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The flow of TGP and partner switching Participants interacted with their partner in the Trust Game with Punishment (TGP). After interacting once (as the truster or the responder), the participant and the partner switched roles and interacted in the TGP again (order counterbalanced). After interacting with the same partner twice, once in each role, participants in the High Partner Choice condition decided whether they wanted to continue interacting with their current partner in the next TGP, or switch to a new partner. Participants in the Low Partner Choice condition were reminded that they would continue interacting with the same partner.
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Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. The...
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Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment for behaviors that harm the interests of groups with different reputations. However, conventional pairwise int...
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Fundamental frequency ( f o ) is the most perceptually salient vocal acoustic parameter, yet little is known about how its perceptual influence varies across societies. We examined how f o affects key social perceptions and how socioecological variables modulate these effects in 2,647 adult listeners sampled from 44 locations across 22 nations. Low male f o increased men’s perceptions of formidability and prestige, especially in societies with higher homicide rates and greater relational mobility in which male intrasexual competition may be more intense and rapid identification of high-status competitors may be exigent. High female f o increased women’s perceptions of flirtatiousness where relational mobility was lower and threats to mating relationships may be greater. These results indicate that the influence of f o on social perceptions depends on socioecological variables, including those related to competition for status and mates.
Negatively sanctioning cheaters promotes cooperation. But do all negative sanctions have the same consequences? In dyadic cooperation, there are two ways that cooperators can sanction failures to reciprocate: by inflicting punishment or withdrawing cooperation. Although punishment can be costly, it has been proposed that this cost can be recouped if punishers acquire better reputations than non-punishers and, therefore, are favored as cooperation partners. But the evidence so far is mixed, and nothing is known about the reputations of those who sanction by withdrawing cooperation. Here, we test two novel hypotheses about how inflicting negative sanctions affects the reputation of the sanctioner: (i) Those who withdraw cooperation are evaluated more favorably than punishers, and (ii) both sanctioners are viewed as less exploitable than non-sanctioners. Observers (US online convenience sample, n = 246) evaluated withdrawers as more cooperative and less vengeful than punishers and preferred withdrawers as a partner. Sanctioners were also viewed as more difficult to exploit than non-sanctioners, with no difference between punishers and withdrawers. The results were the same when punishment was costly (US college sample, n = 203) with one exception: Costly punishers, who lost their payoffs by punishing, were viewed as more exploitable than withdrawers. Our results indicate that withdrawing cooperation has advantages over punishing: Withdrawers are favored as cooperative partners while gaining a reputation as difficult to exploit. The reputational consequences of the three responses to defectors—punishing, withdrawing cooperation, and not sanctioning at all—were opposite to those predicted by group selection models.