Source publication
Article
Full-text available
Contrary to the prevailing assumption that language is “primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, I argue that language is, to invoke Oscar Wilde, “quite useless”. Arguing from aesthetic philosophy and the minimalist program for linguistic theory, I conject that language, like art, is not “for” anything—it simply is , conforming to a...

Contexts in source publication

Context 1
... passant, it is quite perverse that a paper entitled "Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought" fails to define "language", "thought", and "communication". (In due course I shall define what I mean by "thought" and "communication", Figure 1.) It is intellectually reckless to assert what something is for without first establishing what that something is. ...
Context 2
... linguistic competence in terms of its functionalityhow we use language-in critical rationalism draws into relief just how categorically different human language is from anything in nonhuman animals. Inspired by Popper, himself inspired by Bühler, we can organize a hierarchy of linguistic functions in Figure 1 (with higher levels subsuming lower levels): (1) the expressive function (i.e., the expres­ sion of an inner state); (2) the signal function (i.e., the expression in (1) functions as a signal to some receiver, whether it was intended to or not); (3) the descriptive function (i.e., over and above (1) and (2), it makes statements that can be true or false); and (4) the argumentative function (i.e., over and above (1)-(3), it adds argument, with its values of validity and invalidity). ...
Context 3
... beyond the four functions of Figure 1 is a fifth function, homologous in its profundity-and mystery-to Plato's fifth solid, the dodecahedron. Of the latter, having associated the other solids (the cube, the octahedron, icosahedron, the tetrahedron) with the classical elements (earth, air, water, fire), Plato remarked in the Timaeus that "the god used [the dodecahedron] for arranging the constellations on the whole heaven". ...
Context 4
... reason Figure 1 does not include an explicit fifth function is that the poetical function is a kind of argument (subsumable in Level 4), in that poetry-like any work of art-is created in a critical process of inspired-trial and error-correction. Keats, for instance, was distinctively Popperian. ...
Context 5
... to Figure 1, Popper criticized "radical behaviorists" and "radical physical­ ists" in terms that apply with equal force to FPG, who argue that their "view that language is simply a communication system aligns with a continuity view of human evolution", and that my "contrasting alternative-that language is the medium for think­ ing-implies a sharp discontinuity between our species and others. This alternative view centres language-perhaps innately-as the mechanism of change, and the mechanism that endowed humans with a novel representational format for mental computations". ...
Context 6
... derivation is [...] roughly analogous to a proof with Σ", a finite set of initial symbols, "taken as the axiom system and F", the finite set of rewrite rules, " [taken] as the rules of inference" (Chomsky, 1956). It is important that both of these axiom systems-geometry and language-be finite: "Since any language L in which we are likely to be interested is an infinite set, we can investigate the structure of L only though the study of finite devices (grammars) which are capable of generating its sentences" (Chomsky, 1959); "When the number is infinite, [s]ome kind of rule or systematic procedure"-some finite system-"must be given" (Turing, 1954(Turing, /2004). ...

Citations

... As Watumull (2024) vividly illustrates, language as an internal system "exists for its own sake" though crucially it can be used by humans to "[unify] the worlds of abstractions, minds, and bodies" (Watumull, 2024, 2). The language-for-communication thesis is deficient, attempting to reduce language use to serve as a tool for mere expressiveness (Watumull, 2024, 15-16). ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Some generative linguists have long maintained that human beings exhibit a species-specific form of intellectual freedom expressible through natural language. With roots in Descartes' effort to distinguish humans from machines, it is the human use of their linguistic capacity that demonstrates a unique intellectual and creative potential. This "creative aspect of language use," or CALU, is typically conceived as neither determined nor random yet appropriate to the circumstances of its use. CALU is therefore taken to be beyond the scope of computation. This paper argues that there is substance to this claim and that CALU is likely an unreachable threshold for artificial intelligence (AI) developed via computational means. Background is provided by distinguishing the Cartesians' original "language test" from Turing's later "Imitation Game" for machine intelligence. Moreover, it is shown how Turing's work on computability theory allowed generative linguists to reformulate the original Cartesian problem of language use in the twentieth century. The paper proceeds to show why generative Large Language Models do not reproduce CALU. Then, it argues that characteristics relevant to human intelligence such agency and embodiedness-while conceivable in future AI systems via computation-are insufficient for attaining CALU. Language use's non-teleological nature, in contrast to these characteristics, poses a formidable challenge to AI via computation. Finally, clarifying remarks are offered on the problems posed by testing for CALU, with contrasts to Turing's Imitation Game and tests designed in its lineage.
... Compared to the previous volume, book reviews have made a comeback with reviews of Merge and the Strong Minimalist Thesis (Chomsky et al., 2023;reviewed in van Gelderen, 2024) and The Philosophy of Theoretical Linguistics: A Contemporary Outlook (Nefdt, 2024;reviewed in Voudouris & Roe, 2024). Lastly, our Forum section has again seen lively discussion with contributions questioning how to evaluate the language abilities of LLMs (Leivada, Dentella, & Günther, 2024), arguing that so-called "laryngeal descent theory" for the origin of speech was actually never a popular line of thinking in speech-centric sciences (Ekström, 2024), and providing a minimalist perspective on ongoing discussions about the purpose of language claiming that language evolved primarily as a tool for communication (Watumull, 2024). ...