Asian Survey

The period covered is mainly the 30 years from 1949 to 1979, with emphasis on the relevant events of the late 1970s. Includes: a discussion of the magnitude of the food availability-supply consumption balance problem; a description and analysis of the government's procedures for controlling: 1) the demand-consumption side of the equation; and b) the supply-production side of the equation; and finally an assessment of the outlook for meeting social and economic goals. -from Author

At the October 29, 1997, summit meeting between President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) and President Bill Clinton of the United States, President Jiang announced his government's commitment to join the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and thereby eliminate China's tariffs on semiconductors, computers, and other information technology products. President Jiang also agreed that, in the context of the negotiations concerning China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), his country would make further substantial tariff reductions. A major issue that remains open both with respect to China's participation in the ITA and its accession to the WTO is the speed of tariff liberalization that the country will commit to in these negotiations. Given that recent changes in the structure and competitive dynamics of information technology (IT) industries now demand open markets, we argue in this article that, at least with respect to these industries, rapid elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade are in China's own self-interest. Tariffs and other trade restrictions are incompatible with the new competitive dynamics for IT. Countries that continue to pursue policies of promoting 'national champions' behind protected national boundaries will experience slower growth of IT activities while their domestic IT industries will be technological laggards compared to competitive ones operating in open markets. The first two sections of this article set forth our analysis of the new environment for IT activity worldwide and how this has affected policies in both developed and developing countries. We then discuss the implications of these changes for Chinese trade policy, especially in the context of negotiations regarding China's participation in the ITA and its accession to the WTO.

For most of the last three decades, economic growth in the Philippines lagged its Asian neighbors, earning it such sobriquets as "the Sick Man of Asia" and "the Latin American of Asia." During the Asian financial crisis however, the sick man proved more resilient than his neighbors. This was not simply a matter of being unable to fall out of the basement. On the eve of the crisis in mid-1997, the Philippines economy was forecasted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private sector analysts to grow at more than six percent in 1998—a rate faster than most other low income countries worldwide, and a rate faster than the Philippines' own performance in recent history. When the crisis hit in the second half of 1997, those same forecasts exhibited less downward revision for the Philippines than for the other Asian countries, and in fact, the Philippines' contraction was considerably less severe than the others. The question naturally arises as to why the Philippines, with its reputation for weakness, fared better in the crisis than other countries in the region. To answer that question one has to have a theory or explanation of the crisis, and then show how the Philippines differed from its comparators in the relevant dimensions. This paper examines two non-mutually exclusive explanations for the crisis, weak domestic fundamentals and international contagion, and concludes that the Philippines endured the crisis relatively more successfully than its neighbors both because its financial system was in better shape than others around the region, and because it had a uniquely low vulnerability to contagion. In particular, the Philippines had already had its financial crises, and as a consequence, had undertaken measures to strengthen its domestic financial system. This observation is at once both trite and profound: it suggests that backsliding on the part of the Philippines could lead to renewed problems, and, that with respect to the benefits

As a small country dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea should be highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. In June 2009, following North Korea's second nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874, broadening existing economic sanctions and tightening their enforcement. However, an unintended consequence of the nuclear crisis has been to push North Korea into closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in cooperating with international efforts to pressure North Korea, let alone in supporting sanctions. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce any impact that traditional sanctions could have. Given the extremely high priority the North Korean regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pressure the world can bring to bear on North Korea will be sufficient to induce the country to surrender its nuclear weapons. The promise of lifting existing sanctions may provide one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country's military and diplomatic positions, but sanctions alone are unlikely to have a strong effect in the short run. Yet the United States and other countries can still exercise some leverage if they aggressively pursue North Korea's international financial intermediaries as they have done at times in the past.

Abstract not available

Typescript (photocopy). Thesis (M.A.)--University of West Florida, 1997. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 47-61).

In an eventful year that kicked off with a general election and a resounding win for the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), there were plenty of reminders that Singapore's island status belies a susceptibility to neighborhood influences. The fundamental strength of the Singapore economy was not enough to prevent the city-state from being dragged into regional financial and stock market crises. Pollution from fires in nearby Indonesia also tested Singaporeans' neighborly spirit during the year. Relations with Malaysia were strained too as one incident after another kept alive a war of words across the causeway.

This paper explores the sequence, pace, and outcomes of bank restructuring in South Korea since the financial crisis of 1997, paying special attention to the state intervention in regard to resolving non-performing loans and privatizing temporarily nationalized banks by foreign selling. It argues that, contrary to the conventional view that stresses the positive roles of foreign banks' entry in upgrading the domestic banking, the rapid foreign selling and increased foreign ownership has not substantially contributed to such a upgrade.

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the role of civic organizations in political processes in South Korea. More specifically, this article examines the impact of the blacklisting of candidates by the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE) on the outcomes of the National Assembly election of April 13, 2000. I discuss the relationship between the characteristics of political systems and political culture and the emergence of civic organizations. I analyze the effects of CAGE’s blacklisting of politicians on the nomination processes of candidates by major political parties. I also discuss the long-term effects of CAGE on the political system.

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During 2002, Singapore's government attempted to stimulate political life by encouraging debate among its backbenchers in parliament. It took steps also to revive economic competitiveness, adjusting tax incentives and targeting new industries. And it tried to perpetuate security, setting up a range of new agencies through which to deal with terrorist threats. Yes Yes

During 2003, Singapore's prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, announced that he would be succeeded by Lee Hsien Loong some time before the next election. The country's economy was severely affected by falling export markets and SARS. A free trade agreement was concluded with the United States, while relations remained strained with Malaysia over a variety of issues. Yes Yes

With strong economic recovery, Goh Chok Tong decided the time was right for the long-anticipated handover of Singapore's prime ministership to Lee Hsien Loong. In foreign relations, the earlier leadership change in Malaysia fostered improved bilateral ties, but a visit by Lee to Taiwan generated friction with Chinese authorities.

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's controversial decision to introduce casinos as part of the "remaking" of Singapore's economy was accompanied by officially tolerated public criticism of that decision. Yet, other attempts at organized protests and political expression on a range of issues were subjected to the customary suppression that underlines the government's continued resistance to political pluralism.

Following a decade-long experiment with engagement, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, inaugurated in February 2008, brought a more skeptical posture toward the North. The spring saw a recurrence of widespread food shortages in North Korea. Pyongyang initially moved to implement the roadmap for denuclearization, but wrangling over the timing of the country's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and verification stalled negotiations until a partial breakthrough in October.These events were overshadowed in September by the first reports that Kim Jong-il had suffered a stroke. These reports cast uncertainty over all aspects of politics and policy and once again raised questions about leadership transition and the future of the Six Party Talks.

Timor-Leste (East Timor) appears to have put the crisis of 2006 behind it. No major outbreaks of violence recurred. The security dividend translated into tangible economic progress. Added to that, the otherwise impoverished, half-island Southeast Asian nation has joined the holders of sovereign funds. Still, macro-development indicators do not give cause for unbridled optimism

Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN after independence in 1984 will mark the first enlargement from the original five since 1967. Such inclusion will solidify the Malay-Indonesian cultural heart of ASEAN. It will affect Singapore's status as ASEAN's mini-state. Brunei's claim to part of Malaysia and arguments about maritime jurisdiction remain unresolved, but there is nevertheless a rapprochement with Kuala Lumpur, and a welcome in the other ASEAN capitals too. Assesses likely developments and identifies elements in the progress towards full independence from Britain.-B.W.Beeley Dept Govt & Internat Studies, Univ of South Carolina, USA.

Burma's relations with ASEAN have changed signifi cantly since 1997. This article examines how Burma-ASEAN relations have been influenced by intense international pressure and ASEAN's desire to maintain regional credibility. As ASEAN continues to redefine its position with Burma, the generals' relations elsewhere may continue to define it for them. Yes Yes

In 2010, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) agreement established a new Asian financial arrangement to help address potential currency or liquidity crises. This article analyzes the origins and basic features of the new arrangement, which reflect both progress and the continuing political challenges of building regional institutions in Asia.

The Philippines has long been regarded as the weak sister of Asia, but in the Asian financial crisis it performed relatively well. This is not simply a matter of not being able to fall out of the basement, either-in mid-1997 the Philippine economy was forecasted to grow at more than 6% in 1998, and both the post-crisis forecasts revisions and the degree of the eventual contraction were less in the Philippines than elsewhere in Asia. Rather, the Philippine crisis experience offers valuable lessons for the Philippines, the rest of Asia, and indeed, emerging markets around the world. The lesson is that policies matter: economic reform, particularly of the financial system, can have a demonstrable impact on a country's ability to weather a crisis, even if the crisis originates elsewhere and is spread by contagion.

This paper analyzes the factors that have contributed to development of the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is one of the prominent examples of recent East Asian financial cooperation, by comparing it with the failed 1997 proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund.

Some students of international trade relations contend that the GATT regime is poorly suited to organizing trade between the political economies of East Asia and the rest of the world. I explore in some detail the fit between the East Asian political economies and the GATT regime, and conclude that these political economies have moved far toward compliance with extant rules of the GATT regime but that the GATT rules fall far short of effectively promoting cooperation, minimizing conflict, and settling commercial disputes between East Asia and the rest of the world economy. Nevertheless, since competitive advantage in East Asia today lies more in firm strategy and industrial organization than in state policy, and since global interdependence is changing the region's state policy preferences, I argue that the East Asian political economies are converging with the industrialized countries and that the GATT regime - with much additional rule creation - can adequately govern trade relations with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. -from Author

May 1998 nuclear tests and the changing South Asian security dynamic significantly affect China's assessments of its own security environment in the face of an emerging and nuclear India, its South Asia policy in general and the relationship with Pakistan in particular, and its relations with India in the coming years. This article reviews and discusses Chinese responses to the Indian nuclear tests and seeks to address three sets of issues. First, the consequences of India's nuclear tests for international arms control and nonproliferation, South Asian security, and Sino-Indian relations will be considered. Second, India's rise as a major power and the challenges this poses for China are viewed. Third, Chinese analyses of how to manage the post-Pokhran-II Sino-Indian relationship, given both the common interests they share and the disputes that remain, will be presented. The discussions draw on the author's interviews of top Chinese South Asia and India analysts, as well as an extensive review of the growing Chinese literature on Sino-Indian relations, regional security, and the implications of a rising, nuclear India for China's security interests. I argue that while the majority view favors the development and maintenance of a stable Sino-Indian relationship, there are also voices expressing serious concerns over the direction and implications of India's policy and ambitions. Both sides see the post-Pokhran developments through a particular conceptual prism that not only influences their perspective on Sino-Indian relations and regional security but also predisposes it to a certain set of policy prescriptions. An understanding of these divergent views, the rationales and domestic actors behind them, and their relative influences could direct our attention to the likely trends in Chinese policy toward India and South Asia.

This paper reviews and compares three deliberative approaches to conflict, and applies the deliberative approach to the Tibet issue. It examines the case of a deliberative workshop, its achievements and limits. Deliberative dialogue appears to have improved knowledge and mutual understanding, enhanced mutual trust and deliberative capacities, and produced moderating effects.

This article examines the impact of Japanese local government's initiatives for promoting the protection of foreigners' rights. Evident in this study is the premise that local government is the single most important factor for promoting foreigners' rights in Japan.

The importance of this study is at least threefold. To begin with, it provides yet another case study to test some of the assumptions derived from existing literature on European and the Middle Eastern cooperative monitoring experiences. In addition, it is underscored by the growing demands for cooperative monitoring in implementing arms control agreements and supporting peacekeeping missions in coming years in various global and regional contexts. There is a growing need to analyze and compare different models of cooperative monitoring and hopefully provide useful precedents for other regions of tension. Last but not least, given that cooperative monitoring both as a concept and practice is still something new to China and India, we hope the findings can demonstrate the positive role of cooperative monitoring in dispelling some concerns and misperceptions between these two countries. In doing so, the study also seeks to present a strong case for the two countries to open up new avenues of cooperation and confidence building. This article does not confine itself only to the broad political and strategic perspective for such cooperation but also provides detailed, empirical and practical models of what an acceptable cooperative monitoring regime would look like on the ground. It offers three (short-, medium-, and long-term) models in the Sino-Indian context and also identifies potential areas along the disputed border where these models could be tried out. The potential Sino-Indian cooperative monitoring experience, should the three models proposed be put into practice, could also be useful in the India-Pakistan case.

The prospects for improving justice and stability in Burma remain bleak. This article discusses how conventions and talks have proven to be neither fully representative nor substantive, economic prospects remain woeful, consolidating purges continue, and institutional reforms are being undermined by mistrust and the ruling generals' unwillingness to relinquish power Yes Yes

The article examines the complexities involved in the establishment of a constitutional culture in Burma, which was named Myanmar in 1989 by military generals who took power. It briefly reviews events leading up to the national convention convened by the military government to draft guidelines for a new constitution several years after rejecting the 1990 election outcome in support of the democratic opposition and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The article posits that the modality of constitution-making determines the substantive result in many cases. After examining Burma's constitutional history and the modality for constitutional reform initiated by the miltiary government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the article concludes that the control by SLORC of the constitutional reform process defeats any attempt by the people of Burma to express their will in a genuine social compact.

Despite similar histories, cultures, and positions in the international system, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have followed distinct modernization trajectories. The differences in the effect of financial policies on small businesses in the three countries are explained and their similarities in the process of policy-change over time are traced. An analytical framework is proposed after the working terminology is described. Two factors explain financial policies on small businesses: the degree of organization of small businesses (SMEs) and the type of regime coalition. Two measures of SME organization are used: organizational cohesion and membership size. Postwar "dirigiste" regime coalitions in the three countries are classified as growth-oriented and stability-oriented, and it is argued that the "dirigiste" coalition politics model explains both snapshot differences and important similarities in processes of policy change. Statistic variations and dynamic changes in financial policy on small businesses are discussed in the Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese contexts, respectively. The findings suggest that economic policymaking in East Asia is explained not only by technocratic preferences of an elite bureaucracy but also by political exigencies and the choices of the regime coalition. It was not crises that dictated the changes in SME-related financial policies, but the shifting balance of political power between regime coalitions.(CBS)

Increasing economic liberalization of the Chinese media has not resulted in proportional political liberalization, and previous explanations for the state's puzzlingly fi rm grip are inadequate. This article argues that a "regime of uncertainty" is critical toward keeping the Chinese media in line.

Based on in-depth interviews, survey data, and archival sources, this paper analyzes the origins of nostalgia for Maoist mass campaigns directed against corruption and other malfeasance engaged in by local officials. It argues that campaign nostalgia is an indicator of frustration and unmet expectations. Its origins trace to an unwillingness on the part of the Party leadership to rely on mass mobilization to check cadre corruption. Although nostalgic villagers undoubtedly underestimate the downside of mass movements while conjuring up an idyllic era of official probity, it is understandable that these individuals long for a romanticized version of the rectifications of old and dismiss ineffective clean government drives, legal remedies and bureaucratic supervision as feeble replacements for centrally sponsored, direct struggle against wrongdoers. Still, campaign nostalgia may wane as institutional anti-corruption measures take hold and popular confidence in rule by law builds up. Continuing economic growth and village elections, at least in some locations, may also help reduce the popular yearning for mass mobilization.

This paper examines a recent debate at the highest level of China's politico-legal leadership on the application of the death penalty. The debate centers around the interpretation of a new criminal justice policy called “balancing leniency and severity” and around limiting the death penalty to all but the most egregious criminals. Yes Yes

This article explores the sources and trajectories of Vietnam’s strategy toward China since the last stage of the Cold War. It argues that Vietnam’s China policy in the post-Cold War era has not been guided by a single strategy. Nor is there a pattern of shifting from one strategy to another. What has informed Vietnamese policy is a mixture of four different pathways with a changing salience of components. These pathways are the preferred foreign policy approaches of Vietnam’s two competing grand strategies. As a result of the superposition of the two, Vietnam’s China strategy has been a mix of solidarity, deference, balancing, and enmeshment. Each of these pathways is based on a distinct paradigm of how the world works. Thus balancing is based on realism, solidarity on socialist internationalism, enmeshment on complex interdependence, and deference on asymmetry. The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rise and fall of different strategies as the most salient - but not dominant - ingredient of Vietnamese China policy. The combined strategy cannot be seen as hedging, however. It is the product of a political contest among competing views within the country’s ruling elites rather than the deliberate calculation of a unified leadership.The salience of each pathway in the mixture that makes Vietnam's foreign policy depends on the balance of influence (the balance of power plus the interplay of interests) among key actors including China, the United States, ASEAN, Vietnam’s two grand strategic camps - anti-imperialists and integrationists - and the chief of the Vietnam Communist Party.The articles makes the prediction that an ideological alliance with China - the foreign policy linchpin of the anti-imperialist grand strategy - is impossible. Vietnam’s China policy in the future will be a synthesis of balancing, deference, and enmeshment. Which of these components is more salient will depend on Chinese and U.S. policies toward Vietnam as much as on the balance of power between the two grand strategies. As long as the country’s leadership continues to be divided in terms of grand strategy, the leadership style of the general secretary will remain an important factor in shaping Vietnam’s policy choice.The case of Vietnam suggests that the debate about the implications of a rising China is misleading because it assumes that the state is a unitary actor behaving according to a single logic of international relations. By pointing out the broad range of paradigms shaping Vietnamese foreign policy, this article argues that the framing of state responses to China's rise on the basis of dominant IR theories of the West has truncated the picture. This study also demonstrates that it is not power or ideas alone, but the interplay of power and ideas that matters most in shaping the choices of a state.

Why has the Chinese regime been resilient in the most populous country in the world? Based on survey data collected from five large Chinese cities, this study finds that a majority of Chinese urban residents show a certain degree of support for the current political regime and do not favor fundamental regime change. This diffuse regime support is largely determined by satisfaction with government performance in a number of policy areas that affect people's daily lives. © 2013 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war in 1989-90 provided the impetus for both Vietnam and China to reassess their relationship. Cambodia was the main obstacle to an improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the settlement of the Cambodian question made normalization in November 1991 possible. This article describes the nature of Vietnam-China relations from the time of normalization to the present by integrating the two analytical approaches outlined above. It also examines the remaining unresolved issues between the two countries and their current status.

Based on election observations and a two-wave panel survey, this paper offers a more rigorous test of the hypothesis that free and fair village elections may make Chinese villagers feel empowered. It shows that after the introduction of free elections, more villagers said that they would not vote in the next election for cadres who did not comply with central policies, that they would persuade other villagers not to vote for such cadres, and that they would join other villagers to make an impeachment motion. Moreover, more respondents said that they would ask the villagers' committee director to raise objections if the township government had made a decision that did not accord with central policies. A confirmatory factor analysis shows that these four indicators measure the same latent construct, which I call election-sensitive external efficacy regarding villagers' committee cadres. It also shows that the mean level of efficacy manifested by respondents after the election is significantly higher than that they did before the election. The paper argues that enhanced efficacy may lead to more active popular participation, which may affect the political restructuring in the village when villagers rally behind elected villagers' committee cadres in challenging the monopoly of power by the village Party branch. In the long run, repeated elections may help to cultivate the notion of electoral legitimacy among villagers.

Critical deputy speeches and opposition to draft bankruptcy, enterprise, and villager committee laws have led some observers to conclude that the National People's Congress (NPC) is a conservative, obstructionist force in Chinese politics. This article reviews the evidence for this claim and finds that the NPC's institutional impact is more accurately described as procedurally conservative than as substantively conservative. Not a staunch opponent of market reforms nor of redefining the role of the Communist Party, the legislature instead stands for rationalizing and legalizing policymaking and for guaranteeing policy implementation; it weighs in on the side of caution, carefully-planned change, and minimizing risks, and against campaign-style politics and reliance on revolutionary enthusiasm and charisma.

Japan's reemergence as a "normal" military power has been accelerated by the "super-sizing" of North Korea: a product of the North's extant military threat, multiplied exponentially by its undermining of U.S.-Japan alliance solidarity, views of the North as a domestic "peril," and the North's utilization as a catch-all proxy for remilitarization.