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Utility function shapes for risk averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking individuals

Utility function shapes for risk averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking individuals

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Crowdsourcing has rapidly developed as a mechanism to accomplish tasks that are easy for humans to accomplish but are challenging for machines. However, unlike machines, humans need to be cajoled to perform tasks, usually through some type of incentive. Since participants from the crowd are typically anonymous and have no expectation of an ongoing...

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... measure of absolute risk aversion (Arrow 1971;Pratt 1964). This measure associates one of three risk attitudes with the curvature of an individual's utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, risk seekers have convex utility functions and risk averse individuals have concave utility functions, as illustrated in Fig. ...
Context 2
... Fig. 1, we can examine the ratio of DU(W), the change in utility (or value) of the increased reward and DW, the change in certain compensation, for different attitudes towards risk. This simplified view of the Arrow-Pratt measure states that for risk seekers, DU(W)/DW [ 1, for risk neutral individuals, DU(W)/DW = 1, and for risk averse ...

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... Si la fonction est linéaire, on dit que la personne reste neutre face au risque (« risk-neutral »). Si la fonction est concave, l'individu a une aversion au risque (« risk-averse ») et si la fonction est convexe, la personne est prône au risque (« risk-prone »), c'est-à-dire qu'elle préfère une récompense incertaine à une plus petite récompense certaine (Harris and Wu, 2014). La théorie de l'utilité espérée propose que ce paramètre soit compris dans la fonction d'utilité subjective qui donne les valeurs subjectives aux paris. ...
Thesis
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