Asian Survey

How do local natives react to a sudden influx of asylum seekers? Scholarship has consistently found that respondents exposed to a refugee crisis tend to exhibit an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes. However, because most such studies have been conducted in a Western setting, we have surprisingly little understanding of how natives would react in a different political setting, especially in an East Asian context. I use difference-in-differences analysis to examine how local natives reacted after the 2018 Jeju refugee crisis. Two independent studies show little evidence of increased hostility. Local residents who were equally or more anti-immigrant (on multiple dimensions) before exposure became less anti-immigrant after exposure than mainland residents. This finding contrasts with previous studies but also provides grounds for understanding the conditions under which an influx of asylum seekers can induce relatively positive reactions among local natives.

China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore share a cultural legacy and have all been doing well economically over the years—two of the factors which have often been associated with democratization. Yet, thus far, two (Taiwan and South Korea) are democratic while the other two (China and Singapore) are not. It is argued in this article that factors other than culture and economy have played a significant role in facilitating democracy in Taiwan and South Korea but are not present in China and Singapore. One such factor is a quasi-pluralistic social order—ethnic division in Taiwan and regionalism in South Korea—which drives people to seek democracy to redress their grievances, to help solve the collective action problem, and to provide resources (e.g., popular support) in their fight against the authoritarian regime. Such a social order is not present in China or Singapore.

Most grassroots cadres work out of sight of management, posing challenges for direct management (i.e., commands and incentives). Cadre training can be an effective tool for shaping their behavior, serving as an alternative or supplement to commands and incentives. However, this effectiveness depends on the cadres’ perceptions. Using evidence from Chinese government agencies, we empirically explore the impact of cadre training on grassroots cadres’ taking-charge behaviors. We also investigate public service motivation and professional role identity as potential mediators of this impact. Analyzing survey data from 587 Chinese grassroots cadres using a structural equation model, we find that cadre training substantially strengthens their taking-charge behaviors. This relationship is partially mediated by public service motivation and professional role identity. This study augments our knowledge of cadre training in the Chinese context and its effects on grassroots cadres’ attitudes and behavior.

This study examines the consequences of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit and China’s military response, using survey data from 2,027 respondents in Taiwan and 4,575 in Shanghai. The visit achieved its goals: assuring Taiwan’s public and creating a deterrent effect on China’s public. In response, China’s military exercises aimed to alleviate domestic concerns about US involvement (counter-deterrence) and to undermine Taiwan’s confidence in US assurances (counter-assurance). The exercises had a slight counter-assurance effect but no significant counter-deterrence. This study highlights the complex interplay between military and non-military strategies in the Taiwan Strait’s security environment and their roles in geopolitical stability.

Is China using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to advance its economic development or to fulfill broader geopolitical objectives? While the BRI is often touted as a primarily economic venture aimed at addressing domestic overcapacity, this paper posits that political objectives are equally important. Drawing on selectorate theory, I assess whether China uses this initiative for political purposes. If so, it would be more likely to partner with authoritarian countries it sees as more amenable to political influence. Using logistic and Cox models to analyze data from 2013 to 2020, I find that political considerations are as relevant as economic ones. This research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the BRI within global political and economic contexts and explains China’s international strategy.

This article provides a comprehensive examination of social trust in China. It addresses ongoing debates about how much people trust, whether there is a trust crisis, and where trust comes from. Analyzing extensive harmonized data from the Chinese General Social Survey (2003–2021) and the World Values Survey (1990–2018) spanning three decades, we find that Chinese people have high levels of general trust in others; this high social trust has been largely stable over the last three decades; and political confidence and perceived fairness are two key drivers of trust. On the other hand, we see marked low trust toward several groups, such as strangers, businessmen, and religious individuals. Potential explanations are discussed. This study contributes to key trust debates and identifies novel trust patterns that can serve as valuable subjects for future research.

Has progress toward democracy affected the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to East Asia? Existing research presents conflicting theoretical perspectives on the effect of democratic institutions on FDI. One thread suggests that democratization will lead to more FDI inflows; a second argues for less; and a third argues there may be no effect. We explore whether political institutions impact FDI flows to East Asia by empirically assessing the relationship between the two phenomena. Using three-stage least-squares estimation to account for endogeneity and pooled annual time-series data from 1975 to 2018 for 13 East Asian countries, we find that democratic institutions are associated with higher levels of inward FDI. The results are robust across alternative measures of FDI and democracy. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications.

Since 1978, China has consistently taken a pragmatic approach in its overseas propaganda to avoid ideological confrontation with the West. However, as China’s influence grows, this tradition has shifted. The West now criticizes China’s global promotion of its own “democracy”—often depicted in the West as authoritarianism—as an attempt to undermine Western liberal democracy. This raises a question: Is China exporting democracy through its overseas propaganda? We conduct a discourse analysis of China’s democratic propaganda in France during the Xi Jinping era. Employing quantitative analysis, we challenge the prevailing argument that geopolitical safety is the primary driver of China’s overseas propaganda. Instead, we find that the primary goal is to address the growing demand for democracy among the Chinese. In a framework of descriptive, defensive, and aggressive dimensions, we show that the underlying motivations behind China’s overseas democratic propaganda sit within the first two dimensions.

This article examines the evolution of the authoritarian developmental state model in the digital era amid intensified global power dynamics, focusing empirically on China. It introduces the concept of the techno-developmental state to illustrate how this evolved state emphasizes digital technologies for both economic growth and social governance. I assert that this evolution is driven by the state’s enhanced capacity to foster high-tech industries amid heightened competition among major powers, alongside bolstered social governance through advanced digital tools. Emphasizing its crucial role in sustaining authoritarian developmentalism, the article analyzes the emergence of the Chinese techno-developmental state amid escalating US–China technological rivalry. It also scrutinizes the New Infrastructure initiative of the early 2020s as the state’s key initiative to drive its economic and governance agendas.

What impact does the Russo–Ukrainian War have on Taiwanese citizens’ attitudes toward the country’s self-defense? We used seven waves of representative surveys by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research between September 2021 and March 2023 (n = 10,869) in Taiwan. We tested two major hypotheses: that support for self-defense should increase for all citizens after the Ukraine crisis; and that the effect should be visible only among certain partisans. Using two surveys fielded before and after the Russian invasion, respectively, we found that support for war did not change significantly. Instead, we found a pattern of polarization based on partisanship. Subsequent analyses using seven waves reached the same conclusion. The partisan hypothesis also received additional support from a robustness test. Overall, the paper highlights the importance of context in studying public reactions to security threats. Policy and theoretical implications were discussed at the end of the paper.

Cambodia has been portrayed as the most pro-China country in Southeast Asia. We argue that such views oversimplify and overgeneralize Cambodia’s agency and its perception of China. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of Cambodians’ perceptions of China, we examined these perceptions using data from our extensive survey in the capital city and 11 provinces. We identify several key factors influencing these perceptions, which vary significantly across regions and groups. The data indicate a multifaceted and evolving relationship between Cambodia and China. While Cambodia’s economic growth and Chinese investments have strengthened ties between the two nations, it is crucial to recognize the diversity of perceptions among Cambodians. Policymakers and stakeholders in both Cambodia and China should consider these nuances to foster mutually beneficial partnerships.

Combining international relations and critical geopolitics literature with a public opinion survey in Thailand that delves into some rarely explored and sensitive questions to understand respondents’ political views and attitudes, we examine the extent to which domestic political developments can be understood through a US–China great power lens. Are politically progressive Thais more likely to be pro-US, and more politically conservative Thais likely to favor China? While we find some relationship between liberal domestic political leanings and sympathy for the United States, we also show that conservative domestic political leanings do not automatically translate into support for China. To view election outcomes in a country such as Thailand as “wins” for one or other great power would be highly misleading.

In the context of a diverse media landscape grappling with an increasingly stringent political climate, this study asks whether the Chinese government’s media-control policies shape public opinion. Drawing on online survey data collected between 2014 and 2018 and using regression models and inverse probability weighting, I find that in 2017, as Xi Jinping began his second term as general secretary, there was a noticeable conservative shift in the political attitudes of the Chinese public. While foreign media might have reduced support for the Chinese Communist Party’s stance and ideology among those with less exposure to the party-state media, state propaganda did shift public attitudes, offsetting the impact of foreign media. These findings underscore the Party’s effectiveness in using media censorship and propaganda to consolidate its legitimacy in the ideological sphere.

The county-township cadres in China have a pivotal role as intermediaries between the strong state apparatus and the general population, directly overseeing public services. In contrast to the conventional paradigms that take external political pressure to be paramount in shaping bureaucratic receptiveness, this study uses a bureaucratic subjectivity approach that amalgamates intrinsic service motivation with structuralized external pressures in the context of Chinese local government to provide a more systemic and nuanced explanation of the sources of Chinese cadres’ responsiveness. Data are from an original quota-sampling survey of local cadres in 10 cities in China. We find that service motivation, together with mass media and top-down political pressure, shapes county-township responsiveness at both individual and organizational levels, and that service motivation transfers top-down political pressure to organizations’ responsive activities.

Although studies have shown China’s growing influence on developing countries’ policies, little empirical work has considered the relationship between Chinese overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) and host countries’ online digital freedom. Considering as many as 112 developing countries from 2003 to 2019, and using a two-stage least squares selection modeling approach, we find an association between Chinese FDI and four types of limits on online digital freedom. Conversely, when we substitute global FDI (excluding Chinese FDI), we obtain different results, suggesting there is something unique about Chinese multinational corporations and online digital freedom. Our research indicates that China and host states’ domestic leaders mutually benefit by restricting online digital freedom.

The personalization of politics and elite polarization have attracted considerable scholarly attention. We conducted an online experimental survey on policy proposals and voters’ evaluations of candidates during the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election. We see an elite effect on voters’ policy attitudes when controlling for party-related factors. The effect shows up as a negative cue but not as a positive cue. Moreover, the negative effect varies by candidate. These findings suggest that in policy attitude formation, opposition to a candidate has a stronger effect than liking a candidate. Overall, this study extends our understanding of the elite effect from the perspective of personalized politics with evidence from the Taiwanese electoral context. This information is critical not only for understanding the political consequences of polarization but also for understanding how it relates to opinion formation among citizens.

Since the late 1970s, Singapore has been an important policy reference for China. Some Chinese policymakers viewed Temasek, its government holding company, as a model for state asset management. They studied Singapore’s approach, but ultimately chose a different institutional design when establishing the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003. China’s engagement with Temasek subsequently concentrated on corporate governance, specifically boards of directors in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Yet despite the Temasek model’s appeal, its influence in China was limited by the far greater size and indebtedness of the state sector; the weaker role of firm performance in asset and capital allocation; SOEs’ numerous social and welfare functions; lack of willingness to augment firm autonomy; and divergent interpretations of the Temasek model and its reference value. “Policy collage” by Chinese policymakers explains the existence of formal similarities between China and advanced capitalist economies without fundamental convergence in function.

Prejudice and negative attitudes toward stronger gender-equality policies are often associated with personal traits such as sexism. An alternate perspective focuses on intergroup threats in resource-scarce situations, highlighting economic frustration. Centered on South Korea, this study examines the connection between deepening pessimistic economic perceptions among young men and their opposition to gender equality, based on intergroup threat theory. Analyzing data from the 2019 Unification Survey, we find that young Korean men expressed less support for gender-equality policies than other segments of the population. And among Korean men in their twenties, a pessimistic view of their economic status correlated with weaker endorsement of gender-equality policies. In contrast, we saw no significant link in this group between sexist attitudes and resistance to gender-equality policies.

The past year witnessed a broad range of cooperation between the US and Asian states. As tensions with China and Russia and threats from North Korea continued to mount, the Biden administration’s strategic goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific gained ground in many Asian states, and strategic partnerships were formed based on various interests. The trilateral partnership between the US, South Korea, and Japan and deepening ties between the US and India were notable. While US–China relations deteriorated, there was a glimpse of positive adjustment in their competition. However, uncertainties and skepticism were raised regarding shared interests or values. Worries about the rise of a new Cold War intensified. The third year of the Biden administration continued to see persistent challenges to its Asia policy.

Vietnam experienced drastic political and economic disruptions in 2023. The anti-corruption campaign reached the very top level of government. Ongoing prosecutions and new arrests targeted the business sector. Vietnam successfully navigated an unprecedented leadership change and restored stability to the political system, emboldening the public security forces in the process. International relations were marked by successful upgrades of ties to both the US and China. However, a shaky domestic capital market, shrinking global demand, and the side effects of anti-corruption drives resulted in a significant economic slowdown.

This year saw efforts by Japan’s government, led by prime minister Fumio Kishida, to tackle problems such as the need to arrest the declining birthrate, increase defense spending, deepen security ties with the US and other nations, and safeguard the rights of sexual minorities. Yet despite being in an enviable position domestically, with no national election looming, a decimated opposition, and a coalition partner with the votes to underwrite his administration, Kishida was unable to rally the public behind a tax hike to fund defense spending. Japan’s prime ministers remain sensitive to public opinion, likely due to the precariousness of their position as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party rather than electoral considerations.

Jockeying ahead of the 2024 national elections took center stage in Indonesia’s political landscape in 2023. The selection of President Jokowi’s son for a vice-presidential ticket signaled the continuation and intensification of dynastic politics. The economy faced headwinds, but Indonesia’s trade balance remained in surplus and inflation was tamed. The government promoted its green transition agenda while facing pushback from local communities on environmental and labor issues. In foreign policy, the country hosted the ASEAN Summit, and Jokowi engaged in a flurry of diplomatic travels in the twilight of his presidency.

In 2023, in an effort to revive the sluggish economy after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government implemented a variety of stimulus measures, such as interest rate cuts, tax cuts for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the issuance of local government bonds. But recovery has been challenging owing to export controls by the United States, lackluster domestic demand, high youth unemployment, and a real estate bubble. Externally, to respond to stronger cooperation between the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Asia, China actively pursued diplomatic activities with its traditional allies, such as Russia, and developing countries.