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The aim of this thesis is to analyse different forms of Industrial Policy (IP) in Norway and
Brazil to develop the Oil and Gas (O&G) supply chain, identifying the lessons and
contributions from the Norwegian experience. The evolutionist view of IP forms the
theoretical basis of the analysis, which is structured in three parts. The first two essays...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... going further in Sasson and Blongren (2011) analysis on these 2.500 firms, it should be mentioned, as it can be seen in the figure 3.2, suppliers responded for 388 billion Norwegian kroners in sales or almost 30% of the whole sales in the O&G industry in 2008. The importance of suppliers can be also noticed in the evolution of employment in the Norwegian O&G industry (Figure 3.3). We also outline that the employment in suppliers have a strong correlation with investment in the sector. ...
Similar publications
The aim of this thesis is to analyse different forms of Industrial Policy (IP) in Norway and Brazil to develop the Oil and Gas (O&G) supply chain, identifying the lessons and contributions from the Norwegian experience. The evolutionist view of IP forms the theoretical basis of the analysis, which is structured in three parts. The first two essays...
Citations
... Despite of all this positive internal and external environment, in the perspective of the policy makers, Norway still had a learning curve, with the industrial development of the oil industry. It had, for instance, challenges such as (MEDEIROS, 2016;NELSEN, 1991;ENGEN, 2002;NORWAY, 1980;RAMM, 2001;RYGGVIK, 2013) ...
... Brazil opened the market in 1997 and since then had already 13 concession rounds and one Production Share Agreement (PSA) round in 2013 for the pre-salt (giant oil reserves in ultra-deep water, discovered in 2006). Clauses for LC and for Research and Development (R&D) application in the country have been presented since the first concession round since in 1999, expecting to boost the technological development, training of the labour force, the generation of employment and income in the E&P of O&G (ANP, 2015;MEDEIROS, 2016). The LC legislation have been passing through changes, in an attempt to improve its effectiveness, e.g., stabilising minimum and maximum limits, global and specific requirements, a formula to measure, fines for non-compliance and even a system of certification, involving a third part (certifying companies). ...
... Besides this LC and R&D clauses many actions have been taking by the government, reinforcing the objective to develop the O&G supply chain in Brazil and related to (MEDEIROS, 2016): i) stimulus to form and develop clusters in five geographical areas; ii) internationalization of suppliers; iii) qualification of labour force in technical and tertiary level; iv) funding investments (CAPEX, OPEX) and R&D; Despite of not being able to fully evaluate the results of the policies and actions implemented by the Government, due to insufficient of data and studies/documents found, it could be identified the following positive facts in the O&G industry and its supply chain (MEDEIROS, 2016) problems in the industrial policies related to planning, execution, measuring the results and transparency, when stablishing targets, indicators and time horizon of the actions, e.g., for the internationalization of suppliers and for the development of shipbuilding industry, as it lacked objectiveness, feasibility, measurability and the results are not being made public in a systematic way; ii) the hundreds of millions of funds lifted with the application of fines, that the operators pay when not reaching the minimum or agreed LC goes to the federal government, without a defined destination, instead of staying in the sector to support the solution of problems in the supply chain 11 ; iii) too much detailed items that LC should be measured, and apparently not fully considering the real potential that the equipment or services have to be competitive one day; iv) the continuity to access some of the benefits of the policies do not be linked to the need to improve performance, as in general, but specially funding for the shipyards, and having as a reference international metrics (lack of stimulus to be competitive); v) lack of focus on the application of the R&D funds on technological results oriented to the market; vi) lack of adequate monitoring of the performance of the supply chain, evaluating the productiveness of the companies, in a way that facilitate identify more precisely which actions should be taken or reinforced, as in general, and per segments (MEDEIROS et 2015;MEDEIROS, 2016). Some of the main challenges that the suppliers of the oil industry are facing in Brazil, are similar to those that Norway had at the beginning of its oil industry, such as delays in the deliveries and cost overruns. ...
Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List stand out among the leading promoters of policies and actions focusing on industrial development, with their work in the 18th and 19th centuries, respectively, to accelerate the process of catching up for the United States and Germany. Since then, many other countries have implemented policies to develop its local industry. The country analysed here is Norway, which has been regarded worldwide as one of the best examples of success in implementing policies to develop the O&G industry. More than developing local oil companies, significant tax revenues to the Government, a giant petroleum fund and avoiding the Dutch disease/oil curse, Norway also managed to build up a broad and competitive O&G supply chain, with around 2.500 suppliers. Norway became a benchmark and a technological leader in several segments such as: subsea, drilling, seismic, offshore services and equipment. Another reason why this case is so emblematic is due to the short time in which Norway managed to build this whole industrial competence. It only started to produce oil at the beginning of the 70´s and the main or stronger policies instruments had to end when Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994. Not surprisingly, Norway became a reference for developed and developing countries in the attempt to manage oil resources and build a competitive local O&G industry, such as: Canada, Australia, South Africa, Uganda, Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Brazil. However, Norway still had a learning curve, with the industrial development of the oil industry. Some of the challenges that Norway had to overcome were: problems in the production of offshore equipment/structures, leading to delays and cost overruns; shortage of workforce; unproductive investments of the oil companies in the local industry and in the economy as in general; the bankruptcy of important local companies in different levels of the supply chain; and the fact that oil companies withdraw their application of rounds, because of excess of requirement and control of the authorities over the production of O&G. Some countries implementing policies to develop the O&G supply chain nowadays, such as Brazil and Mexico, are also facing similar difficulties as Norway had in the past. In this vein, the aim of this article is to withdraw some lessons from the Norwegian policies to develop the O&G industry, especially its supply chain. The main lesson that we believe that are still to be learned, from the Norwegian oil experience, is that it is possible to build a broad and competitive O&G supply chain, but it won´t be so easy to have again the internal and external favourable scenario, that was key to this success case. Therefore, we believe that the countries´ ambition with the policies to develop the O&G supply chain should be aligned with its potential to succeed, and for that a right perception of the international and internal environment status and changes is of high importance.
... Local content commitments are assumed long time before the acquisition of the products and services for the projects. The risk of cost overruns, delays, and low quality of products is a key consequence of the current policy, thus affecting the attractiveness of Brazil's oil and gas industry.Until April 2015 ANP has applied 86 fines for non-compliance of local content commitments, totalizing around US$ 90 million in fines(MEDEIROS, 2016). However, operators expect that the value of fines could be over a billion dollars, if current LC compliance methodologies are not modified. ...
Norway became a global reference for technology and innovation in the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry, serving as reference for other countries including Brazil, which do not wish to rely its wealth generation solely on the exploitation of these natural resources, (ABDI, 2011; Medeiros, 2016; Medeiros et al, 2016; Morais and Turchi, 2016). The objective of this
work is to analyse the innovation system in the O&G sector in Norway and Brazil, in order to withdraw lessons from the former to the later. Analysing from the past to the present, we believe that the Norwegian policies to develop the O&G industry and its innovation system has been more successfully than the Brazilian ones, especially as the oil industry in the Norway started decades later (70s), than it did in Brazil (40’s-50s). The innovation system in the O&G industry in Norway seems to be more complex and well developed than the Brazilian one, which apparently is still much centred in Petrobras, universities and research institutes, and less in suppliers and others actors. Among other findings, we
identified that there are higher number of patents awarded in the O&G innovation system in Norway, while the Brazilian one has more masters and PhDs related to the sector. Lastly, the research carried out suggests that there are more consolidated activities towards open innovation and sharing economy in the O&G sector in Norway, than in Brazil. We hope this work can contribute to stimulate more measures to boost the innovation O&G system in Brazil.
