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    ABSTRACT: We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.
    Full-text · Article · Aug 2013 · Journal of Public Economics
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    ABSTRACT: We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator—who can only become active with the consent of both parties—in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. Journal of Economic Literature classification Number: C78.
    Full-text · Article · Aug 2013 · Games and Economic Behavior
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    ABSTRACT: Discussion paper Despite limited government control over the pre-1914 economy, opposition politicians were enthusiastic in blaming bad economic news on the incumbent. In a study of 458 by-elections between 1857 and 1914, we find that voters typically gave new governments a 'honeymoon' but thereafter held them responsible for high unemployment and high prices. Each 1% rise in the price level, on average, brought about a 0.21% swing against the government of the day, while each one-point rise in the percentage unemployed had double this effect. Attributing shorter- or longer-term memories to voters, as they used the past to determine what constituted unacceptable price and unemployment levels, makes little difference to this result. We also look at grievance asymmetry - the idea that voters give governments more blame for bad outcomes than they give credit for good ones - and find some evidence in its favour.
    Full-text · Article · Dec 2012 · Electoral Studies
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