A new style of international migration, temporary and often illegal immigration in order to work, began to emerge after World War II. Many countries initiated immigration policies that gave the appearance of control, while their back doors remained open and, possibly, unclosable. In the US, it is slowly becoming obvious that foreign workers cannot be used as a temporary labor force at will. 2 usual theories of migration are the classical and the conflicts schools. The classical school presents migration as a rational, economic act that leads to economic adjustment between sending and receiving countries. The conflict school, often Marxist, views migration as an unequal process that leads to the inclusion of developing countries into the world capitalist system and to a widenin gap between rich and poor countries. The convergence of these 2 theories leads to the idea that although migration may be a survival strategy of individuals and households, it is also determined by a country's integration in the world economic system. The author reviews several books on immigration theory, which appreciate the complexity and worldwide character of migration; indicate that migration patterns are persistent; and support the view that migration is an economic, social, and political problem; and recommend that policies must be integrated and address the entire issue.
The article suggests that the massive transformation of the political system often referred to as “political development” is responsible for the movement from high to low birth-and death rates in national populations. The effect of the changing political system is independent of (and in addition to) the effects of socioeconomic changes previously presented in the theory of demographic demographic transition. The article reports first the nature of the systematic connection between change in the political system on the one hand and change in vital rates on the other. Second, it presents a new empirical measure of the capacity and effectiveness of whole political systems.
"Why is it so difficult for a liberal-democratic state to regulate immigration? Although control of a territory is part and parcel of the definition of state sovereignty, labor-importing countries have found it increasingly difficult to regulate the flow of noncitizens across their borders. This article seeks to address the difficulties of regulating immigration by focusing on the policy-making process and the interaction of politics and markets in France, one of the principal countries of immigration."
Until the important public dialog on 3rd World population issues began in the Soviet Uuion in 1965, ideological limitations and bureaucratic interests prevented policy makers from recognizing the existence of a world of national "population problem." Since then, freer discussions of the Soviet Union's surprising decline in birthrate and labor shortages have led to serious policy questions. Conflicting policy goals, however, have resulted in only modest pronatalist policies. The Soviet population problem is a result of interregional disparities in population growth rates between the highly urbanized Soviet European populations with low birth rates and the least urbanized Central Asians with dramatically higher birth rates. As a result, these essentially Muslim people will provide the only major increases in labor resources and an increasing percentage of Soviet armed forces recruits. Policy planners are thus faced with difficult options. Current policies stressing technological transfers from the west and greater labor productivity, however, are unlikely to solve further labor shortages and regional imbalances. Ultimately, nonEuropana regions will be in an improved bargaining position for more favorable nationwide economic policies and for a greater role in policy planning.
With the creation of EMU, European Welfare States have entered a new phase of development. The margins for manoeuvring public budgets have substantially decreased, while the unfolding of the four freedoms of movement within the EU have seriously weakened the traditional coercive monopoly of the state on actors and resources that are crucial for the stability of redistributive institutions. The article explores these issues adopting a Rokkanian perspective, i.e. building on Rokkanâ€™s pioneering insights on the nexus between boundary building and internal structuring. The first part of the paper briefly presents the theoretical perspective. The second part sketches the development of national welfare institutions from their origin up to the early 1970s, discussing their implications in terms of boundary building and internal structuring. The third part describes the challenges that have emerged in the last couple of decades to the â€œsocial sovereigntyâ€ of the nation state: challenges that are largely linked to the process of European integration, but that are partly reinforced by endogenous developments as well. The final part offers some more speculative remarks of the potential de-structuring of the traditional architecture of social protection, with some hints at cross-national variations and possible developments at the EU level.
Political scientists for some time have questioned the value of party identification in the British context. The most popular objection has been that party identification appears to be less stable and less independent from the vote in Great Britain than in the United States. We attempt to demonstrate that the first objection is based on strong assumptions about how to deal with minor party identifiers and independents while the second can be disputed by showing that short-term forces, and not just measurement error, cause party identification and the vote to covary imperfectly. The analysis is carried out with the original Butler and Stokes data.
I present a model of the emergence and evolution of governance, conceived (narrowly) as the continuous resolution of dyadic conflicts by a third party. The model is comprised of three core elements: normative structure, dyadic contracting, and triadic dispute resolution. I demonstrate that a move to triadic dispute resolution leads the triadic dispute resolver to construct, and then to manage, specific causal relationships between exchange, conflict, and rules. Once established, triadic governance perpetuates a discourse about the rulefulness of individual behavior, and this discourse gradually penetrates and is absorbed into those repertoires of reasoning and action that constitute political agency. In this way, political life is judicialized. The model further predicts that, under certain specified conditions, the triad will constitute a crucial mechanism of (micro and macro) political change. I then illustrate the power of the model to explain judicialization and the dynamics of change in two very different political systems: the international trade regime and the French Fifth Republic. In the conclusion, I draw out the implications of the analysis for our understanding of the complex relationship between strategic behavior and social structure.
This paper estimates the risk preferences of cotton farmers in Southern Peru, using the results from a multiple-price-list lottery game. Assuming that preferences conform to two of the leading models of decision under risk--Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)--we find strong evidence of moderate risk aversion. Once we include individual characteristics in the estimation of risk parameters, we observe that farmers use subjective nonlinear probability weighting, a behavior consistent with CPT. Interestingly, when we allow for preference heterogeneity via the estimation of mixture models--where the proportion of subjects who behave according to EUT or to CPT is endogenously determined--we find that the majority of farmers' choices are best explained by CPT. We further hypothesize that the multiple switching behavior observed in our sample can be explained by nonlinear probability weighting made in a context of large random calculation mistakes; the evidence found on this regard is mixed. Finally, we find that attaining higher education is the single most important individual characteristic correlated with risk preferences, a result that suggests a connection between cognitive abilities and behavior towards risk.
This article traces the evolution of two types of immigrant rights—alien rights and the right to citizenship—across three polities (the United States, Germany, and the European Union). It argues that the sources of rights expansion are mostly legal and domestic: Rights expansion originates in independent and activist courts, which mobilize domestic law (especially constitutional law) and domestic legitimatory discourses, often against restriction-minded, democratically accountable governments. The legal-domestic hypothesis is qualified and differentiated according to polity, migrant group, and type of immigrant right.
This article advances hypotheses linking specific European institutions to changes in agent preferences, with the objective to explore the pathways and mechanisms through which such shifts occur. Drawing on work in social psychology and communications research, the author develops a micro-, process-, and agency-based argument on the nature of social interaction within institutions. Empirically, he examines committees of the Council of Europe, the main European rights institution, asking whether the preferences/interests of social agents changed as they discussed and debated issues. Put differently, did they "go native" in Strasbourg? Theoretically, a series of scope conditions for when argumentative persuasion will be effective in "changing minds" is advanced. By thus defining clear domains of application, the article contributes to a central goal of this special issue: building bridges to other-rationalist, in this case-views on social interaction.
What political institutions improve property rights? Building on the work of North and Weingast (1989), this paper argues that institutional checks on policymaking discretion ("veto players") improve the property rights of investors regarding the value of the domestic currency. Veto players constrain the ability of policymakers to opportunistically pursue policy that may lead to a depreciated domestic currency. The study offers some of the first large-sample evidence that checks and balances institutions lower the risk of expropriation, using a direct measure of investors' revealed preferences as the dependent variable. In particular, evidence from 127 countries over the period 1975-2004 shows that the use of foreign currency as a store of value -- a common hedge against domestic currency depreciation -- decreases with the number of veto players in government. The findings are robust to multiple specifications, including instrumental variables models that exploit exogenous sources of institutional variation.
Theoretical reasoning disagrees about what type of bargaining system performs best. The authors have tested the explanatory power of three competing hypotheses: neoliberalism, corporatism, and the hump-shape hypothesis. All of these hypotheses lack empirical support due to two main shortcomings. First, they ignore that wage restraint raises three distinct types of collective-action problems. Second, they do not consider qualitative differences among the national bargaining systems (particularly the role of the state) that do not allow analysis to construct such ordinal rankings of bargaining coordination as adopted by all previous empirical studies. Proceeding from a revised hypothesis and new measures of national bargaining systems, the authors have found a nonlinear relationship between the bargaining system and economic performance in a way that economy-wide wage coordination is superior only when the bargaining system is able to make local bargaining comply with coordination activities.
The discussion focuses on the effects that changing forms of authoritarian rule and the growth of a bureaucratic state had on A gentine public policies during the 1930-1970 interval. Hitherto quite separate literatures are brought together in the examination of two different arguments. The first, drawn from the emerging literature on authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America, suggests that the trends in Argentine public policies should have been interrupted whenever different types of authoritarian coalitions sequentially replaced each other in power. The second thesis, drawn primarily from research on Latin American bureaucracies and North American policy analyses, suggests that there is a need to disaggregate the coalition/policy linkage. It hypothesizes that four factors which developed at about the midpoint of the 1930-1970 period in Argentina—the growth of a large and well-entrenched public sector, limitations on the ability of political elites to press their policy demands, limitations on previously uncommitted resources, and the existence of a crisis of hegemony—should have increasingly constrained the policy-making importance of the coalitions and the leaders who represented them in the highest levels of government. Coalitions and elites should have been increasingly unable to direct and indirect policies in the ways which they preferred. Interrupted time-series analyses of seven policy series provided support for the constraints thesis. Coalitions and those who governed at the top were once important in Argentina as the authoritarian literature suggests. Coalition changes did not occur in a vacuum, however. Once the four state-related constraints developed, such shifts came to have only marginal impacts on the examined policy indicators.
European publics and politicians are concerned about big and growing governments. Such concern is not ill founded: Government size, measured as the ratio of government expenditures to gross domestic product, has marched upwards steadily since 1950 in the 12 European nations examined here. The present research represents an initial step toward solving the mystery of why these governments have grown. To begin, a modest theoretical framework for understanding government growth is advanced. Next, specific hypotheses of growth are fitted into the framework, and operationalized for empirical testing. Finally, statistical models to account for public sector expansion in each of the dozen nations over the 1950-1980 period are developed. The models suggest that a variety of forces have worked to enlarge European governments, with perhaps the most important being pressure for government assistance from groups disadvantaged by sour economic conditions.
This article links decisions and general descriptions of campaign issues and personalities. In so doing, it answers questions that have also been considered in other articles of this special issue. How much is support for the major British parties affected by underlying social processes and how much by deliberate party initiatives? To what extent is class the predominant division within British politics and to what extent is it being replaced by other cleavages and issues? How will the parties, new and old, be affected? And how should they respond? In tackling these questions the discussion utilizes new types of data and places results within a comparative framework.
Japanese elections are notorious for the money that flows between contributors, politicians, and voters. To date, however, nobody has estimated statistically the impact of this money on electoral outcomes. Students of American politics have discovered that this question is difficult to answer because, while performance may depend on spending, spending may also depend on expected performance - so that there is simultaneous causation to deal with. In this paper, we specify a two-stage least squares model that explains the vote shares of LDP candidates as a function of their own spending, spending by other candidates, and a battery of control variables. Interestingly, the multiple candidate nature of Japanese elections means that district-level demographic variables are largely unrelated to any particular LDP candidate's vote share, allowing us to use these variables to create instruments for campaign spending. Finally, in a necessarily tentative comparison, we find that the marginal dollar of campaign spending buys the spender a great deal more in Japan than is true in the U.S.
Across Western Europe, unions have increasingly engaged in staging general strikes against governments since 1980. This increase in general strikes is puzzling as it has occurred at the same time as economic strikes have been on the decline. We posit that theories developed to explain economic strikes hold little explanatory power in accounting for variation in general strikes across countries and over time. Instead, we develop a framework based on political variables, in particular, whether governments have included or excluded unions in framing policy reforms; the party position of the government; and the type of government. Our empirical analysis, based on a conditional fixed-effects logit estimation of 84 general strikes between 1980 and 2006, shows that union exclusion and the party position of the government can provide an initial explanation for the occurrence of general strikes.
Denmark and Norway have experienced significant political changes during the past three decades, changes that affect the constraints and opportunities organized interests are facing. Corporatist representation in the policy-making process has declined, and changes in executive-legislative relations have increased the power of parliaments. Organized interests are expected to adapt to these changing circumstances to maintain their political influence. This article shows how Danish and Norwegian interest groups have coped with the decline of corporatism and the revival of parliaments. Representation in corporatist policy-making committees and lobbying toward civil servants in government ministries have been supplemented and in some cases substituted by political lobbyism directed toward elected representatives in the parliament and the government. The analysis is based on panel data from several surveys carried out among nationwide interest groups in Denmark and Norway.
One of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the third wave of democratization is the rise to political prominence of outsider candidates in presidential elections. I use an original database of political outsiders in Latin America to examine the institutional factors that contribute to the emergence of political outsiders. Using a fixed effects variance decomposition (FEVD) model, I find that, in addition to the favorable conditions already identified in the literature—legitimacy crisis of traditional political parties and negative socioeconomic conditions—the rise of political outsiders is determined by institutional factors, such as nonconcurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and reelection provisions.
Are the policy failures of subnational officials reliably punished by voters, or do subnational elections instead pivot around national trends? This study attempts to shed new light on these questions by exploring subnational elections in the Argentine context. Building on a modified version of the referendum-voting model, our analysis suggests that the fate of candidates in both national and subnational elections is shaped by the performance of the incumbent presidential administration. At the same time, however, we also find evidence that voters respond to the policy choices of subnational governments, albeit in ways that attenuate, rather than strengthen, the nexus between policy responsibility and electoral accountability.
How do citizens in developing countries access public services? Scholars study this question by emphasizing the role of government, measuring government performance as household access to public services, such as clean water and sanitation. however, the authors argue that the state does not hold a monopoly on provision of such utilities: citizens in developing countries often turn to nonstate providers of basic utilities. In Mexico, the authors find that direct money transfers from migrants, known as remittances, are used to provide household access to public services. The statistical analysis across Mexico's 2,438 municipalities demonstrates that citizens improve their own access. The results also contribute new evidence to the literature on remittances and development by offering a micro-level explanation for how remittances affect both the availability and the source of basic utilities. The findings suggest that the measures scholars typically associate with government performance may in fact capture nonstate provision of basic utilities.
This article argues that researchers must broaden their definition of representation if they are to expand their understanding of electoral reform. The authors use the 1996 case of inter- and intraparty electoral reform in Israel to illustrate their claim. These reforms were designed either to enhance the circle of participation or to improve governability, without damaging representation. However, the type of representation that was supposed to be maintained by the reforms was different in each case. Party primaries were supposed to preserve representation as presence, whereas direct election of the prime minister was supposed to uphold the representation of ideas. The reformers did not perceive this distinction and felt that representation (defined as proportionality) would not be affected by both reforms. The result of the 1996 elections in Israel was that both reforms damaged representation, and both missed their targets.
The issue of presidential term limits is emerging as an important political norm on the African continent, but the effects of the third term debates on the institutionalization of the party systems have so far not been analyzed. We argue that the third presidential election represents ‘a window of opportunity’ for politicians aspiring for the top position, leading to party fragmentation (fissions) and party mergers (fusions). Politicians pursue an office seeking strategy, weakly connected to ideological or political priorities. We demonstrate that the combination of leadership centered parties, executive dominance, and the institutional rules for presidential elections, encourage turbulence in the party system in the context of the third democratic elections. We illustrate these processes with the case of the 2004 Malawian presidential and parliamentary elections. In Malawi, the third elections after the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1994 led to a number of new party formations. After the elections, fusions of parties and coalitions among parties became alternative strategies for winning office. Thus, rather than having institutionalized over time, the Malawian party system appears to have fragmented.
A spate of work has demonstrated tensions between ethno-cultural diversity and social capital. Some have suggested that attachment to the nation can foster cross-group trust, particularly if this national self-definition is “civic” in character rather than “ethnic” (the Miller thesis). Similarly, others have argued that civic nations are less likely to suffer reduced social capital in response to increased diversity, as the sense of threat that typically emerges in ethnically diverse contexts will be mitigated (the Putnam thesis). The authors test these hypotheses on 27 countries using both contextual-level data and the latest wave of the European Values Study (2008). Though the evidence is mixed on civic nationalism, the authors find strong evidence that ethnic nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reduced social capital and that it increases the negative social impact of diversity. So although this study only partially confirms the benefits of civic nationalism, it clearly underlines the costs of its ethnic variety.
What role does the international system play in amplifying the impact of domestic social movements on social change? The Argentine human rights movement reached the international system through the projection of cognitive and affective information—persuasion. International response was facilitated by the international human rights regime, and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played a critical role. This challenge from above and below did have a clear impact on the target government and the development of broader mechanisms for the protection of human rights—even under the most severe conditions of repression and powerlessness.
In its final months, the Pinochet regime engineered a number of institutional reforms with the intent of bolstering the right side of the spectrum and of promoting “centripetal” political competition once democratic procedures were reinitiated in 1989. One of the most important reforms created 60 double-member districts for elections to the lower house. While some analysts have claimed that the new system does in fact promote centrist position taking, using game theory and spatial modeling, we demonstrate in this paper that the incentives of the Chilean electoral system encourage politicians to take non-centrist positions along a left-right spectrum. The combination of double-member districts with the d’Hondt seat allocation method and open-list voting creates a “Rival Partners Game,” creating perverse incentives for Chilean candidates. Our theoretical results help clarify the debate about the effects of post-authoritarian institutional reforms in Chile and should encourage empirical research on the same issues.
Empirical studies on representation have been based mainly on the descriptive analysis of levels of political or ideological congruence between MPs and voters. Very few studies focus on explaining congruence, and those that have done so do not explore all the explanatory dimensions. This article contributes to filling this gap by testing whether three theoretical models can explain left–right congruence among European parties. These models explore causality at the micro or individual level (the characteristics of voters and MPs), the meso level (party characteristics), and the macro or system level (party system and institutional characteristics). Based on data from the PIREDEU project, the study examines the party systems of the 27 countries of the European Union with reference to the 2009 European Parliament elections. The findings reveal that MP–voter congruence is best explained at the party level and by key MP candidate characteristics.
Across Western democracies, individuals frequently vote for different parties in different elections. A variety of explanations have been proposed for this behavior. In the European context, scholars have focused on the idea that individuals may vote for different parties because some elections are less important than others (i.e., are “second-order” elections). In the U.S. context, scholars have focused on the possibility that individuals might vote for different parties because they care about how the two chambers will affect policy outcomes. In this article, the authors test among four alternative motivations for vote switching, two predicated on the notion that individuals treat one of the elections as second-order and two predicated on the notion that individuals care about policy outcomes from both chambers. The tests are performed by analyzing Euro-barometer survey data on individual voting behavior in European national and European Parliament elections. The authors find support for all four motivations.
How do workers in authoritarian states engage in protest, and how do they choose from available protest strategies? Through analysis of Chinese migrant labor protests from 2007 to 2008, the author examines how structural change expanded opportunities for protest and how migrants took advantage of those opportunities. Where formal organization is prohibited, informal ties facilitate protest by providing material support and information. Although traditional kinship ties provide material support, urban ties between workers with no connections before migrating to the cities provide information. Workers with access to urban ties are both more likely to engage in protest and more likely to engage in nonviolent protest through informal bargaining or the legal system. Little is known about the process of collective action among workers in authoritarian states, and understanding how Chinese migrant workers engage in labor protests despite prohibitions on formal organization sheds light on this phenomenon.
"This paper examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the paper is that it combines a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach with the analysis of primary data collected by the authors. "The game-theoretic model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The monitoring of individual actions is a collective good. Our analysis focuses on third-party monitoring. We examine two significant aspects of all common-pool resources protected by third parties: one, the lumpiness of the monitoring technology and two, imperfect excludability from the common. We propose a general argument as to why costs of third-party monitoring will rise more than proportionately as group size increases. In combination with the lumpiness assumption, it yields us the following theoretical conclusion: medium sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. "The empirical analysis investigates the validity of this conclusion in a real life situation. We consider data on 28 forest councils from Kumaon in the Indian Himalaya. In consonance with the theoretical result, medium sized councils are the ones that successfully raise the funds necessary for third-party monitoring. Small and large councils fare badly. We present additional evidence to support our argument, and point toward future arenas of research on the relationship between monitoring and group size."
This article examines the legality of homosexual acts quantitatively in a cross-national perspective with a large sample of countries from 1972 to 2002. Employing path dependence as its theoretical framework, this work explains how political, economic, and legal institutions at the domestic and international levels affect the lives of individual citizens. The rights and privileges of individuals, the findings of this study indicate, are determined by a wide array of variables, including legal origin, economic development, religion, democratization, and the position of the nation in the international community. The authors use recently released cross-national data concerning decriminalization of homosexual intercourse, economic conditions, and political institutions. A generalized estimating equation analyzes decriminalization of homosexual acts. A Cox proportional hazards model examines how long it takes to introduce this legal reform. Last, this study also offers some important lessons about civil rights and liberties more generally.
Over the past decade, several Latin American jurisdictions have extended rights to sexual minorities. Yet political science attention to this development has been scant, and scholars know little about the factors that have led to these unprecedented policy changes. This article fills this gap and explains policy outcomes in a notoriously understudied policy area by comparing the two jurisdictions in Latin America that were the first to adopt same-sex unions: Buenos Aires and Mexico City. The article first argues for the usefulness of engaging theoretical approaches to the study of social mobilization in policy analyses. Based on extensive field research, it subsequently advances the argument that the passage of these pieces of legislation in both cities is largely the result of the ability of very-well-organized activists to present an effectively framed policy within rare and favorable political conditions.
This study investigates the factors that affect variations in secular attitudes toward politics. The literature suggests that modernization may weaken traditional bonds with religious adherence and the state can assume an important role in this endeavor through mass education, industrialization, and other factors. However, this explanation is incomplete in light of the resurgence of religious movements. This study argues that economic inequality increases the positive evaluation of the role of religion in politics through its effect on religiosity and participation in religious organizations. Employing a multilevel analysis on 40 countries, this study demonstrates that inequality decreases attitudes toward support for two dimensions of public secularization: the secularization of public office holders and the influence of religious leaders in politics. Simultaneously, the effect of modernization on these attitudes varies. The results also suggest that although inequality diminishes secular attitudes of all socioeconomic groups, its effect is nonlinear, with a greater effect on the poor.
Political scientists often describe party competition, political behavior or public preferences in left/right terms. Nevertheless, the usefulness of the concepts “left” or “right” is rarely explored. This study assesses whether the left/right continuum resonates with publics in developing Latin American democracies. Using data from the 2008 wave of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), the authors measure variability in left/right self-placement in three Latin American countries, namely, Ecuador, Mexico, and Chile. Building on the approach developed by Alvarez and Brehm for public opinion in the United States, the authors explore (a) the extent to which voters in Ecuador, Mexico, and Chile possess predicable left/right positions and (b) whether predictability can be attributed to individual- and country-level characteristics. At the individual level, the authors show that variability decreases with political sophistication. At the country level, they find that a lower degree of programmatic party system structuration leads to higher levels of response variation. Mapping the variability in left/right preferences provides important insights into the structure of public opinion and contours of political behavior in Latin America and how they differ from those of other regions such as North America. In addition, this study brings to bear important new individual-level insights into recent political developments in the Latin American region, especially the so-called left turn in Latin American politics.
Nearly all systematic empirical work on the effect of social diversity on the number of parties suggests that there is an interaction between rules and diversity. Most analyses make a strong case that social heterogeneity leads to party fragmentation under permissive electoral rules, but that a psychological effect mitigates the power of social forces to promote party proliferation under single-member district, first-past-the-post rules. However, in this paper we provide substantial evidence that runs counter to most previous work. Using an original data set of district-level measures of ethnic diversity and party fragmentation, we demonstrate that social diversity helps shape the number of parties even under first-past-the-post electoral rules, thus suggesting that restrictive rules are not as powerful a constraint on electoral behavior and outcomes as is usually supposed.
According to an influential view, in the United States pay for less skilled workers is low and government benefits are stingy, but this facilitates the creation of new jobs and encourages such individuals to take those jobs. In much of Western Europe, relative pay levels are higher for those at the bottom and benefits are more generous, but this is said to discourage job creation and job seeking. This article offers a comparative assessment of this trade-off view based on pooled time-series cross-section analyses of 14 countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that greater pay equality and a higher replacement rate do reduce employment growth in low-productivity, private-sector service industries and in the economy as a whole. However, these effects are relatively weak. The results point to a variety of viable options for countries wishing to maintain or move toward a desirable combination of jobs and equality.
Scholars have begun to investigate the mechanisms that link ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision but have paid only minimal attention to the role of preferences for public policies. Some argue that ethnic groups hold culturally distinctive preferences for goods and policies, and that such differences impede effective policy making, but these studies provide little evidence to support this claim. Others argue that preferences do not vary systematically across ethnic groups, but again the evidence is limited. In this article, we engage in a systematic exploration of the link between ethnic identity and preferences for public policies through a series of individual and aggregated analyses of Afrobarometer survey data from 18 sub-Saharan African countries. We find that in most countries, preferences do vary based on ethnic group membership. This variation is not merely an expression of individual-level socioeconomic differences or of group-level cultural differences. Instead, we suggest that citizens use ethnicity as a group heuristic for evaluating public policies in a few predictable ways: We find more persistent disagreement about public policies between politically relevant ethnic groups and where group disparities in wealth are high.
Gender scholars have found that democratization is rarely associated with advances in women’s rights and offer a range of reasons why. This article offers a new explanation that targets the quality of democracy in the leading institutions in the public sphere. The author argues that open and inclusive debate conditions, or women’s access, voice, and capacity for contestation in the legislature, civil society, and the media, enable them to shape debate content and pressure the state to respond with legislative reform. The author tests this claim through a structured, focused comparison of Chile and South Africa during the period prior to the transition to democracy, when the public sphere expanded and debate conditions were dynamic. The author finds that different levels of openness and inclusiveness coincide with different outcomes in women’s rights. This suggests that the quality of democracy in the public sphere shapes women’s rights and that it may shape the outcomes of rights for other marginalized groups and in long-standing democracies as well.
Why do some immigrant minorities in the developing world integrate into their host societies while others face exclusion and hostility? This paper offers new insights on the determinants of political identity and group relations in ethnically diverse societies through the lens of South-to-South migration. Using original data from surveys and interviews collected during twelve months of field research in West Africa, and a unique empirical strategy that allows for single-group cross-country and single-country cross-group comparisons, this paper tests the relationship between cultural proximity and immigrant exclusion. The analysis indicates that cultural similarities between immigrants and their hosts may limit immigrant integration because they motivate community leaders to highlight group boundaries. The results shed light on immigrant exclusion in Africa and contribute to the debate on the determinants of political identity in ethnically diverse societies.
Globally, there is a significant gender gap in political engagement between men and women; however, this gender gap varies both across countries and within countries over time. Previous research has argued that the inclusion of women in elite political positions encourages women’s political engagement at the citizen level—by augmenting women’s symbolic representation—and can reduce this gender gap. Using Afrobarometer data from 20 African countries across four waves of surveys from 1999 to 2008, we employ an interactive multilevel model that controls for the sex of the respondent, the percentage of women in the legislature, and the interaction of these two variables. We find that as women’s descriptive representation increases, the political engagement gender gap diminishes. This finding is robust across several measures of political engagement. Our findings suggest that the incorporation of women into political institutions encourages the political engagement of women at the citizen level.
This article explores the relationship between economic development strategies and conflict outcomes in Africa, using a comparison of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Findings suggest that development strategies that create contestation for resources along identity group lines, absent provisions for co-opting disenfranchised groups, increase the likelihood of communal violence, whereas development plans that transcend ascriptive social identities bear the greatest chance of generating long-term peace, irrespective of their short-term economic success. The author complements the comparative case study with evidence of intracase variation in Ghana and with original micro-level data collected in 2009.
Do African countries suffer from their arbitrary boundaries? The authors test several hypotheses from the debate on this question. They differentiate, one by one, the degree of arbitrariness of African boundaries along two axes: the extent to which they partition preexisting political groupings (dismemberment) and the degree to which they bring together distinct precolonial political cultures (suffocation). They find that dismemberment is positively associated with international disputes and that suffocation magnifies the likelihood of civil wars, political instability, and secession attempts. The evidence appears to support claims that Africa has paid a substantial price for refusing to challenge some of the arbitrary boundaries it inherited from colonialism. The authors discuss the policy implications of their findings.
This article proposes an historically oriented typology of contemporary African political systems: the polyarchic, the socialist, the civil-authoritarian, and the praetorian. Their performance after independence is evaluated then in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita growth, improvements in the “physical quality of life,” indicators of “dependence,” and normative standards. Closer analysis reveals a differentiated pattern that contradicts many commonly held assumptions concerning the developmental advantages of (civil or military) authoritarian rule in Third World countries. Thus polyarchic systems fare quite well both in terms of GNP growth and the improvement of the basic quality of life. They also have the best record concerning normative standards (protection of civil liberties and freedom from political repression). Socialist systems show a poorer performance in terms of economic growth, but have a good record in improving the living conditions of a larger part of the population, especially in the fields of health and education. The civil-authoritarian states do well with respect to GNP per capita growth rates, but relatively little of this growth contributes to the improvement of basic living standards. Praetorian systems have the worst records in all regards. Dependence does not turn out to be a significant factor contributing to this differentiated pattern of performance.
Africa’s urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization. Opposition parties, which are pivotal for democratic consolidation, have nevertheless exhibited disparate success at obtaining votes from this constituency. To explain why, this study focuses on the case of Zambia and draws on interviews with political elites as well as a survey of informal sector workers in Lusaka. Instead of vote buying, ethnic alignments, or economic voting, these data show that the urban poor’s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena. Opposition parties that employ populist strategies are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties reliant on alternative modes of mobilization. The advantages of a populist strategy include greater differentiation from the myriad of purely personalistic parties in Africa and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor, including service delivery and jobs.
The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.
This paper challenges the long-standing emphasis in the developmental state literature on the powerful pilot agency as an essential component of industrialization. While a pilot agency may be able to facilitate growth in mature industries, we argue that policy-makers seeking to promote rapid innovation-based competition must instead rely on continuous, radical policy innovation. We argue that this kind of experimentation is more likely to occur at the periphery of the public sector, in agencies with few hard resources and limited political prestige. In addition to providing a novel interpretation of how states enter new, high technology markets, we explain why some successful countries become less innovative over time. As agencies successfully introduce radical policy innovations, their higher profile exposes them to greater political interference and reduces their entrepreneurial capacity. The argument is supported by within-case analysis of two historically low-technology economies that successfully promoted rapid innovation-based growth, Finland and Israel.
At the beginning of each Parliamentary session, almost all European governments give a speech in which they present the government’s policy goals and legislative agenda for the year to come. Despite the enormous body of literature on governments in European parliamentary democracies, systematic work on these executive policy agendas is surprisingly limited. In this paper we compare the evolvement of executive policy agendas - measured through the annual government speeches in four West European countries, UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark over the past 50 years. We find that government policy agendas on the one hand are relatively stable on a year to year basis, On the other hand, when looking at the long-term development, government policy agendas do show significant patterns of change, which furthermore looks remarkably similar across the four countries despite the differences in the four countries’ political institutional structure. Hence, over the long run, executive policy agendas do change substantially, but contrary to election-based explanations of policy change, elections are not the main driver of change. Instead, the results are consistent with a more general model of issue intrusion
Scholars have long recognized the importance of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as an active court and an engine of European integration. Few, however, have peered inside the black box of the institution to look at the individuals who do the work or to analyze the ECJ as an organization. Law clerks at the ECJ, called référendaires, are drawn from the ranks of lawyers, legal academics, legal administrators, and judges. They provide valuable legal and linguistic expertise, ease the workload of their members, participate in oral and written interactions between cabinets, and provide continuity as members rapidly change. Although they have more power than their counterparts in the United States Supreme Court, they are not the puppeteers of the members, but their agents. Focusing on the purported unchecked power of clerks distracts us from examining the important institutional consequences of changes in workload or an expansion of members.
In recent years a great deal of attention has been directed to the application of multivariate statistical methods to the assessment of dependency approaches to North-South relations. This article attempts to contribute to the debate with an effort at specificity. It concentrates closely upon a single mode of North-South interaction, private direct foreign investment, and explores the consequences of investment holdings differentiated into three economic sectors—mining, agriculture and manufacturing—on income distribution and social policy in 68 Third World countries. It is found that hypotheses relating extensive foreign investment holdings to inequitable income distribution and social marginality are consistently borne out (although the effects vary somewhat by economic sector) but that hypotheses relating foreign investment to inequitable taxation and social welfare policies are not.
The alternative vote (AV) is an electoral system that tends to produce centripetal effects. It therefore has some potential to foster interethnic compromise and coalition in severely divided societies. Fraenkel and Grofman's attempt to show that AV will not “necessarily” and “uniformly” produce moderate results refutes a proposition that has not been advanced and does so on the basis of assumptions contrary to those specified by proponents of AV's generally moderating propensities. Fraenkel and Grofman's examination of two elections under AV in Fiji is based on perverse interpretations of the data and embodies a serious underestimate of the extent to which strategic behavior can support interethnic moderation.