Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Despite widespread acknowledgement that trust is important in a pandemic, few concrete proposals exist on how to incorporate trust into preparing for the next health crisis. One reason is that building trust is rightly perceived as slow and challenging. Although trust in public institutions and one another is essential in preparing for a pandemic, countries should plan for the possibility that efforts to instil or restore trust may fail. Incorporating trust into pandemic preparedness means acknowledging that polarization, partisanship and misinformation may persist and engaging with communities as they currently are, not as we would wish them to be. This paper presents a practical policy agenda for incorporating mistrust as a risk factor in pandemic preparedness and response planning. We propose two sets of evidence-based strategies: (i) strategies for ensuring the trust that already exists in a community is sustained during a crisis, such as mitigating pandemic fatigue by health interventions and honest and transparent sense-making communication; and (ii) strategies for promoting cooperation in communities where people mistrust their governments and neighbours, sometimes for legitimate, historical reasons. Where there is mistrust, pandemic preparedness and responses must rely less on coercion and more on tailoring local policies and building partnerships with community institutions and leaders to help people overcome difficulties they encounter in cooperating with public health guidance. The regular monitoring of interpersonal and government trust at national and local levels is a way of enabling this context-specific pandemic preparedness and response planning.

The conflict in Kashmir is influenced by various interactive factors among which the Islamization of Pakistan and the following Talibanization of the entire Sub-Indian region undoubtedly have played a significant role. The emergence of the dispute is a consequence of the decolonisation process which peaked after the Second World War. Unfortunately, this same period was also marked by the beginning of the Cold War. Hence, it is argued that the Islamization of Pakistan is the product of the negative interaction of two main factors – the geopolitical rivalry of the superpowers at that time, especially considering the negative impact of the war in Afghanistan, and the rise of Islam as a consequence of the overall religious revival around the world. Adding to them is the local rivalry between the newly emerged states of India and Pakistan producing an extremely explosive mixture with the potential to ignite the entire region of South-East Asia, involving also the leading international powers. Thus, the conflict in Kashmir became an integral part of the post-Cold War world directly affected by the Islamic revival and the dissemination of the Islamist principles in Pakistan.

Economic security is going to occupy an increasingly important role in global politics. While the EU should aim to avoid a fragmentation of the global economy and support multilateralism, it needs to prepare for protectionism, a global subsidy race and weaponisation of interdependencies. First, the EU must take geopolitical risks seriously and use stress tests and a data‐driven approach to identify vulnerabilities. We propose creating a European Economic Security Committee to advance coordination between national security and European economic policymaking. Second, the EU must increase its resilience to better withstand economic coercion and be less affected by shocks. Resilience cannot be increased by protectionism but by keeping markets open and concluding trade agreements. Industrial policy has some role to play, but the EU should apply the ‘narrow yard’ principle in industrial policy and enhance cooperation to reduce the risks and costs of a global subsidy race. Third, economic security will require investments in European public goods such as R&D for defence, decarbonisation, technology and the reconstruction of Ukraine, which will be cheaper to procure at EU level. Strengthening the international role of the euro would add to Europe's economic security and financial power.

Simultaneous harvest failures across major crop-producing regions are a threat to global food security. Concurrent weather extremes driven by a strongly meandering jet stream could trigger such events, but so far this has not been quantified. Specifically, the ability of state-of-the art crop and climate models to adequately reproduce such high impact events is a crucial component for estimating risks to global food security. Here we find an increased likelihood of concurrent low yields during summers featuring meandering jets in observations and models. While climate models accurately simulate atmospheric patterns, associated surface weather anomalies and negative effects on crop responses are mostly underestimated in bias-adjusted simulations. Given the identified model biases, future assessments of regional and concurrent crop losses from meandering jet states remain highly uncertain. Our results suggest that model-blind spots for such high-impact but deeply-uncertain hazards have to be anticipated and accounted for in meaningful climate risk assessments.

Despite pronouncements about the inevitable diffusion of artificial intelligence and autonomous technologies, in practice, it is human behavior, not technology in a vacuum, that dictates how technology seeps into—and changes—societies. To better understand how human preferences shape technological adoption and the spread of AI-enabled autonomous technologies, we look at representative adult samples of US public opinion in 2018 and 2020 on the use of four types of autonomous technologies: vehicles, surgery, weapons, and cyber defense. By focusing on these four diverse uses of AI-enabled autonomy that span transportation, medicine, and national security, we exploit the inherent variation between these AI-enabled autonomous use cases. We find that those with familiarity and expertise with AI and similar technologies were more likely to support all of the autonomous applications we tested (except weapons) than those with a limited understanding of the technology. Individuals that had already delegated the act of driving using ride-share apps were also more positive about autonomous vehicles. However, familiarity cut both ways; individuals are also less likely to support AI-enabled technologies when applied directly to their life, especially if technology automates tasks they are already familiar with operating. Finally, we find that familiarity plays little role in support for AI-enabled military applications, for which opposition has slightly increased over time.

Heat conditions in North America in summer 2021 exceeded previous heatwaves by margins many would have considered impossible under current climate conditions. Associated severe impacts highlight the need for understanding the physical drivers of the heatwave and relations to climate change, to improve the projection and prediction of future extreme heat risks. Here, we find that slow- and fast-moving components of the atmospheric circulation interacted, along with regional soil moisture deficiency, to trigger a 5-sigma heat event. Its severity was amplified ~40% by nonlinear interactions between its drivers, probably driven in part by land–atmosphere feedbacks catalysed by long-term regional warming and soil drying. Since the 1950s, global warming has transformed the peak daily regional temperature anomaly of the event from virtually impossible to a presently estimated ~200-yearly occurrence. Its likelihood is projected to increase rapidly with further global warming, possibly becoming a 10-yearly occurrence in a climate 2 °C warmer than the pre-industrial period, which may be reached by 2050.

Abstract A heatwave in Siberia starting in January 2020, initiated by a wave 5 pattern in the jet stream, caused the surface air temperature to reach 38°C in June with important impacts on ecosystems and water resources. Here we show that this dynamical setup started a chain of events leading to this long‐lasting and unusual event: positive temperature anomalies over Siberia caused early snowmelt, leading to substantial earlier vegetation greening accompanied by decreased soil moisture and browning in the summer. This soil moisture depletion and vegetation browning, in turn, increased the impact of the heatwave on the atmosphere through a land‐atmosphere feedback. This line of evidence suggests that large‐scale dynamics and land‐atmosphere interactions both contributed to the magnitude and persistence of this record‐breaking heatwave, in addition to the background global warming impact on mean temperature. Here, we describe a carry‐over effect in Siberia from a spring positive temperature anomaly into summer dryness and browning, with retroaction into the atmosphere. With the Arctic warming twice as fast as the global average, this event foreshadows the future of northern latitude continents and emphasizes the importance of both atmospheric dynamics and land‐atmosphere interactions in the future as the climate changes. More frequent similar events could have major consequences on the carbon cycle in these carbon‐rich northern latitude regions.

Based on a research in progress, the ‘micro-geopolitics of organised crime’ (MGPOC) framework examines how and why organised crime groups (OCGs) around the globe develop illicit economies associated to natural resources. The foundational premise underlying the MGPOC is that OCGs vie for contested resources-rich territories, transport routes, and access to national and international markets in order to secure strategic hubs of illicit wealth, influence and power, thus creating conditions for large-scale violence primordially at a local scale. The present methodology article represents a step forward in the research agenda. Its purpose is to test—and refine—the MGPOC as an actionable early-warning tool aimed to prevent OCGs from creating illicit economies out of environmental commodities. The article is also keen on highlighting the nefarious ramifications of environmental crime to human vulnerability, particularly to democratic governance, environmental sustainability and citizen security. Because a concrete case study is central to this strategic intelligence assessment, the article analyses lithium in Zimbabwe—Africa’s largest producer and world’s sixth—and the variables that might enable organised crime to tap into this industry, especially as this metal becomes increasingly critical in the energy sector’s transition towards a low-carbon future.

As the clean energy transition gathers momentum, it will face myriad technical, economic, and political challenges. However, one in particular is often underappreciated: the potential disruption to the transition from surging climate extremes. We identify three ways in which extreme events may impede the transition: direct physical impacts to transitional infrastructure, strained resources due to rising recovery costs, and political backlash from disaster-affected populations. If these pitfalls materialize, the transition could stall, leading to continued emissions, additional worsening of climate extremes, and further disruption of the transition. We propose three avenues to avoid this potential positive feedback: integration of adaptation and mitigation as mutually supportive goals, fostering political and cultural commitment to a sustained transition, and an interdisciplinary research and training agenda to improve modeling and preparedness for the cascading impacts of climate extremes

Machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) researchers play an important role in the ethics and governance of AI, including through their work, advocacy, and choice of employment. Nevertheless, this influential group's attitudes are not well understood, undermining our ability to discern consensuses or disagreements between AI/ML researchers. To examine these researchers' views, we conducted a survey of those who published in two top AI/ML conferences (N = 524). We compare these results with those from a 2016 survey of AI/ML researchers and a 2018 survey of the US public. We find that AI/ML researchers place high levels of trust in international organizations and scientific organizations to shape the development and use of AI in the public interest; moderate trust in most Western tech companies; and low trust in national militaries, Chinese tech companies, and Facebook. While the respondents were overwhelmingly opposed to AI/ML researchers working on lethal autonomous weapons, they are less opposed to researchers working on other military applications of AI, particularly logistics algorithms. A strong majority of respondents think that AI safety research should be prioritized more and a majority that ML institutions should conduct pre-publication review to assess potential harms. Being closer to the technology itself, AI/ML researchers are well placed to highlight new risks and develop technical solutions, so this novel data has broad relevance. The findings should help to improve how researchers, private sector executives, and policymakers think about regulations, governance frameworks, guiding principles, and national and international governance strategies for AI.

Российское мессианство и американская исключительность играли совершенно разные роли в формировании внешней политики двух великих держав. Мессианство не оказывало серьезного влияния на российских государственных деятелей, которые в своих действиях в основном руководствовались принципами реальной политики (Realpolitik). Даже в советскую эпоху идеологический запал вскоре уступил место государственным интересам. Мировое господство под эгидой российского универсализма и исключительности по большей части мало заботило российских правителей; скорее они были сосредоточены на поддержании фундаментального характера российского государства и на сохранении своего места за главным столом мировой геополитики среди других великих держав. Напротив, за океаном идея американской исключительности вдохновляла как элиты, так и широкую общественность, и способствовала выработке уникального среди мировых держав подхода к международной политике. Стремление пропагандировать американские ценности личным примером положило начало энергичной кампании по распространению влияния Соединенных Штатов по всему миру на протяжении десятилетий после Второй мировой войны. Идея глобального лидерства легла в основу американской внешней политики, базировавшейся на принципах универсализма. Американский динамизм привел к обострению соперничества с Россией. Продвигаясь вглубь евразийского континента в поисках коммерческих возможностей и одновременно с этим распространяя свои демократические ценности, США в конечном счете вплотную подошли к обширному периметру безопасности России. Соединенные Штаты уже не могли свернуть поиски новых рынков или отказаться от продвижения американских ценностей, равно как и Россия была не в состоянии поступиться уникальным характером своей государственности. Таким образом, продолжительное идеологическое и геополитическое соперничество стало неизбежным.

Migration is often considered a form of climate change adaptation by which individuals, households, and communities seek to reduce the risks associated with climate change. In this study, we examine first-time seasonal migration out of a village in North-Western Burkina Faso to neighbouring countries, triggered by more irregular rainfall patterns. Through a set of 52 qualitative interviews, we analyse the perceptions of migrants themselves as well as the sending community regarding migration consequences. Men migrated in the off-season, whereas women stayed behind. Most migrant men and wives of migrants perceive migration to have negative consequences for their socio-economic situation and their health. Despite this, a lack of options and deteriorating environmental conditions might force the men to move again. We interpreted the range of narratives provided by women and men against the background of the scientific literature on migration as climate change adaptation. While migration could be beneficial, this study challenges the notion of migration as an effective adaptation strategy for people in climate-vulnerable settings, who lack other options.

В конце XIX – начале XX вв. наметились рамки российско-американского соперничества, основанного на противоречащих друг другу принципах и столкновении геополитических амбиций. Это противостояние стало следствием американского динамизма, уверенности в себе и самоуважения, которые вывели страну за пределы Западного полушария, подтолкнув США к экспансии в Восточной Азии и Европе, в том числе путем насаждения своего образа жизни и институтов за рубежом в качестве основы, надежно обеспечивающей собственные процветание, безопасность и успех. В России же, напротив, во внутренней структуре и геополитических чаяниях практически ничего не поменялось, несмотря на внутренние трудности и постоянно меняющиеся коалиции с великими европейскими державами. Ее внешняя политика определялась чувством уязвимости и необходимостью поспеть за соперниками, а не великой миссией. Она предпочла бы сохранить дружественные отношения с Соединенными Штатами, но у нее не оставалось иного выбора, кроме как противиться, поскольку США продвигались в регионы, которые они считали для себя жизненно важными, и усиливали критику состояния ее внутренних дел. Под влиянием географического, климатического и геополитического факторов в сознании россиян укоренилось чувство уязвимости и незащищенности, тогда как для Америки те же факторы способствовали превращению ее в великую державу. Если для России расширение диктовалось соображениями безопасности и представляло собой непременное условие ее выживания, то движущей силой американской экспансии выступало стремление выполнить свое предназначение. В конечном итоге американский идеологический активизм и геополитические амбиции разрушили хрупкие рамки сотрудничества, существовавшие с 1775 г.

International migration has increased since 1990, with increasing numbers of migrants originating from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Efforts to explain this compositional shift have focused on wage gaps and other push and pull factors but have not adequately considered the role of demographic factors. In many LMICs, child mortality has fallen without commensurate economic growth and amid high fertility. This combination increases young adult populations and is associated with greater outmigration: in the poorest countries, we estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in the five-year lagged growth rate of the population of 15-24-year-olds was associated with a 15 per cent increase in all-age outmigrants, controlling for other factors. Increases in growth of young adult populations led to 20.4 million additional outmigrants across 80 countries between 1990 and 2015. Understanding the determinants of these migration shifts should help policymakers in origin and destination countries to maximize their potential positive effects.

The period from the American War of Independence (1775-1783) to the sale of Alaska (1867) was the longest period of friendly relations in US-Russian history. This was hardly a period of close ties, however, or what we would now call partnership. Each country was of marginal concern to the other. The gulf in values was profound and unbridgeable, even if the two powers insulated relations from ideological disputes. Geopolitical tension was absent because the two countries largely operated in separate spheres. Where they did interact, friction did not erupt into serious conflict, because Russia was willing to accommodate American expansionism rather risk escalation in regions that were far from vital. The benefits that each country derived from the other were minimal and never arose from extensive collaboration. Rather they were the consequence of each country’s refusal to take sides against the other in conflicts with third powers, including the War for Independence, the Crimean War, and the American Civil War. If relations were friendly, it was because there was no compelling reason to be rivals. The situation changed dramatically in the last decades of the 19th century, as the United States experienced an unprecedented period of rapid growth in wealth and power while Russia entered a prolonged period of imperial crisis. American ideological and geopolitical ambition eventually turned distant friendship into an incipient rivalry.

Background The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) require States Parties to establish National Focal Points (NFPs) responsible for notifying the World Health Organization (WHO) of potential events that might constitute public health emergencies of international concern (PHEICs), such as outbreaks of novel infectious diseases. Given the critical role of NFPs in the global surveillance and response system supported by the IHR, we sought to assess their experiences in carrying out their functions. Methods In collaboration with WHO officials, we administered a voluntary online survey to all 196 States Parties to the IHR (2005) in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and North America, from October to November 2019. The survey was available in six languages via a secure internet-based system. Results In total, 121 NFP representatives answered the 56-question survey; 105 in full, and an additional 16 in part, resulting in a response rate of 62% (121 responses to 196 invitations to participate). The majority of NFPs knew how to notify the WHO of a potential PHEIC, and believed they have the content expertise to carry out their functions. Respondents found training workshops organized by WHO Regional Offices helpful on how to report PHEICs. NFPs experienced challenges in four critical areas: 1) insufficient intersectoral collaboration within their countries, including limited access to, or a lack of cooperation from, key relevant ministries; 2) inadequate communications, such as deficient information technology systems in place to carry out their functions in a timely fashion; 3) lack of authority to report potential PHEICs; and 4) inadequacies in some resources made available by the WHO, including a key tool – the NFP Guide. Finally, many NFP representatives expressed concern about how WHO uses the information they receive from NFPs. Conclusion Our study, conducted just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrates key challenges experienced by NFPs that can affect States Parties and WHO performance when outbreaks occur. In order for NFPs to be able to rapidly and successfully communicate potential PHEICs such as COVID-19 in the future, continued measures need to be taken by both WHO and States Parties to ensure NFPs have the necessary authority, capacity, training, and resources to effectively carry out their functions as described in the IHR.