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Updated version of the SORO pyramid (Tompkins 2013: 6).

Updated version of the SORO pyramid (Tompkins 2013: 6).

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While Unconventional Warfare (UW) remains a viable, low-cost method of indirect warfare, some of the assumptions underpinning traditional UW have diverged from reality in the last two decades. These include the idea that UW occurs mostly within denied areas; the categorisation of resistance movements into underground, auxiliary and guerrilla compon...

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... incorporates several assumptions inherent in modern UW doctrine, including the categorisation of resistance into underground, auxiliary and guerrilla components, the covert/overt dichotomy, and the notion that successful resistance must be built from the underground upward, progressing from psychological and political operations by clandestine underground cells, through auxiliary networks and increasingly violent covert activities, toward open warfare by mobile guerrilla forces. The pyramid was updated in 2013 under the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project to include a 'public component' that operates openly alongside the underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force (Figure 2) (Tompkins 2013: 6). ...

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... In order to clarify the different types of war in a contemporary security environment, as well as their basic characteristics, a number of scholars have attempted to define new types of war. In the literature we can find terms Unconventional war [6][7][8], Irregular war [5,9], Fourth Generation of War [10][11], Unrestricted War [12] Compound War [13] and Asymmetric War [14][15][16]. All this approaches of modern war in different ways are pointing at the blurring of subjects, objects and dynamics in contemporary conflicts. ...
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