furthermore, a public investigation commission established by the Israeli government implicated key decision-makers, and especially Prime Minister Olmert, as guilty of hasty and irresponsible decision-making. This article views this case through the lens of prospect theory, showing how the decision was made at the framing stage, and suggesting that this decision was not hasty but, rather, was consistent with the logic of loss-aversion.
This article looks at a project involving nine internationally acclaimed street artists who agreed to make murals in Oslo, following the 22 July 2011 attacks. Resting on the art project’s aims (‘to promote universal human rights and to counter the intolerance and xenophobia that can give rise to violence and justify terrorism’) and the art community’s reaction, the article argues that street art’s visibility and agency offer alternative ways of thinking about, and approaching, international relations (IR). The article examines the streets as the space where artists express and engage the ‘everyday’; and as the medium that allows artists to bring art to the public (as opposed to galleries or exhibitions the public chooses to visit). We argue that the incorporation of street art’s spatiality and aesthetics into ‘everyday IR’ supports more critical frameworks that (a) expose the exceptional logic(s) of illiberal governance; (b) enable the visibility of marginalised and/or dissenting voices in society; and (c) explore experimental, eclectic and creative approaches of doing/thinking everyday security, community and peace.
Finland promoted a value-based agenda as the President of the European Union (EU) Council in 2019. The focus was especially on the defence of the rule of law principle. A role as a strong value promoter departs from the pragmatic and cautious tradition of Finnish EU policy. In this article, I will ask why Finland chose to promote values, and what kind of political debate preceded its Presidency term. Second, I will look at the actual promotion of the common values during the Presidency. Third, I will provide some evaluations of the success of Finland’s value-based approach. The analysis draws from comprehensive documentary sources related to Finnish EU policy and her Presidency term, and from 33 semi-structured research interviews among the key Finnish politicians, civil servants and civil society organization representatives in 2020. The article shows that values were thoroughly debated before the term and their relevance increased as the Presidency approached. Finland also succeeded in promoting several values, especially by linking them to practical questions. The article argues that evaluating the success of Finland’s approach is more contentious, which may be tackled several ways.