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1: The eastern Baltic sea region at the turn of the 17th century. Source: Map drawn by Kasper Kepsu and Petri Talvitie.
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During the early modern centuries, gunpowder and artillery revolutionized warfare, and armies grew rapidly. To sustain their new military machines, the European rulers turned increasingly to their civilian subjects, making all levels of civil society serve the needs of the military. This volume examines civil-military interaction in the multination...
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This article explores media coverage of the European revolutionary turbulence of 1848, particularly the outbreak of the February Revolution in France. By analysing several European newspaper depositories, the article sheds light on the role of newspapers in the spread of revolutionary news in European media space across various political borders an...
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... which constituted only 3.33% of the campaign costs (1,443,458 dalers). 101 The former was to gain a lot from the conflict with Russia. 102 In the fall of 1621, when the royal treasury was short of money, Marshal Jacques de la Where did the Scandinavian state get the money for this? ...
Our article aims to deal with the costs of the war in Livonia between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden in 1600-1629. We want to answer several questions. First of all, can it be calculated? Do we currently have the materials that allow us to do this? Depending on the answers to the previous questions, we want to try to answer the following questions. How much money did both warring sides spend on the war in Livonia? How significant a burden were these amounts for these countries? Which side of the conflict spent more? Were there any breakthrough moments in these expenses? Did increased spending translate into successes in the war? What were the additional sources of financing for the conflict? Finally, what profits did the possession of Livonia generate for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden? Which side was able to make more use of this territory?
This article studies a previously unknown asset market in eighteenth-century Sweden. It emerged as a result of a partial default in 1719, when large amounts of recently released fiat coins were converted into government liabilities. These could only be redeemed as a customs duty on international trade, the licent . As merchants had to acquire such assets to conduct their trade, tens of thousands of transactions were carried out on a secondary market over a period of more than 45 years. Networks of local merchants bought assets from initial holders and sold them on to intermediaries or merchants, who deposited the liabilities with a newly established government agency, the Debt Office. Here, hundreds of account holders could transfer the value of their deposits between them. When a licent payment was due, the amount was deducted from the merchant's account. Prices on the liabilities were low and sometimes volatile, but the long-term trend was rising. We have distinguished three types of market participants: a small group of very active users, most of them professional dealers or brokers; merchants who traded on a regular basis as they needed to pay the licent , or when a favorable opportunity appeared; and finally, those who traded sporadically. The emergence of this market was part of a financial expansion that occurred in many European countries at the same time, the closest equivalent being the segmented default in France after the abolition of John Law's system. This study aims to broaden our understanding of eighteenth-century financial developments, which have rarely been studied in a semi-peripheral European economy.
The second half of the sixteenth century was a period of intermittent war for the fledgling Swedish empire. Intensive and protracted fighting on multiple fronts stimulated a steady growth in the size of the military establishment. At the same time, the rapidly developing art of war and Sweden's shift from local defence to overseas wars of conquest placed new requirements for the expertise and motivation of both officers and soldiers. As a result of these developments and in imitation of foreign precedents, the Vasa kings became increasingly dependent on foreign professional soldiers to augment domestic forces.
One of the most significant groups of military migrants were Scots who, thanks to both push and pull factors, rapidly became a staple of Swedish armies. A complex social network between the Swedish crown and Scottish military enterpreneurs formed, which became the engine for ongoing Swedish–Scottish military collaboration. By utilizing these connections, the Swedish crown was able to create a cluster of tried and tested officers to whom recruitment could be outsourced. For the Scots themselves, this network quickly became a means to gain information and experience and to find employment with the Swedish kings.
This chapter traces the creation, extension and sustenance of this long-standing Swedish–Scottish network from 1556 to 1610. We look at how key individuals were retained in service and integrated with the Swedish state and society, and why others were abandoned. Finally, we look at the turmoil caused by the dynastic struggles of the 1590s and show how the existing network nonetheless survived to the following century.
