Figure 3 - uploaded by Daniel A. Ovando
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Total biomass and quota in TURF 1 and 2 in our hypothetical state of nature with source sink dynamics (M2) and identical TURFs under Cooperative Game and Cooperative ITQ management institutions.
Source publication
Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), which allocate spatial fishing rights to fishers, are increasingly implemented in an effort to incentivize sustainable fishing practices. In some contexts, TURFs may be preferred over other rights-based approaches, such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). However, TURFs may not always achieve fishe...
Contexts in source publication
Context 1
... TURF 1 (Fig. 3). Though system-wide profits were maximized (the distribution is Pareto-optimal), this strategy left substantial amounts of biomass unfished in TURF 1. Under the assumptions of our model, trading occurred to achieve this distribu- tion of effort, but in reality the ability of the ITQ to achieve this optimal outcome will depend on the ...
Context 2
... suboptimal with respect to profits, but would not be equal. Through competition, TURF 2 still ended up with more quota than TURF 1, meaning that less quota would have to be purchased from TURF 1 by TURF 2 if this Cooperative Derby allocation were to transition to an ITQ than if initial allocation of quota were split evenly between the two TURFs (Fig. 3). This sug- gests that when transitioning to an ITQ in this scenario, a grandfathering allocation strategy may impose less of a transaction cost burden than would an equal initial allocation strategy. ...
Context 3
... the TURF provides an incentive not to overfish, improved efficiency reduces the standing stock of biomass in the system. There is an apparent balancing between the effects of efficiency and costs on biomass. We show that conditional on the state of nature, the ITQ institutions provide higher levels of biomass than the game-based institutions (Fig. 3). So, improving the allocation of effort among TURFs and resolving inter-TURF competition through the ITQ provides better conservation outcomes, but decreasing costs within an ITQ through efficient cooperative fishing may then drive biomass ...
Citations
... Despite the expansion of TURF systems worldwide researchers argue that they must meet very specific conditions to be successful, thus a combination of management systems or livelihood diversification strategies are often proposed (Ovando et al., 2017;Quynh et al., 2017). In theory, mixed TURF-aquaculture systems could provide the best of both worlds, economic benefits from aquaculture (Johnson et al., 2013) and socio-ecologic benefits from TURFs (Castilla and Defeo, 2001). ...
... Even in the context of rights-based fisheries, there are challenges to establishing strong and durable collective agreements that can achieve fishery sustainability benefits. These challenges include a lack of sufficient incentives; lack of leadership; market instability; lack of capacity and funding to organize, manage, and oversee collective actions; lack of trust or social cohesion; and the presence of outsider actors that threaten benefits [15,19,20]. ...
Voluntary collective agreements among fishermen can improve the environmental and economic performance of a fishery, particularly when local leadership, strong incentives, catch accountability, and operational support are in place. Rights-based fisheries, such as Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) systems, incentivize fishermen to act collectively to reduce fishing impacts, enhance stock health, and improve economic outcomes. However, developing cooperatives requires durable contracts, operational capacity, funding, and the ability to track, monitor, and enforce agreed-upon catches and fishing practices. This project focuses on the U.S. West Coast groundfish trawl IFQ fishery, and how the formation of a voluntary collective agreement, in the form of a bycatch risk pool (California Groundfish Collective), achieved improved fishery performance and other ancillary benefits. Up-front investment in the risk pool by a conservation non-governmental organization (NGO) provided both capacity and quota to cover transaction costs and incentivize transition to a cooperative model that was implemented across 5 ports and more than 48,000 km² of fishing grounds off California. The challenges encountered in developing and operating the risk pool offer insights into designing and implementing voluntary collective agreements. By using spatial fishing plans and technology for collecting and sharing catch information, risk pool members reduced bycatch of overfished species relative to the fleet at large. Risk pool members were also able to use their spatial fishing data to inform a seafood sustainability rating and propose areas for Essential Fish Habitat protection, their quota pounds to support collaborative research on overfished species, and their collective membership to advocate for policy.
