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Two generative models. The left-side generative model embeds inference about hidden states given outcomes within a processing hierarchy with temporal depth (from Friston et al. 2017, p. 386). This means that it becomes possible to infer future outcomes based on actions yet to be selected by the agent. The right-side generative model is an illustration of a generative model that cannot function as a search plan, for it cannot perform inferences over how changing states in the future impacts on outcomes given action (from Parr et al. 2018, p. 3)
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The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the biological and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic) free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in approximate Bayesi...
Citations
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... Do agents really possess a model of their environment, or are they merely usefully modelled as such? These questions about realism and instrumentalism of cognitive constructs are interesting and have been extensively discussed in the recent literature on active inference (Colombo & Seriès, 2012;van Es, 2021), but these discussions are not our main focus. The framing of the agent as a modeller of its environment has also led to an important but rather long-winded debate about whether, and in what sense, free energy minimizing agents should be seen as utilizing generative models as representations of their environment (Clark, 2015a(Clark, , 2015bDołęga, 2017;Gładziejewski, 2016;Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018;Kirchhoff & Robertson, 2018;Williams, 2018). ...
The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... Do agents really possess a model of their environment, or are they merely usefully modelled as such? These questions about realism and instrumentalism of cognitive constructs are interesting and have been extensively discussed in the recent literature on active inference (Colombo & Seriès, 2012;van Es, 2021), but these discussions are not our main focus. The framing of the agent as a modeller of its environment has also led to an important but rather long-winded debate about whether, and in what sense, free energy minimizing agents should be seen as utilizing generative models as representations of their environment (Clark, 2015a(Clark, , 2015bDołęga, 2017;Gładziejewski, 2016;Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018;Kirchhoff & Robertson, 2018;Williams, 2018). ...
In this commentary, I first acknowledge points of common ground with the target article by Bruineberg and colleagues. Then, I consider how certain ambiguities could be resolved by considering spatiotemporal constraints on causality. In particular I show how blanket closure emerges from localized interactions between temporally separable subsystems, and how this points to valuable directions of future research. Finally, I close with a process note discussing the allegorical implications of the authors' creative title.
... Tschantz et al. (2020) simulate bacterial chemotaxis, and give an active inference interpretation. Three contributions to the present Topical Collection discuss E. Coli in an active inference context: Corcoran et al. (2020); Kirchhoff and van Es (2021); and Kiverstein and Sims (2021). Baltieri and Buckley (2019) argue that a certain kind of control process called Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control, which has been used to explain the behaviour of bacteria and amoebae, can be understood in terms of active inference. ...
... In their contribution Kirchhoff & van Es are interested in whether or not active inference can overcome what they call the universal ethology challenge (Kirchhoff and van Es 2021). Active inference can only unify biology and cognition if low-level biological systems are explained in terms of inference, but-so the challenge goesexplaining such systems does not require inference. ...
Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim—labelled mathematical, empirical and general—routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This paper is the Introduction to the Topical Collection “The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition”.
... In their contribution Kirchhoff and van Es (2021) are interested in whether or not active inference can overcome what they call the universal ethology challenge. ...
Over the last fifteen years, an ambitious explanatory framework has been proposed to unify explanations across biology and cognitive science. Active inference, whose most famous tenet is the free energy principle, has inspired excitement and confusion in equal measure. Here, we lay the ground for proper critical analysis of active inference, in three ways. First, we give simplified versions of its core mathematical models. Second, we outline the historical development of active inference and its relationship to other theoretical approaches. Third, we describe three different kinds of claim -- labelled mathematical, empirical and general -- routinely made by proponents of the framework, and suggest dialectical links between them. Overall, we aim to increase philosophical understanding of active inference so that it may be more readily evaluated. This is a manuscript draft of the Introduction to the Topical Collection "The Free Energy Principle: From Biology to Cognition", forthcoming in Biology & Philosophy.
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... • the boundaries of the mind , • the boundaries of living systems van Es & Kirchhoff, 2021), • the life-mind continuity thesis Kirchhoff & van Es, 2021;Wiese & Friston, 2021), • the relationship between mind and matter , while also offering (apparently) new insights on: ...
... Do agents really possess a model of their environment, or are they merely usefully modelled as such? These questions about realism and instrumentalism of cognitive constructs are interesting and have been extensively discussed in the recent literature on active inference (Colombo & Seriès, 2012;van Es, 2021), but these discussions are not our main focus. The framing of the agent as a modeller of its environment has also led to an important but rather long-winded debate about whether, and in what sense, free energy minimizing agents should be seen as utilizing generative models as representations of their environment (Clark, 2015a(Clark, , 2015bDołęga, 2017;Gładziejewski, 2016;Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018;Kirchhoff & Robertson, 2018;Williams, 2018). ...
The free energy principle, an influential framework in computational neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology, starts from the assumption that living systems ensure adaptive exchanges with their environment by minimizing the objective function of variational free energy. Following this premise, it claims to deliver a promising integration of the life sciences. In recent work, Markov Blankets, one of the central constructs of the free energy principle, have been applied to resolve debates central to philosophy (such as demarcating the boundaries of the mind). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we trace the development of Markov blankets starting from their standard application in Bayesian networks, via variational inference, to their use in the literature on active inference. We then identify a persistent confusion in the literature between the formal use of Markov blankets as an epistemic tool for Bayesian inference, and their novel metaphysical use in the free energy framework to demarcate the physical boundary between an agent and its environment. Consequently, we propose to distinguish between ‘Pearl blankets’ to refer to the original epistemic use of Markov blankets and ‘Friston blankets’ to refer to the new metaphysical construct. Second, we use this distinction to critically assess claims resting on the application of Markov blankets to philosophical problems. We suggest that this literature would do well in differentiating between two different research programs: ‘inference with a model’ and ‘inference within a model’. Only the latter is capable of doing metaphysical work with Markov blankets, but requires additional philosophical premises and cannot be justified by an appeal to the success of the mathematical framework alone.
Self-affirmation. Self-evidencing. Self-creation. Self-location and perspective. Body ownership and agency. Free will. The self as a good regulator. The self’s blankie. Subjectivity of self-models. Phenomenal content and phenomenal affect. Virtual reality, real suffering. The third revolution.
