The Law quarterly review (Law Q Rev)

Publisher: Sweet and Maxwell

Journal description

First published in 1885, the Law Quarterly Review provides authoritative and critical analysis on a broad range of legal issues. It is widely acclaimed as a leading platform for scholarly legal debate, in the UK and throughout the common law world. With four issues a year, it keeps readers up-to-date with many important legal developments; The Law Quarterly Review is committed to providing a balanced coverage of developments in the common law world; Issues covered are relevant to both academics and practitioners.

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Additional details

5-year impact 0.00
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Website Law Quarterly Review, The website
Other titles Law quarterly review
ISSN 0023-933X
OCLC 1755607
Material type Periodical
Document type Journal / Magazine / Newspaper

Publisher details

Sweet and Maxwell

  • Pre-print
    • Author cannot archive a pre-print version
  • Post-print
    • Author cannot archive a post-print version
  • Restrictions
    • Only if funded by Research Councils UK (RCUK) or HEFCE
    • 12 months embargo
  • Conditions
    • On open access repositories
    • Publisher's version/PDF cannot be used
    • Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
    • Set statement to accompany deposit (see policy)
    • Published source must be acknowledged
  • Classification

Publications in this journal

  • No preview · Article · Jan 2013 · The Law quarterly review
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    ABSTRACT: This note considers the decision of the House of Lords in Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18. It considers its effect on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and its treatment of the earlier House of Lords decision in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe. It welcomes the fact that the Thorner decision involves a withdrawal, by the majority of the House of Lords, from the strict positions adopted by each of Lord Scott and Lord Walker in the earlier case. The note considers how proprietary estoppel will operate in the future, particularly in cases where one party relies on another’s commitment to give that party a right in the future.
    No preview · Article · Jan 2009 · The Law quarterly review
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    ABSTRACT: In the post-Human Rights Act landscape, judges are increasingly called upon to adjudicate in new and challenging fields. Traditional deference to the legislature or executive on matters of public interest is pitted against the newly acquired judicial role of protecting fundamental rights. Of the dilemmas faced by the courts, none could be more acute than that presented by AV Home Secretary, in which the Government derogated from its human rights commitments in order to institute powers of indefinite detention without trial of non-U.K. nationals suspected of terrorism. Socio-economic policy is also implicated in human rights challenges; all the more so in light of the European Court of Human Rights' ("ECtHR") increasing willingness to impose positive duties on contracting states. It is in this context that judges have had to demarcate a democratically defensible role. From the bland view of democracy as requiring deference to legislators, courts have begun to see human rights as constitutive of democracy rather than ranged against it. With this has come the emergence of equality as a central democratic principle, relevant both in its own right and as part of the proportionality analysis. Other values are still in their infancy, foremost amongst them that of dignity. The result has been a new approach to deference, no longer based on "abasement" of courts to legislatures, but on a view of the courts as active participants in upholding a rights-based democracy. The precise parameters of this role, however, remain under-developed. Under the HRA, judges contribute to the political debate about democratic values but do not have the last word. This makes it a unique forum to develop a model of democratic human rights adjudication. However, to delineate the judicial role demands more complex understandings of both democracy and equality. This paper sketches the contours of such a role, arguing that it is through strengthening accountability and enhancing participation that human rights adjudication gains its democratic legitimacy. This is particularly important in developing an appropriate role, not just for rights in their traditional role of protecting individuals against state intrusion, but also in the context of a modern state with a positive responsibility for the provision of equality and liberty. Part I critically assesses judicial attempts to delineate separate spheres for judicial and legislative decision-making. Part II assesses the value of equality as it emerges in recent House of Lords decisions. Part III outlines a potential democratic role based on accountability and participation, while acknowledging that there is a great deal more work to be done to sharpen and clarify these principles.
    No preview · Article · Apr 2006 · The Law quarterly review

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  • No preview · Article · Jan 1992 · The Law quarterly review