Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (J Theor Phil Psychol)

Publisher: American Psychological Association

Current impact factor: 0.00

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5-year impact 0.00
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ISSN 1068-8471
OCLC 313232002
Material type Periodical
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

American Psychological Association

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
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    • Authors' pre-print on a web-site
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    • Copy of authors final peer-reviewed manuscript as accepted for publication
    • Authors' post-print on author's web-site, employers server or institutional repository, after acceptance
    • Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged
    • Must link to APA journal home page or article DOI
    • Article must include the following statement: 'This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.'
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • APA will submit NIH author articles to PubMed Central, after author completion of form
  • Classification
    green

Publications in this journal


  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: Phillip Rieff, preeminent Freud scholar and cultural critic, in The Triumph of the Therapeutic (Rieff, 1966), discusses how Freud's psychoanalytic theory ushered in a new conception of the person, "psychological man," resulting in a major cultural shift. Rieff believed that this appeal to psychotherapy to solve life dissatisfaction has resulted in increased isolation and individualism, and contributed greatly to the loss of any external moral authority. Rieff claimed that the therapeutic mentality eschewed all outside means for determining right and wrong, and encouraged individuals to liberate themselves from societal constraints and pursue personal fulfillment at the expense of the communal good. Since Rieff wrote Triumph, the theory and practice of psychotherapy has undergone several significant shifts. First, there has been a transition from a positivist to a constructivist view of the mind. Second is the change from a 1-person drive-based model to a 2-person or relational psychology. These shifts have, to some extent, addressed Rieff's concerns and allow for the possibility for psychodynamic psychotherapists to address moral and cultural issues in treatment. This article will argue that contemporary relationship-based psychodynamic models, rather than eroding a sense of shared morality, make it possible for distressed and alienated individuals to connect to a concern for others and to regain a sense of being part of a group or community.
    No preview · Article · Nov 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: The concept 'construct' has been used to denote a large class of phenomena, including more classically defined traits (such as introversion and extroversion), clinical and diagnostic categories (e.g., psychopathy), cognitive functions (e.g., cognitive control, verbal memory), and more specific attitudinal and/or behavioral phenomena (ranging from "attitudes towards work schedules" to "pharmacists' care of migraineurs"). Moreover, how construct as a general category is characterized varies considerably, and constructs are often portrayed at the same time as theoretical concepts and the very phenomena designated by those theoretical concepts. In the present work, we draw on Michael Billig's descriptions of some of the implications of privileging a particular style of writing in social science discourse to provide a partial explanation as to why the constructed connotation of constructs (i.e., as theoretical concepts created by psychological researchers) has largely given sway to the reification of constructs (i.e., as objects under study) in the discourse of construct validation, and psychological discourse, more generally. We conclude by providing recommendations for psychological researchers regarding how to ward against ambiguous uses of the concept 'construct.'
    No preview · Article · Nov 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: Across the U.S. Veterans Affairs health care system, there have been programmatic initiatives to implement evidence-based psychotherapies (EBPs) for posttraumatic stress disorder, such as Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) and Prolonged Exposure (PE) (Chard, Ricksecker, Healy, Karlin, & Resick, 2012). Several thousand clinicians have been trained, which makes these manualized treatments some of the most widespread and influential clinical training tools in the country. This article contends that these approaches are inadequate in responding to what is arguably the most important impact of military trauma: an enduring sense of guilt, remorse, and regret. A dialogue from the CPT training manual is highlighted as an example of how a therapist's assumptions about, inattention to, or underestimation of clients' moral horizons can cause harm. The author situates this critique in a broader discussion of some of the ways that psychology in general has dismissed guilt by divorcing it from the traditional contexts and value systems that give it meaning. This includes the cognitive- behavioral propagation of guilt as the byproduct of an irrational and unhelpful cognitive style, and recent research on moral injury conceptualization and treatment.
    No preview · Article · Nov 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: Prominent psychiatrists have moved to rebrand psychiatry as clinical neuroscience and rechristen mental disorders as brain disorders. Recent shifts in research and funding priorities have followed suit, privileging neuroscience over psychological and behavioral research. With the possible exception of identifying general paresis with advanced syphilitic brain infection, however, no theorized identities between mental and brain disorders have been empirically corroborated. Consequently, we regard the thesis that mental disorders are brain disorders as an ontological hypothesis. Any robust formulation of the hypothesis that mental disorders are brain disorders logically requires the minimal thesis that mental disorders supervene upon brain disorders. A mental disorder supervenes upon a brain disorder if there could be no change in the mental disorder without a change in the brain disorder. In this paper we analyze contemporary diagnostic criteria used to individuate certain mental disorders to argue that at least some mental disorders fail to supervene upon brain disorders. Hence, we conclude that at least some mental disorders are not and cannot be (merely) brain disorders. This conclusion highlights a basic heterogeneity in psychiatry's subject matter: some mental disorders constitutively involve psychological experiences or sociocultural relationships to the external environment that cannot be identified with or reduced to brain states or functioning. We propose that establishing cases of supervenience failure represents a method for discriminating between more robustly mental (as opposed to brain) disorders.
    No preview · Article · Nov 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: The 4 articles in this special issue (Stam, Sugarman, Teo, Walsh) each provide an illustration of particular ethical failings of psychology, and argue for a reconceptualization of ethics in psychology. Teo and Walsh focus their analysis in part explicitly on the codes of ethics of the Canadian and the American Psychological Association. All 4 papers focus on the ethical implications of the distinctive character and development of psychological knowledge and practice in broader societal contexts. Taken together, they constitute a formidable critique of the ethical foundation of (North American) psychology. In this commentary I reflect on some of the key themes across the articles. I focus, in particular, on the need for broadening conceptualizations of ethical decisionmaking in psychology to incorporate a sense of social responsibility, and on ethical failings resulting from psychology being based on epistemology modeled on the natural sciences.
    No preview · Article · May 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: The question is raised whether the American and Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists (codes) are able to address some of the most important moral issues that have plagued the discipline of psychology in recent history. Applying Habermas's distinction between pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasoning, the codes are challenged on moral grounds and calls for reflexivity are articulated. Using examples from academia and psychological practice, lacunae of the codes are disclosed. First it is argued that the ethics codes are not equipped to deal with epistemological violence that is expressed in some research articles. Second it is suggested that the codes, despite their apparently clear articulation, are not immune to ideological changes that have been observed on the background of the "War on Terror." Finally, it is argued that the codes ignore and provide no ethical guidelines when dealing with work that is based on financial conflicts of interest that afflict recent versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Reflections on the possibility for postconventional codes are included.
    No preview · Article · May 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
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    ABSTRACT: This article addresses the following 2 long-standing issues in the field of psychology: (1) the lack of an adequate explication of what is arguably the central concept as a science of behavior, that of "behavior" itself and (2) whether behavior, and especially human behavior, is wholly explicable in terms of, and so reducible to, biological states of affairs and thus whether the claim that the science of psychology will be superseded by that of biology is justified. In response to the first issue, a conceptual formulation of behavior is provided; in response to the second, building upon this formulation, I argue that behavior per se is neither explicable in terms of, nor is it reducible to, biological states of affairs. Implications for the science of psychology, including its very survival, are drawn throughout. (PsycINFO Database Record
    No preview · Article · Jan 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2015 · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology