Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (J ECON BEHAV ORGAN)

Publisher: Elsevier

Journal description

The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy's structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome. The journal is eclectic as to research method; systematic observation and careful description, simulation modeling and mathematical analysis are all within its purview. Empirical work, including controlled laboratory experimentation, that probes close to the core of the issues in theoretical dispute is encouraged.

Current impact factor: 1.01

Impact Factor Rankings

2016 Impact Factor Available summer 2017
2009 Impact Factor 1.081

Additional details

5-year impact 1.44
Cited half-life 9.10
Immediacy index 0.19
Eigenfactor 0.02
Article influence 1.16
Website Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization website
Other titles Journal of economic behavior & organization, Journal of economic behavior and organization
ISSN 0167-2681
OCLC 6974696
Material type Periodical, Internet resource
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper, Internet Resource

Publisher details

Elsevier

  • Pre-print
    • Author can archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author can archive a post-print version
  • Conditions
    • Authors pre-print on any website, including arXiv and RePEC
    • Author's post-print on author's personal website immediately
    • Author's post-print on open access repository after an embargo period of between 12 months and 48 months
    • Permitted deposit due to Funding Body, Institutional and Governmental policy or mandate, may be required to comply with embargo periods of 12 months to 48 months
    • Author's post-print may be used to update arXiv and RepEC
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Must link to publisher version with DOI
    • Author's post-print must be released with a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License
    • Publisher last reviewed on 03/06/2015
  • Classification
    green

Publications in this journal

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The increased availability of process measures implies that the quality of health care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable dimensions of quality is well-described in the theoretical literature on incentive design. We seek to narrow the large gap that remains between actual price-setting behaviour in pay for performance schemes and the incentive design literature. We present a stylised model for hospital price setting for process measures of quality and show that optimal hospital prices should reflect the marginal benefit of the expected health gains, the weight given to patients’ benefit relative to profits, and the opportunity cost of public funds. Based on published estimates, we derive the optimal prices for three measures of quality that have been incentivised in the English National Health Service since April 2010 (treatment in an acute stroke unit, rapid brain imaging, and thrombolysis with alteplase). We then compare the optimal prices with the actual prices offered to hospitals in England under the Best Practice Tariffs scheme for emergency stroke care.
    No preview · Article · Mar 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: We conduct experiments based on the oligopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to assess the impact of demand side concentration on market outcomes. Both buyers and sellers in our markets are humans. The number of firms is fixed at three in all treatments. Only the number of buyers is varied and total demand is split equally among them. We observe that firms set lower prices in markets with only few buyers, namely one or two. Price dispersion is higher in markets with few buyers. Aggregate demand withholding decreases with the number of buyers. This results in lower profits for firms and higher profits for buyers in markets with few buyers.
    No preview · Article · Feb 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: This paper extends the standard sequential search model by allowing the agent who compiles the choice set via search (the “searcher”) to differ from the agent who chooses from the set (the “chooser”). I show for a general joint distribution of the agents’ preferences that the searcher's optimal policy is a threshold rule. In contrast to the standard model, the threshold is weakly decreasing in time (i.e., exhibits the “discouragement effect”), although the search horizon is infinite and the search environment stationary. I characterise the threshold and discuss the testable implications of the discouragement effect. The characteristics of my model differ from two single-agent search models that feature a time-varying threshold (convex search costs or deadline). In particular, my model features a threshold that decreases endogenously over time and never generates return to an item rejected earlier, in contrast to the other models.
    No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: We use the synthetic control method to perform a case study of the impact of Hugo Chavez on the Venezuelan economy. We compare outcomes under Chavez's leadership and polices against a counterfactual of “business as usual” in similar countries. We find that, relative to our control, per capita income fell dramatically. While poverty, health, and inequality outcomes all improved during the Chavez administration, these outcomes also improved in each of the corresponding control cases and thus we cannot attribute the improvements to Chavismo. We conclude that the overall economic consequences of the Chavez administration were bleak.
    No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: In a large-scale field experiment, a random sample of car owners in Tsingtao, China received one of four cell phone text messages from the police. Three groups received general messages, urging them to drive safely, warning them about the widespread use of electronic traffic monitors, or describing the penalty for running a red light. The fourth group received personalized messages about how many traffic tickets they had received from electronic monitors. During the subsequent month, drivers who received general messages were as likely to commit a traffic violation as were drivers in the control group, while those who received a personalized message committed 14% fewer traffic violations. A personized message did not prevent subsequent violations if it simply repeated information that was known to drivers, and only new information on traffic tickets had a deterrence effect.
    No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: We investigate how a collusive group can sustain non-Nash actions by enforcing internal discipline through costly peer punishment. We give a simple and tractable characterization of schemes that minimize discipline costs while preserving incentive compatibility. We apply the model to a public goods contribution problem. We find that if the per-capita benefit from the public good is low, then regardless of whether peer discipline is feasible or not only small groups will contribute to the good. If the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is infeasible it remains the case that only small groups contribute. On the other hand, if the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is feasible then full contribution takes place regardless of group size. We reconcile this result with Olson's idea that small groups are more effective by considering the case where the per-capita benefit of the public good varies with group size.
    No preview · Article · Jan 2016 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: A number of studies on taxpayer interaction, from large-scale surveys to field experiments, reveal that people's tax compliance attitudes and behavior change after they discuss tax with other taxpayers. However, we know very little about the content of these communications and the processes by which they produce changes in tax compliance. To address this knowledge gap, we employed an in-depth analysis of naturally-occurring online discussions about income tax among software developers. Using a discourse analytic framework, we report an empirical analysis of 120 online interactions between taxpayers, providing a categorization of these interactions. Interactions ranged from asking for information about tax regulations and receiving such information, to a variety of interactions aimed at persuading defiant individuals to comply with tax laws. These persuasion techniques ranged from stating the benefits of compliance, to threats of severe economic and reputational consequences. Overall, this study is the first in-depth empirical investigation of social influence processes in taxpayer communication. We discuss how the results inform research into social norms and tax compliance, tax communication in social networks, and persuasive messaging in tax compliance campaigns.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: In its standard format, the concept of homeostasis refers to the ability, present in all living organisms, of continuously maintaining certain functional variables within a range of values compatible with survival. The mechanisms of homeostasis were originally conceived as strictly automatic and as pertaining only to the state of an organism's internal environment. In keeping with this concept, homeostasis was, and still is, often explained by analogy to a thermostat: upon reaching a previously set temperature, the device commands itself to either suspend the ongoing operation (cooling or heating), or to initiate it, as appropriate. This traditional explanation fails to capture the richness of the concept and the range of circumstances in which it can be applied to living systems. Our goal here is to consider a more comprehensive view of homeostasis. This includes its application to systems in which the presence of conscious and deliberative minds, individually and in social groups, permits the creation of supplementary regulatory mechanisms aimed at achieving balanced and thus survivable life states but more prone to failure than the fully automated mechanisms. We suggest that an economy is an example of one such regulatory mechanism, and that facts regarding human homeostasis may be of value in the study of economic problems. Importantly, the reality of human homeostasis expands the views on preferences and rational choice that are part of traditionally conceived Homo economicus and casts doubts on economic models that depend only on an “invisible hand” mechanism.
    Full-text · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: We consider the shopping and consumption decision of an individual with a self-control problem. The consumer believes that restricting the consumption of a sinful product (such as chips) is in his long-run interest. But when facing the actual decision he is tempted to overeat. We ask how firms react to such self-control problems, and possibly exploit them, by offering different package sizes. In a competitive market, either one or three package sizes are offered. In contrast to common intuition, the large, and not the small package might be a commitment device. The latter may serve to exploit the naive consumer.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: This paper examines the reflexive interplay between individual decisions and social forces to analyze the evolution of cooperation in the presence of “multi-directedness,” whereby people's preferences depend on their psychological motives. People have access to multiple, discrete motives. Different motives may be activated by different social settings. Inter-individual differences in dispositional types affect the responsiveness of people's motives to their social settings. The evolution of these dispositional types is driven by changes in the frequencies of social settings. In this context, economic policies can influence economic decisions not merely by modifying incentives operating through given preferences, but also by influencing people's motives (thereby changing their preferences) and by changing the distribution of dispositional types in the population (thereby changing their motivational responsiveness to social settings).
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: We use data from a unique survey of members of drug-trafficking gangs in favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to characterize drug-trafficking jobs and study the selection into gangs, analyzing what distinguishes gang-members from other youth living in favelas. We also estimate wage regressions for gang-members and examine their career path: age at entry, progression within the gangs' hierarchy, and short- to medium-term outcomes.Individuals from lower socioeconomic background and with no religious affiliation have higher probability of joining a gang, while those with problems at school and early use of drugs join the gang at younger ages. Wages within the gang do not depend on education, but are increasing with experience and involvement in gang-related violence. The two-year mortality rate in the sample of gang-members reaches 20%, with the probability of death increasing with initial involvement in gang violence and with personality traits associated with unruliness.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of interest and (2) to what extent does selection matter. The experimental work consists in testing the effects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the school level. Overall we find mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level, but the magnitude is small.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: This article contributes to the literature on knowledge transfer via labor mobility by providing new evidence regarding the role of educational diversity in knowledge transfer. In tracing worker flows between firms in Denmark over the period 1995-2005, we find that knowledge carried by workers who have been previously exposed to educationally diverse workforces significantly increases the productivity of hiring firms. Several extensions of our baseline specification support this finding and show that insignificant effects are associated with the prior exposure of newly hired employees to either demographic or culturally diverse workplaces.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: An emerging economic literature has found evidence that wellbeing follows a U-shape over age. Some theories have assumed that the U-shape is caused by unmet expectations that are felt painfully in midlife but beneficially abandoned and experienced with less regret during old age. This paper is the first to analyze age patterns in unmet expectations. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, a unique data set that contains life satisfaction expectations as well as the same individuals’ subsequent life satisfaction realizations, I match 132,609 life satisfaction expectations to subsequent realizations. I find people to err systematically in predicting their life satisfaction over the life cycle. They expect -- incorrectly -- increases in young adulthood and decreases during old age. These errors are large, ranging from 9.8% at age 21 to -4.5% at age 68. They are stable over time and observed within cohorts and individuals as well as across socio-economic groups. These findings support theories that unmet expectations drive the age U-shape in wellbeing.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores a striking form of tax policy interdependence that can be observed in the German federation. Though municipalities enjoy discretion in setting the local business tax rate, large fractions of municipalities – in some states even the majority – set identical tax rates. Our analysis shows that this tax-rate “bunching” is not the result of federal or state-level institutions. Possible explanations rest on partial coordination and yardstick competition. The role of the former is exemplified by the finding that small jurisdictions and jurisdictions sharing the same county are more likely to engage in “bunching”. Yardstick competition seems also relevant since jurisdictions for which strategic tax-setting should be associated with larger gains and lower cost are in fact more likely to set identical tax rates.
    No preview · Article · Dec 2015 · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization