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the average total electoral volatility for nine countries. For reasons of systematic comparison, Japan is excluded from the table because it may be assumed that the regular conduct of elections over a long period of time will calm down electoral volatility. For methodological reasons, Indonesia is also excluded because it has conducted only one election in 1999. Two numbers are given for Malaysia and Taiwan. For Malaysia, the figures differentiate two periods. The first value gives the TEV for the period 1955-69, i.e. before emergency rule; the second value gives the volatility rate for the period 1974-99. Table 14 gives the average TEV for Taiwan in the period 1992-2001 and a second number only for 2001 for reasons explained below.
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Citations
... 8.3.2) (vgl. Croissant 2002;. ...
... Die strikte Kontrolle parteiinterner Nominierungsverfahren sowie die Monopolisierung der Allokation finanzieller Ressourcen durch den jeweiligen Parteigründer erzeugten eine Abhängigkeit der meisten Mandatsträger von der Person des Präsidenten und sicherten somit die Mobilisierungsund Durchsetzungsfähigkeit der nominell gegebenen Entscheidungsmehrheit in der Nationalversammlung. Zusätzlich gestärkt wird die Kontrolle der Parteiführung über "ihre" Parlamentarier durch eine im internationalen Vergleich hohe Mitgliederfluktuation im Parlament, die während der 13.-16. Wahlperiode (1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000) im Durchschnitt bei 45,8 % lag, da die in der Regel unerfahrenen Abgeordneten kein eigenes politisches Netzwerk aufbauen konnten (Croissant 2002). ...
... Je höher die Disproportionalität, desto geringer ist die Repräsentationsleistung eines Wahlsystems, da dies zu hohen Verzerrungen zwischen den bei der Stimmabgabe geäußerten politischen Präferenzen der Wähler und ihrer Umsetzung in politische Vertretung in Parlamenten führt. Im interregionalen wie im asiatischen Vergleich liegt der Disproportionalitätsgrad 20 auf einem mittleren Niveau -signifikant über dem anderer Wahlsysteme in Ostasien (Japan und Taiwan), zugleich aber auch deutlich niedriger als in den etablierten angelsächsischen Demokratien (USA, Großbritannien, Australien und Neuseeland) (Croissant 2002;Croissant 2006 Die stark regionalistische Prägung des politischen Wettbewerbs ist ein herausragendes Merkmal des Parteiensystems. Ein zweites ist die geringe Institutionalisierung und die hohe Instabilität von politischen Parteien. ...
... n.d.). People participate mainly by choosing policymakers in competitive elections (Croissant, 2000). Such elections are instruments of democracy insofar as they influence the people on policy making (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). ...
Authority in resolving disputes regarding the results of general elections is the authority of the constitutional court granted by the constitution. While the authority in resolving violations is structured, systematic and massive is the authority of the electoral supervisory body granted by law. In the dispute over the results of the general election, which was decided by the constitutional court, the constitutional court did not have the authority to test the petition filed on the basis of a structured, systematic and massive violation because the constitutional court only based on the dispute over the results as intended in its authority. The court verdict has been in accordance with the authority held according to the original instruction given by the constitution, which wants the implementation of elections that are sovereign and carried out on a direct, public, free, confidential, honest and fair basis.
... Comparatively, the average disproportionality of other Asian countries with SMD plurality systems is above 10. For example, Malaysia is at 15.8 , Thailand at 11.1 , and the Philippines with 10.4 (1992-8) (Croissant et al. 2002;Hicken 2008). This means that, despite the critique of disproportionality against FPTP and fears of the largest parties taking all the seats in the winner-takes-all system, disproportionality is not such a big concern in Myanmar. ...
Party system stability is core to new democracies. In Myanmar’s 2015 general elections, more than 90 political parties competed but only 11 won seats. Will the proliferation of parties undermine Myanmar’s party system stability? Given its single-member plurality electoral system and ethno-geographically segregated electoral landscape, what kind of ethnic parties are likely to be electable? This paper addresses these questions by examining how Myanmar’s electoral system affects the electability of small ethnic parties and party system stability. Specifically, we compare the mechanical and psychological effects of the electoral system on ethnic parties and voters since the creation of an ethnically segregated geographical landscape after 2008. For mechanical effects, we compare the degree of disproportionality, extra or ‘bonus’ seats, and how malapportionment affects small ethnic parties. For psychological effects, we examine how electoral experiences shape voting behavior and ethnic party strategy. Our findings, based on limited electoral data and recent party developments, indicate that, in addition to the mechanical effects of electoral institutions, the electoral success of ethnic parties are dependent on the geographic distribution of seats, concentration of voter support, strategic fielding of candidates in underpopulated constituencies, and co-ordination with other parties to prevent vote splitting.
... 2 So far, students of the welfare state or party politics have paid only scant attention to why conventional variables/frameworks have minimal explanatory power for this region. Instead, East Asian particularity was simply attributed to these countries not having sunk roots in party politics or the welfare state (Croissant, Bruns, & John, 2002;Esping-Andersen, 1997), or treated as anomalies, which often resulted in removing them from the cross-sectional analyses. However, by 2017, Japan, South Korea (henceforth, Korea) and Taiwan were consolidated democracies, having passed Huntington's (1991) two turn-over tests and with the GDP per capita levels as high as the developed Western democracies, ranking 23rd, 27th and 33rd, respectively (International Monetary Fund, 2017). ...
This paper investigates elite-level partisan differences along the socioeconomic dimension in three developed East Asian democracies—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the one hand, the mainstream literature in welfare studies and party politics expects left and right-leaning parties should vary significantly in utilizing social policy promises. On the other hand, the path dependency logic tells us that left-right difference should be found over particularistic benefits such as agricultural subsidies or construction projects, considering that these were central means for right-leaning parties to maintain their power during the developmental state period in the three countries. Using an original bill-sponsorship dataset between 1987 and 2012, the evidence shows that there has not been any substantial difference in the agenda setting of conventional social welfare bills between left and right-wing government periods. However, a clear elective affinity can be observed between established right-wing parties and particularistic benefits. The paper shows that contextualizing key political actors’ preferences can lead to a more systematic understanding of political dynamics behind the socio-economic dimension in non-Anglo-European countries.
... However, the case of democratisation in the Philippines deviates from Southwell's conclusions on the relationship between political alienation and electoral participation because even with the persistence of institutional dysfunctions, an entrenched and disempowering oligarchy, a myriad of structural limitations on political participation in general and widespread political alienation (Dressel 2011;Eaton 2003;Franco 2001;Quimpo 2005;Rivera 2011;Teehankee 2002) voter turnout in the Philippines enjoys a sustained rate with an average of 74.25 per cent from 1992 to 2013 with a peak of 81.08 per cent during the 2001 elections and a floor of 63.68 per cent during the 2007 elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2002). From a regional perspective Croissant (2002) argued that electoral politics in the Southeast Asian region can be summed up as a gradual movement from electoral ritualism to democratic competition, albeit the movement is uneven across cases with the Philippines, like Indonesia, being mired in low electoral quality in terms of procedural vulnerabilities and electoral competition in the context of relatively high turnouts. Moreover, from a comparative study of voter turnout in five Southeast Asian countries, Buehler, Lowry-Fritz and Schraufnagel (2014) concluded that at the aggregate-level many traditional explanations for voter turnout are inadequate for the case of Southeast Asia. ...
The electoral process can be considered as one basic component of a democracy and for this reason one way to evaluate the progress of a democratisation project is by looking at the development of this civic practice in terms of both quantity (voter turnout) and quality (voters’ preferences). Focusing on the former, specifically the impact of political alienation on electoral participation as voter turnout this article will look at the challenges to democratisation posed by electoral politics. From the case of electoral participation in the Philippines, I ask the question: What is the relationship between political alienation and voter turnout in the context of the latter enjoying relatively high and sustained rates? Through a synthesis between the notions of political spectatorship, habitual voting and the learning approach towards analysing voter behaviour, I argue that electoral participation is a disempowered mode of participation resulting from the interdependence of sustained spectatorship and habitual voting.
... For example, the military regime in South Korea pre-1988 cycled through direct presidential elections, election of the president by an elected assembly, an electoral college system, and periods in which elections were suspended. " The frequent changes of electoral system are largely attributable to the political interests of the president in office, who changed tactics for every election in the face of domestic political pressure and shrinking voter support " (Croissant, 2002, p. 237). ...
Many scholars have examined the durability of parliamentary versus presidential regimes in democracies, but the process by which authoritarian leaders are (nominally) elected is generally assumed to be irrelevant. However, even if the electoral outcome is not in doubt, the executive selection process may affect outcomes such as regime durability. I argue that, when opposition parties are allowed to participate in the executive selection process, a Parliament-based election system increases authoritarian regime durability by creating incentives for ruling party elites to work cooperatively for mutual gain. In this article, I identify dictatorships by executive selection system and find that regimes with a multiparty Parliament-based system are more durable than those with a multiparty Presidential system or an Unelected (or single party) system if the party, relative to the ruler and the military, is an important power center.
... 5 Because the percent women in a legislature in a given year may reflect the results of elections that occurred in prior years, we lag the electoral system variables by five years. Data on electoral systems were coded by combining a range of information sources including datasets (Beck et al. 2001;Golder 2005), articles and books (Croissant 2003;Otero and P erez-Liñ an 2005), and websites (e.g., African Elections Database 2006). ...
National gender quotas—policies that require a certain percentage of women candidates or legislators—are becoming more effective over time. Using data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, we document this trend with latent growth-curve models. Part of the explanation for increasing effectiveness is that countries have ratcheted up targets for women's inclusion and that quotas are increasingly written in ways that make them more effective at achieving stated goals. Activists, political elites, and policy makers have learned over time which quota policies are most effective, resulting in quotas with provisions that more often lead to success. But, changes in rules alone do not account for the increasing effectiveness of quotas over time. It appears that changing norms about women's incorporation in politics are also increasing quota effectiveness regardless of policy design.
... It diverges from the 'Asian model' of a mixed system that combines list proportional representation and a plurality/majoritarian element (Reilly, 2007). Singapore's party list bloc vote system has been found to penalise smaller parties and generate high electoral disproportionality (Croissant et al., 2002;). This article argues that the multimember constituencies/GRCs mandating the nomination of minority ethnic groups also offer more opportunities to field women. ...
This article examines the effects of ethnic quotas on women's political representation in Singapore. The 1988 electoral reform requires at least one minority ethnic candidate to be fielded in the multimember constituencies based on the party list plurality bloc vote system. Based on elite interviews, party publications and electoral data, this article argues that the increases in the district magnitude of the multimember constituencies have had the unintended effect of improving women's political participation. More broadly, the article shows the conditions under which electoral rules shape behaviour and focuses on how the ruling party leaders in Singapore act as gatekeepers through centralised candidate selection methods that have a direct impact on legislative diversity.
... Following Laakso and Taagepera, the effective number of parties in Singapore is calculated based on following formula: N ¼ 1= P n i¼1 p 2 i where n is the number of all parties and the square of each parties proportion of all votes (or seats) (1979). A comparison of the effective number of parties (based on vote shares) and the effective number of parties in parliament (based on seats shares) would show the degree of fractionalization or how the electoral system concentrates the party system (Croissant et al., 2002;Norris, 2004: 88-9). As Table 2 shows, before the GRCs were introduced (1968)(1969)(1970)(1971)(1972)(1973)(1974)(1975)(1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984), the effective number of electoral parties was 1.8. ...
... For example, the mean number of effective parties is 2.0 in the U.S., 2.1 in the U.K. and 3.0 in Canada (Norris, 2004: 86). In Asian countries that adopted the plurality rule for SMDs and mixed-member majoritarian systems (MMM), the and 2.48 in Nepal (Croissant et al., 2002;Hicken, 2008). See Table 3. ...
... Comparatively, the disproportionality of other countries with SMD and MMD plurality systems in Asia are much lower. For example, Malaysia is at 15.8 (Hicken, 2008), Bangladesh and Nepal (Croissant et al., 2002) and Singapore, author's calculations. Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections Department. ...
... As democratic practice takes more complex and nuanced versions in different contexts, comparative heuristic tools assessing democratic qualities warrant constant updating. 5. Croissant (2002) provides a matrix that compares the fragmentation of political parties in South-east and East Asia and the extent of polarisation. 6. ...
The theory and practice of democracy have moved on from the paradigm of electoral democracy to conceptualising alternative models that can facilitate democratic deepening in different contexts. Methodology should follow too. In this piece, I build on Morlino’s framework, which takes a step towards a pluralised assessment of democratic qualities but remains largely hinged on the electoral model of democracy. I suggest that Morlino’s heuristic tools can be further sharpened by incorporating a deliberative democratic criterion. I provide an empirical illustration through the Philippine case – a country that already exhibits formal features of electoral democracy but fails to translate democratic impulses into democratic deepening.
