Figure 2
Source publication
The article focuses on the party political spaces in four Southern European countries (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) since the onset of the Euro crisis. To understand the emerging conflict structures, it argues for the need to consider that these countries simultaneously face an economic crisis and a political crisis and that both crises...
Citations
... Uncertainty is a fundamental aspect of political reality, rendering outcomes challenging to predict for actors and underscoring the important role of ideas in explaining how parties navigate the opportunities and constraints within political equilibriums and elections, serving as mechanisms for change in these equilibriums (Blyth, 2011). Large-scale economic, political and/or public health crises rank among the circumstances most likely to induce acute uncertainty, prompting strategic learning and the revision of programmatic beliefs and framing tactics (Pontusson and Raess, 2012;Hall, 1993;Bremer and McDaniel, 2020;Farrell and Quiggin, 2017;Hutter et al., 2018;Roberts, 2017). According to Mark Blyth (2002: 37), large-scale crises and their acute uncertainty create space for new ideas which, in turn, help lower the uncertainty faced and "[narrowing] possible interpretations of the crisis, and hence courses of action, to a significant degree." ...
Why did the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) and the New Democratic Party (NDP) enter into a supply-and-confidence agreement in March 2022? Interparty cooperation among federal parties is rare during minority governments, and yet the agreement created a formal alliance in the House of Commons. In this article, we argue that ideational factors led to the 2022 agreement. We examine the role of programmatic beliefs and strategic learning during the COVID-19 crisis and the 2019-2021 election sequence to shed light on changes in federal parliamentary strategies in Canada. From ad-hoc voting coalitions to extended cooperation on social policymaking, the LPC and the NDP learned how to work together in the House of Commons while using the agreement as a tool to compete with each other in anticipation of the next federal election.
... Candidate figures with dominant control continually use their power to strengthen their party's position, even if it means sacrificing the interests of their constituents. [18]. ...
This study aims to describe the pattern of relations between political parties, figures and constituents in the regional head elections in Makassar City, to elaborate on the political communication strategies of figures in building patterns of relations with political parties and constituents in the regional head elections in Makassar City, and to find relevant theoretical solutions in providing political education for constituents and increasing active participation of constituents in the regional head elections in Makassar City. The method used is a Qualitative approach, with the research paradigm used, namely Post Positivistic. The results of the study indicate that the relationship between political parties and candidate figures is transactional, where material interests and power are the main binders. This relationship often exploits and dominates constituents, prioritizing symbolic politics and the use of money as the main tool in building relationships.
... Second, for the regressions on the consideration set composition, I re-run the regressions adding a variable controlling for the size of a consideration set (see Tables D3 and C4 in the Online Appendices). Third, to rule out if different groups of countries might bias the results, I run separate regressions excluding defined sets of countries: In Tables B9 and C10 (Online Appendix), I am excluding Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) from the analysis, also because these countries' political conflict structures differ to some extent (Hutter et al. 2018). In a further robustness test (Online Appendix, Tables B10 and C11), countries with electoral systems mainly characterised by majoritarian elements are also excluded (France, Ireland, UK). ...
While it is established that core values and voting behavior persistently differ between birth cohorts, less is known about the consideration set stage that lies between those two stages of the electoral decision. However, studying cohort differences in the consideration stage can help to even better detect underlying cohort-driven transformations of the electoral decision than the final vote choice. This paper thus studies this "overlooked" stage: Do newer cohorts consider voting for more parties than earlier cohorts? And how does the composition of the consideration sets differ? These questions are analyzed by using data from the European Election Studies, covering thirty years and fifteen countries. APC-mixed-regressions show that newer cohorts are more likely to include more parties in their consideration sets. Furthermore, cohort differences exist regarding which parties are represented in consideration sets. Those results have important implications for understanding cohort-driven de- and realignment, as well as increasing trends of volatility.
... 159-61). By contrast, left-wing populist parties tend to employ a political discourse with a clear focus on economic inequality and social justice (Rovira Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert 2020, p. 5;Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018;Vachudova 2021, pp. 477-8;Venizelos & Stavrakakis 2022, pp. ...
... Studies on the impacts of the economic crises on political representation and party competition have primarily focused on Southern European countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. These studies have examined specific aspects, such as the influence of the economic crisis on the emergence of new political parties or on the policy agendas of existing parties, including anti-elite sentiments and Euroscepticism (Muro & Vidal, 2017), as well as changes in the relationship between government and opposition parties, leading to increased polarization (Giuliani & Massari, 2017;Hutter et al., 2018). ...
Crises were highly relevant in the 2022 Italian general election. The label of “crisis” was associated with multiple policy issues, ranging from the environment and health to foreign policy. Previous studies have extensively discussed the impact of crises on voter behavior, demonstrating that voters are particularly concerned with parties’ valence attributes, such as the effectiveness of policies and leaders’ ability to resolve emergencies. However, limited attention has been paid to assessing how parties mobilize the crisis paradigm on social media. This study seeks to bridge this gap by analyzing the impact of crisis-related content on Facebook user engagement, with a special focus on distinguishing the relative effectiveness of populist versus mainstream parties in deploying such narratives. Moreover, this research explores how the intertwining of crisis narratives with portrayals of party responsibility or irresponsibility influences the virality of social media posts. To answer these questions, we manually coded 4,827 election campaign posts to create an original dataset. The evidence shows that crises have an impact on boosting user engagement, although this effect seems to be limited to populist parties. The results also suggest that irresponsible claims cease to be rewarding during a crisis. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the strategic use of crisis narratives by political parties on digital platforms and underscores the complex interplay between crisis communication and public engagement in the contemporary political landscape.
... At the same time, the recent literature has also shown that the structure of political conflict in Southern Europe (mostly dominated by the economy and the conflict between old and new politics) differs from the structure of conflict in North-West European countries (which is instead mostly dominated by the EU and immigration issues) (e.g. Charalambous et al. 2021;Hutter et al. 2018). ...
In this article, we examine party positions on sovereignty issues in European countries based on an analysis of party supply. First, we develop an index of sovereignism reflecting the multidimensional articulation and differentiated emphasis put by parties on sovereignist issues. By applying the index to Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, the analysis maps all EU member states. Second, we integrate in the analysis party- and country-level data (including the orientations of domestic public opinion). Through multivariate regression analysis we show how party ideology, contextual factors and public mood favoured the spread of party-based sovereignism in European countries.
... The exogenous events of the European sovereign debt crisis and the increased influx of refugees since 2015 influenced the structure and content of political spaces particularly in Southern Europe (see Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018), accentuating, or in certain instances initiating, the process towards an augmented dimensionality of national party systems (Bornschier 2010). The increased role of European institutions in domestic affairs and the escalating waves of mass migration set incentives for parties to change their programmatic strategy (Charalambous, Conti & Pedrazzani 2023;Hutter & Kriesi 2022;Kriesi 2016). ...
... Indeed, the emergence of a new dimension potentially orthogonal to the economic left-right axis has taken on different connotations among southern European member states and cross-country differences exist in the salience and in the configuration of the new cultural dimension of conflict. On the one hand, whilst in some countries, such as Portugal and Spain, EU-related issues are rather aligned with the economic axis of conflict (Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018), in other countries, such as Greece and Italy, the positions of the parties on the EU have determined the emergence of a distinct axis of party competition, orthogonal to the economic dimension (see Giannetti, Pedrazzani & Pinto 2017;Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018). Although the magnitude of the financial crisis has oriented party competition dynamics mainly towards the economic axis of competition, the outbreak of the refugee crisis has increased the salience of the new cultural cleavage, encompassing socio-cultural and immigrationrelated issues, especially in those countries exposed to greater migratory pressure such as Italy (see Charalambous, Conti & Pedrazzani 2023). ...
... Indeed, the emergence of a new dimension potentially orthogonal to the economic left-right axis has taken on different connotations among southern European member states and cross-country differences exist in the salience and in the configuration of the new cultural dimension of conflict. On the one hand, whilst in some countries, such as Portugal and Spain, EU-related issues are rather aligned with the economic axis of conflict (Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018), in other countries, such as Greece and Italy, the positions of the parties on the EU have determined the emergence of a distinct axis of party competition, orthogonal to the economic dimension (see Giannetti, Pedrazzani & Pinto 2017;Hutter, Kriesi & Vidal 2018). Although the magnitude of the financial crisis has oriented party competition dynamics mainly towards the economic axis of competition, the outbreak of the refugee crisis has increased the salience of the new cultural cleavage, encompassing socio-cultural and immigrationrelated issues, especially in those countries exposed to greater migratory pressure such as Italy (see Charalambous, Conti & Pedrazzani 2023). ...
This article examines the determinants of the partisan composition of cabinets formed in the last twenty years in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Assuming that coalition formation processes take place in three-dimensional political spaces, we assess the impact of the ideological heterogeneity of potential coalitions on economic, EU-related, and socio-cultural issues on the chances that a combination of parties finally forms a cabinet. We find that – in line with the intensified role exerted by EU institutions in domestic affairs – parties were more likely to form a coalition government with those actors who share similar positions on an economic and an EU integration dimension.
... This trend was exacerbated by the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, that severely affected the legitimacy of incumbent governments and mainstream parties. Across Southern Europe, the crisis prompted an 'electoral epidemic' marked by low levels of turnout, declining support for the incumbents, and diminishing trust in political parties (Bosco and Verney, 2012), that soon turned into a government epidemic characterized by extreme electoral volatility and government instability (Bosco and Verney, 2016;Hutter et al., 2018). This loosened the ties between mainstream parties and their electorates (Marcos-Marne et al., 2020), and opened a niche for challenger parties to capitalize discontent against austerity and voice the need for a regeneration of the political system (Hutter et al., 2018). ...
... Across Southern Europe, the crisis prompted an 'electoral epidemic' marked by low levels of turnout, declining support for the incumbents, and diminishing trust in political parties (Bosco and Verney, 2012), that soon turned into a government epidemic characterized by extreme electoral volatility and government instability (Bosco and Verney, 2016;Hutter et al., 2018). This loosened the ties between mainstream parties and their electorates (Marcos-Marne et al., 2020), and opened a niche for challenger parties to capitalize discontent against austerity and voice the need for a regeneration of the political system (Hutter et al., 2018). ...
Across Western European democracies, the last 20 years have seen a growth of precarious employment and the rise of challenger parties. Both trends are especially marked in Italy, where occupational insecurity has become the norm and over half of the electorate has turned to a challenger party. In this article, I investigate the relationship between these two phenomena, addressing the question of whether and how precarity in the labor market influenced vote choice in the 2018 general election. First, I provide descriptive evidence that the Italian labor market shifted from dualism to generalized precarization. Second, I empirically investigate the relationship between precarity and voting in this context. The results show that the perception of precarity, not formal employment status, influenced voting behavior: it fostered participation, increased support for the Five Star Movement, and decreased support for the Democratic Party. These findings challenge core assumptions in the literature, first and foremost about precarious workers' low turnout rate, difficult mobilization, and consequent political irrelevance. They indicate that the electoral weight of precarious workers has increased, and their representation can be electorally beneficial.
... The last few decades in the West have spawned the outgrowth of an oligarchic configuration of politics (Hutter et al. 2018). Liberal democracies increasingly rely on governance models that keep elites immune from popular claims, collective mobilization, and governance continues to shift to outside the setting of democratic competition. ...
One of the most studied hypotheses in political economy and development literature posits that social heterogeneity is negatively associated with favorable societal and political outcomes. This study problematizes the diversity debit hypothesis. It overviews its theoretical underpinning and uncovers its roots to be in rational choice theory and the homo economicus framework of human behavior. As such, scholarly accounts of diversity debit have attributed it to the agency (or lack thereof) of minority groups and their impaired ability to engage in collective mobilization to pressure elites for concessions. Through case studies of three most-different countries: the US, Turkey, and Vietnam, this study discovers that even when mass mobilization has been waged by minority groups either along ethnic or cross-ethnic boundaries, it has not led to favorable outcomes. Diversity debit has subsisted and will likely continue to exist not as a result of individual failure, but due to the interaction of structural (neoliberal capitalistic) forces with the agency of either government-led actions (antagonization and discrimination of minority groups) and corporate profiteering.
... Focusing on party strategies and issue salience, scholars have investigated on which issue dimensions political conflict played out before and after the crisis. Hutter, Kriesi, and Vidal (2018) conclude that both economic and political issues are key to understanding the structure of political competition in Southern Europe in the early 2010s, as all countries saw significant combinations of conflicts over austerity and old versus new politics. What remains largely unexplored is how Southern European party systems relate to the main patterns observed in the rest of Europe where, driven by consecutive mobilization of the "new" left and the far right, the divides over economic and cultural issues have become equally salient (Bornschier 2010;Hooghe and Marks 2018;Kriesi et al, 2012). ...
... We study variance in issue salience over time, between geographical regions, but also across different party profiles, with a central focus on Southern Europe. Unlike past studies (Hutter, Kriesi, and Vidal 2018;Hutter and Kriesi 2019) we do not consider "crisis" elections only, but rather extend the time period back and forth in time. This enables us to assess if changing issue patterns intensified or "normalized" ten years after the onset of the crisis, in relation to what predated them. ...
Did the crisis period influence party issue salience on the two main dimensions of conflict – economic and cultural – in Europe? How did this happen in terms of potential differences between Southern European countries, the most exposed to economic depression and austerity, and the rest of Europe? And what can we learn about all this when we look at the parties themselves and consider party-level determinants of issue salience? In answering these questions, this study investigates continuity and change in party issue salience over time, comparing Southern Europe with the rest of Europe between 2000 and 2018. Using manifesto data, we test hypotheses on the relevance of the economic crisis for issue salience in party competition and the intermediary role of party characteristics in one of the most turbulent areas of recent times. We show that in Southern Europe, during the Great Recession, the socio-economic cleavage contained the ascendance of a socio-cultural dimension and that party-level characteristics are important in conditioning responses to the crisis in terms of issue salience. To pursue the argument, we combine insights from saliency theory and accounts of party strategic adaptation.
